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Oregon State Police Officers' Ass'n v. State
918 P.2d 765
Or.
1996
Check Treatment

*1 25, 1995, OSPOA, Arguеd judgments and submitted October of the circuit court in Tissue, affirmed; judgment and Morgan SPEU reversed and remanded instructions; 21, 1996 with otherwise June affirmed OREGON STATE POLICE OFFICERS’

ASSOCIATION, Oregon Federation of and Parole Probation Officers Oregon Employees, and Association Corrections

Respondents, v. OREGON,

STATE OF Appellants.

(CC (Control)) 94C-14019; SC S42333 TISSUE,

Richard S. Swann, LaRhette Darrell Wells Garry McCorkle, and Respondents, v. OREGON, OF

STATE by through and Oregon State Correctional Institution Employee and Public Retirement Board,

Appellant, and PORTLAND SCHOOL 1J, DISTRICT NO.

Beaverton School District No. City and School District No. Defendants-Respondents.

(CC 94C-13963) Dawn MORGAN, Logan Michael Cullivan, Ann Ferderber, Paul and Respondents, and Sterling WILLIVER, Bruce Prunk and Hatch, Alice

Plaintiffs, v. OREGON,

STATE OF and Vocational through Oregon Division; through Rehabilitation Corrections; Oregon Department Education, Board of Higher State through Portland, City Appellants, *2 KLAMATH COUNTY and Deschutes County,

Defendants. S42511) (94-12-08563; SC UNION, POLICE EMPLOYEES SALEM Miller, Locke and Jim Terry Respondents, v. SALEM,

CITY OF Appellant.

(CC S42355) 95-C10338; SC

918 P2d 765 *4 Reynolds, Attorney Michael D. Assistant General, Salem, argued appellants Oregon the cause for State of and Public Employees Retirement Board. With him the on briefs were Kulongoski, Attorney Virginia Theodore R. General, and L. Linder, General, Solicitor Salem. Meng, Deputy City Attorney,

Linda Chief Portland, argued appellant City the cause and filed the briefs for Portland. City Attorney, argued Blair,

William Assistant Salem, G. City appellant the cause for of Salem. With him on the brief Stephanie Smythe, City Attorney, Salem. Daryl Hoag, Garrettson, S. Garrettson, Goldbert & Fen- argued rich, Portland, the cause and filed the brief for respondents Oregon State Police Officers’Association, Fed- Oregon eration of Parole Officers, and Probation Association Employees, Employees’ Corrections Salem Police Terry Union, Locke, and Jim Miller.

Gregory Reynolds Hartman, A. of Bennett, Hartman, & argued Wiser, Portland, respondents the cause and filed the brief for Morgan, Logan, Cullivan, Dawn Michael Ann and Paul Ferderber. With him on the brief were James S. Lory Kraut, Coon and J. Portland. Coon, Swanson,

James S. & Coon, Portland, Thomas argued respondents the cause for Richard Tissue, LaRhette Garry Swann, Wells, S. Darrell McCorkle. With him on Gregory Lory the brief were A. Hartman and J. Kraut, Portland. Hager Osborn, Miller, Nash,

John W. Weiner, & Carl- appearance defendants-respon- sen, Portland, waived 1J, dents Portland School District No. Beaverton Dis- School Oregon City trict No. School District No. 62.

360-a Rosenthal, of & Greene, P.C., Elden M. Rosenthal Portland, filed a on Braun, Richard H. brief behalf of amicus curiae Benefits Committee. J. HOOMISSEN,

VAN Fadeley, opinion. J., concurred and filed an specially part Gillette, J., concurred in and dissented in opinion, and filеd an Carson, J., which C. and Graber, joined. J.,

360-b *6 HOOMISSEN,

VAN J. question presented by appeals these four any part cases is of consolidated whether Ballot Measure 8 (1994)1impairs obligation plaintiffs’ Employes’ an Public (PERS) System Retirement contract with their employers I, in violation of the Contracts Clause of Article 10, section States Ballot United Constitution.2 Meas adding ure 8 amended the Constitution three sec (six tions to Article EX.The percent pick-up), held circuit courts that sections 10 (sick (guaranteed return), 11 Article EX rate and 12 credit) of leave violate federal Contracts agree. 11, Clause. We We hold that sections 12 of 10, Article EXviolate the Contracts Clause of the United States Accordingly, Constitution. we 10, 11, declare sections and 12 void.3 The circuit 11, courts’ declarations that sections (Ballot 8)

and Contracts Clause are and Or of Article EX Measure violate the federal question on a

determinations of law Ragsdale Dept. are reviewable de novo.See v. Rev., 321 (1995); Oregonian 216, 217, P2d 1348 v. Post Publish (1974). ing Co., 214, 222, 268 Or 519 P2d 1258 appeals This court’s resolution these involves few relevant facts: enactment of Ballot Measure concerning public employees,4 statutes sector and the exis- bargaining agreements employment tence of collective political customs between the state5 and its subdivisions and employees thereof. Those matters are discussed below. *7 1 reproduced appendix opinion. The text of Ballot is Measure 8 in the to this 2 I, 10, 1, provides Article section of clause the United States Constitution in part: * * * * * * pass impairing Obligation “No shall State Law of the Contracts!.]” 21, I, Oregon prohibition. Article section of the Constitution embodies a similar 3 justices Employes’ All the of this court are members of Public Retirement (PERS). System Thus, justice may each in have some financial interest the out Notwithstanding, necessity” come of these cases. the “rule of authorizes this court adjudicate Hughes Oregon, 1, 2, these claims. See v. State 314 Or 5 n 838 P2d (1992). 1018 4 legislative session, After the 1995 PERS statutes were recodified. Citations opinion the PERS statutes this are to the force at statutes were in the time approved people. Measure 8 was 5 opinion, employers When we use word “state” in this we refer to all parties that are these cases. 362 on cross motions for sum-

These cases were resolved Oregon mary judgment.6 Police In State Association Officers’ (OSPOA), plaintiffs challenged Oregon 10, sections v. State of granted plaintiffs’ The circuit court motions for and 12. 11, summary judgment all three sections on their claims that judgments Contracts Clause and entered violate the federal accordingly. (Tissue), plaintiffs Oregon v. chal-

In Tissue State of granted plaintiffs’ lenged only 12.7The circuit court section summary judgment their claim that section 12 on motion for judgment Clause and entered the federal Contracts violates accordingly. plaintiffs Morgan Oregon (Morgan), v. State of only City

challenged filed a cross- section 10. The of Portland indemnity asserting against state, state claim for city might any liability responsible incur as a result for is granted plain- passage of Measure 8. The circuit court of the tiffs’ motion for tion 10 summary judgment on their claim sec- granted Clause, violates the federal Contracts summary judgment City on its Portland’s motion for judgment indemnity against state, and entered claim accordingly. City Employees Salem Union v. In Salem Public

(SPEU), challenged plaintiffs 11, and 12.8 The 10, sections summary judg- granted plaintiffs’ court motion circuit that all three violate the federal ment on their claims sections judgment accordingly. entered Contracts Clause and constitutional, statutory, challenged Measure 8 on various Plaintiffs Ballot opinion only plaintiffs’ grounds. claim that Ballot law This addresses and common Clause, the basis for the federal Contracts because that was Measure 8 violates summary judgment in each of these cases. (1996) Atiyeh Oregon, Educa- 323 Or 918 P2d 795 v. State of (1996) challenges Keisling, P2d 803 also involve v. 323 Or tion Association majority’s light grounds. In the result in these Measure 8 on other to Ballot cases, this date as moot. those two cases are dismissed consolidated Disability and belongs the Portland Fire and Police Plaintiff Cullivan system. (FPDR), FPDR of the PERS retirement Plan which is Retirement City Portland. authorized the Charter of the represents bargaining that SPEU unit Plaintiff Miller is not a member bargaining unrepresented issues. with collective and he is otherwise connection

363 over These of the federal disputes applicability Contracts Clause arise from the different markedly parties’ view of law pension contract that Oregon regarding PERS that state contends the circuit courts represents.9 erred in that declaring 10, 11, sections and 12 the fed violate eral Clause. Contracts the state that Although acknowledges return, six rate of percent pick-up, guaranteed and sick are, leave or been, сredit at least have terms of the PERS con tract, the argues state that those contractual attach promises only for already performed work and that the state may mod or ify unilaterally even eliminate all of entirely any or those terms The state prospectively.10 relies on v. primarily Hughes State 314 1,Or Oregon, (1992), P2d 1018 arguing this court in Hughes construed law Oregon pension by recog nizing concept new and future “accrual” past, present, retirement benefits permits the state unilaterally and to reduce prospectively retirement benefits that it offered and that were its accepted either when employees, they first commenced work at a time thereafter.

Plaintiffs that, respond Oregon law, under pension the state has entered permanent into obligations contractual to them with to the six respect percent pick-up, guaranteed rate return, and sick leave credit. Plaintiffs further argue plan PERS is a statewide benefit defined retirement that is administered Employes’ Employes’ trustee Public Retirement Board. ORS ch 237. The Public (PERF) express statutory fund, separate Retirement Fund is an trust and distinct (“The 237.271(2) from the state’s General Fund. ORS 237.271. See ORS State of Oregon public employers and other that make fund contributions to the have no proprietary them”); interest the fund or in the contributions made to the fund (1969)(the Straub, 507, 521-22, 451 Sprague see v. also 252 Or P2d 49 state has no PERF). proprietary interest The State holds Treasurer the PERF as a mere cus managed by todian. PERS investments are 293.701et tributions of Council. Investment ORS seq. paid by Benefits PERS are funded from three sources: con (either employees’ paid by employers withheld from salaries or on behalf employees); employer contributions; earnings from the investment those adopted, adequate funds. At pay the time Measure 8 was the PERF had in PERS. funds to accruing all retirement benefits accrued Oregon legislature peo The 1995 established a different level of benefits for ple January 1, 1996. begin employment who their on or after Or Laws ch guaranteed higher age, 654. It That level called Tier Two. has a normal retirement no investments, pay benefits, return on no use ofvacation to increase disability by any payments compen offset retirement benefits are from workers’ sation. employed do not The 1995 amendments affect the benefits of PERS members 1, 1996. January before plaintiffs vested when or con- obligаtions accepted that those they may and that not be modified or ter- tinued employment unilaterally during *9 minated detriment the full plaintiffs their service careers.11 Plaintiffs public employment term of a also that the of unilateral contract have prerequisites argue the the already and that state has received benefit of accrued the rely on state’s Plaintiffs promises. primar- their reliance Bd., 445, v. Mult. Co. Sher. Ret. 265 Or 510 ily Taylor Dep. on (1973). P2d 339 the under federal

Analysis parties’ argument first, Contracts Clause this court to determine: requires there is contractual between relationship plain whether state; so, tiffs if the nature of the contractual second, and third, that have been whether a allegedly impaired; promises (here a constitutional of provision) impairs any state law if and, so, contractual whether promises impair those fourth, if the state “substantial”; so, ment is and whether law aby the substantial is impairment justified signifi creating and the method legitimate purpose cant and whether the state to constitutes public purpose used advance unnecessarily an broad of its contractual repudiation obliga Romein, v. Corp. tion to General Motors private persons.12 11 context, of‘Vesting” point concept refers in time which In this after working particular rights, they stop lose even if in a cov cannot benefit position. ered 12 opening The state’s brief asserts: exists, not case if state does in this that if a contract “The contend contract, impairment impairs that does 8 is not substantial. Nor

