96 Neb. 619 | Neb. | 1914
This is an action brought by Albert N. Orcutt, the plaintiff, and now one of the appellants, against James H. Mc-Ginley, the county treasurer of Keith county, the Alfalfa Irrigation District, the First National Bank of North Platte, and others. We will omit a statement of the contents of the pleadings, giving only such parts as may seem necessary to a general understanding of the case.
The plaintiff alleges the ownership of certain land within the Alfalfa Irrigation District, part of which he asserts may not be irrigated. It is his purpose (1) to set this land outside of the district, (2) to cancel the irrigation taxes against the plaintiff’s land for the year 1896 to and including 1909 because of certain alleged irregularities in the issue of the bonds, (3) to cancel the irrigation bonds issued by the Alfalfa Irrigation District of the date of July 1, 1895, in the sum of $22,000, also, to enjoin the different owners of such bonds from asserting any claim, against the district and against the plaintiff’s land on account of such bonds. The Alfalfa Irrigation District was formed in the year 1895. On May 14, 1895, the petition was filed in the office of the county clerk of Keith county looking to the organization of the “Alfalfa Irrigation District.” The boundaries of the proposed district were set forth in the petition. On June 8, 1895, an election was. held, and the district was declared to be organized.’ On July 13, 1895, there was an election to issue $22,000 of the bonds of the district for the construction of irrigation works, said bonds to mature in 20 years from their date.
After tbe decree of tbe district court confirming tbe organization of the district, tbe then officers of tbe district, M. A. Daugherty, president, and H. C. Anderson, secretary, signed up and held in tbe office of tbe secretary tbe $22,000 of bonds, being tbe same bonds offered in evidence in tbe confirmation suit. On tbe 18th day of September, 1896, tbe said Alfalfa Irrigation District entered into a contract with said W. O. Rogers, by which be (Rogers) agreed to excavate tbe canal under tbe supervision of tbe engineer employed by tbe district. W. 0. Rogers died in March, 1898. Prior to his death be bad constructed tbe canal, and bis work bad been accepted by tbe district and
On September 4, 1906, William H. Thomas, a citizen and resident of the state of Iowa, began a suit in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska against the last named appellees and the bondholders, the Alfalfa Irrigation District, the county of Keith, and the officers of the irrigation district charged with the management of its affairs, and the county treasurer of the •said county of Keith. The purpose was to enjoin the district and the officers of the county from levying taxes upon the land in the district to pay the interest on these bonds
The permanent relief sought in the said bill of complaint was an order restraining and enjoining the said James EL McGinley, county treasurer of said county of Keith, from collecting any of said taxes upon lands of the
To. the foregoing bill of complaint of the said William H. Thomas there were filed answers of the Alfalfa Irrigation District, Elizabeth O. Rogers, Elizabeth 0. Rogers as guardian of Erwin F. Rogers and Hazel D. Rogers, John W. Welpton, Charles P. Ross, Exchange Bank of Ogalalla, and the First State Bank of Ogalalla, and others, which denied the material things alleged therein, and pleaded the validity of all the proceedings and of the bonds.
“The record shows that the lands mentioned in the bill were purchased by the appellee from one H. S. Collins on the 14th day of July, 1906, nine years after the bonds had been delivered to IF. 0. Rogers and more than seven years after the bonds were delivered to Elizabeth O'. Rogers under their contracts. During all of this time Collins, the then owner of the lands mentioned in the bill, as well as all other landowners in the district, assented to and acquiesced in the construction of the irrigation ditch, the sale of the bonds, accepted the benefits to their lands arising from the construction of their works, Collins being, as the record shows, the first man to take water from the ditch and apply it to his land. In addition to this, the record further shows that for three years he was an officer of the irrigation district, and necessarily was thoroughly familiar with the entire transaction. During all of that time the validity of the bonds was not questioned by the irrigation district or by any taxpayer therein. Neither is it suggested in the pleadings that the price agreed to be paid for the work was excessive, or that there was any failure to complete the project in compliance with the terms of the contract between Rogers and the irrigation district. * * * After an advertisement for bids for the sale of bonds, and no bids having been received, the irrigation district on September 18,1896, entered into a contract with Rogers for the construction of the irrigation works,*627 wherein the irrigation district agreed to pay 8 cents per cubic yard for the excavation, and no reference is made to the bid, nor is there any provision in the contract requiring the district to give, or Rogers to accept, bonds in payment, so that upon the face of the contract the payments were to be made in cash. The record shows', however, that the payments were made in bonds, he taking the bonds at par value. From the fact that in the bid Rogers offered to do the work for 8 cents per cubic yard payable in bonds, and that the contract provided for the payment of 8 cents per cubic yard, and the further fact that bonds were delivered in payment for the work done under the contract, it is insisted that it affirmatively appears from the record that the board of directors accepted the second proposition contained in the bid, and that the contract must be read as though that provision was contained therein, and, further, that, as a construction fund was not created by the sale of the bonds of the district for cash in the manner contemplated by the statute, the bonds are void.” Rogers v. Thomas, 193 Fed. 952.
