71 So. 770 | La. | 1916
Statement of the Case.
Plaintiff brought this suit for the expropriation of a strip,of land, 30 feet wide, extending across a tract belonging to the defendants, fronting the Mississippi river and extending in the direction of the lake at a point about 7 miles above the city of New Orleans, the whole amount sought to be taken being 1.9 acres, for which a tender was made before suit of $237.50. Defendants deny the necessity for the expropriation, estimate the value of the land at $2,000, and demand $1,500 additional, by way of damages. The jury brought in a verdict for $237.50, as the value of the land, with “no damages,” and defendants have appealed.
The evidence abundantly shows that $100 an acre is a good price for the land in question, being $40 an acre more than it could have been sold for before the scheme for the building of the railroad was announced; it also shows that the road is an interurban enterprise; that the cars will be propelled by electricity; that it will be the only road that will traverse defendant’s property, and, instead of being an injury, will be an advantage thereto. In fact, defendant’s counsel, in his brief, barely refers to the amount of the award and devotes his attention to certain questions concerning the organization of the jury, to wit: That, though the Civil Code (article 2632) declares that “in impanneling the jury” (in an expropriation case) “either party may challenge for cause, * * * no peremptory challenge shall be allowed,” the Code of Practice (article 511) allows to each party four peremptory challenges, in civil cases, in general, in addition to challenges for cause, and, the Revised Statutes (section 592) declares that, “in case the Code of Practice should contain any provisions contrary or repugnant to those of the Civil Code, the provisions of the former shall prevail,” and hence that defendant should have been allowed four peremptory challenges which privilege was denied him.
Opinion.
Being asked whether he was a property holder in the parish, he answered, “No, sir.” He then testified that he lived with his wife upon certain premises in the parish; that the property stood in the name of his wife;
Unless the contrary is made to appear, the law presumes that married persons live under the rógime of the community, and that property acquired in the name of either is acquired as the property of the community. And we do not find that the confused testimony of Mr. Kerner rebuts those presumptions in so far as they apply to his marital relations; we therefore agree with the judge a quo that he was a good juror.
The judgment appealed from is accordingly affirmed.