102 P. 1011 | Or. | 1909
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was brought to condemn for the use of the plaintiff lots 2, .3, 4, and 5, in block 12, of Riverside addition to the town of La Grande, to enable it to construct additional, side tracks, switching facilities, and repair shops in its depot grounds in said city. The complaint is in the usual form, alleging the plaintiff’s corporate existence; the extent and character of its business as a common carrier; the necessity of the use of said lots in the performance of its public duties; its inability to agree with the owners as to the' value thereof, which, it is averred, does not exceed $250.
The answer admits the material averments of the complaint, except the alleged value of the land sought to be taken, which is therein stated at $3,000. At the trial plaintiff called J. B. Eddy to testify in its behalf as to the value of the lots. After stating that for seven or eight years he had been assistant right of way agent of the plaintiff, and during that time had been familiar with the lots in question, and otherwise qualifying to the satisfaction of the court as a competent witness, he testified that the lots were worth $100 to $150 a lot, according to the lay of the land. On cross-examination he was asked: “You bought block 13 from Mr. Grandy ?” The answer was, “Yes.” He then was asked: “Tell us what the Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company paid for block 13.” This was objected to by plaintiff “as not the measure of valuation.” Before a ruling was made by the court, counsel for defendant asked: “When did you buy block 13?” To which the answer “I guess about a year ago,” was given. Then the court overruled the previous objection, and the question was repeated in this form: “What did you pay for block 13?” To which witness replied: “I paid $5,000 for block 13.” Again
On Motion to Dismiss.
Opinion on the Merits
On the Merits.
“It is held that evidence of the selling value of lands in the neighborhood may be given, as tending to establish a basis from which the landowner’s damages can be assessed in cases where the land taken is not shown to have any definite market value; but, as a general rule, where there is a definite market value, that value should be taken as the basis for estimating compensation. Evidence of actual sales of such lands has been held admissible in cases where the market value of the land sought to be condemned was in dispute, though other authorities hold such evidence inadmissible upon the ground that it is*202 the general selling price of land in the neighborhood which is the test of its value, and not the price paid for particular pieces of property. The sales proven must have been of land similar in character and location to that condemned, and must have been made near the time of taking.”
That author is inclined to doubt the soundness of the cases which hold evidence of particular sales to be competent, although he thinks it proper to test the knowledge of witnesses by asking them, on cross-examination, whether they know of such sales. In support of fhis view the following cases may be consulted: East Pa. R. v. Hiester, 40 Pa. 53; Pa. & N. Y. R. Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. 414; Pa. & S. V. R. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa. 560 (17 Atl. 187) ; Montclair R. Co. v. Benson, 36 N. J. Law 557; C. P. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247-262; Selma R. & D. R. Co. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178; In re Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463 (28 N. E. 389: 14 L. R. A. 52). On the other hand, the propriety of allowing proof of the sales of similar property to that in question, made at or about the time of the taking, is said by Mr. Lewis on Eminent Domain (Volume 2, § 443) to be “almost universally approved by the authorities.” See, also, 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 463. It is conceded, however, in those jurisdictions excluding such testimony as substantive evidence of value, that on cross-examination of an expert witness testifying as to value, for the purpose of testing his knowledge of the market value of land in the vicinity, he.may be asked to name such sales of property, and the prices paid therefore, as have come to his attention. In re Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463 (28 N. E. 389: 14 L. R. A. 52) ; Elliott, Railroads (2 ed.) § 1036; Greenleaf, Evidence (15 ed.) § 448; C. P. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 262; Kansas City & T. R. Co. v. Vickroy, 46 Kansas 248, 250 (26 Pac. 698) ; Chicago K. & N. R. Co. v. Steivart, 47 Kan. 703, 706 (28 Pac. 1017). Whatever may be the better rule upon the controverted question of the admissibility of particular sales as substantive
“Such sales are not a fair criterion of value” says that eminent author, “for the reason that they are in the nature of a compromise. They are affected by an element which does not enter into similar transactions made in the ordinary course of business. The one party may force a sale at such a price as may be fixed by the tribunal appointed by law. In most cases the same party must have the particular property, even if it costs more than its true value. The fear of one party or the other to take the risk of legal proceedings ordinarily results in the one party paying more, or the other party taking ' less, than is considered to be the fair market value of the property.”
It is claimed by the defendants’ counsel that the questions propounded to Eddy on cross-examination, by which he was required to state the amounts paid for block 13, and for lot 6 in block 12, with other adjacent property, was not for the purpose of offering substantive testimony as to value, but to test the knowledge of the witness. The form of the interrogatories and the general character of the cross-examination of the witness do not indicate that any such limitation was intended. The court in ruling upon the offer did not so limit the effect of the evidence received, and we have no doubt the jury understood and treated the evidence as proof of value. But, however that may be, under any view that may be taken of the matter it was not admissible.
“The general rule that objections to evidence must be . specific, admits of this exception: That if they cannot in any manner be obviated, or if the evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose, a general objection will suffice.” 8 Enc. PI. & Pr. 228.
Hamilton testified in defendants’ behalf, as one acquainted with market value of town lots in that vicinity, that the value of the lots in question was at least $2,500, but on cross-examination it developed that his opinion was based exclusively upon what he had heard plaintiff had paid Grandy for block 13. Plaintiff moved that his testimony be stricken out, which was denied. This was error, because what plaintiff paid Grandy was not a fair criterion of value, and an opinion based thereon
Other errors are assigned; but as they will not likely recur on a retrial of the case, which appears to be unavoidable, there is no necessity to refer to them at this time.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed.