Honorable Robert T. Jarvis Grayson County Attorney Justice Center Sherman, Texas 75090
Re: Applicability of House Bill 1434, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1250, at 5046, which relates to purchasing by local units of government, to county attorneys, and related questions (RQ-1881)
Dear Mr. Jarvis:
You ask whether section
Section 140.003, as enacted by House Bill 1434, see Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 1250, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1989, provides in pertinent part:
(a) In this section, `specialized local entity' means:
(1) a district or criminal district attorney;
(2) a juvenile board, juvenile probation office, or juvenile department established for one or more counties; or
(3) an adult probation office or department established for a judicial district.
(b) A specialized local entity shall purchase items in accordance with the same procedures and subject to the same requirements applicable to a county under Subchapter C, Chapter 262 [Local Gov't Code §
262.021 et seq.]. For the purposes of this section, a specialized local entity is treated as if it were a county. A specialized local entity may make a contract with a county under which the county performs purchasing functions for the entity.
Section
The county attorney performs the duties of a district attorney in Grayson County and is subject to the provisions of the Professional Prosecutors Act. Gov't Code §
In your second question you ask us to assume that the "specialized local entity" provision applies in determining whether a "skilled carpenter" comes within the "professional service" exception to the competitive bidding requirements of section 262.023. You do not provide any information regarding the work required to be performed by the carpenter.
Section
The question of whether a contract for the services of a skilled carpenter is a contract for a "professional service" is a fact question that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. We cannot answer fact questions in the opinion process, but we can provide guidelines to use in determining whether the contract in question is a contract for "professional service."
In Attorney General Opinion
Section 21.907 does not define the phrase `professional services.' The courts have not adopted a universal definition of the term; however, several cases suggest that it comprehends labor and skill that is `predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual.' Maryland Casualty Co. v. Crazy Water Co.,
160 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1942, no writ). It no longer includes only the services of lawyers, physicians, or theologians, but also those members of disciplines requiring special knowledge or attainment and a high order of learning, skill, and intelligence. See Attorney General OpinionMW-344 (1981); Black's Law Dictionary 1089-90 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of `profession').
Accordingly, this question must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Very truly yours,
Jim Mattox Attorney General of Texas
Mary Keller First Assistant Attorney General
Lou McCreary Executive Assistant Attorney General
Judge Zollie Steakley Special Assistant Attorney General
Rick Gilpin Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Tom G. Davis Assistant Attorney General