Measure the state light significant argue Hughes in the that Measure 8 advances such that, legitimate public purposes should the court conclude Measure 8 rights, impairment justified.” impairs is contract nevertheless 1505, Jersey, 1, 25-26, Trust Co. 431 US 97 S Ct 52 L Ed See United States v. New (1977) (“The subsequent 2d Contract is not an absolute bar to modifica 92 Clause obligations obligations. impairing tion private essary complete Aswith laws of a State’s own financial contracts, impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and nec an standard, however, important public purpose. applying an this to serve necessity legislative deference to a assessment reasonableness entity governmental appropriate self-interest is at A because State’s stake. money, always especially a use for taxes do not have to be can find extra when obligations spend financial it wanted to raised. If a State could reduce its whenever regarded important public purpose, the money what it as an Contract all”) (footnote omitted)). protection provide no at also Richard A. would See Clause Epstein, 703, Clause, the Contract L Rev Toward Revitalization 51 U Chi * * * (1984) repudiate unilaterally (arguing “[t]o allow a state its contracts very is to of factual coalition contract clause was invite abuses that the 181, 186, 112 1105, 117 503 US S Ct L Ed 328, (1992); 2d Assoc, Bituminous Coal v. Keystone DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 504, 1232, 107 S Ct 94 L Ed 2d 472 (1987); Energy Reserves Inc. v. Kansas Power & Group 400, 459 US Light, 411, 103 697, S Ct 74 L Ed 2d 569 (1983); United States Trust 1, Co. v. New 431 US Jersey, Ct 52 L Ed 2d S (1977). den 431 US 975 See reh’g Tribe, Laurence H. Ameri (2d 1988) Law, can Constitutional 613-28 ed fed (discussing eral Contracts Clause); see also R. Rotunda and Nowak, J. (3d 1992) (sum 2 Treatise On Law, Constitutional 15.8 ed § cases). relevant marizing United States Supreme Court The consolidated cases on do not come appeal to this court a clean slate, on without or case principle law guide Rather, us. these cases call for a straightforward application of well-established case law. In order to understand the essential underpinnings law, it is instructive *10 review cases: following In v. Teachers’ Ret. Fund Ass’n, 77, 164 Or Crawford (1940), P2d 729 a retired school teacher to sought

compel payment of an annuity she claimed due her on retirement. The defendant refused to pay the annuity, that, arguing because the by-laws the association had been amended after the retired, teacher had she was required more for the same pay benefit. The defendant that, conceded retired, before she the teacher had the amount paid required under the by-laws. former In court, the trial affirming which had ruled in favor of the teacher, this court recognized “contractual relations” had been created between the parties: there “[W]hen had been full performance on the part * * *

plaintiff, her rights became vested subsequent and no change, by-laws in the could interfere with or impair such rights. Any utterly other rule would destroy stability all security in the plan[.] retirement fund designed prevent, every repudiation provide for we can be that almost sure will others”). groups expense benefits to some at the In personal November the state $157 refunded about million to income taxpayers gave corporate tax $166 credits of about million to income and excise taxpayers respect obligations pursuant with to their 1995 income tax to ORS (2 statute). percent surplus 291.349 “kicker” “** * by continuing teacher, The in the service and making accepted fund, has, effect, contributions to the through governmental agencies, State, the offerofthe its * * * annuity pay upon age. [We an retirement at a certain dealing] rights payment are with the of an annuity provided anof for under the terms of the statute * * * part whichbecamea ofthe contract. it, Aswe view the might mere fact that of the fund consist of contribu- tions the schooldistrict wouldnot refute the idea ofcon- relationship. tractual great opinion expressed ‘While there is a differenceof question the courts relative to the as to whether a plans acquired teacher under similar retirement fund has * * rights authority *, vested we think the trend ofmodern and the better-reasoned cases are to the effectthat contrac- upon performance that, tual relations are created and by by subsequent legislation full rights impaired annuitant, accrue which cannot be * * (citations *[.]”164Or at 86-88 omitted). employer may did not decide whether an unilater-

Crawford ally during employ- alter the terms of the retirement formula respect employee already ment, with to services that the has performed. question Harryman This court answered that Roseburg District, v. Rural Fire Prot. 244 Or 420 P2d 51 (1966). Harryman, fireman commenced work under a pay retirement rule that said he was entitled to receive for unused sick retirement if authorized leave on system employer, accept and that unused sick would pay calculating leave as the basis for the retirement benefit. employer’s provision follows: sick leave credit was as (1) day days, per up month, On

“One Cash *11 Termination.” employer unilaterally

During employment, the fireman’s previous revoked its authorization for sick leave credit on employer argued trial, retirement. At that the allowance gratuity and, credit on retirement was a there- for sick leave right the fireman had credit was ter- fore, whatever provision. employer its sick leave minated when revoked rejected argument: This court “When plaintiff entered his upon employment with defen- dant he was advised that he would receive an allowance for accumulated sick upon leave termination of employment. He accepted employment upon the assumption allowance for sick leave was a part comрensation of his for services. Since it was a of the inducement to accept employment, it can regarded be as a contractual term of plaintiffs employment. not, Defendant could therefore, deprive plaintiff of the allowance after he had earned it.” (footnote omitted). 244 Or at 634-35 this court affirmed the Accordingly, trial court’s for judgment the fireman.

In Adams v. Schrunk, 6 Or 580, 488 App P2d rev (1971), den the Court of Appeals applied Harryman. The employer attempted to amend its retirement after the plan plaintiffs had commenced their employment as policemen by altering, plaintiffs’ detriment, an rule existing govern ing the calculation of the period of service for required retire ment. The question in Adams was whether the plaintiffs would credit get for their temporary service before their per manent appointments. The Court of Appeals concluded that the employer could not amend the unilaterally rule after the plaintiffs had commenced service so as to cut off their right have their temporary service included in their eli computing gibility for retirement. The Court of Appeals, Craw citing ford, noted that Oregon rejected had the gratuity theory pension contracts: ‘We conclude therefore city that the could not the adoption of the amendment of 1949 cut off right ofthese

plaintiffs, who were then and at all times since have been permanent officers, to have included the period of their prior temporary service in computing their eligibility for retirement.” 6 Or atApp 587-88.

Thus, Adams, the Court of Appeals as recognized, Craw- not, had that a contractual right could be established ford before the completion service for a necessary pension. ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‍Taylor, Or at 450-51, this court specifically approved holding Adams that a contractual right could be estab- lished before the completion of the service necessary pension. *12 the case on which Taylor, plaintiffs primarily rely

In matron asserted that she for inclusion here, jail qualified retirement for sworn County’s plan personnel. Multnomah Multnomah amended its claim, County plan to her response the definition of a covered and to employee, to delete former from the new definition. The sued plaintiff omit matrons jail in the retirement the to include her county original to compel This court stated: plan. theory gratuity to advocate the of

“Somе states continue the the pensions largess came from of pensions. Originally, increasing An recipient and the had no vested interest. king abandoning are this rationale and are number of courts theory upon pension a contract which looks as adopting promised delayed compensation the but part employee’s of job. Today, probably of his it can be said performance for the theory generally accepted compensation that the is that of acquire it for an a ‘vested’ possible employee and that [A]nnotation, right pen See “Vested right pension. to a 2d, McQuillin, 437; Municipal 52 ALR pension,’ sioner ed, 3rd 12.144. Corporations, § rejecting the the

“Oregon joined gra- has ranks of those theory and has held that contractual tuity pensions the rights pension to a can be created between employer.” Taylor, (citing Crawford, the 265 Or at 450 man). Harry Adams The court concluded: Taylor only the contractual

“Oregon adopted concept has also, but, concept rights that contractual can pensions, necessary of the to a prior completion arise service * * * course, subject, are to subse- rights Such pension. necessary quent completion of service.

“* * * was an offer for a adoption pension plan accepted by an can be contract. Such offer unilateral performance. tender of

* * * * * “* * accep- s tender of the contributions and [P]laintiff to revoke power terminated defendants’ plan tance offer, would be entitled to the benefits of plaintiff if she continued to plan requisite period work for necessary for retirement.” Id. at 451-54.

The court held that the tender of plaintiffs part performance furnished consideration for the contract. Under Taylor, par- tial performance by employee limited employer’s to revoke the offer of a power retirement plan. Accordingly, because the under that when plaintiff qualified she first plan work, went to she was entitled to be included in the original *13 plan.

The issue that legal Taylor decided was what employee response was to make the offer required of a retire- ment plan binding. court’s answer was “tender of per- formance.” After there partial performance, was no question that a contract existed. Partial performance prеvented the its employer revoking subsidiary promise not to revoke the retirement plan was offered when performance com- menced. In Rose City Transit v. City Portland, 271 Or 588, (1975),

533 P2d 339 court, this Taylor, held that citing of a adoption pension plan is an offer for a unilateral contract. The court also noted that

“[p]ension plans, disability benefits, and health insurance ** extremely important are today to all fact, workers *. In taxes, because of tant than salaries or such benefits impor- could become more

salary increases.” 271 Or at 595. In McHorse v. Electric, Portland General 268 Or 323, 331, 521 P2d 315 (1974), this court stated:

“[I]n the situation where the employee has satisfied all con- precedent ditions to becoming eligible for benefits under a plan, the better reasoned is that the employee view has a vested to the right benefits. This employer’s view sees the plan as an offer to the employee which can be accepted employee’s continued employment, employ- such ment constitutes promise.” underlying consideration for the

In Gantenbein v. PERB, 33 Or 309, 576 P2d App 1257, rev den 282 Or (1978), the Court of Appeals recog- nized that follows the rule that retirement benefits acceptance employment. the time Id. at become vested at Taylor). explained: (citing The court accepts “Taylorsimply employe holdsthat an who an initial rights plan contractual under retirement offerhas vested plan put offer cannot be altered a second into which accepted by plan the initial has been effect after original). employe[.]” (emphasis Id. at 316 Bryson App 27, 30, v. Or 607 P2d 768 PERB, (1979), (1980), Appeals rev den 289 Or 107 the Court stated: statutory question petitioner

“[I]t contractual at any is without has computed right retirement benefits to receive applicable in effect the most favorablerate under laws at judicial Taylor.) during (Citing time his service.” Finally, Hughes, pri the case on which the state marily interpreted tax statute here, relies this court a state impairment challenge I, Article in the context of an under Oregon Constitution, section to determine whether (1989) legislative amendments to ORS 237.201 former 316.680(1)(d) (1989) impaired the state’s contractual former Hughes obligation that, held to members PERS. pension that the amendments affected benefits relat extent *14 existing ing pre-existing at work, the tax statute issue pro obligations impaired contract, the state’s which the of accruing Hughes, 314 Or accrued and benefits forever. tected obligation Hughes held that the contractual at 36. also per to be in that сase did not extend to benefits for work state accordingly, the state could in the future and that formed impairing modify the of those without its treatment benefits Tay Hughes specifically obligation contract. Id. reaffirmed of analysis holding respect Oregon pen earlier with lor’s Id. at 20-21. sion law. wrongly plaintiffs argue Hughes

The Tissue that Although interpretation of this court. this court’s decided open Hughes exemption it is criticism, is the tax statute in of that case. the law Hughes, that PERS is a con- this court reaffirmed employees, and that the state and its

tract between obligations employment gives that rise to certain contractual

371 protected are Id. at state federal constitutions. 17- recognized may Hughes 21. The gate mally, general court that the also state obli- contractually private that, itself individuals and nor- govern

principles inquiry. of law contract Importantly, Hughes recognized, Id. at 14. in dictum, albeit binding obliga- that the state could undertake contractual may tions with its to include benefits that accrue yet performed. in the future work Id. at 28.13 not for running through Oregon The common thread may binding cases cited above is that state undertake obligations employees, including contractual with its benefits may yet performed. accrue the future work not recognize pension plan Moreover, the cases that the PERS is accepted by an offer for a unilateral contract which can be part performance by employee. tender of line majority jurisdictions of cases consistent with of have considered the issue and also is consistent with the pensions. jurisdictions of modern view the nature of Most adhering theory pensions pension to a contract of construe rights acceptance employment proba- on to vest of or after a tionary period, vesting only encompassing per- with not work yet begun.14 formed but also work that has not Having para- examined case relevant and the law Oregon pension provisions meters of law, we now turn to the at issue in these noted, cases. As the state does not contend

