Organon, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Organon, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
This matter comes before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed jointly by defendant Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Mylan”) and defendant Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Teva”) (jointly “Defendants”), for judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on plaintiff Organon Inc.’s (“Organon”) and plaintiff Akzo Nobel N.V.’s (“Akzo”) (“Plaintiffs”) complaint for patent infringement.
The issue posed by the instant motion, at its core, concerns the clash of equally valid and important legal rights: the rights of pioneer pharmaceutical patent owners to enjoy the exclusivity granted by patent law in return for their significant and costly innovations in the advancement of science, and the rights of generic drug manufacturers to enter the market and compete to sell generic equivalents of patented drugs after the patents have expired. 1 In this case, the clash comes before this Court because, shortly before expiration of Plaintiffs’ patent on Remeron (known generically as mirtaza-pine), Plaintiffs patented a new combined-use therapy of Remeron with a selective seratonin reuptake inhibitor (“SSRI”). 2 Defendants, meanwhile, had already begun developing generic mirtazapine upon the expiration of the Remeron patent.
It is undisputed that it would be perfectly legal for Defendants to sell mirtazapine if its ultimate use was prescribed by doctors (and filled by pharmacies) as a single drug therapy. It also is undisputed that a doctor who prescribed a combined therapy of generic mirtazapine and an SSRI would infringe Plaintiffs’ patent rights. Plaintiffs assert that the actions of Defendants in selling generic mirtazapine to pharmacies will result in the inability to protect their patent for the combined-use therapy because Plaintiffs will be unable to police a prescription written by a doctor and filled by a pharmacy for combined-use therapy
Defendants argue that they are merely selling a generic drug whose patent has expired; that they do not promote the generic for combined-use therapy; and that they take no steps to induce doctors or pharmacies to infringe Plaintiffs’ combined-use patent. Thus, Defendants assert, it is not proper to bar them access to the vast lawful market for other uses of mirtazapine simply because some doctors and pharmacists may infringe Plaintiffs’ patent rights. In sum, Defendants argue, the mere act of selling a bulk quantity of generic mirtazapine to pharmacies cannot constitute inducement to infringe without some other act encouraging doctors to infringe.
On December 3, 2001, this Court denied Mylan’s and Teva’s respective motions to dismiss, as premature, and ordered “that the parties proceed with focused discovery on the issue of whether Defendant knowingly took active steps to induce others to infringe Plaintiffs’ patent.” At the conclusion of this phase of discovery, Mylan and Teva 3 were permitted to file motions for summary judgment solely as to this claim, which, if dispositive, would render it unnecessary to reach the remaining claims.
I. BACKGROUND
This lawsuit is brought by Organon and Akzo pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which regulates the process to be used by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in approving new and generic pharmaceutical drugs. The Supreme Court has bemoaned the Hatch-Waxman Act’s inelegant draftsmanship,
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act and Applications for New and Generic Drugs
In enacting the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Before a pioneer pharmaceutical developer may market a new drug, it must obtain FDA approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). This requires submission of a New Drug Application (“NDA”), which must detail the composition of the drug and the research done to test the drug’s efficacy and safety. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). Because this application process is very long and expensive, the applicant for an approved NDA is granted an automatic five-year period of exclusivity to market that drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii). This is separate from any patent that the pioneer drug maker may already have, and runs concurrently. Thus, if a patent holder obtains FDA approval near the end of its patent term, it may extend the period of exclusivity by up to five years. This compensates the pioneer drug maker for the time spent doing the required testing for safety and efficacy, which in many cases takes up much of the patent term.
Although generic drug manufacturers must wait out the exclusive period granted to the pioneers, the process Hatch-Wax-man created for them to obtain FDA approval thereafter is far less arduous. They file an ANDA, 21 U.S.C. § 355®, which piggybacks on the pioneer’s research by stating that the compound is the bioequivalent of the previously FDA-approved drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(F);
see also Eli Lilly,
However, in order to protect the patent holders, a generic manufacturer who has benefitted from section 271(e)(1) must, if there is any unexpired patent on the drug identified in the ANDA, include a certification (known as a “Paragraph IV certifica
The § 271(e)(2) “infringement” is a “highly” artificial construct to create judicial jurisdiction.
