51 F. 465 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon | 1892
Lead Opinion
after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The oral arguments of counsel on the hearing of this case were extended and able, and their elaborate briefs since filed, covering 350 pages of printed matter in octavo form, touch upon nearly every question relating
1. The complaint avers that it is the custom of railroad companies operating connecting lines to receive and transport freight tendered to them in the cars in which it is tendered, and to pay the usual car mileage on such cars, and to advance the charges for the transportation of the freight from point of origin to the point of connection. This averment is denied b.y the answer, and numerous witnesses were examined on the subject, called both by the complainant and the defendant,-who had been or w'ere connected with railroad companies as managers or superintendents, and who had had large experience in conducting traffic between connecting lines. Their testimony differs only in immaterial matters. It agrees in the main points, and is to this purport: That whether or not the freight received by one company shall be transported in the cars in which it is tendered, or be transferred to the cars of the.receiving company, is, as a general rule, dependent upon contract between the connecting companies, and is pot a matter in which there is any established custom applicable to all cases. Exceptions to the general rule arise when the cars of the receiving company are all in use; then the freight is usually received and transported in the, cars in w'hicli it is tendered, that there may be "no unnecessary delay in the transportation. Sometimes also the cars are received where the freight is of such a character that it may be injured by transfer from one car to another. There can be no usage founded in reason requiring the receiving company to transport the freight in the cars in which it is tendered, when its own cars are not in use. The receiving company is not under any obligation to allow its owm cars to remain idle in order to transport
The receiver of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Company, and president of the Minnesota Transfer Company, testified that from his experience and observation the question of transferring ears received by one railway company from a connecting line, containing freight for transportation from a receiving line, was determined more or less by the nature of tlie freight, and the question whether the receiving line has or not plenty of cars of its own in which to load and forward tiie freight: that in some cases companies decline to allow their cars- to go beyond tlie terminal point on their own line, and in such cases the freight is. of course, transferred. One of the vice presidents of the Ohicago, Milwaukee & St. Raul Railway Company testified that, when there is no agreement between the connecting companies on the subject, the question whether the freight tendered shall be transported to destination in the original cars, or be transferred into the cars of the receiving company, rests with tlie latter company. The general manager of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, in answer to the question, “What is the custom or method obtaining among railroads concerning the handling of cars?” testified as follows:
“The method of handling through business interchanged between railroads is controlled by various circumstances, in some cases by traffic contracts, which provide for cars going through without transfer or breaking bulk. In many cases it is controlled by conditions of what we might term tlie car market; that is, by the car supply. There are times when railroads east of St. Paul give orders at the transfer to permit none of their cars to go beyond St. Paul. There are times when tiiey permit their cars to go through without breaking balk. On the other hand, there are times when the railroads north and west of St. Paul do not take through ears, even when the roads*472 tendering them are willing to have them go through, because they have sufficient of their own ears, and, under the general agreement and understanding between the railroads of the United States to pay a certain rate per mile on all cars of other railroad companies used over their lines, it would become a burden to take a foreign ear, and permit its own car to lie idle, and pay a mileage rental for the foreign car. The receiving road determines for itself whether to take the cars of a connecting line or to transfer the freight to its own cars. This [said the witness] is the universal practice all over the country, [meaning, of course, in the absence of special contract on the subject.]”
It follows that the .complainant has failed to show the existence of a controlling custom as to the manner of receiving and forwarding freight in the cars in which it .is tendered. A controlling custom .can only be established by long usage, and must be certain, reasonable, and uniform, to have the force of law.
As the receiving company is under no obligation to take the freight in the cars in which it is tendered, and transport it in such cars, when it has cars of its own, not in use, to transport it, there can be no custom that it,shall pay the owner of such cars, should it receive them in such case, car mileage for their use. The car mileage in that case must he upon an arrangement between the parties. But when the receiving company takes the freight in the foreign cars because it has noire of its own out of use to transport it, or because it would injure the freight to transfer it to its own cars, it is the general practice for the receiving company to pay the usual mileage on the cars taken and used, and such practice is a reasonable one, and should be enforced. . .