13 opening The state’s brief asserts: “Indeed, knowledge promises it is common that the state makes such in its bargaining agreements, negotiated generally every years, collective two which yet promises performed, performed during include for work but to be period bargaining agreemеnts.” of the collective (1965) See, e.g., Copins, (holding Yeazell v. 98 Ariz P2d 541 that a legislative prospectively amendment increased contributions was contract); Omaha, impairment City an unlawful see v. also Calabro 247 Neb (1995); Faculty College Pennsylvannia, State NW2d 541 Assoc v. 505 Pa 369, 479 (1984); City 356, 607 Singer Topeka, (1980); A2d 962 v. 227 Kan P2d 1980) (D Dannemann, Supp (applying Marvel v. 490 F 170 Del Delaware contract law); Opinion Justices, 847, 303 (1973); Bakenhus City 364 Mass NE2d 320 v. *15 695, Beach, Seattle, (1956); City Long 48 2d P2d 536 Wash 296 Allen v. 45 Cal of of 128, (1955); Washington Department Sys 765 2d tems, 287 P2d Bowles v. Retirement of 52, 847 (1993); Administration, 121 P2d Wash 2d 440 Betts v. Board 21 Cal of Trustees, 859, (1978); 614 v. 3d 582 P2d Petras State Bd. Pension 464 A2d 894 of (1973). 926, 489 (1983); Cheney, Jones v. 253 Ark SW2d 785 372 contract if

that, exists, if a and Measure 8 that con- impairs is not substantial. Nor does tract, impairment the state in the of 8 argue light Hughes Measure advances such that, and legitimate should the significant public purposes 8 impairs rights, court conclude Measure contract therefore, nevertheless Our impairment justified. analysis, are only must focus on two narrow What the con- questions: in tractual contained the relevant statutes and obligations 8 impair obligations? does Measure of those contractual any — SECTION 10 SIX PERCENT PICK-UP Section contribute requires public employees of their to their percent system; six retirement wages prohib or after 1, its the state subdivision political January their six percent from to 1995, contracting pay employees’ contribution; contract prohibits public employers to offset effects on of the ing pay employees to raises grant six contribution. percent 1979,

Before who were members of PERS their salary were contribute a of required percentage (1977).15 ORS The con- plans. their Former 237.071 pension on an ranged percent, tribution from four seven depending monthly The 1979 enacted salary. legislature employee’s 538, in 1979, 3, provided Laws section which chapter part: Employes’ employer participating in the Public

“[A] System may agree, employment a written Retirement July 1, 1979, agreement in effect on or after policy or assume 30,1981, on or terminating ‘pick-up,’ before June required the fund the full amount of contributions to pay or system of or less than all active members all agrees: public employer If a so employed employer. “(1) The rate contribution of each member employer is covered system employed by who six agreement uniformly shall be policy such monthly salary.” Or the amount salary regardless (codified at ch ORS 237.075 § Laws former 1995).16 238.205 (1993); recodified as ORS ORS 238.200 in 1995. Renumbered expressly legislature pick-up, it limited the the 1979 authorized When two-year terminating period 1981. pick-up to a to continue the authorization *16 to that the state contract statute, agreed, response (such as in the case of certain of the charter, other means city herein) the “full amount contribu- to employers pay public employees. tions” for public lengthy enactment of ORS 237.075 followed

The unions, and negotiations during between state employee raise in agreed pay to forego requested which for a right public employers for to with exchange bargain the state to six The enactment allowed percent “pick-up.” what to a six increase pay amounted give employees percent increasing Security. without the state’s Social payments also for the significant had tax benefits agreement employees.

If the state six and stops paying percent pick-up that reduce its PERS plaintiffs, cost is shifted state will costs six Because will have to percent salary. plaintiffs salary, they experience PERS six of their will pay percent more than a in their slightly salaries, six reduction because amounts are not considered as income and pick-up contributed, are when taxed whereas employees pay their contributions from their taxable income.17 that reply brief,

In its the state acknowledges Tay- lor, face, plain- on its susceptible interpretation it, i.e., tiffs once a offers benefits give employer to an as employee, terms those terms remain plan contract as the continues long so employment also that its employer. work for the The state recognizes pro- commitment of its six posed interpretation percent pick-up this may analysis holding Taylor. contradict court’s state court to However, Taylor narrowly. read urges The state modified argues pension promises However, provision. in 1981 to the sunset Or the statute amended remove 10, 373, challenge respect plaintiffs’ pick- Laws 1. With to section § ch agreements up subsequent bargaining until the over into collective was carried passage Measure 8 in 1994. of Ballot plaintiffs’ salary compute Eliminating pick-up used to also would reduce benefits, percent pick-up pension PERS includes the six in the final PERS because 237.075(2) Salary.” salary Average compute a “Final See ORS used to former (3) (1993) (so pick-up plaintiffs’ computa stating). Eliminating the would reduce plaintiffs. resulting salary by percent, in lower retirement benefits tion six thus nothing salary, may Measure 8 are more than which be mod- prospectively. disagree. ified We Measure 8 is not about sal- ary; pensions. may noting it is about caption It bear that the title for ballot Measure 8 states:

“AMENDS [STATE] CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PAY PART OF SALARY FOR PENSIONS.” Salary pensions synonymous. City are not See Rose City Transit v. Portland, 271 Or 595, 533 P2d 339 (1975) (pension plans may important salary). be more than disagree reading Taylor We with the state’s and believe reality, Taylor. that, in the state seeks to overrule This court Taylor Hughes, followed Tay- and we continue to adhere to lor here. *17 Taylor analysis, contrary

Under the to the sta- argument implemen- here, te’s ORS 237.075, and the state’s authority promised tation of the pension contained in statute, that a plaintiffs only benefit that could realize on retire- years ment rendering with sufficient of service, is, that after accepted by labor working. for state. Plaintiffs that offer Taylor, change by See 265 Or at 452. The mandated section obligation, 10 alters state’s contractual in violation of Taylor, by increasing plaintiffs’ cost ofretirement benefits for separation employment, they that, services absent a lawful of provide consequence, approved, will in the future. That if permit plaintiffs’ would the state to retain the benefit of paying plaintiffs labor, but relieve the state of the burden of promised what it for that labor.18That result would frustrate 18 jurisdictions Cases from other public that follow a pen contractual view of legislative sions likewise have concluded that enactments that increased the level public employee contributions, of providing offsetting benefits, without violated See, e.g., Sims, either the state or federal 323, contract clauses. Booth v. 193 W Va (1994) (stating 456 SE2d 167 pension that a modification of a statute that employee percent percent increased contribution income, from six to nine of offsetting benefits, that did not offer impair pension contract); new would (1993) (statute 354, Regan, McDermott v. 82 NY2d 624 NE2d 985 changing the funding system method for state retirement impairment violated the of contracts Assoc, constitution); clause of College Faculty state (holding State that a modifi of pension cation of a employee statute that percent increased contribution 1.25 of income, any corresponding benefits, and that did not offer impairment new was an (same contract); pension Singer of a holding regard (same doubling employee with to contributions); pension Opinion holding regard Justices with to increasing employee pension percent percent); contributions from five to seven (same holding regard increasing employee Allen with contribution from two income). percent percent to ten (concluding statutory See also Marvel that a

375 expectations plaintiffs’ that were reasonable contractual legal expressly made the state. on commitments based accepted, pension promise made Once offered and mirage (something seen in the distance state is not a retirement). disappears employee reaches before express plaintiffs’ contract term of PERS an Nullification impairment purposes of Contract the state is an with analysis. Spannaus, v. Steel Co. Allied Structural Clause (1978). 247, 2716, 98 Ct 57 L Ed 2d Section 234, US S substantially changes expressly the state’s contractual respect partici plaintiffs promise the cost with of their plan pation they and the in the PERS retirement benefits the cost of receive on retirement. Under section will employee participation the benefits increases while ultimately receive retirement will on Unquestionably, impairs obligation section decrease. plaintiffs’ PERS contract. statutory relationship pension system and the clearly the state and its established between provide obligation to an level of contractual undiminished plaintiffs at a fixed cost. Under section because benefits pay pension more, six of their PERS must value unilaterally. contrary A has been diminished hold contract ing person might on who would serve notice consider embarking prom on a career in service that the state’s employ prove worthless, ises could well be even after given promises form of had consideration for those in the ees *18 performance. purposes partial The most of the Con basic fairness Clause, tracts as well as notions of fundamental princi point simple to these itself, that transcend the clause may depart keep ples: promises, and the state must its it only legitimate public pur significant therefrom for a and significant pose. 26. Co., United US аt No States Trust 431 legitimate impair public purpose present here. The and resulting that We hold ment from section is substantial. concluding the circuit that 10 vio courts did not err in section lates federal Contracts Clause. employee’s pension contribu- requiring amendment that had the effect of percent salary impairment of con-

tion to increase from tract). was an 1.1 to 4.3 cited Cases in full above at note 15. Justice Gillette’s dissent as to section 10 would treat percent pick-up the six ORS 237.075 in isolation, former parties’ outside of the broader pension context of the PERS analysis contract. The fatal flaw in that is that it “errs in fail- ing significance Hughes, consider the of context.” 314 Or at percent pick-up integral part 21 n 27. The six is an of the underlying pension PERS contract. Unilateral termination of percent pick-up pension the six term of the PERS contract materially changes underlying pension contract plaintiffs’ plaintiffs’ and, detriment thus, frustrates reason- able reliance on the offer the state made to them and which they accepted part performance. the tender of Id. at 20-21.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATION argues any promise by

The state the state to cre obligation currently ate a unappropriated, future debt nonspecial express unambigu monies, funds however ous, Oregon would violate Article XI, 10, sections and of the (debt limitation).19 Constitution argues:

The state “The legally state could not validly promise the state would continue for future periods fiscal pick-up employee contributions, grant or to credit for sick leave. To do so would be to contract pay money in the future from funds not currently appropriated or available for that purpose, which would violate constitutional debt limitations. Contracts agreements ánd should be construed to be valid possible. when Any doubt, therefore, as to XI, Oregon Constitution, Article provides part: section Legislative Assembly “The any shall not lend the credit of the state nor in any manner create singly debt or liabilities aggregate which shall or in the previous fifty with debts or dollars, liabilities exceed the sum thousand except repel suppress case war or to invasion or insurrection or to build * * * permanent roads; every and maintain contract of indebtedness entered into or provi- assumed or on behalf of the state in violation of the sions of this section shall bе void and of no effect.” XI, Constitution, Article section provides: county singly “No shall create debt or liabilities which shall or in the aggregate, previous liabilities, $5,000; with debts or pro- exceed the sum of vided, however, may counties incur bonded indebtedness in excess of such $5,000 carry purposes by statute, limitation to out authorized such bonded indebtedness not to exceed limits fixed the statute.” *19 language promise unambiguous express whether fund dol- general of future the commitment where appears, finding no such resolved in favor [sic], should be lars made.” to have been promise (PERF) Employes’ Fund is Retirement Public

The separate statutory distinct from General fund, trust pay-as-you-go fully on a basis is funded PERF Fund. employee employer and interest on its contributions present, payment is made in Because full investments. pension cases do not create at issue in these benefits acknowledges obligation. Moreover, the state debt future agree- employment has recourse under its that it its brief any separate of the debt before violation ments to XI, sections 7 and Thus, occur. Article limitation would implicated here. are — RATE OF RETURN 11 GUARANTEED