Glaxo,
This scheme will not work, of course, if the holder of the patent pertaining to the pioneer drug is disabled from establishing in court that there has been an act of infringement. And that was precisely the disability that the new 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) imposed with regard to use of his patented invention only for the purpose of obtaining premarketing approval. Thus, an act of infringement had to be created for these ANDA ... proceedings. That is what is achieved by § 271(e)(2)-the creation of a highly artificial act of infringement....
Eli Lilly,
Not only does § 271(e)(2) create a cause of action, it also grants patent-holders an automatic thirty-month extension of exclusivity in the unpatented staple drug for which they have obtained a use-patent, by enjoining the sale of the generic for that long or until a court determines that there is no infringement, whichever is sooner. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). This creates a strong incentive to file suit against the ANDA filer because there is no disgorgement provision for profits earned during the thirty-month period of exclusivity if a court determines that the suit is without merit.
In yet another congressional effort to balance the effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Act creates what has been called a “bounty” for the first generic company to challenge these kinds of patents. In exchange for undertaking the legal challenge to clarify the application of the patent in court, the first generic company to file an FDA-approved ANDA (with a paragraph IV certification) is granted a 180-day period of exclusivity in relation to other generic manufacturers. 21 U.S.C. § 355Cj)(5)(B)(iv).
B. Mirtazapine
Mirtazapine is a tetracyclic antidepressant pharmaceutical compound that was disclosed and claimed in U.S. Patent No. 4,062,848 (“the ’848 patent”), which expired on June 14, 1998. The ’848 patent was at all times owned by an entity affiliated with one or both of the Plaintiffs. Mirtazapine, marketed as Remeron, 7 has primarily been used as a monotherapy to treat depression, or in combination with other (non-SSRI) drugs.
Organon owns New Drug Application (“NDA”) 20^415 for mirtazapine and its use in treating depression, which the FDA approved on June 14, 1996. This approval created a five-year period of exclusivity in the sale of mirtazapine, which expired on June 14, 2001, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(l)(D)(ii). Thus, Organon gained an additional three years of market exclusivity beyond that already created by the patent. The FDA approval only applies to the use of mirtazapine as a monotherapy, and does not apply to any combination therapy. In November 1999, plaintiff Akzo obtained a use-patent, numbered 5,977,099 (“the ’099 patent”), for the combination therapy of mirtazapine together with an SSRI. Plaintiffs have never sought FDA approval for the combination therapy, which Organon markets for “off-label” use. 8
In 1998 and early 1999, Defendants My-lan and Teva made their internal decisions to develop generic mirtazapine for placement in the market after June 14, 2001. These decisions were based on the price and quantity of sales of Remeron, using very basic data. Defendants knew that the drug patent had expired, and that the three extra years of exclusivity were coming to an end. There was a sufficiently strong market for Remeron to be worth the cost of producing it generically. At that time, the only patent on mirtazapine was the ’848 patent, which had just expired.
Later, in November 1999, plaintiff Akzo Nobel was granted the ’099 patent on the combination of mirtazapine with an SSRI. By this time, both Mylan’s and Teva’s development work was well underway. Defendants did not actually become aware of the ’099 patent for a substantial period of time after it was issued. An e-mail in February, 2001, between two high-level decision-makers for development at Mylan, evidences their newly acquired knowledge of the ’099 patent on that date:
Per today’s electronic Orange Book update, an additional patent granted to Akzo Nobel in 11/99 was listed making the product an immediate Paragraph IV opportunity. 9 It seems that the patent pertains to mirtazapine in combination with an SSRI which certainly does not appear to apply to our product?
I know we are extremely close to filing and prior to today, no one could file due to the NCE until 6/01. 10
How quickly can we file?