We will hereafter refer to the argument of the learned judge who delivered this opinion. A decree was rendered by the district court of the United States for the district of Nebraska in conformity with the opinion and memoranda dismissing the bill of complaint.
The validity of the said bonds has been determined in favor of the bonds, and the proper organization of the said Alfalfa Irrigation District has also been determined in favor of the district. Although said bonds have been declared to be valid by the said courts and the said Alfalfa Irrigation District has been declared to be properly organized under the laws of the state of Nebraska, yet the said plaintiff in this case, regardless of the judgments and decrees of the said courts herein recited, seeks to relitigate all the matters heretofore determined and to have such matters determined adversely to the validity of said bonds and against the proper organization of said district, and to that end recites in his petition the facts alleged in the
It is urged by the plaintiff, Orcutt, that such decree is not binding on him, first, because he was not a resident of the district, and was not then an owner of land within the “Alfalfa Irrigation District;” and he urges, second, that the matter is not res judicata as to the district or to the landowners within it because the owner of the bonds, the defendants Rogers, were sought to be enjoined along with the district, and the district asserted no rights adverse to the defendants Rogers. Considering the first ground of objection- — that is, that the judgment is res judicata as to the plaintiff because he was not a party to it — it is a fundamental rule that the inhabitants or taxpayers of a municipality are bound by any judgment against the municipality. This arises out of the necessity of government, and because, if it were not so, a judgment against a municipal corporation could never be made binding upon the inhabitants of the municipality. If a different rule prevailed, then, when new inhabitants or new taxpayers became interested in the city, the whole matter could be litigated over again. Nothing would be settled by a trial. 1 Herman, Estoppel and Res Judicata, sec. 155, uses this language: “Thus where the validity of a tax is determined, without fraud, in an action against the officers of a county to compel its collection that decision is a bar to an action by the taxpayers of such county to enjoin its collection.” The plaintiff in this case, Orcntt, and all the
In Owens v. City of South Omaha, and Shannahan v. City of South Omaha, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 466, it is said in the syllabus: “(1) A judgment recovered in an action upon a judgment cannot be collaterally assailed upon the ground that the last mentioned judgment was fraudulently obtained. (2) A judgment against a municipal corporation is equally conclusive upon the city and its taxpayers.” In the language of commissioner Ames, who prepared the opinion: “The questions involved in both cases are identical, and for these reasons both will be disposed of as one and in a single opinion.” Case No. 10,989 was for a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax by'the city of South Omaha upon the taxable property within that city, and the issuance of warrants to pay a certain judgment rendered in the district court for Douglas county on the 11th day of April, 1896, in favor of one Catherine Dris
The officials of the city answered in the mandamus case admitting the corporate character of the city, the official capacity of the defendants, the rendition of the judgment in favor of Catherine Driscoll, the assignment of the same to Mary G. Madden, the rendition of the decree in favor of Shannahan, as administrator, in the equity suit .brought by him to set aside the assignment and compel payment to himself, admitting said decree was in force, but denying that it was binding upon the city of South Omaha, upon the grounds that the original judgment against the city in favor of Catherine Driscoll was obtained by fraud, and that the decree in the equity case which adjudged one-half of the judgment to be paid to Shannahan, administrator, was also obtained by fraud and before the case had come on for hearing. At the time of filing the answer in the mandamus case, the city attorney of South Omaha prepared and filed the petition of Owens and others against the city and its officials and Shannahan, administrator, for the purpose of enjoining the payment óf the Driscoll judgment. That petition alleged the same grounds of fraud in respect to the original judgment against the city, and the decree in the equity case which required the city to pay one-half of the judgment to Shannahan as administrator, and also sought to have the judgment in the law action and the decree in the equity case set aside and held for naught, and the judgment perpetually enjoined. After reversing these two judgments, the cases were brought to this court, one upon appeal and one upon petition in error.
It is said in the opinion: “The only question which we think it is necessary to consider or decide is whether the city of South Omaha and its taxpayers were bound by the decree of October, 1897, in the case-of Shannahan v. City of South Omaha. The petition in that case pleaded the
This would seem to be conclusive in the instant case. There are two judgments, one rendered in the district court and affirmed by the supreme court, the other rendered in the United States circuit court of appeals. If the case is not fully adjudicated now, it never can be. Any new settler coming into the district and purchasing land within it may continue to enjoin the proceedings if the present action can be maintained. This would be a travesty on the efficiency of judicial proceedings. It would leave the decree of a court without the power of settlement and adjustment.
Taking up the second reason urged by plaintiff for holding the judgment in this case of Rogers v. Thomas, supra, not to be res judicata of the right of the district, an exam
Courts of equity have the power to determine the rights of codefendants as between themselves as well as with reference to the complainant. Ordinarily, if the plaintiff in such a case waits until the contractor doing the work is barred by the statute of limitations and may not successfully bring an action to recover for the work done, then he is in no condition to assert that the defendant is without the right to hold the bonds.
The evidence sustains the finding, and judgment of the district court. The judgment is therefore
Affirmed.