Opinion No. (2011)
INTRODUCTION
The State Natural Gas Regulation Act (
ANALYSIS
A. The Negotiation Process and Commission Review Under § 66-1838.
Section 66-1838 contemplates two avenues by which a general rate filing may result in a change in the rates of a jurisdictional utility. The first is by negotiations between the jurisdictional utility and affected cities.
If the Commission receives resolutions evidencing an intent to negotiate adopted prior to the expiration of the 60 day deadline in
Subsections (7) and (8) of
When (a) the [C]ommission receives notice or has written documentary evidence on file from cities representing more than fifty percent of the ratepayers within the affected cities which notice or documents either expressly reject negotiations or reject such a resolution or (b) the [C]ommission receives written notice from the jurisdictional utility expressly rejecting negotiations, the rate change review by the [C]ommission shall proceed immediately from the date when the [C]ommission makes such a determination or receives such notice.
Subsection (8) of
When the sixty-day period provided in subsection (4) of this section has expired without the receipt by the [C]ommission of resolutions from cities representing more than fifty percent of the ratepayers within the affected cities evidencing their intent to negotiate an agreed rate change [ ] with the jurisdictional utility, the rate change [review by the commission] shall proceed immediately from the date when the commission makes such a determination.4
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this subsection, if the negotiations fail to result in an agreement upon new rates, the rates requested in the rate filing shall become final and no longer subject to refund if the commission has not taken final action within two hundred ten days after the date of the expiration of the negotiation period or after the date upon which the jurisdictional utility and the cities file a written agreement that the negotiations have failed and that the rate change review by the commission should proceed as provided in subsection (7) of this section.
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this subsection, if the filing is not certified for negotiations, the rate requested in the rate filing shall become final and no longer subject to refund if the commission has not taken final action within one hundred eighty days after the date of the expiration of the sixty-day period provided for in subsection (4) of this section or the date that the commission receives notice or has accumulated written documentary evidence on file from cities representing more than fifty percent of the ratepayers within the affected cities, whichever is earlier, if such notice or documents either expressly reject negotiations or reject such a resolution.
(c) The commission may extend the deadlines specified in subdivision (a) or (b) of this subsection by a period not to exceed an additional sixty days upon a finding that additional time is necessary to properly fulfill its responsibilities in the proceeding.
B. When a Jurisdictional Utility Files a General Rate Application Containing Notice of Its Intent Not to Negotiate With Affected Cities, Must the Commission Take Final Action on the Filing Prior to the Deadline Established in § 66-1838(15)(b), Which Applies When a Rate Application is Not Certified for Negotiations?
Subsection (15) of
The interpretation of
A statute should be construed to “give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.” Piska v. Nebraska Dep‘t of Social Services, 252 Neb. 589, 594, 567 N.W.2d 544, 547 (1997). When construing a statute, it is necessary to “look to the statute‘s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it.” Henery v. City of Omaha, 263 Neb. 700, 705, 641 N.W.2d 644, 648 (2002).
The phrase “filing not certified for negotiations“, in its ordinary and popular sense, can reasonably be construed to apply not only to a filing that is not certified because cities either reject negotiations, or fail to meet the 60 day deadline for seeking negotiations, but also to a filing where the jurisdictional utility has expressed its intent not to negotiate. In either case, the result is that the filing is “not certified for negotiations.” Thus, the plain meaning of the phrase “filing not certified for negotiations” supports concluding that it applies to all instances where a rate filing is not certified for negotiations, including those filings in which a jurisdictional utility states its intent not to negotiate for agreed rates.
This conclusion is also consistent with the purpose and intent of the deadlines for Commission review and final action in
C. If the Commission Must Take Final Action on a General Rate Filing by a Jurisdictional Utility Containing Notice of Its Intent Not to Negotiate With Affected Cities Within the Time Allowed Under § 66-1838(15)(b), Does the 180 Day Period for Commission Final Action Commence (a) At the Expiration of the 60 Day Period Set Forth in § 66-1838(4), or (b) From the Date of Filing by the Jurisdictional Utility?
Having determined that the time period for Commission final action in
“When asked to interpret a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.” Harvey v. Nebraska Life and Health Ins. Guaranty Ass‘n, 277 Neb. 757, 764, 765 N.W.2d 206, 211 (2009). “In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. . .“, and a “court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words that are plain, direct, and unambiguous.” Japp v. Papio-Missouri River Natural Resources Dist., 271 Neb. 968, 973, 716 N.W.2d 707, 711 (2006).
The plain language of
This conclusion is further supported by comparison of the language utilized in
Finally, we have also examined the legislative history of the 2008 amendment which adopted the language contained in the current version of
L.B. 1072 as introduced proposed to amend
Generally, resort to legislative history to aid in the construction of a statute is appropriate only “when its terms require interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.” American Employers Group, Inc. v. Dep‘t of Labor, 260 Neb. 405, 413-14, 617 N.W.2d 808, 815 (2000). As noted previously, the provisions of
To the extent application of the 180 day time period for Commission final action in
While the amendment was apparently intended to address the time period for Commission action in situations where negotiations were possible but affected cities either failed to act within 60 days of filing or declined to negotiate, it is evident that the purpose of the change was to ensure the Commission and Public Advocate had adequate time to conduct a rate change proceeding for filings not certified for negotiations. It is true that construing the provision to apply to cases where
CONCLUSION
We conclude that it would be contrary to the intent and purpose of the Legislature‘s establishment of a time deadline for filings which are not certified for negotiations to construe
While we believe this conclusion best comports with the intent and purpose of
Very truly yours, JON BRUNING Attorney General
____________________________ L. Jay Bartel Assistant Attorney General
Approved: ____________________________ Attorney General