This email demonstrates the generic manufacturer’s state of mind that the new patent did not apply to Mylan’s product, and also indicates that, by the time the generic manufacturer learned of the Orange Book filing, the development period for the generic had been virtually completed and it was “extremely close to filing.” Mylan filed its ANDA with a paragraph IV certification very quickly thereafter and Plaintiffs responded by filing the first of these actions on May 4, 2001, against Mylan. 11 Numerous other generic companies also have filed ANDAs for mirtazapine, and Plaintiffs have sued each of them as well. 12
Plaintiffs allege infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), which states that “[w]ho-ever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Plaintiffs allege that, because doctors and pharmacists know that the generic products are the bioequivalent of Plaintiffs’ product, they will substitute generic mirta-zapine for Remeron for both unpatented uses and for the patented combination use. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, because Defendants know that doctors and pharmacists may infringe the ’099 use patent, the act óf taking lawful steps to sell their generic products in bulk to pharmacies constitutes an inducement to infringe. The result of such a legal conclusion would be to bar generics from the majority of non-infring
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), a motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
Substantive law controls the inquiry into which facts are “material.”
Anderson,
Finally, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedure for Patent Infringement Analysis
There is a two-step analysis for determining whether a patent has been infringed.
Glaxo,
There is no dispute in the present case that the ’099 patent claims the use of
B. Burden of Proof
In their brief and at oral argument, Plaintiffs argued that the burden of proof has been shifted to Mylan and Teva. Plaintiffs’ argument rests on the literal wording of § 271(e)(2) of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which states that it shall be an act of infringement to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification. This interpretation stretches § 271(e)(2) far beyond its statutory construction by the Supreme Court. As stated above, this “highly artificial act of infringement” was held by the Supreme Court to have been created by § 271(e)(2) purely as a jurisdictional construct to enable patentees to get into court quickly before a potentially infringing product gets out into the market.
Eli Lilly,
C. Inducement
“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). “ ‘Actively inducing,’ like facilitating, requires an affirmative act of some kind.”
Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., Ltd.,
1. Active Steps
Plaintiffs allege that the “active steps” to induce infringement of their patent are: 1) that Defendants filed an ANDA calling their product the bioequiva-lent of Remeron; 2) that Defendants considered the total sales data for Remeron in making their decision to develop a generic version, and continue to do so; 3) that Defendants will market their product as an across-the-board substitute for Remeron for all uses; and 4) that Defendants will offer their products at a lower price than Remeron.
Step 1: This act is the perfectly legal step of filing an ANDA, set forth by Congress as the proper means to proceed. The Hatch-Waxman Act tells Mylan and Teva that this is a correct way to develop a generic drug, and they followed the law.
Step 2: The second alleged “act” is not an act that might induce others to infringe, but rather potential evidence of intent, to be discussed below.
Step S: Plaintiffs have failed to point to any evidence in the record to support the third alleged act of inducement. While market practice evidence does suggest that Defendants will market generic mirtaza-pine to large pharmacy chains as an AB-rated bioequivalent of Remeron, this is the only realistic way to market their product at all. Obtaining the AB rating is a perfectly lawful step, created and regulated by the FDA. There is no evidence adduced by Plaintiffs that Defendants will advise any pharmacies (or anyone else) to substitute generic mirtazapine for combination use therapy with an SSRI. It is notable that Plaintiffs made the deliberate choice not to apply for FDA approval of their combination therapy. If they had chosen to apply for FDA approval, Plaintiffs could have differentiated their product from the generic product by a packaging insert and label stating Remeron’s approved use for combination therapy with an SSRI. The generic manufacturers could not have placed in their packaging inserts such an approved use, and generics would have had to file “little eight” statements to carve SSRI combination therapy out of their applications to make generic mirtaza-pine. Instead, Plaintiffs strategically opted to force the generic companies to file paragraph IV certifications, and thereby gain thirty extra months of exclusivity, rather than to differentiate their new patented use. Having chosen the path to thirty months of exclusivity rather than product differentiation, Plaintiffs cannot now claim that the resulting lack of product differentiation constitutes inducement of infringement. The ability to create product differentiation was solely within Plaintiffs’ power.
Step I: The fourth alleged act, price competition, is a legitimate method of competing in the marketplace, and is encouraged, inter alia, by Hatch-Waxman.