SECTION legislature 237.277, ORS which ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‍enacted The 1975 part: provides in

“(2) employee for an member The individual account year. examined If the individual each system shall be year in an previous for the earnings account is credited with cred- earnings that would have been less than the amount year interest rate for that to the assumed pursuant ited board, the difference shall by the the amount of determined to a charged individual account and be credited to the purpose.” for the account in the fund established reserve 1995.) (Recodified 238.255 in as ORS guarantee rate a minimum effect of ORS 237.277 was member. account of each PERS on the individual of return any political prohibits subdivision or state Section contracting guarantee or return rate of interest system plan law. established in a retirement on monies agree, Although concedes, state and we guaranteed rate of return became a contractual minimum obligation on the the state relies PERS, of the state under arguments 10. We it in its defense of section that made same reject arguments in our for the reasons identified above those employee performs services of section 10. Once the discussion particular employer’s promise to afford a in reliance on employer contractually benefit on retirement, the bound to obligation. Taylor, Harryman, honor that 265 Or at 451-52; promise, atOr 634-35. The state’s access to the return rate as material, included procedure described in *20 obligation ORS 237.277. Section 11 would cancel that after employees partially performed their services. Moreover, sec- impairs obligation tion 11 the of contract stated in ORS entirely obligation 237.277, because it would eliminate that respect employee with contributions to PERS made cur- employees performed rent for work both and after the before Hughes', Taylor. effective date of Measure 8. impairment resulting

As with section justified by any significant section 11 is substantial and not legitimate public purpose meaning within the of federal impairment analysis. argue As noted, the state does not otherwise. We hold that the circuit courts did not err in con- cluding that section 11 violates the federal Contracts Clause. holding

As to section this court is unanimous in grounds. void, that that section is albeit on different — SECTION 12 SICK LEAVE CREDIT legislature

The 1973 enacted ORS 237.153, which provided part: in

“Upon request by employer that its employ- ees be compensated for accumulated unused sick leave with in the pay form of increased retirement upon benefits serv- disability retirement, ice or the board shall pro- establish a cedure adding gross to the salary amount of used in * * * determining ‘final average salary’ monetary value of one-half accumulated unused sick leave of each retiring employee of the requesting public employer and shall establish his benefits on the basis of a average final (Recodified salary reflecting addition.” as ORS 238.350 1955.) in provisions

The sick leave credit of ORS 237.153 unambiguous legislature evince a clear and intention of the contractually obligated for the plaintiffs state to become in requested participation the event that the state in the sick program. leave request credit The state made the contem- plated by prohibits any the statute. Section 12 the state or accumulated, from using employees’ subdivision political to increase retirement benefits for unused sick leave 1,1995. after January retiring and the sick Harryman note a between parallel We at issue rate of return guaranteed provisions leave credit that section 12 nullifies is these cases. The sick leave credit in credit authorization in to the sick leave employer’s akin had a Harryman legal Harryman. Although employer time, at any to cancel its sick leave credit authorization right this court held that the relevant was whether question was in effect at the start of the plaintiffs authorization Partial bound the employment. performance to honor the contractual that was employer obligation at the commencement of the plaintiffs employment, place thus a unilateral preventing change employer detriment of his plaintiffs during period employment. *21 concedes, The state and we that the sick leave agree, credit became contractual of the state under obligation the PERS. The state defends section with same arguments in it made its defense of section 10. For the reasons above, reject stated we those Plaintiffs again arguments. pro- vided labor in faith reliance on the state’s good promise receive enhanced retirement benefits on account they would of accumulated unused sick leave. Section 12 would relieve the state of its contractual to obligation provide prom- benefit, ised even the have though employees already pro- vided consideration for the promise refraining using the maximum sick leave. Section 12 the permissible impairs state’s contractual to obligation plaintiffs.

As with sections 10 and is sub- impairment stantial and not justified by any significant and legitimate within the of federal public purpose meaning impairment noted, As the state does analysis. otherwise. argue we hold that the circuit courts did not err in con- Accordingly, that section 12 violates the federal Clause. cluding Contracts

As to section this court holding is unanimous in void, that that section is albeit on different grounds. —13 SECTION SEVERABILITYCLAUSE provides: Section of Article IX 10,11 “If or 12 part Sections of this Article is held to be unconstitutional under the State Federal or Consti- tutions, remaining parts shall not be affected and shall remain in force and full effect.” University City Policy, See v. Educ. 320 Or Officeof (1994) (discussing severability 422, 885 P2d of a unconstitutional). statute held Because each substantive sec- impairment tion of Ballot Measure 8 is an unconstitutional obligation plaintiffs, a vested contractual of the state to we conclude that no section can be saved. OF

CITY PORTLAND’SCROSS-CLAIM Morgan The state contends that the circuit court City granting summary erred in of Portland’s for motion judgment City’s indemnity. agree. on the for cross-claim We obligated City indemnify The state is not of Portland any damages, attorney including City fees, that the required pay plaintiffs. Morgan legislature has not, outside the context of claim, a tort authorized an indem nity by political against action the state, subdivision empowered expand legislature’s courts are not chosen policies by exposing state, indemnification in its sover eign capacity, expressly it liabilities that has not under Accordingly, taken. we hold that the court circuit erred in Morgan granting City of Portland’s motion for sum the state’s motion for sum mary judgment denying and in mary judgment City’s on cross-claim for indemnification.

CONCLUSION *22 summary, a PERS is contract between the state employees. Hughes, and its Or at 18. The enactment of constitutionally protected the PERS in 1953 scheme created rights in PERS members. PERS an Id. constitutes offer employees may state to its for unilateral contract that accepted part performance by be the tender of those employees. plan pension Id. at 20-21. The PERS becomes acceptance employment. vested in the state’s on pick-up, guaranteed return, rate of and six Id. The plaintiffs’ pen- integral terms of PERS leave credit are sick obligations they also are contractual contracts; sion plaintiffs’ and PERS contracts. The amount of under state of the state in an contributes manner which parcel employee’s pension plan is and PERS binding pension contrac- is, essence, It contract. PERS price anticipated obligation purchase for as tual employees’ completion PERS- on ofthe be received benefits public service. covered IX and 12 of Article

We hold that sections obligations substantially impair contractual the state’s plaintiffs of the federal Contracts Clause in violation any significant justified by impairment is not public purpose. Accordingly, legitimate we declare sections 8) (Ballot 10, 11, and 12 ofArticle IX Measure void. judgments OSPOA, of the circuit courts in The judgment Morgan are on Tissue, SPEU affirmed. City of Portland’s cross-claim is reversed and the remanded to entry judgment

the circuit of a for the court City’s cross-claim; on the otherwise affirmed. State

APPENDIX Measure 8 Ballot provides:

“ANACT by “Be it enacted the People Oregon: of the State of 1. The “Paragraph by Constitution is amended creating new Sections to be added and made part of Article IX, such sections to read: (1)

“Section 10. Notwithstanding any existing State laws, or of employee Federal an the State of Oregon any or of political subdivision the state is a who member of a system or plan by law, retirement established or charter ordinance, or who will receive a retirement benefit from a system or offered state plan political or a subdivision state, system must contribute to the or plan an amount to six equal salary of their or gross wage. “(2) January 1,1995, On or after political state and subdivisions of the state shall not thereafter contract or agree otherwise to make any payment or contribution to a system plan retirement relieving or that would have the effect of employee, regardless an of when employee (1) employed, of obligation imposed by subsection this section.

“(3) On or J anuary 1,1995, after the state and political subdivisions the state shall not thereafter contract or agree any salary, otherwise to increase benefit or other compensation payable to an employee purpose of off- setting or compensating employee an for the obligation (1) imposed by subsection of this section. (1) any

“Section 11. political Neither the state nor ofthe guarantee any subdivision state shall contract to rate on system of interest or return the funds in a retirement or law, plan established charter or ordinance for the benefit an employee of the state or political subdivision of the state. (1) 12. Notwithstanding any existing

“Section Fed- law, or eral State the retirement benefits of an state political retiring or subdivision of state on January 1, any way or after shall not in be increased as a result or due to unused sick leave. any part 10,11 or 12 ofthis ofSections 13. If

“Section the Federal under unconstitutional held to be Article is remaining parts not be shall Constitution, the State forceand effect.” remain in full shall affected approved at the Novem the voters 8 was Measure Ballot date was its effective Election, and General 8, 1994, ber 8, 1994. December *24 concurring.

FADELEY, J., judgment analysis by I in the concur and in the Jus- separately tice Van I Hoomissen. write to detail the nature long-standing system the state’s retirement contracts and to prevents impairing indicate that the state constitution obligations just thereof, not the federal constitution. Oregon

Individuals and the State Policе Officers’ County Association obtained a Multnomah Circuit Court judgment declaring that 10, 11, sections and 12 of an initi prohibition ated measure violate the federal constitutional against impair obligation laws that of contracts. US Employees § Const, Art 10. I, Salem Police and others County judgment holding obtained Marion Circuit Court 10, 11, that sections and 12 that measure violate the same prohibition. Appeals federal constitutional Court cer appeal tified the state’s consolidated four trial those court directly judgments to this I court decision. would hold protection against impair the measure violates the laws that obligation of contracts in Article I, section impairment as Constitution, as well clause ofthe federal constitution.

BACKGROUND *25 Supreme 1989, the United States Court declared Michigan a unconstitutional tax law that taxed retirement government income offederal retirees received from a federal plan govern but retirement ment retirees on that did not tax and state local

payments they from that received state’s plan. Michigan Dept. Treasury, retirement Davis v. US 489 of (1989). 803, 109 1500, 103 S Ct L 2d 891 Ed That Court held intergovernmental that constitutional doctrine immu nity requires equal in treatment taxation between retired government employees state local former mer or and retired for government employees. Supreme federal The Court held a state’s tax treatment of federal state and retirement payments payments plan be the If must same. state are exempt payments from state federal also must be taxes, exempt. Michigan, Oregon exempted

BeforeDavis v. statutes payments state from taxation retirement received benefit (PERS), Retirement System Employes’ Public Oregon’s from tax statutes. enacted in income Oregon also an exemption retirement ben- to federal exemption applied But no similar Davis, in Court’s decision In reaction to Supreme efits. Laws Oregon enacted however, Oregon legislature the 1989 income. A referen- a tax on all retirement 1989, 906, chapter it voters, measure to the where sent tax dum petition That left the situ- in the 1990 election. general defeated was were and local retirement benefits plan as before. State ation federal retirement tax, the state income but from exempt were taxed. payments system plan

This court has held that retirement a public employees provided statutes formed contract when Tay the statutes in effect. their labor and services while were 510 P2d 339 Bd., 445, 450, Sher. Ret. 265 Or Dep. lor v. Mult. (1973). repealing, among