There is no law or custom requiring a railway company receiving freight from a connecting line to advance or assume the payment of the charges due thereon for the transportation from its point of origin to the connecting line. If it does thus advance or assume the payment of such charges, it can retain a lien upon the property transported for their payment as well as for the transportation rendered by itself. A railway company, like any other common carrier, has a right to demand that its charges for transporting goods shall be paid in advance, and is under no obligation to receive the goods for transportation unless such charges are paid, if demanded. The general practice, it is true, is to collect the charges upon delivery of the goods transported to the consignee, and, where goods are received without the payment in advance being demanded, it becomes the duty of the railway company to complete the carriage. Its right to payment in advance is thus waived. It holds, however, a lien upon the goods for payment, and in case the goods are delivered previous to payment it can hold the consignee responsible. The same law applies where the goods are received from the original consignor or from an intermediate carrier. The railway company, in the absence of any contract on the subject, is under no obligation to take the carriage in the one instance, or to continue the carriage in the other, without prepayment of its charges, if demanded.
As to the alleged .obligation of the defendant to honor tickets or coupons for passage over its lines north of Portland, issued by .the complain
2. But it is also contended that the obligation alleged of the defendant to receive freight tendered to it by tlio complainant at Portland, and to transport, it to the point of destination without breaking bulk, in the manner mentioned, and to pay the charges stated, and honor the tickets of connecting companies for passage over its road north of Portland, is imposed by the third section of the interstate commerce act. 24 St. p. 380. e. 104. That section is as follows:
“That it. shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonaale preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines, but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business.”
The first subdivision of this section does not make all preferences or advantages which may bo given by a common carrier unlawful; only those which are undue or unreasonable are forbidden. The second subdivision is similarly guarded in its provisions. Common carriers are there only required, according to their respective powers, to afford all roa-" sonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and are forbidden to discriminate in their rates and charges between them. And even this provision is subject to the limitation that it shall not be construed as requiring any common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business. As justly said by the circuit court of the United States, in the case of Kentucky & I. Bridqe Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 624:
“No provision of the interstate commerce act confers equal facilities upon connecting lines under dissimilar circumstances and conditions. On the contrary, even as to interstate commerce itself, the distinction is recognized throughout between discriminations and preferences which are just and reasonable and those which are unjust and unreasonable, according as they are made or given under similar or dissimilar circumstances and conditions. All discriminations and preferences are not forbidden or made unlawful, but only*474 such as are unjust or undue or unreasonable are prohibited. In each and every case, therefore, the question whether a discrimination is unjust or a preference is undue or unreasonable, either as to the common carrier or the commerce it may transport, involves a consideration of the circumstances and conditions under which such discrimination or preference is made or given.”.
It does not appear from the testimony produced in this case that the defendant has, as against the complainant, made or claimed the right to give any undue or unreasonable preferences or advantages to any person, company, firm, or corporation, or locality, in receiving and transporting freight in the cars in which it is tendered. It has claimed the right in all cases to refuse to-take freight and transport it in foreign cars, when it has cars of its own in which it can be carried, except only where the freight is-of such a character that its transfer to another car would be injurious to it. The answer of the defendant impliedly admits that it has usually refused to transport freight in foreign cars, where the freight has originated east of the 97th meridian, unless the complainant waived on its own cars, and assumed to pay on the cars of other companies, the current rates of mileage for the distance run over defendant’s road; but such refusal can in no respect be deemed an unreasonable discrimination against the complainant, if made when the defendant’s own cars were not in use, but were free to be employed in the transportation desired, or was made when to transfer the freight would not have been injurious to it. Nothing of this kind being shown, there was no foundation for the allegation of any unjust or illegal discrimination in favor of other companies, as against the complainant, upon which this suit proceeds.
