37 A.2d 478 | N.H. | 1944
On March 29, 1944, The House of Representatives, then assembled in special session, by authority of Article 50, Part II, of the Constitution, adopted the following resolution:
"Resolved, that the Speaker of the House of Representatives is hereby instructed to obtain a ruling from the Supreme Court on the following questions:
"Does the General Court have a right to convene itself without the approval of the Governor and Council?
"If the General Court has a right to convene without approval, what proper procedure is necessary?"
The following answer was returned:
To the House of Representatives:
The Justices of the Supreme Court make the following answer to the inquiries contained in your resolution of March 29, 1944, as to *475 the right of the General Court to convene itself without the approval of the Governor and Council:
The Justices of this Court have many times declared that their advisory duty under Article 74, Part II, of the Constitution does not require them to furnish an opinion when the question submitted is not pending and awaiting action in the body propounding the inquiry. Opinion of the Justices,
Moreover, the first question asked differs materially from most questions on which the members of the Court have declined to express advisory views. Usually such questions have related to the legality of proposed legislation, and if the General Court has adjourned while the inquiry is pending and there is no reasonable expectation of a subsequent session of the same Legislature, an answer has been deemed futile. Opinion of the Justices,
Article 3, Part II, of the Constitution contains the following provision: "The senate and house shall assemble biennially on the first Wednesday of January and at such other times as they may judge *476 necessary." These words are plain, simple, and direct. They cannot be construed to mean that the General Court is without authority to reassemble of its own volition after the adjournment of the regular session. They are to be read, however, in connection with Article 50, which provides that the Governor, with the advice of the Council, "shall have full power and authority, in the recess of the general court, to prorogue the same from time to time, not exceeding ninety days, in any one recess of said court."
We interpret the word "recess" to mean the period during which the General Court is not assembled either in regular or special session. The word "prorogue" appears to have been used in its original, primary sense of protract, prolong, or extend. See Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.). It follows that although the General Court has the power to convene without the consent of the Governor and Council, the date of its reassembling may be postponed by executive action under the authority of Article 50. This is but a typical example of the various checks and balances with which the Constitution abounds.
The procedure by which the General Court may call itself into special session is for the Senate and House of Representatives to decide, either by concurrent resolution or other appropriate action if the Legislature is in session, or, if not in session and no specific provision for reassembling exists, by some method which recognizes the rights of all members. As suggested in the brief of counsel, it is not our province to devise a proper method. Our authority is limited to advice on the correctness or incorrectness of specific acts contemplated by the body requesting our opinion. In this connection, however, your attention is called to Opinion of the Justices,
*477THOMAS L. MARBLE. OLIVER W. BRANCH. ELWIN L. PAGE. HENRI A. BURQUE. FRANCIS W. JOHNSTON.
Alexander Murchie and Jonathan Piper furnished briefs and argued the questions orally.