The 1991 enacted law legislature under statutory rights other the state’s things, promise act be taxed.1 But that of the 1991 PERS never would it the obli- nullity declared void and a because impaired I, of Article section of contracts contravention gation v. 314 Or Oregon, Constitution. State Hughes (1992). 31, 838 P2d 237.201) (former presently provides: ORS ORS 238.445 “(1) annuity right person pension, of a an or a retirement allow- or retirement allow- contribution, annuity ance, pension, to the return benefit, itself, any right any optional accrued or or death or other ance benefit money any person provisions chapter, accruing of this and the under 238.670, exempt funds created ORS 238.660 and shall be the various state, county municipal garnishment imposed, except all taxes or heretofore hereafter taxes], provided chapter [inheritance shall as under ORS execution, any process subject garnishment, or to attachment or other not be insolvency operation bankruptcy law heretofore or hereafter or the existing support except process upon a obli- for execution or other or enacted 25.311, 25.314, 25.060, pursuant gation of notice to ORS or an order entered 110.441,419B.408 419C.600, unassignable. and shall be 110.300 (1) “(2) apply personal to state income Subsection of this section does not added.) paid chapter.” (Emphasis under taxation of amounts this (2) attempt ruling legislature the 1991 in an to avoid was added Subsection of the United Supreme to inheritance States Court in Davis. The cross-reference *26 (1) interesting implies some It that at least in is for two reasons: taxes subsection inheritance; may Oregon property right pass right that is an individual benefit apply cross-reference to to for over a decade. had no inheritance tax for the has 26-27, 314 Or at Hughes, this court held that ORS (1989) was 237.201 been had since 1953 “term the PERS and an contract of the state obligation under that con- * * * I, tract "virtue Article section of the Con- * * * stitution not to subject legislative impairment without the consent PERS beneficiaries.” The Hughes court its holding limited tax-exemption rights in retirement ben- efits that were based on services before performed the effec- tive date of legislative repeal promise of specific in exemption found the public employees’ retirement stat- " Id. utes. at 29. As in a explained separate in supported opinion case, that I would have that held all sections of the act that repealed existing taxation of retire- exemptions ment laws rights impaired were con- obligation of (Fade- Id. at 38 tracts and were unconstitutional. similarly J., concurring That ley, part dissenting part). separate made it clear that opinion any repeal of the statutes existing a tax would granting exemption impair obligation of con- under state tracts and federal constitutions. The Hughes however, majority, went on conclude that ORS 237.201 “benefits” that have accrued or are protected accruing performed work before the unconstitutional attempt repeal ORS 237.201. The Hughes majority concluded that the is state’s no than to obligation greater those accrued and pay benefits but as to that accruing that, the consti- obligation, tution that the “are benefits from state and required exempt added). Id. at 29 local taxation I (emphasis continue forever! that, to adhere to the view to the extent that Hughes pension yet taxation PERS benefits for work approved to be performed, Hughes decided. Id. at 36. On wrongly it point, retirement case decisions contrary countrywide. Hughes

The court did decide the expressly mean- of the words “hereafter ing imposed” described the taxes statutory from which the contract PERS exempted benefits. Those words are found in ORS presently 238.445. The the legislature’s Hughes court struck down effort to tax state local benefits based on the pension 1945 and 1953 enact- statute, of a exemption ment tax without regard to the “here- tofore or hereafter imposed” Hughes language. court *27 removing tax-exemption promise legislation the the declared nullity a under Article statutes void and from the retirement prohibiting Constitution, the laws I, 21, section of My obligation concurring impair in the of contracts. dissenting part opinion Hughes have also in would and repeal exemption the income that the of a similar within held nullity and a based on the tax statutes was likewise void provisions parallel and on the federal same constitutional provision against impairing obligation the constitutional Hughes wrongly I continue to believe that was contracts. repeal exemption tax and that no of the contractual decided permissible. persons responded Hughes 1993, In interested by filing and its state constitutional basis the initia- decision Qualifying petition for Measure 8. for the that ini- ballot, tive tiative was approved general at the election 1994. As we provisions see, shall the ofthat measure further modified the obligations. pertinent state’s retirement I first turn to the promises plan they and facts state retirement as impact existed before Measure 8 so of that measure may be made clear. Thereafter, discussion the effect of separate provisions of Measure 8 on those facts and promises will be conducted.

THE STATE’SRETIREMENT PROMISES understanding A detailed statutes, various PERS timing necessary and the of their enactment, is to our consid- constitutionality eration of the effect and of Measure 8. Exempt 1. Retirement Taxation Benefits from legislature public employ- In 1945, established a system. legislature retirement In 1953, ees’ enacted a statutory system plan public employee mature ment. Those statutes and retire-

provided rights pension that the to a successfully period working would become vested after a government. They expressly provided for the state or local rights subject that those should not be to taxation at level any government political in the state or its subdivisions. legislature changed strengthened concerning statutory “rights” wording promise plan system subject under the would never be to state or promise exemption only appli- The local taxes. of tax was not imposed, cable taxes “heretofore” but was extended to imposed by govern- all taxes cover “hereafter” state or local exemption, § ment. Or Laws ch 640, 13. The 1953 tax as language, pres- refined the 1969 has thus continued to the 238.445(1) day, (formerly ent and is now found in ORS num- 237.201), placed by reorganization ORS it bered where was renumbering public employee system retirement legislature.2 statutes Pays Employer Annuity 2. Purchase Amounts provides As established in 1953, PERS benefits length separate annuity pur- based on ofservice and also on a during employment. portion chased of the benefits based *28 length public employee applies percentage on of service as a a year employee’s factor for each of creditable service. The highest salary years public employment level for the final by multiplied portion thеn is the “service credit that factor. This is referred to as

portion” of retirement benefits. The employer, government paid a state or local unit, has to the system percentage gross wages PERS retirement a of all its portion in order to finance the service credit of retirement benefits. portion type

The other of retirement benefits is a annuity. “money-purchase” refund Sometimes called a con- annuity purchased money paid tract, the with that is to the system employee by money as an works month month. That paid Principal in is invested and earns interest. and interest pay invested, continue to be and the amount available to the annuity grows in the future in relation to the rate of invest- length ment return and the of time over which interest is principal received and contributions continue. Initially, public employees govern- of state and local paid percentage ments a of their individual salaries to PERS. legislature membership The 1995 also established a new within class of 1, membership system January PERS. Persons who first establish in the after 1996, separate membership are a class from those who before that established 1995, 654, person system date. Or Laws ch 2. No § who was a before member of the opinion that date is included the new class. This the effect of does not consider rights. that classification or its members’ in the annui- establish and invest those funds to PERS uses example, person publicly For employees. ties of individual of his or her in six during July paid employed trust, the PERS, money which received gross salary annuity an then used PERS to by purchase the was money in the money in the form of a promise pay for the employee described, However, just during as to the employee future. the funds to for pay the source of of employment period was annuity of the employee’s purchase employee’s the governmental an between by agreement changed agreement and the That contractual employee. employer to save the designed taxpay- authorized and was statutorily ers money. the legislature provided state, could contract to assume or including

employer, to the funds to an contributions employee’s purchase pay the statutes had previously contributions annuity, Thus, to PERS its members.3 by to be required paid as or well as annuity money-purchase portion plan, credit could be for portion plan, paid the service had been whereas the annuity portion previously employer, employee. to be required paid 237.075) (former provides: ORS ORS 238.205 subject “Notwithstanding any provision chapter, of this other system may section, public employer participating provisions in the of this July 1, agreement employment policy in effect on or after agree, a written or pay fund ‘pick-up,’ the full amount of contributions assume *29 by system employed the required of all'or less than all active members public employer agrees: employer. If a so “(1) system of active member of the The rate of contribution each policy agreement employer such or shall employed the who is covered salary monthly salary. uniformly percent regardless of of the amount of be six “(2) employee ‘picked-up,’ required contributions full amount of employer employees paid on behalf of its shall be considered or assumed 238.005(11) only purpose comput- meaning of ‘salary’ of ORS for the within the 238.005(15), salary’ meaning average of ORS ing ‘final within a member’s ‘salary’ advantages’ or ‘other within the and shall not constitute additional 238.005(11) purpose. meaning for other of ORS “(3) ‘picked-up,’ required employee contributions The full amount employees paid by employer shall be added to on behalf of its assumed or employees for their annuities and shall account balances of the the individual chapter.” employee purposes of this contributions for all other be considered double-digit present annual inflation was economy. very the national At time, substantial base-pay necessaryjust increase in the number of dollars was stay purchasing power every person’s to salary even terms employees,

or income. Public thus, could and did make very good increasing base-pay case for their rate. However, pressed response the state also was for funds. In to reason- requests base-pay governor able increase, the and other government agreed money-saving plan. leaders on a To partially keep pace increase escalating salaries to with the price using consumer index but to do so fewer tax dollars, governments promised pay state and local to PERS the money purchase needed to annuities on behalf of state and government emplоyees. local employees purchased thereto,

Prior those the same by monthly annuities contributions to PERS made from their Previously, salaries after taxes. therefore, it had cost the employees eight percent gross salary buy to nine of their annuity, they using their because were after-tax dollars to purchase. purchase make the Because the state’s was with subjected funds that had not been to state or federal income annuity purchased taxes, the same amount of could be for six percent wages eight that otherwise would have cost to nine percent paid money had the employee state first to each employee paid and the had then state and local taxes on the money purchased annuity received and thereafter had government bought annuity with the net. If the instead of paying base-wage government increase, the saved two to wage three ity of all its costs but the same level of annu- acquired. annuity “pick-up” plan, benefit Under the public employees would continue to receive the lower number base-wage dollars rather than a raise, but would receive annuity they the same value in benefits as would have annuity received had the base rate been increased and the purchase money paid by salary them out of net, after-tax, wages. taxpayer

Thereafter, in order to save funds, a statu- torily government authorized contract between the and its required gov- was entered. The contract that the employer pay annuity ernmental for the individual instead of employee’s purchasing it with dollars that the *30 only paying percent use after taxes on them. Six of could gross wages,

paid by employer, brought the same amount annuity required eight percent benefit as had to nine of when purchased the after-tax net. with government tax-saving

The an received additional plan many, payroll benefit the 1979 if all, because by payable employers percent- ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‍taxes are owed and based on a age annuity gross wages employees. By paying of of their giving employees

contribution rather than their governmental employer payroll money raise, the saved tax payroll paid because wages. Examples taxes were on a total lower amount of payroll percentage unemploy- taxes аre security, compen- insurance, ment social workers’ state mutually sation insurance. beneficial contract has bene- participating governments by fited the state and other payroll savings hundreds of millions of dollars in since 1979. adopted authorizing the state When the statute agreements public employee pay “pick- bilateral for a to —or up” percent salary formerly paid by six —the public employee purchase annuity a future for the employee, arrangement it entered that contractual to obtain a substantial and, benefit for the state therefore, for its tax- payers, just explained. public employers as Other who arrangement entered that contractual authorized statute taxpayers also did so because of the substantial benefit government thereby Taxpayers ofthat level of obtained. were saved hundreds of millions of dollars since 1979, because the salary base all remained lower because purchased annuity percent state of the same amount of with six gross wages eight that would have cost to nine gross wages recognizing of the individual after spendable wages represented by reduction in taxes on such wages. Savings Average

3. Sick Leave Credited to Increase Final Salary. legislature provision compen- made

sating for unused sick leave in the form of retirement bene- compensation adding fits. The took the form of one-half ofthe government’s savings value of the from unused sick leave to gross salary average amount of used to determine final salary against percentage which a factor for the number of years multiplied. of creditable provision service is to be This subsequent is, with amendments, codified as ORS 238.350, formerly and was numbered ORS 237.153.

4. Minimum Annuity Rate Return Guaranteed on *31 Investments. legislature

In 1975, the enacted what was then num- bered 237.277, ORS and has now been renumbered ORS by legislature 238.255 the 1995 as it includes an amendment by Oregon chapter Laws 1993, 177, section 31. legislation

The 1975 that, established as to the annuity purchased employees’ with the contributions, an money paid assumed interest rate of return on the in would provide be used to an annual minimum floor for the rate of investment return. That assumed rate of return was set Employes’ the Public Retirement Board. If the actual earn- ings required earnings, were less than the assumed then the law surplus moneys be transferred from other years earnings where the actual had been at a rate of return higher earnings than the surplus assumed rate. The thus up year would shore the deficient return for the and cause year’s earnings to meet the assumed rate of interest earnings. “surplus” acquired by The placing earnings was years where the rate of return on investment of the employees’ funds exceeded the assumed rate of return estab- statutory program, rolling lished the Board. Under the a five-year average performance of investment return surplus used to establish the reserve or account from which deficiency up, thereby keeping an annual was made statutory promise provide employee annuity state’s portion specific Any surpluses assumed rate of return. up above the assumed rate not needed to shore deficient earnings annual were available to PERS to meet its other obligations plan. under the foregoing obligation, oper-

The state contract, plan rights, ation continued until 1989. PERS whether accruing, exempt. employer paid accrued or still were tax necessary purchase annuity por- the dollars the individual plan. tion of the retirement A minimum interest rate on the annuity year. investment was realized and assured for each Unused sick leave benefits could be saved and one-half to increase final applied years’ salary used compute service credit portion retirement benefits. Measure 8 erased all of those contract obligations, as we shall see aby review of that measure.

