The Honorable Frank J. Corte Jr. Chair, Committee on Defense and Veterans' Affairs Texas House of Representatives Post Office Box 2910 Austin, Texas 78768-2910
Re: Whether a facility must have a license to perform medical abortions, and whether drugs to induce an abortion must be ingested in the presence of the prescribing physician (RQ-0859-GA)
Dear Representative Corte:
You initially asked for our opinion regarding whether a facility must have a license to perform medical abortions.1 You subsequently asked for our opinion regarding "whether drugs that are administered for the purpose of inducing an abortion must be ingested by the patient in the presence of the physician who has prescribed them for her."2 We have consolidated your two requests and consider the questions together.
Abortion facilities in Texas are licensed and regulated under chapter 245 of the Health and Safety Code, the Texas Abortion Facility Reporting and Licensing Act (the "Act"). See generally TEX. HEALTH SAFETY CODE ANN. §§
The licensing requirement of chapter 245 applies to an "abortion facility." See id. § 245.003(a). An "abortion facility" is defined as "a place where abortions are performed." Id. § 245.002(2). Thus, to address your question whether a facility must have a license, we must determine whether a medical abortion that you describe as involving the use of drugs is an "abortion" under chapter 245.
Chapter 245 defines an abortion as
an act or procedure performed after pregnancy has been medically verified and with the intent to cause the termination of a pregnancy other than for the purpose of either the birth of a live fetus or removing a dead fetus. The term does not include birth control devices or oral contraceptives.
Id. § 245.002(1). The plain language of the definition of abortion does not distinguish between the termination of a pregnancy through surgical or medical means. See id.; cf. United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152,160 (5th Cir. 2009) (construing the term "employee" in statute and noting that plain language did not distinguish between "high-level" and "low-level" employees); Exparte Hernandez,
Texas courts rely on dictionaries to determine the meaning of terms not defined in statute. See Center Point Energy Entexv. R.R. Comm'n, 208
S.W.3d 608, 619 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. dism'd) (explaining that Texas courts may rely on commonly used dictionaries to discern the plain meaning of statutory terms) (citing Powell v. Stover,
In your request letter, you generally describe a medical abortion as one caused by the use of drugs. See Oct. Request Letter at 4-5 (describing the use of drugs, primarily Mifeprex ® known colloquially as "RU-486," to induce abortions). Prescribing or providing5 a drug is a deed or something done or a specific method or course of action, and thus is an act or procedure under the common definitions of those terms. If the prescribing or providing of a drug is done with the requisite intent to terminate a pregnancy that has been medically verified, then the prescribing or providing of the drug is an abortion under chapter 245. Accordingly, unless expressly exempted, a facility performing such an act or procedure within the scope of subsection 245.002(1) is an abortion facility that must be licensed under chapter 245.
Because our analysis of this question is focused on medical abortions generally and because questions of intent involve factual considerations that fall outside the purview of an attorney general opinion, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the prescribing or providing of any particular drug is an abortion as defined by subsection 245.002(1).6See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos.
You also inquire whether a drug that is provided with the intent to induce an abortion must be ingested by the patient in the presence of the prescribing physician.7 See Jan. Request Letter *Page 4
at 1. In averring that Texas law requires such a result, you direct us to section
You argue that Health and Safety Code section
Texas statutes do not require a patient to ingest drugs that are provided to the patient with the intent to induce an abortion in the presence of the prescribing physician.
Very truly yours,
GREG ABBOTT Attorney General of Texas
DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. SCHENCK Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
NANCY S. FULLER Chair, Opinion Committee
Charlotte M. Harper Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
