210 Mass. 609 | Mass. | 1912
To his Excellency
Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:
The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, in reply to the questions presented to them, respectfully submit the following answers:
The power, duty and responsibility of the Governor respecting pardons is found in the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Article VIII, Section I, Chapter II of Part the Second provides that “ The power of pardoning offences, except such as persons may be convicted of before the senate by an impeachment of the house, shall be in the governor, by and with the advice of council.” The words “The power of pardoning offences” are
The Governor is not required to ask the advice of the Council in forming his opinion. He may refuse to pardon without first referring the matter to the Council. But if he desires to grant a pardon, he must take the advice of the Council before undertaking to act. This is pointed out clearly in the Opinion of the Justices, 190 Mass. 616, 619, in these words: “ The provision for advice of the Council is a requirement that their approval and concurrence shall accompany the affirmative act and enter into it before it becomes complete and effective.” The power to pardon as vested in the Governor is not absolute but conditional, and that condition is that it shall be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Council. Such is the plain reading of the Constitution; and so far as we know this always has been the practice.
The same principle applies whether the act be a complete or a modified pardon. A commutation of sentence, which is the substitution of a lighter for a more severe punishment, is an exercise of the pardoning power and must be in accordance with the Constitution. It is an act of the Governor which becomes
Although no express reference is made to the Council in R. L. c. 220, § 89, which relates to the commutation of sentences, the statute must be read as subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise the statute would be unconstitutional. It cannot be assumed that the Legislature intended to confer upon the Governor a power which would be beyond its constitutional authority. The power of commutation of sentence, conditional pardon and respite of sentence referred to in this and other sections of the statute is not created by the statute but is derived wholly from the Constitution. The only right of the Legislature is to enact laws to render the exercise of the constitutional power efficient and convenient. Kennedy’s case, 135 Mass. 48.
Mr. Justice Loring, being ill, has not considered these questions.
January 12,1912. Arthur P. Rugg.
James M. Morton.
John W. Hammond.
Henry K. Braley.
Henry N. Sheldon.
Charles A. DeCourcy.