Apotex Corp. markets [generic] products to wholesalers, warehousing chains, mail order organizations and group purchasing organizations. It does not market any [generic] products directly to doctors. Apotex Corp.’s advertisements, which are placed in sales and marketing pharmaceutical 'journals, do not encourage any specific use for [the generic] drugs. Apotex Corp. has not researched off-label uses of gabapentin and has not funded any research on gabapentin or any professional meetings where doctors might discuss gabapentin and its uses. Moreover, plaintiffs own expert opined that doctors learn about off-label uses from professional meetings and conferences, formal studies, medical literature, case reports and discussions with colleagues, not from drug companies. In short, there are no facts to suggest that Defendants took any steps to encourage doctors to write gabapen-tin prescriptions for [the patented use].
Id. All of this is also true of Defendants Mylan and Teva with regard to mirtaza-pine. There is simply no evidence in the record upon which to prove to a reasonable jury that Defendants have taken, or will likely take, active steps to encourage others to infringe the ’099 patent. 15
2. Intent
The Federal Circuit has held “that proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,
Plaintiffs contend that the fact that Defendants used the total Remeron sales data in deciding to develop and market generic mirtazapine is evidence of their intent to benefit from infringing uses. Although this Court construes the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the record does not
Plaintiffs alternatively argue that this very lawsuit itself has provided Defendants with all the information they need to have the requisite intent to infringe: the existence of the patent, the data showing that a twenty-three percent of Remeron sales are made in combination with an SSRI,
16
and the discussions of the common practice of across-the-board substitution of generics. If Mylan and Teva did not know before, suggest Plaintiffs, they surely know now, so their decision not to discontinue their plan to sell the generic mirtaza-pine now is an act of infringement. This rather bold argument was wisely rejected in a case that was even further along its timeline, with the product already being sold and the doctors already prescribing it for the allegedly infringing use.
See Catapano v. Wyeth Ayerst Pharms., Inc.,
Here, the Court assumes, without necessarily finding, that Catapano’s allegation that “doctors, hospitals and others in the medical field” are using the vaccine for the purpose of immune system stimulation in violation of his patent is sufficiently specific to allege a claim for actual infringement against these anonymous non-party “doctors, hospitals, and others in the medical field.” However, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, Catapano’s complaint fails to allege that the Defendants specifically intend to encourage this behavior. Even if the Defendants are aware that doctors and hospitals are using the vaccine to stimulate patients’ immune systems in violation of Catapa-no’s patent, such knowledge alone does not suffice to hold the Defendants liable for inducement.
Id.
at 30 (citing, for the proposition that “mere knowledge that its customers use its products in the infringing manner does not demonstrate the requisite intent for claim of inducement,”
R2 Medical Systems, Inc. v. Katecho, Inc.,
Plaintiffs rely upon an unreported opinion from the Southern District of New York,
In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation
(opinion of July 6, 2001)(not identifiable by citation because it was not placed on Westlaw and Lexis where it could have
IV. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Mylan and Teva’s joint motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.
Notes
. That pioneer pharmaceutical patent owners require legal protection is without question. Congress has manifested its support for pharmaceutical patent owners by enacting stringent patent laws to encourage the significant lead-time in research and in resources required in creating potentially life-saving drug therapies.
. Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft are several examples of SSRIs. Basically, SSRIs are monoth-erapies for depression, as is mirtazapine. The difference, according to the Plaintiffs, is that when these are used in combination they not only treat depression more effectively, but also reduce the side effects that often occur when an SSRI is used alone.
. There are numerous other cases before this Court in which Organon has sued generic drug manufacturers for filing ANDA's to sell mirtazapine. This decision only affects Mylan and Teva. This is a fact-intensive inquiry, which must be considered on a case-by-case basis, following discovery with respect to each generic manufacturer.
. Achieving the balance between competing policies in this area is a matter most appropriately handled by Congress.
. It should be noted that there is some distortion between the plain language of this part of the statute and the practical realities faced by ANDA filers. The statute appears to require a paragraph IV certification only as to a patent which claims either the drug itself or
"a
use for such listed drug
for which the applicant is seeking [FDA] approval"
in the ANDA. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (emphasis added). At least one district court has interpreted this to mean that generic manufacturers filing an ANDA for an unpatented drug, which has a patented use for which they are not applying, need not file a paragraph IV certification.
See, Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.,
No. SA CV 02-40 DOC,
However, this "little eight” section expressly applies when the patent holder has sought FDA approval for the patented use. Thus, by promoting the patented use as an off-label use, and never seeking FDA approval, a patent-holder can, as a practical matter, prevent an ANDA applicant from filing a "little eight” statement. This should not matter with regard to the plain language of subsection viii, applying itself only to ANDAs for a patented drug or for a patented use
for which approval is sought,
but as a practical matter, it does. This is because the FDA requires a paragraph IV certification in the absence of a "little eight” statement where there is any patent at all relating to the ANDA. This practice has been upheld as a reasonable exercise of the FDA’s discretion.
See, e.g., Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Tommy G. Thompson,
As a result of this practice, holders of method-of-use patents can benefit by not seeking FDA approval for the patented use. By so doing, they force the generic manufacturers to file paragraph IV certifications, which then triggers the thirty-month extension that Hatch-Waxman adds to their period of exclusivity. (See further discussion, infra)
. Generic manufacturers determine whether there is a patent that may be applicable to their ANDAs by reference to the "Orange Book,” in which patent-owners list their patents in order to provide such notice. Despite that FDA regulations require that "[f]or patents that claim a method of use, the applicant shall submit information [to the Orange Book] only on those patents that claim indications or other conditions of use of a pending or approved [FDA-approval] application,” 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b), it is common for pioneers to list any and every patent they can obtain in the Orange Book so as to force generic manufacturers to file paragraph IV certifications. The FDA does not appear to have policed this practice.
. Remeron Is a trademark owned by Orga-non.
. A use can only be put in the drug's packaging insert if it is FDA-approved. However, it can lawfully be prescribed by doctors for off-label uses.
. The "paragraph IV opportunity” is a reference to the 180 days of exclusivity in generic marketing that may be obtained by being the first to file a paragraph IV certification.
. Without a paragraph IV certification, an ANDA cannot be filed until the exclusive period expires.
. The FDA tentatively approved both Defendants' ANDAs on January 15, 2002. As such, the pendency of these lawsuits (and the thirty-month stay created thereby) is the only barrier to the marketing of generic mirtazapine.
. These cases, consolidated for pretrial proceedings before this Court, are in the process of fact discovery.
. Indeed, Defendants argue that it is Plaintiffs who have a large corps of drug salespersons who visit doctors regularly and can most readily police their own patent.
. This hypothetical future inquiry was held appropriate in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Laboratories, Inc., 69
F.3d 1130, 1135 (Fed.Cir.1995) ("section 271(e)(2) makes it possible for a patent owner to have the court determine whether, if a particular drug
were put
on the market, it
would
infringe the relevant patent.”). While a recent district court decision held that this future inquiry cannot meet the case or controversy requirement when applied to
inducement, Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.,
. Although not required of them by law, Defendants have even offered, on the record at oral argument, to market their product as being solely for use as a monotherapy, which would sacrifice the significant portion of the market in which mirtazapine is combined with drugs other than SSRIs. Moreover, if evidence were later to develop that Defendants were marketing their product for combination use with an SSRI, Plaintiffs would not be estopped from suit for inducement of infringement at that time.
. Plaintiffs submit data which they urge should be construed to mean that twenty-three percent of all Remeron sold is combined with an SSRI. This data is not without flaws. It lists the drugs a doctor "mentions" in a particular visit. Thus, if a doctor treating a patient for depression suggests that the patient use either mirtazapine or an SSRI, both will be listed as "mentions,” and will count toward Plaintiffs' twenty-three percent figure, whether or not combination therapy is actually prescribed. It will also count as a "mention” if the doctor discusses it, but decides to prescribe no medicine or another medicine. Thus, the twenty-three percent figure is inflated. Nonetheless, the reasoning of this decision would not differ even if the data were to support an inference that twenty-three percent of the market for mirtazapine is in SSRI combination therapy, because seventy-seven percent of the market would still not be covered by any patent exclusivity.