The alleged discrimination against freight originating east of the 97 th and 105th meridians, in favor of freight originating west of those meridians, is not shown to have been made under conditions which rendered it unreasonable or a denial of equal facilities afforded to others. Proof to that effect must be produced to authorize a court to interfere with the conduct of a railroad company in the interchange of traffic with connecting lines, upon charges of giving undue or unreasonable preferences to some of them over others, and thus unlawfully discriminating between them. The provision in the second subdivision of the third section of the interstate commerce act, that a common carrier shall not be required to give the use of its tracks and terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business, is a limitation upon or qualification of the duty declared of affording all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic, and the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from the several lines and those connecting therewith.- It was so expressly held in the case above cited of Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 571.
It follows from this, as it was decided in that case, that a common carrier is left free to enter into arrangements for the use of its tracks or terminal facilities with one or more connecting lines, without subjecting itself to the charge of giving undue or unreasonable preferences or ad
“The right of ownership of railroad property, with the power oí control over employes and management of the property, is as absolute under the act as before its passage. The regulation of commerce between the states, which is all that the act contemplates, does not involve community of property or joint control of subordinates among the several companies that honor through tickets. The corporate powers of every company for all administrative and governing purposes within its prescribed sphere remain unimpaired. With tiie legitimate exercise of these powers another company has no concern and no right to intermeddle.”
8. The fifth section of the defendant's charter, that is, of the act of congress of July 2, 1864, creating the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. making it the duty of that company to permit any other railroad company which should be authorized to be built by the United Hiatos, or by the legislature of any territory or slate in which the same may he situated, to form miming connections with it on fair and equitable terms, does not impose any obligation upon the company to carry freight in the cars in which it may bo tendered by a connecting Line when its own cars arc not in use, except where the transfer of the freight to another would be injurious to it. In all other cases the receipt and transport of the freight tendered in foreign cars is a matter of conventional arrangement between it and the connecting company. The running eoiincotlions which must be permitted by the defendant are not, as contended by complainant’s counsel, a running over its line, but only in connection with it; a provision intended to secure the transportation and exchange of freight between connecting lines, and not the use of each Others road by the cars of such companies. Whenever an intention has been manifested, in the creation of railway charters, that a connecting company shall have the power to run its cars over the lines of another, or to require one company to haul over its line the cars of another, such intention has been expressed in unequivocal terms, such as is found in the constitutions or statutes of several of the states respecting railway companies, which is substantially in those terms: “And they shall'receive and transport each other’s passengers, tonnage, and cars, 'loaded or empty, without delay or discrimination.” In some of the English charters of railway companies it is provided that all companies and persons shall he entitled to use the railway with engines and carriages, properly constructed, subject to the provisions of the “act for the better regulation of railways and lor the conveyance of troops, and' regulation's to he from time to time made by the company.”
The terms “running connections,” as used in the act of July 2, 1864, in incorporating the defendant, apply to both passenger and freight con
We do not deem it essential to inquire into the arrangements alleged to have -been made by the Transcontinental Association, and how far those arrangements should be regarded as binding upon the parties as to traffic in freight originating east of the 97th meridian, and in the passenger traffic originating east of the 105th meridian, as the material questions which must govern the interchange of freight and passengers at points of connection in their respective lines, from whatever quarter they may come, are considered so far as there is any difference in the contention between.the parties to this suit.
