Section 605, Or. L., prescribes the duty of a writ of review in this language:
“The writ shall be concurrent with the right of appeal, and shall be allowed in all cases where the inferior court, officer, or tribunal in the exercise of judicial functions appears to have exercised such functions erroneously, or to have exceeded its or his jurisdiction, to the injury of some substantial right of the plaintiff, and not otherwise.
Before a writ of review will issue it must appear from the petition that the inferior court, officer of tribunal whose order is sought to be reviewed was exercising judicial function. Ministerial acts or orders are not subject to be reviewed:
Cole
v.
Portland,
Did the County Court exercise any judicial function in apportioning the taxes admitted to have been transferred to Oregon City? The statute governing the apportionment of taxes, in so far as is applicable, reads as follows:
*552 “It shall be, and is hereby made, the duty of the (county) court or commissioner’s court of each county in this state to levy a tax of not less than one mill nor more than ten mills on the dollar on all taxable property in such county at the time of making the annual tax levy, which shall be set apart in the county treasury as a general road fund, * * . Seventy per cent thereof shall be apportioned to the several road districts, including districts composed of incorporated cities and towns in such proportion as the amount of taxable property in each district shall bear to the whole amount of taxable property in the county, and the remaining thirty per cent shall be applied to roads in such locality in the county as the county court or commissioner’s court may direct; * • .” Or. L., §4600.
The law further provides that incorporated cities are separate road districts and the 70 per cent' to be turned over to the road districts shall be transferred to such incorporated cities to be expended under the management of the officials thereof. It has been recently held by this court that this statute enjoins that duty upon the county which it must exercise. The county has no discretion except as to the amount of the levy:
City of Astoria
v.
Cornelius
(Or.),
The plaintiff relies on the cases of
Oregon City
v.
Moore,
“Such County Court shall apportion the taxes so collected among the several road districts in the county, having due regard to the amount of taxes 'collected in the several road districts, to the condition of the 'roads, and necessity for repairs, and to the amount of travel thereon.” Laws 1893, p. 60.
It clearly appears that the application of the statute from which the above excerpt is taken required an investigation and inquiry, the exercise of discretion and judgment which was properly held to be the exercise of judicial functions.
5. The law is well settled in this state that a writ of review will lie only when there is no other adequate, complete or plain remedy: Plaintiff had a complete remedy by an action at law: Authorities cited above;
Chapman
v.
Hood River County,
6. The petition for the writ of review does not state facts sufficient to authorize the issuance of a writ. Before a writ should issue the petition must disclose facts entitling the petitioner to the relief prayed for:
Sustar
v.
County Court,
The petition in the instant case demands that the county turn over to it 70 per cent of the taxes collected from the taxable property in Oregon City. The facts stated in the petition show only the amount of the taxes collected from the property in Oregon City and 70 per cent thereof. The law does not require the county to turn over to Oregon City 70 per cent of the taxes collected therefrom. The requirement of the law is that such proportion of the 70 per cent of the road fund collected as the total tax-, able property within Oregon City bears to the total taxable property in Clackamas County shall be transferred to the City. If all of the taxes levied in the county were paid that proportion would be 70 per cent. It is a matter of common knowledge that all taxes levied are not paid. As a matter of practice it is not at all likely that the delinquent taxes of Oregon City would be the same proportion as the delinquent taxes of other parts of the county. The legislature evidently took cognizance of that fact, else why the provision to apportion the 70 per cent of taxes collected iif'the proportion the taxable property of Oregon City bears to the taxable property of the county? If the legislature intended that the county should pay to the several road districts 70 per cent of the amount of the taxes collected therefrom it would have been a very easy matter to have said so.
The county is not' required to pay 70 per cent of the entire taxes levied for road purposes but only 70
*555
per cent of the amount collected:
City of Pendleton
v.
Umatilla County,
9. In considering the petition for the writ of review upon a motion to quash only the petition itself will he considered:
Drummond
v.
Miami Lumber Co.,
10. While it was not necessary for the court -to make findings of fact and adopt conclusions of law, its doing so was a mere matter of supererogation:
Kime
v.
Thompson,
For the reasons assigned herein the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to allow the motion to quash.
Reversed and Remanded.