MEASURE 8 PROVISIONS Measure initiative measure declared invalid the lower courts, adds three4 separate new sections to Article IX of the Oregon Constitution, an article dealing with taxation and government finance. One section of the measure itself contains three subsections. one Although may group the different amendments under a general of reduc- heading ing public employees’ vested rights and thereby reducing gov- ernment obligations from the arising state and local public retirement employees’ plan, three constitutional amend- ments each accomplish different and distinct purpose. Measure 8 added expressly them to the constitution with but a single vote on all amendments lumped Under together. Measure three of the new sections added to Article IX of *32 the Oregon Constitution are: (1)

“Section 10. Notwithstanding any existing State laws, or Federal employee an of the any Stаte of or political subdivision of the state who is a member of a system retirement or plan by law, established charter or ordinance, or who will receive a retirement benefit from a system plan or offered political state or a subdivision state, of the must contribute to system or plan an amount equal to six percent salary of their gross or wage. “2. On and after January 1, 1995, the state political subdivisions of the state shall not thereafter contract or agree otherwise to any payment make or contribution to a system retirement plan or that would have the effect of relieving an employee, regardless when that employee was 4 Measure 8 10, 11, added four sections to Article IX. Sections and 12 are the substantive sections severability provision discussed herein. Section 13 is a separate meaning has no unless one of the substantive sections is found constitu tionally wanting. any part “If of section 11 or 12 of this Article is held to be unconstitu- tional under the Federal Constitution, or State remaining parts shall not

be affected shall remain in full force and effect.” (1) this imposed subsection obligation employed, section. 1, 1995, political January state On and after

“3. contract or of the state shall subdivisions thereafter any salary, benefit or other com- agree to increase otherwise employee purpose to an payable pensation of offset- for imposed obligation an compensating or ting (1) this section. by subsection (1) any political Neither the state nor 11. “Section any rate guarantee shall contract to of the state subdivision system or on the in a retirement interest or return funds the benefit by law, charter or ordinance for plan established political or a subdivision of employee of the state of an state. (1) any existing Fed- Notwithstanding

“Section 12. employee of law, of an the retirement eral or State benefits retiring of the state on subdivision political the state or any way be increased January 1, shall not or after (Emphasis to unused sick leave.” a result of or due as added.) 1. Section (1) 10, added to constitu- of section Subsection salary percent special tax of six 8, enacts a

tion Measure only public employees. wages applicable gross Because to belong required by employees PERS, ORS are law 237.011), (former law mandates the initiated ORS 238.015 salary. public employees of their be taxed six belong all PERS,5 all must statutes, our Under government specifically pay, and the of PERS must members put. That must be the new revenue directs the use which government it benefits, because one from which use is previously government payments replaces made from other purposes accomplish to be accom- the identical tax funds to plished *33 wages. public employees’ levy our Under on all precedents, that is a tax. 5 only if the employee may escape of the PERS statutes public the reach A historically public very retirement distinct

employee member of one of the few is a systems there, integrate into distinct systems. the recent trend has been Even PERS. In Automobile Club v. State Oregon, 314 Or 479, 485, 840 P2d 674 (1992), this court defined a tax as: sense, “In the most general a tax is ‘any contribution imposed government upon individuals, for the use and * * (6th service of the state *.’Black’s Dictionary Law 1991).” ed In State Ind. Acc. Com. v. Aebi, 177 Or 361, 369, 162 P2d 513 (1945), the court determined that the employer’s contribu tions under the Workmen’s Compensation Act are “taxes” and therefore are not discharged employer’s bankruptcy:

“[I]t does not destroy the character of a tax on exaction imposed by statute merely because it applied only ato cer- tain class.”

And, as this court stated 90 years in Reser v. ago Umatilla (1906): 48 Or County, 326, 86 P 329, “Generally speaking, a tax charge is a or burden imposed on persons or property for the support government of the or for specific some purpose object authorized it. Its is to raise Bouvier, revenue: Law Die.”

Under the doctrine of School Dist. v. Roseburg City Roseburg, 316 Or 379, 851 P2d 595 (1993), a tax is on a “if imposed person payment is a obli- charge legal gation” of that person. Further provisions of Measure 8 so expressly on impose members the employee obliga- tion to If pay. Measure 8 is legal, is a payment legal obli- of each gation individual employee. Under Measure each * * * “must contribute six of their percent salary gross The six wage.” tax payroll imposed by subsec- (1) tion may be repealed by because legislature, impo- sition of the tax is stated in the form of constitutional amend- ments that affect both the and the state and other governmental employers. under Clearly, foregoing authorities, six percent is a tax.6 payment requirement Pamphlet arguments The 1994 General Election Voters’ included several acknowledged operate favor of Measure 8 that that the measure would like a tax. presented by proponents favoring adoption That was as a factor of the measure. *34 396 (2) gov- 10 likewise affects

Subsection of section both employers employees. pro- individual ernmental and their It government any relieving from hibits state and local any employee from that tax means of contract. That govern- of contract of the state restricts the freedom and local employees. contract of the ment and the freedom of may by government repealed tax never or result is that the be employee. One clear effect of sub- otherwise avoided (2) annuity prevent buying the state from an for is to section employees’ compensation employees as a not- withstanding government’s paid-for, statutorily based contrary. contract to the (3) provides that state and

Subsection of section employees, prohibited government, and their are local making any agreement compensation to increase contract or prohibited to offset the six tax. Likewise is in order employees any agreement compensates in some law or they pay. example, way ing For reimburs- for the tax that must (2) pre- is subsection them for that tax forbidden. While annuity employee, buying an for the sub- vents the state from (3) prohibits salary wages a current raise in under section (3)performs a Thus, the conditions stated therein. subsection function and restricts a different kind of contract different employees. government is, to its That sub- as to as both (3) constitutionally restricts contracts but does so section also (2). provi- differently Those different than does subsection government. as as of section 10 restrict individuals well sions 2. Section ability 11 restricts the of the state to enter

Section wholly type guarantees a rate contract, different one retirement trust funds interest or return on invested public employees are involved as the beneficiaries where differing from section is directed section, the trust. This payroll compensatory tax, relief from Measure 8’s not at guaranteeing specific prohibiting rate the state from but at annuity PERS on investments made of return on employees. behalf

3. Section sick leave and the serv- Section 12 relates to unused prohibits comрensating portion ofPERS benefits. It ice credit days employees that those for extra ofwork when that perform payment takes the form of increased investments in their retirement trust funds. Neither service credit portion PERS benefits nor unused sick leave of either section 10 or compensation subject 11, but it is of section 12. only subject Without section law present some, all,7 but public employers permits who has worked extra rather than days, time off taking leave, from work for sick to receive a contribution in lieu of one-half of the for the pay extra as days, dis- previously cussed.

Section 12 also restricts It government. prohibits government for the additional contracting work unless it for it pays directly at the time rather than later paying one- half of its value to the system to fund an additional service credit benefit amount for the employee who did not use allot- ted sick leave.

That relates to provision those who retire on or after 1,1995. January Thus, those who persons may have worked additional days and have not used sick leave from 10, 15, or years ago, on a relying contract at binding time, are of the benefit deprived earned already by working pursuant to the obligation stated aby contract authorized by statute. Section 12 retroactively takes all of away their accrued rights under the untaken sick leave statute agreement.8 addition, section 12 prevents future accrual of enhancements to that Their contract right. to that right benefit is impaired Measure which takes the valuable from them. right 10(1)

Two separate sections, section and sec- tion expressly to purport nullify any law, federal as well as law, state any that has in the contravened or that past presently contravenes the provisions of those sections.

The foregoing provisions most, would cancel if not all, of those tax-saving provisions discussed above in “The example, apply For because sick leave judges, credit statutes do not to elected they are not affected section 12. provision precipitated early January 1, 1995, It is that retirement before of a number of administrators and law enforcement officials. opinion. State’s Retirement Promises” section of this Fur- money-saving plans those carried out and thermore, deliv- statutory obligation pen- of the state that ered on a contract statutory should The sion benefits never be taxed. contract county, imposed state, that no or local tax shall be hereafter expressly on PERS benefits is a contract in relation to: pension, “The to annuity an right person or a pen- contribution, allowance, to the return of retirement any optional sion, itself, annuity or retirement allowance benefit, or death benefit ing accrued or accru- right other any person provisions [the under the retirement money statutes], and the in the various funds created * * 238.445(1) (former 238.660 and 238.670 ORS ORS 237.201) added).9 (emphasis ORS and, statute has mandated under Hughes, That contractual money exemption only presently mandates tax for bene- paid presently accrued fits when but also for the “right” money right payment benefits, later may of such an accrued “accruing” add-ons to it now and the future. have mandatory “right” plan from the are not to be to such benefits by any imposed.” tax “heretofore or Measure taxed hereafter merely statutory erase the contracts under which 8 does not annuity employer agreed pay governmental agreed guarantee return, and benefit, a rate ofinvestment *36 salary by agreed average one-half ofthe sav- to increase final through ings prohibits The measure also untaken sick leave. achieved prohibits any wages and also increase in base compensation purpose or as a means off- of, of, for the other mandatory pay accomplished setting reduction in rate by 10. section analyze against impact 8 the next the of Measure

I statutory foregoing Measure 8 contracts to see whether obligation government unconstitutionally impairs the of the Although the courts ruled on the basis of the lower contracts. rulings impairment a clause and their are correct federal 9 impair statute, wording the law on from the as well as can be seen As someday contracts, decided, Hughes wrongly must be was and that error ment of impair against protections stated in our constitutions to conform corrected obligations governmental by laws. contracts later-enacted the ment of application with clause, below, of that see note 11 I start state guarantees. constitutional by methodology

The followed this court decides a possible, reaching if law, case on the of state before fed- basis finality achieving Moreover, case, eral law. in this now govern- requires law for the Otherwise, a state basis decision. by prolong appeal ment the the can case efforts United Supreme States Court. operation, provisions the Measure mandate very

that the state retain the benefit of the gains contractual bar- requires impair. that Measure also the state to base-wage quid measure retains the lower rate that the pro quo payment pick-up, savings the for from untaken surplus annuity. sick leave, and investment return on the keep government Measure 8 would for the all bene- bargain wages, pay- fits on its side of the base lower —lower payment costs, roll tax and no of sick lieu leave. The meas- guarantees government ure those benefits to in the future placement public employees its in the constitution. But lose they they all of the benefits contracted to receive for which performed. They only have lose, not all future benefit from long-standing bargain, but also what otherwise would base-wage they gave have been rate, increases in increases up part bargain. provi- as Thus, fundamental only deprive public employees sions of Measure of the of the obligations formerly benefit of due to them on side their annuity bargain wages but also further reduce real their though, pointed previously, six even as out those wages already bargain prior were lower because of the on renege. canceling which Measure 8 would The feature of employees paid by per- contract benefit after the have for it present, formance their contract is also in indi- vidually varying degrees, as to the unused leave, sick final years’ salary, portion and service credit of retirement.