Upon a consideration of whatever we deem material in the controveiw before us, and the proofs which have been produced as to the course of business pursued by the defendant, we do not perceive anything against which the complainant can make any valid objection. It is not shown that the defendant has, at any time, refused to make proper connections wijh the complainant seeking to send freight or passengers over its lines north of Portland, or has, in that respect, given any undue or unreasonable preferences or advantages to other companies over the complainant. It was under no obligation, by custom or law, to receive the freight of the complainant or of other companies in the cars in which it was tendered, and transport it over its own road in such cars, when its own cars were not in use, but were free to be employed in the transportation desired, unless it would be injurious to the freight to have it removed from one car to another. Nor is it shown that in ai^ cases it has unlawful^discriminated in its charges against the complainant in the transportation of its freight in favor of other companies. It therefore follows, without further consideration of the numerous matters touched upon counsel, that the bill cannot be sustained. It will therefore be dismissed, and the mandatory injunction heretofore issued be dissolved; and it is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) I am sorry I am not able to concur in the foregoing opinion, and, although I do it with some hesitation, I think it proper to give briefly my reasons therefor. It is admitted by counsel for the defendant that the second clause of section 3 of the act entitled “An act to regulate commerce,” (24 St. 380,) is new, and imposes obligations and restraints upon common carriers,' “subject to the provisions of the act,” unknown to the common law; and this is apparent independent of such admission. The question is, what are these obligations and restraints? The plaintiff contends in this ease that the duty imposed upon the defendant is at least that of hauling car loads of freight, without breaking bulk, when tendered it by the plaintiff, over its line, from Portland to points on the Sound, charging therefor its local rates, and paying therefor, for the use of the car, the customary rate of one fourth of a cent per mile. The defendant denies this obligation, and contends it is only bound to carry freight in its own ears, and that the plaintiff must unload its cars at Portland, and tender the freight thus unloaded, to be reloaded on the defendant’s cars as if it originated at that point. This much it was bound to do at common law,—to carry all freight tendered to it in the order in which it was received. But the section goes beyond the common law, and therefore it must impose a duty beyond that of merely receiving freight from the plaintiff when unloaded from its cars. The language of the second clause of the section in this respect is as follows :
“Every common carrier, subject to the provisions of this act, shali, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines,' and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines, and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in tlioir rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its track or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business.”
The carrier is to afford these “facilities” for what purpose? The act says, “For the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith.” To exchange freight in hulk, by ear loads, is certainly a “ reasonable and proper facility” for that, purpose. It is a general custom, except in some special instance like’ this, where the carrier disobeys the injunction of the law for the purpose of injuring a competing line in its own interest. To exchange freight by the car load is a “reasonable and proper facility” for the interchange of traffic between these lines, and it is such a facility to enable them to receive and forward passengers and property to and from their respective lines and those connected with them. On the other hand, to require the plaintiff to unload its ears with freight destined for points on the sound, at Portland, and there reload the same on the defendant’s cars as freight originating at the ]after point, is to afford no facilities for such purpose at all. Such a construction of the statute renders it altogether nugatory, and leaves
The cost of unloading freight from the plaintiff’s cars to the defendant’s, at this point, operates as- a hindrance, if not a bar, to the transport of freight by the former, originating east of the 97th meridian, to he delivered at points on the Sound. The defendant has no more natural right to a monoply of this business than it has to that originating west of said meridian. To compel the plaintiff to submit to this exaction is to require it to build a competing road between Portland and the sound, when one is amply able to do all the business. The community is thereby taxed to support two roads, where one only is necessary. The defendant should be required to haul the plaintiff’s cars, and also pay the back charges on the freight to this point, and collect the same from the consignee on the Sound. This is a “reasonable and proper facility” for the transaction of business, and is customary and usual as well. There may be exceptions to this rule, as in the ease of perishable freight. But in all other cases the defendant takes no risk in paying such charges, because the freight is good for them. “All reasonable and proper facilities for the interchange of traffic,” and “for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property,” to and from connecting lines, includes, at least, such facilities as railways were accustomed to afford one another before the passage of the act, whether as the result of usage or contract. Nothing less could have been in the mind of the legislature on the passage of the- act. And in my judgment the last clause of section 5 of the act organizing the Northern Pacific Railway Company (13 St. p. 369) also requires the defendant to afford the plaintiff the facilities in question. It reads:
“And it shall be the duty of the Northern Pacific Railway Company to permit any other railroad which shall be anlhorized to be built by the United States, or by the legislature of any territory Or state in which the same may be situated, to form running connections with it, on fair and equitable terms.”
This statute is mandatory. The matter is not left to the-pleasure or judgment of the defendant.- It shall be its “duty” to permit any other road to form “running connections with it on fair and equitable terms.” What are “running connections” but the right to have car loads of freight hauled over the defendant’s road, and that “on fair and equitable terms,” which means, at least, such terms as are usual in such cases, whether established by custom or contract. Nothing more is asked by the plaintiff in this case, and, in my judgment, the injunction should be made -perpetual. ' -