TO: Senator Heath Mello Nebraska Legislature
FROM: Jon Bruning, Attorney General L. Jay Bartel, Assistant Attorney General RE: LB 54 — Whether Legislation Establishing the Base Year for Tax-Increment Financing of Redevelopment Projects as the Year Prior to Commencement of Rehabilitation, Acquisition, or Redevelopment is Consistent with Neb. Const. Art.
Neb. Rev. Stat. §
A. Community Development and Tax Increment Financing ["TIF"]
The Community Development Law, Neb, Rev, Stat. §§
B. Constitutional Authorization of TIF
In 1978, a constitutional amendment was presented to the voters to approve authorizing cities and villages to issue bonds and other evidence of indebtedness to acquire and redevelop substandard and blighted property in a redevelopment project, and to pledge and apply to pay off such indebtedness all taxes levied on the value of real property in excess of the prior year's valuation on property in the project area for a period not to exceed fifteen years. 1978 Neb. Laws, LB 469, § 1. The amendment was adopted and became Neb. Const. art.
C. AnalysisFor the purpose of rehabilitating, acquiring, or redeveloping substandard and blighted property in a redevelopment project as determined by law, any city or village of the state may, notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution, and without regard to charter limitations and restrictions, incur indebtedness, whether by bond, loans, notes, advance of money, or otherwise. Notwithstanding any other provision in the Constitution or local charter, such cities or villages may also pledge for and apply to the payment of the principal, interest, and any premium on such indebtedness all taxes levied by all taxing bodies, which taxes shall be at such rate for a period not to exceed fifteen years, on the assessed valuation of the property in the project area portion of a designated blighted and substandard area that is in excess of the assessed valuation of such property for the year prior to such rehabilitation, acquisition, or redevelopment.
When such indebtedness and the interest thereon have been paid in full, such property thereafter shall be taxed as is other property in the respective taxing jurisdictions and such taxes applied as all other taxes of the respective taxing bodies.
Your question is whether it is permissible under art. VIII, § 12, for the Legislature to amend §
The Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized the following general rules governing the interpretation of constitutional provisions:
The intent and understanding of [the] framers [of a constitutional provision] and the people who adopted it as expressed in the instrument is the main inquiry in construing it . . . The words of a constitutional provision will be interpreted and understood in their most natural and obvious meaning unless the subject indicates or the text suggests they are used in a technical sense. The court may *4 not supply any supposed omission, or add words to or take words from the provision as framed. It must be construed as a whole, and no part will be rejected as meaningless or surplusage, if it can be avoided. If the meaning is clear, the court will give to it the meaning that obviously would be accepted and understood by the layman. . . .It is permissible to consider the facts of history in determining the meaning of the language of the Constitution. . . .It is also appropriate and helpful to consider, in connection with the historical background, the evil and mischief attempted to be remedied, the objects sought to be accomplished, and the scope of the remedy its terms imply.
State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann,
The reference to "the year prior to such rehabilitation, acquisition, or redevelopment" in art. VIII, § 12, does not incorporate any particular temporal requirement establishing when "such rehabilitation, acquisition, or redevelopment" occurs for purposes of determining the base or redevelopment project valuation. While "acquisition" contemplates a relatively fixed time, "rehabilitation" or "redevelopment" are acts which may commence and end at much different points in time. A rehabilitation or redevelopment project may not be completed within a single year, but may span more than one year from commencement to completion. Establishing either the date of execution of the project agreement or commencement of the project as the point in time at which the year prior to rehabilitation, acquisition, or redevelopment occurs for purposes of determining the redevelopment project or "base" value, as opposed to completion of the project, is not, in our opinion, inconsistent with art. VIII, § 12. Such an interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the ordinary meaning of the language employed in this constitutional provision. Accordingly, we conclude that the amendments to §
We point out, however, that use of either the date of execution of the redevelopment project agreement or commencement of the redevelopment project as the effective date for determining the base or redevelopment project valuation for purposes of commencing the division of property taxes will, in the case of projects which take a year or more to complete, reduce the effective period for recapture of incremental tax revenues to less than fifteen years. In order to maximize the tax increment revenues available during the allowable fifteen year recapture period, establishing the effective date for division of taxes at some point after execution of the project agreement or commencement of the project may be appropriate to account for the time taken to complete rehabilitation or redevelopment. To that end, utilizing an effective date for division of taxes tied to completion of the project could help maximize the allowable time period for recapture. For projects with an increase in assessed valuation resulting from redevelopment over a period of years, however, establishing the effective date for division of taxes as the date of completion would result in a base value that would be higher than the value of the property prior to development for a multi-year *5 project, as the base value must be the assessed value for the previous year. We believe, however, that this interpretation is also permissible under art. VIII, § 12, and may be more consistent with the intent to permit use of the maximum amount of the fifteen year recapture period.
Very truly yours,
JON BRUNING Attorney General
L. Jay Bartel Assistant Attorney General
Approved:
_______________________________ Attorney General *1
