Oppenheimer v. San Antonio Land & Irrigation Co., 246 F. 934

Oppenheimer v. San Antonio Land & Irrigation Co.

246 F. 934 | 5th Cir. | 1917

WARKER, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). When the appellants brought their suit in the state court for the recovery of *935land, or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure of a lien thereon, that land was in the custody of the United States District Court, being in the possession of its receiver appointed in a suit previously brought therein, in which suit the foreclosure of an asserted lien on that land was sought and had been decreed. .Possession of that land by the United States court was necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. An effect of its so talcing possession was a withdrawal of the property from the jurisdiction of all other courts. That court, during the continuance of its possession, has, as an incident thereto and as ancillary to the suit in which the possession was acquired, jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions respecting the title, the possession, or the control of the property. Wabash Railroad v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 54, 28 Sup. Ct. 182, 52 L. Ed. 379; State of Texas v. Palmer, 158 Fed. 705, 85 C. C. A. 603, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 316; Palmer v. Texas, 212 U. S. 118, 29 Sup. Ct. 230, 53 L. Ed. 435; White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 15 Sup. Ct. 1018, 40 L. Ed. 67; Empire Trust Co. v. Brooks, 232 Fed. 641, 146 C. C. A. 567.

Provision for invoking the exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction mentioned was made in the foreclosure decree entered in the suit in which McGown was appointed receiver. A clause of that decree required the clerk of the court to issue at once notice to all persons having any claims against the San Antonio Eand & Irrigation Company, Limited, or any of its properties, or who might claim any interest in any of its properties, to intervene in the suit upon such claims or demands within six months after the date of the decree. This shows that it was open to the appellants to assert in that court the claims which they were undertaking to have the state court pass upon.

The appellants, in their answer to the receiver’s supplemental and ancillary bill, disclaimed any intention of interfering with the possession of the receiver, or of the court which appointed him, without that court’s consent and order. There is a similar disclaimer in the argument made in their behalf in this court. But it is not made to appear that it was disclosed to the state court that it was not expected to undertake the enforcement of the judgment it was asked to render. The disclaimers mentioned do not make the bringing and prosecution of the suit in the state court any the less an attempt to have the controversy which that suit raised adjudicated by a court other than the one having, as a result of its previously acquired custody or possession of the subject -matter in controversy, exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the claims asserted. Obviously the purpose was to have those claims adjudicated by the state court, and to rely upon that adjudication as binding and conclusive, in whatever other tribunal it might be invoked. The United States court, having first obtained jurisdiction of the matter in controversy, was not in error in restraining proceedings in another court involving the same subject-matter. Such restraint was appropriate to prevent the defeat or impairment of the United States court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 24 Sup. Ct. 399, 48 L. Ed. 629.

The decree is affirmed.