By prohibition constitutional Measure base-wage are stuck with lower rate that was agreement based on the authorized statute in 1979 that government buy pick up, would them, annui- *37 wages ties. measure, Their base are frozen at an 400 eight percent lower than the base- that is or nine

amount probability wage in all without the have been rate would contract entered into and without the bilateral 1979 statute government pursuant retains the hun- statute.10 The to that already savings gained, dollars of and millions of dreds of gain in the future because of millions that it will other scores base-wage rate. frozеn of the expressly applies, aspect 8 accord

This of Measure “regardless ing of when” an measure, terms of that in relation to the measure’s entered service impair language the intent to date. That indicates effective Inability obligation of contract on a retroactive basis. wage recoup the lower base under for they agreed wage had 8, to which of Measure a lower terms bargain, pay-for-annuity clear that makes of the as their obligation impairs the retroactive law that Measure 8 is a given existing amounts, that the and, the dollar an contract 11 impairment is substantial. promised exemp- 237.201 an Because former ORS right person past on the of a and future taxation tion from annuity, annuity, just payout of that on the final an prom- for its has received the consideration the state because many tax-savings money-saving form of ise in the 237.075) 1979, adopted Oregon chap (former as Laws ORS ORS 238.205 538, ter section 3. Romein, Corp. v. Supreme of the United States in General Motors The Court (1992), 1105, 117 three-question 181, 186, 112 uses a test Ct L Ed 2d 328 S 503 US against impairing prohibition laws whether the constitutional to determine relation there is a contractual obligation contracts has been violated: Whether relationship, impairs and whether ship, change in that contractual a law whether established, may a state impairment Where a violation is thus is substantial. demonstrating legitimate constitutionality offending law of its rehabilitate the law, remedying social or public purpose such as broad general served cases, present showing present problems. is in the record No such economic Group showing Energy v. See Reserves that no such can be made. and it is conceded (1983) 400, 411-13, 697, L 2d 569 Light, 103 S Ct 74 Ed & 459 US Kansas Power (under per adjustment rights public purpose, of contract is legitimate some state missible). ground complete adequate hold Measure Although as a I would constitution, fed courts relied on the the state the trial based on unconstitutional question as well. United States no but that it is violated provision. There is eral 92, Jersey, 431 US 975 52 L Ed 2d reh den 431 US 97 S Ct Trust Co. v. New (1977). at stake. state’s self-interest 10(1) of Measure 8 violates the Consti- section years, *38 the tution and the federal constitution by impairing obliga- of It matters not that the is tion contract. violation itself amendment accomplished by separate, later-adopted 10(1). 8, in the form of section constitution Measure con- so stitution is not circumvented. not easily Obligations may the by be avoided constitution after simply changing they have been created and It is upon. relied the “retroaction” of (Fade- effect that the at Hughes, causes violation. 314 Or ley, J., in concurring part dissenting part and in (quoting (12 Saunders, Justice v. Ogden Chief John Marshall in 25 US Wheat) 335-36, 6 L (1827), Ed 606 that: “The for- thing retroaction.”)). bidden is

On the facts for the stated, stated and reasons the of Measure 8 a six levy the provision exacting against wages state local government who had employees been already that an be promised annuity purchased would governmental funds, with and who their work by for paid not promise, may be of the deprived the obligation undertook to That government provide annuity. obliga- tion law may impaired by be later without passed vio- the lating that, state constitution I, Article section pro- vides in part: * * * impairing obligation “No law the of contracts shall * passed*

ever be *.” 10(1) (2) (3) void Section is and a nullity. Subsections section 10 compound the impairment contract accom- (1) by subsection and serve no other plished purpose. They are void.

The same result —substantial of con- impairment tract under either to the two other applies sep- constitution — arate action sections added Measure 8 to the by constitution, sections 11 and 12. As to the rate of investment guaranteed return it must first be noted that the state prohibition, also substantially from the gains ORS 238.255.12 The operation 237.277) (former provides: ORS ORS 238.255 “(1) section, As in this used ‘individual account’ means individual system account for each active and member of inactive the Public Employes’ provided 238.250, Fund Retirement for under ORS but not the indi- Annuity by vidual account of in the Variable Account established ORS 238.260. surpluses guar- uses of future fund the state first rate surplus, is antee. If there unused as has been case in segregated periods, longer are no recent these funds to or by by fulfilling obligation imposed the rate encumbered promise. may guarantee surplus Instead, the use the state earnings fulfilling purposes other investment eg., obligations See, within PERS. ORS state’s interests expenses paid (system to be 238.610 administrative are from earnings earnings or, insufficient, if are investment contributions). employer impairs obligation 11 ofMeasure 8 ofthe

Section promise statutory prohibiting guarantee contract rate change plan. All of the of that in the contract burden prohibition who, law, fаlls on section system. must remain members of the the The state relieved of *39 greater degree obligation and receives an even control process. employees fund Public over the trust experience investment balancing any obligation or no relief from detri- quid pay pro quo guar- to the loss of ment or other for the a interest rate as result of Measure 8. anteed assumed literal the that all Besides, the words of measure state by mandates, are the new no matter when covered government. they That their service ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‍state- commenced retroactively implies that the measure was intended ment remove or implication, guarantee. By erase the interest rate assumed statutory con- section 11 thus eradicates accrued thereby rights, unconstitutionally impairing the obli- tract gation contract under each constitution. “(2) system for an active member of The individual account or inactive the year. earnings each If the individual account is credited with

shall be examined year earnings previous in less than that would have been for the an amount year pursuant rate assumed interest for that determined credited board, be to the individual the amount of the difference shall credited account purpose. charged in the fund for the A to a reserve account established deficiency may not be on a basis for account so established maintained reserve years. Earnings in the assumed period of more than five excess of interest a year charge years following made to for which is the reserve rate for applied first be to reduce or eliminate amount of account shall deficiency.” 1975, 333, by Oregon chapter originally sec- as enacted Laws The section remains 1993, chapter 177, that an except tion Laws section clarified members, including for all inactive account is be maintained individual members. of one-half of Application the value of unused sick leave to increase final salary and thus increase the portion benefits on predicated service is years impacted differently than the annuity portion benefits. As to the increase of final years’ salary compensate one-half of leave, unused sick the effect of the provisions of Measure 8 the sick prohibiting leave contract from carried out is to being cancel of all part retirement employees’ benefits, even though earned already who employee has already her performed or his side of the contract sick leave.13 using The cancellation is ret- roactive because it is after the fact and after the employee has performed employee’s of the part agreement. Thus, after the has given the required consideration to the state to pay for the state’s return promise, Measure 8 irrevocably would cancel and void that return promise. measure impairs obligation of that contract by canceling the obligation to perform already paid-for return promise. 314 Or at Hughes, 43 (Fadeley, J., concurring and dis- senting part); Taylor, 265 Or at 450-51; v. Teach- Crawford (1940) ers’ Ret. Fund Ass’n, (teacher 164 Or 77, 99 P2d 729 who had completed the prerequisite duty her entitling to a pension had a vested contract right thereto which could not thereafter be substantially impaired).

Measure 8 thus impairs both major parts stat- utory system for calculating retirement benefit amounts, and the annuity service credit portion. The impairment after imposed those benefit-calculation provisions became vested rights as to almost all state and local government employees, including school district employees.

Sections 11 and 12 are void under the state consti- tution, because they impair obligation of contract in the form of the state’s promises mandated or authorized by stat- ute and from which the state has realized and retains bene- fits conferred by its employees, who in turn have conferred those benefits in reliance on the contract that provisions Measure 8 impairs. January is, except employees That all who were able to and did retire before

1, 1995, right credit, before cancellation of except the earned to sick leave judiciary and, thus, for the who have not been accorded sick leave benefits have apply years’ salary. accumulated none to increase final nullity. The state and local and a

Measure 8 is void governments and must now their contracts remain bound unconstitutionally employees disgorge from funds taken Measure 8. under concurring specially and dis-

GILLETTE, J., senting part. of various consti- cases arise out

These consolidated against challenges the sub- that have been mounted tutional provisions the voters of Ballot Measure which stantive approved general election. That 8, 1994,

at the November and 12—to 10,11, added three new measure ballot sections — requires Section 10 Constitution. IX of Article (1) public oftheir sal- contribute all that (2) public system, pension ary that the retirement to their way system employer in a that to the same not contribute required employee contribution, relieve would (3) required employer offset the not otherwise that the any public 11 forbids Section contribution. guaranteeing employer or interest on a a rate of return any respect to pension with that, 12 directs fund. Section January retiring public employee 1, 1995, retire- or after on by any attributable increased amount not be ment benefits sick leave. unused brought cases is: in these combined to us

The issue provisions Clause violate the Contracts ofthe above Do opinion concludes The lead States Constitution?1 the United Measure of the Ballot sections substantive all three follow, I the reasons that For Clause. the Contracts offend analysis conclusion, reject the basis of that analysis ignores that this the rules I believe because As I in cases of this kind. for itself has set heretofore court agree explain, 11 and 12 I that sections however, also shall concerning the rules on well-settled invalid, based are opinion’s the lead impairment I dissent from of contracts. 10. of section invalidation provides: I, of the United States Constitution section Article * * * * * * pass any impairing Obligation Law shall “No state Contracts!.]”

405 the present with a observation about I begin general employees’ statutory concerning public arrangement a that provides, contains contract chapter ORS 273 pensions. the will a for pension receive alia, public employees inter v. See, State Hughes have they performed. e.g., work that of (so (1992) 1, holding). 838 P2d 1018 Oregon, 17-21, 314 Or in 237 is a chapter But ORS every statutory provision Instead, provision contract. whether a particular of that part of intent. Id. I of that contract is a part question legislative in this consideration the involved case. provision turn to a of statutes, the employers Under PERS both public since 1953 to contribute to and have been required lead opinion fund.2 Former ORS 237.071.3 The the pension but fails to its the foregoing obligation, appreciate mentions The statute in significance. provides now part: system “Each who is an active member of the to be withheld shall contribute the there shall fund salary salary.” the employee percent of six from of added.) added 1979, legislature In (Emphasis former ORS That statute now in provides part: 237.075.4 chapter, this “Notwithstanding any provision other of subject provisions 237.315, of ORS to a 237.001 system may agree, by in the public employer participating or agreement or in on employment policy written after effect 1, 1979, pay assume or the full amount of July ‘pick-up,’ or less than all required contributions the fund of all pension system pres majority plaintiffs is the relevant for of PERS but, However, instead, group plaintiffs litigation. one is not of PERS ent (FPD&R). Disability belongs Fire and Retirement Plan to the Portland and Police dissenting opinion primarily lapses I believe to be this is aimed at what Because the analysis, opinion unique opinion’s discusses the and because never lead FPD&R, application do not FPD&R further in this of section 10 the I discuss the opinion. rates, 1979, ranging provided for ORS 237.071 several contribution In former provide percent salary. seven In statute was amended four to except employees, percent rate for all those who became members of blanket six system August 22, 1981, were to a contribution rate before entitled lower in 1995. at ORS was renumbered ORS 238.200 No sub that time. Former 237.071 change made at was that time. stantive replace “employee the statute was amended to member” with “active 237.075 was ORS in 1995. No member.” ORS renumbered 238.205 substantive change provisions. made to its system employed employer.

activemembersofthe a If employer agrees: so “(1) The rate ofcontributionof each active member of system employedby employer who is covered policy agreement uniformly such shall be six salary regardless monthly salary.” amount *42 added.) (Emphasis meaning The of ORS 237.075 is former central this case. to statutory the demonstrates, As context the rule public employee required pay before 1979 was that a to a system. to contribution the retirement Then, in legislature foregoing require- 1979, the fit saw to relax the by enacting ment ORS 237.075. Under that statute, a former public employer was authorized in its discretion in course bargaining process, agree otherwise, collective or to pick-up employees’ required ofits contribution; it was not agree pick-up. to such

Subsequently, many public employers entered into bargaining agreements pick-up pay collective in lieu of raising employees’ wages. Invariably, pick-up was lim- bargaining agreements, ited to the life of the collective but it negotiated two-year has continued to be into successive agreements. employees typically Non-union were extended pick-up arrangement through policy the same informal practice.

