Honorable Dan M. Boulware District Attorney Johnson and Somervell Counties Johnson County Courthouse Cleburne, Texas 76031
Re: Whether the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education exceeded its rulemaking authority in promulgating title 37, section 211.80(a)(1) of the Texas Administrative Code (RQ-293)
Dear Mr. Boulware:
You ask about the validity of title 37, section 211.80(a)(1) of the Texas Administrative Code a regulation through which the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education (hereinafter the commission) requires an applicant for a license as a peace officer, a reserve, and armed public security officer, or a jailer to be a citizen of the United States of America. You urge that the commission has exceeded its authority to promulgate rules under section 415.010 of the Government Code, which grants the commission rulemaking power. We conclude that in this circumstance, the commission has exceeded its rulemaking authority.
The determining factor in answering the question of whether a particular administrative agency has exceeded its rulemaking power is whether the rule is in harmony with the general objectives of the statute which grants that agency rulemaking power. Gerst v. Oak Cliff Sav. Loan Ass'n,
Under this provision, the legislature has granted the commission the discretion to establish minimum standards for licensing certain law enforcement officers. This discretion is not unbridled; the standards must relate only to an applicant's competence and reliability. Furthermore, section 415.010 lists education, training, physical and mental health, and moral character as matters the legislature considered pertinent to an applicant's competence and reliability as an officer, county jailer, or public security officer.
In order to determine whether in promulgating title 37, section 211.80(a)(1) of the Texas Administrative Code2 the commission has exceeded its rulemaking authority, we must determine whether the citizenship requirement harmonizes with the legislative directive of section 415.010 of the Government Code that the commission establish standards relating to competency and reliability. See Gerst. Section 415.010 does not expressly include citizenship in its list of matters bearing on an applicant's competence and reliability. Until 1981, the commission's authorization to establish standards for the employment of peace officers expressly included citizenship as a matter relating to the competency and reliability of peace officers.3 See Acts 1981, 67th Leg., ch. 699, section 1, at 2613 (former V.T.C.S. article 4413(29aa), section 6(c), repealed by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 147, section 6(a), eff. Sept. 1, 1987, see now Government Code chapter 415). In 1981, citizenship was omitted from the list of matters relating to the employment4 of competent and reliable peace officers about which the commission may establish rules. See H.B. 2236, Acts. 1981, 67th Leg., ch. 757, section 3, at 2794-95.
We think this omission is a clear indication of the legislative intent that citizenship not be a qualification for a competent and reliable law enforcement officer. The legislature has withdrawn from the commission the authority to establish a rule requiring that an applicant for a license as a peace officer, reserve, armed public security officer, or jailer be a citizen of this country. See State v. Jackson,
Thus, we conclude that by promulgating title 37, section 211.80(a)(1) of the Texas Administrative Code the commission has exceeded its statutory authority. See, e.g., Bexar County Bail Bond Bd. v. Deckard,
Very truly yours,
DAN MORALES Attorney General of Texas
WILL PRYOR First Assistant Attorney General
MARY KELLER Deputy Assistant Attorney General
RENEA HICKS Special Assistant Attorney General
MADELEINE B. JOHNSON Chair, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Kay H. Guajardo Assistant Attorney General
