197 P. 1085 | Or. | 1921
Lead Opinion
“And when any such common carrier shall have established and published its rates, fares, and charges, in compliance with the provisions of this section, it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any services in connection therewith, than is specified in such published schedule of rates, fares and charges as may at the time be in force.”
This cardinal principle of congressional legislation regulating interstate commerce has been maintained in one form or another ever since the beginning of the general government’s activities on the subject. It was repeated in the amendment of March 2, 1889, likewise in the act of June 29, 1906, and is a vital
“Under the interstate commerce act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide .by it, unless it is found by the commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or misquotation of rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more than the rate filed. This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination”: — citing numerous precedents from the Supreme Court of the United States.
This court has voiced the same doctrine in Baldwin Land Co. v. Columbia By. Co., 58 Or. 285 (114 Pac. 469), and Zoiler Hop Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 72 Or. 262 (143 Pac. 931, 8 N. C. C. A. 64, note). A fair statement of the rule is found in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Harris in Black v. Southern Pacific Co., 88 Or. 533, 537 (171 Pac. 878):
“Neither the shipper nor the carrier is bound by the rate actually paid because the shipments are necessarily controlled and governed by whichever published rate is applicable to the shipment.”
The tariff admitted by the answer in the instant case to be in force at the time the shipment was made was introduced in evidence, from which we learn that
Upon being applied to by the defendant for a rate on the shipments before they were made, the “plaintiff advised defendant that it would establish a rate for the transportation of rock between said points, of three and three-fourths cents per hundred pounds, said rate to apply upon government weights, subject to minimum weight of ten per cent less than marked capacity of car used, and that such government weights, subject to such minimum, would be used in arriving at freight charges.”
But the fact is, as disclosed by the evidence, that this amended rate was not filed until long after the shipments were made.
As to the demurrage, the stipulation, after reciting the Pacific Northwest Demurrage Bureau tariff and the defendant’s admitted agreement entered into in pursuance thereof, goes on to say:
“There accrued on said basis three hundred twenty-two demurrage debits and one hundred and four de-' murrage credits, leaving a balance of two hundred eighteen demurrage debits, and eight days’ excess demurrage, which, according to the terms of aforesaid agreement, produced for said month of June, 1915, a total demurrage charge against defendant of two hundred twenty-six ($226) dollars, no part of which has been paid to plaintiff, although demand has often been made against defendant therefor. Plaintiff, on its part, has performed all of the conditions of said contract, and there is due and owing from defendant to plaintiff the said sum of two hundred twenty-six ($226) dollars.”
This stipulation concludes the defendant on the count for demurrage.
“Those ends cannot be met otherwise than by requiring transportation to be paid for in money which has a certain value known to all and not in commodities or services or otherwise than in money.”
In the case of Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (55 L. Ed. 297, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 671), Mottley had received injuries in a collision on the railway company’s line, and in settlement thereof, made before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Law indeed, the company had agreed to furnish Mottley and his wife annual free transportation for themselves over its lines. The court held that the Interstate Commerce Law put the stamp of disapproval upon that contract, although
For these reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.
Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.
Denied October 11, 1921.
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
Rehearing Denied.-
For the petition, Messrs. Teal, Minor S Winfree.
Contra, Mr. A. C. Spencer, Mr. Blaine Halloch, and Mr. W. A. Bobbins.
The defendant complains, in substance, in its petition for rehearing, that it was denied the privilege of showing how many cars of those which carried all its shipments of rock from
Whatever was the actual net avoirdupois weight of the shipments, the element of minimum weight marked capacity, appearing as it does in the tariff filed with the interstate commerce commission, would control this. For example, if the minimum marked capacity of a car was 80,000 pounds and it was loaded with hut 70,000 pounds, the calculation would be on the basis of 80,000 pounds; while if the car was loaded with 100,000 pounds, the computation of freight would be on the latter figure. Having stipulated that the calculation was made on the basis re
The petition for a rehearing must be denied.
Rehearing Denied.