The effect of of the enactment section 10 thus was to place Oregon specific in the Constitution a constitutional requirement pertinent part that mirrored the ORS former prohibiting practice permit- 237.071, while that had been theory ted since 1979 ORS 237.075. Plaintiffs’ former pension per- that, law, as a matter of traditional once pick-up employees, perma- cent was extended to it became a nently right vested of those that could not be away, respect employment taken even with to future and the solely employ- benefits that were reflection such future providing offsetting ment, without Plaintiffs benefits. further argue provisions although that, in various collective bar- gaining agreements by right definition extended the to the two-year pick-up only underlying over the life of those labor right pre- expiration periodic of that did agreements, the plaintiffs argue, being permanent. Therefore, it from vent impaired impermissibly contract, their PERS section right existing pension eliminating the 6 contractual an plaintiffs percent pick-up. seek to transform words, In other right express limited dura- best, an contractual is, at what right by implied virtue of absolute contractual into an tion traditional opinion performs pension law. The lead transformation. governing question law can be no as

There theory pension ben follows the contract this case. pensions portion deferred of the con it treats as a efits, i.e., by public employees. compensation See, earned tracted-for citing (summarizing Hughes, e.g., 314 at 17-21 law cases). problem there is a con Thus, the here is not whether system. Apparently, that is one: the PERS tract — there is majority. enough today methodology until was far more

But our precedents, demanding. appropriate inquiry, under our (1) steps: question proceed in three Was statute the should a of the (2) specific nature so, the contract? If what was *43 (3) prom- promise that Whatever the made statute? statute, the was its duration? In order ise contained in what (1) prevail plaintiffs that the the must demonstrate here, to part question, of the PERS 237.075, in ORS was a statute contract; (2) promised the that the six statute part employee’s pick-up pension program be a of an that it discusses would employee’s PERS, under once that (3) promise employer agreed pick-up; that that subject perpetuity, at a not to modification i.e., was in later time. opinion that the contract does

The lead concludes plain- enough promise, meet one that is broad contain a tiffs’ desires. only by opinion ignoring the But that does so long ago principle created to assure that this court cardinal legislative contracts enactments would be deemed to be legislature only intended in in those circumstances which recently reiterated that This most them to be such. principle Hughes:5 court in 5 factually. plowed course, Hughes distinguishable But that case no new Of precedents. simple compilation

ground. of rules derived from our earlier It was a 408 determining exists,

“[I]n whether a contract because this legislation case involves state a alleged contract, abe contract will be that legislation it unless inferred expresses unambiguously an intention to create a contract. Oregon, [306 Eckles v. State 380, 390-91, Or 760 P2d 846 appeal dismissed 490 (1988), (1989)]; US Campbell v. 1032 Aldrich, 208, 213-14, Or 79 appeal dismissed [159 P2d (1938)].” 305 US 559 added.) (Emphasis 314 And, Or at 17. if a even contract is proved necessary inquire it has been in this case—it is —as particular part a further to determine whether statute was a Finally, precise of that 314 23. contract. Or at nature particular statutory promise and extent of the must be iden- (illustrating process). Or at tified. See 314 27-29 “intention” that the Eckles, Hughes, Camp require expressed intention, bell decisions all is a legislative particular statutory provision party in that a asserts is government. party of the contract that the has with the (demonstrating 314 Or at 22-27 the method See Hughes, specific which the looks to court determine whether a statute legislature promise). was intended to be a Under principles statutory familiar the construction, intention of legislature enacting determined, first, in a statute is to be by examining wording together the statute, with the statutory appears. in context which statute PGE v. 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d Industries, Bureau & Labor (1993). legislature Thus, if the is to said to be have percent pick-up intended that in authorized former promise perpetuity public employees, ORS 237.075 be opinion that intention must be found statute. The lead acknowledges foregoing methodology, never even much attempts it. less to follow Thus, my precedents frequent citations to it are a shorthand to all of on this our topic, Hughes compendium. of which is the opinion’s appreciate elementary The lead failure to the reason for this tenet is manifested, alia, by jurisdictions inter its reliance on numerous from other cases *44 required pension increase in to that conclude that an contributions cases, Invariably plan impaired obligation. legis a contractual in those the state by requirement subsequently a certain then lature created statute contribution Here, statutorily required that amount. rate of statute increased contribu (six 237.071) percent, per in tion set ORS has not been altered. The six as former negotiated employers employees; pick-up promise it cent between never does, assuming, opinion apparently Even as the lead wa's created statute. purposes opinion, assume,

I shall for the of this plaintiffs hurdle, can overcome the first i.e., can show that part 237.075 is a of the PERS contract. But, ORS as I shall plaintiffs get past they show, hurdle, cannot the second i.e., promise that the cannot demonstrate made ORS 237.075 prevail. as it needs is as extensive to be in order for them to already statutory I have reviewed relevant text again and context above need set that review out at summary length general here. A fair is that there is a statu- tory public employee rule that a must contribute 6 employee’ssalary employee’s pension, toward the former employer may exception 237.071, ORS but that an make an (in general by agreeing, formally rule if it wishes either (with bargaining agreement) informally a collective respect unrepresented employees), “pick up” to that it will employee’s percent obligation. Former ORS 237.075. wording Where, in of that statute, latter is there plausible interpretation room for a that transforms the afore- statutory permission promise pick up mentioned into a to all public employees’ 6-percent And, contribution? Nowhere. plausible statutory because there is no such construction of simply may context, text and the statute not be read to do (and plaintiffs opinion) what the the lead wish to have it do. (citing PGE, 317 Or at 610-11 to ORS 174.010 for the rule of statutory construction that a court “not to insert what has omitted”). been opinion

The lead an devotes enormous amount of its energy proving, through prec- an exhaustive review of our possible legislature promise edents, that it is for the bene- public employees fits to that continue to be available into the nobody questions power leg- future. However, here promise public employees perpetuity; make a islature to in specifically recognized Hughes prom- this court that such a possible. establishing ise would be legislature 314 Or at 28. But that the power thing ipso has the not, do does facto, thing mean that the has been done. pick-up promise bargaining agreement

the utory the collective became of the stat- two-year promise, express agreements durational limitation ofthose nec- essarily kept promise becoming permanent. *45 opinion gets only by pre-

The lead as far as it does statutory tending that the PERS scheme is monolithic, with being part provision single promise. each ofit of a However, (and illustrates) precedents Hughes earlier demand our statutory provision must be examined on each its own terms legislative particu- intent to determine and that this is true statutory larly provisions of later-enacted like ORS former Hughes, 237.075. 314 Or at 22-29. Why opinion strayed the lead has so far from the methodology appropriate in this case is hard fathom, although states, it does offer some hints. It for instance 323 at 373: Or

“The enactment of ORS 237.075 followed [former] between the lengthy negotiations employee state and unions, during employees agreed which forego requested pay exchange bargain raise in for a with right public employers percent ‘pick-up.’ for a six The enactment give employees allowed the state to what amounted to a six percent pay increasing pay increase without the state’s Security. agreement signifi ments to Social also had employees. cant tax benefits for the stops “If the state the six paying percent pick-up and plaintiffs, that cost is shifted to the state will reduce its percent salary. plaintiffs PERS costs six Because will pay percent salary, they have to PERS six of their will expe- slightly rience more than a six reduction in their salaries, because amounts are not considered as pick-up contributed, income and are not taxed when whereas their from their taxable employees pay contributions income.”

(Footnote omitted.) opinion

So what? Those statements the lead are are analysis. they any anything, If not a relevant expressions consequences policy of concern over people adopting Ballot Measure 8. It choice made may opinion’s musings imply, that true, well be as the lead wrong-headed, represents public policy is Measure 8 short-sighted, mean-spirited. any all of those But if qualify legislation this characteristics for invalidation changed utterly that which the court, our work has pursuant made to it allo- and the laws Constitution cate to us. weighs justifica- opinion in with a

The lead further that is a flat misstatement: “That conse- its actions tion for allowing permit stand] [of quence 10 to would Section plaintiffs’ labor, the benefit of but relieve to retain state state of promised paying plaintiffs what it the burden of argument specious. The state 323 Or 374. That that labor.” any Bal- the substantive sections never has claimed retroactively, thereby depriv- applied be lot Measure 8 should employee ing any public that the benefit *46 any already respect pension to fund con- has worked With for. up the effective date ofBal- made on their behalf to tributions nothing. money plaintiffs That is not 8, lot Measure withdrawn; have lost it continues to draw interest and will be availa- They they per- retire, as benefits. have lost the 6 ble, when they promised pick-up prospectively never were cent —but contrary. anything to the summary, opinion’s approach I find the lead challenge and resolution of the to section 10 to be at odds principles with the most fundamental that this court hereto- applied impairment-of-contract involving fore has claims observing procedures Instead of that this state statutes. opinion speaks cases, has in such the lead court as if it has set ability established utility up judge accept- itself social people adopt. of a measure that the have chosen to inappropriate judicial power.7 That is an use of the I would hold that section 10 does not violate the Contracts Clause. opinion 11, lead section

The also strikes down guaranteed section, 12, rate of return and section sick analy- opinion provision. utilizes an each, As to the lead leave I invalidate section 10. As have sis similar to that used to disagree opinion’s approach explained, the lead entire does not extend I with my disagreement problem. However, to the by opinion highlighted inappropriate role assumed the lead [Con opinion’s that “notions of fundamental fairness that transcend assertion opinion at the lead reaches. 323 Or Clause] tract itself’ dictate the conclusion court’s) (or any juris approach has a of this court’s 375. That novel never been Clause, prudence. apply not to “transcend” it in some Our role is to the Contract to be “fundamen quixotic to arrive at what some members of the court deem effort tally fair.” opinion’s holding to the lead as to either section. The lead opinion applying retrospectively, i.e., reads both as sections rights affecting employees already as for which have performed requisite agree I labor. that those sections fairly may way impermis- read and, read, be as are so impairments e.g., Hughes, See, sible (retrospective of contract. 314 Or at 31

abrogation exemption pensions tax contract); impairment Harryman Roseburg of PERS v. Fire (1966) (invalidating District, 634-35, 244 Or P2d 51 retrospective ‍‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​‍application decision fire of a district that rule). terminated an accrued sick leave I therefore concur specially those as to two sections.8 charged writing

If we were in this case with aon subject concerning clean slate matter addressed sec- might policy 10,1 tion well set in line with that which results opinion. policy from the lead But the in this choice area is government people, entrusted exercising another branch of —the legislative power IV, their under Article section opinion oversteps The lead Constitution. proper scope authority policy of our to overrule that choice.In doing, opinion good so suffers, the lead not from want of diligence, temporary perspective, will or of but loss of apparently subject pensions—that due we are matter — addressing. join I cannot it. join specially

Carson, C. J., Graber, J., in this concurring dissenting opinion. *47 it, opinion prospective application As I lead read would not allow of sec 12, either, respect public employees already

tions 11 and at least with who were job view, error, my on the when Ballot Measure 8 went into effect. In that is for the (in view) ruling my same reasons on that the section 10 error. But that error does disposition not affect the of this case toas sections 11 and 12.

Case Details

Case Name: Oregon State Police Officers' Ass'n v. State
Court Name: Oregon Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 21, 1996
Citation: 918 P.2d 765
Docket Number: 94-12-08563 CC 94C-14019, CC 94C-13963, CC 95-C10338 SC S42333 (Control), SC S42511 and SC S42355
Court Abbreviation: Or.
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