REQUESTED BY: Richard P. Nelson, Director, Department of Health and Human Services, Regulation and Licensure
You have requested our opinion on the following: 1. Does Neb. Rev. Stat. §
Neb. Rev. Stat. §
It might be argued that the term "chiropractic physician" is a "word or abbreviation indicating that they are engaged in the treatment or diagnosis of ailments, diseases, injuries, pain . . . of human beings." However, we are of the opinion that such a reading would be overly broad. Neb. Rev. Stat. §
Likewise, Neb. Rev. Stat. §
On all signs, announcements, stationery, and advertisements of persons credentialed to practice osteopathic medicine, chiropractic, podiatry, optometry, audiology, speech-language pathology, medical nutrition therapy, professional counseling, social work, marriage and family therapy, mental health practice, massage therapy, or physical therapy shall be placed the word "Osteopathic Physician, Chiropractor, Podiatrist, Optometrist, Audiologist, Speech-Language Pathologist, Medical Nutrition Therapist, Professional Counselor, Social Worker, Master Social Worker, Marriage and Family Therapist, Mental Health Practitioner, Massage Therapist, or Physical Therapist, as the case may be.
While this statute clearly requires that any sign, announcement and so forth must contain the word "chiropractor" it does not prohibit other words from being placed on the same sign. For example, Neb. Rev. Stat. §
There is a split of legal authority on the question of whether a chiropractor may identify himself or herself as a "chiropractic physician." Generally speaking, of course, this is a question of state law that can vary from state to state. A statute in one state might specifically authorize the use of the term "chiropractic physician" while a statute in another state might explicitly prohibit the use of that term. In other cases, including Nebraska, the state law may be ambiguous. In such circumstances, various courts have reached different conclusions.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has never addressed this question. In our opinion, the most recent state supreme court and the one opinion most relevant to the present inquiry, comes from the State of Wyoming in the case of Johnson v. Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Board of Medicine,
The appellee claims that, by using the term "chiropractic physician," Dean violated § 33-
The statute is clear as to what is prohibited. It does not prohibit the use of the term "chiropractic physician." That term does not represent that the person is engaged in the practice of medicine. We hold that a chiropractor licensed to practice in Wyoming does not violate the medical practice act by using the reference "chiropractic physician."
The Wyoming statute is, in important part, nearly identical to Nebraska statute
Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See, for example, Beverungen v. Briele,
The State Attorney General opinions from other states are also divided on the question. In an opinion dated February 22, 1982, the Attorney General of South Carolina held that a chiropractor may lawfully refer to himself as a chiropractic physician. The South Carolina Attorney General relied on the fact that the South Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that the practice of chiropractic was the practice of a field of medicine. The South Carolina Attorney General stated as follows:
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held, both before and after passage of the Chiropractic Act of 1932, that chiropractic is a field of medicine and that chiropractors are practitioners of medicine, albeit in a narrow field. [citations omitted] In Williams, the court refused to make any distinction between `practitioners of medicine' and `physicians', asserting that to do otherwise would be `straining at a gnat.' [citation omitted] Thus, our Court held in Williams that a duly licensed practitioner of a recognized branch of medicine — including chiropractic — is a physician, at least to the extent that he limits his activities to the scope of his profession.
Like the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the practice of chiropractic is the practice of medicine in Harvey v. State,
The Texas Attorney General in an opinion dated December 28, 1990, said that the Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners could adopt a rule authorizing a chiropractor to use the title "chiropractic physician." The Texas Attorney General stated as follows:
We understand you to ask whether the board is authorized to promulgate a rule permitting a chiropractor to use the title `chiropractic physician'D' in addition to one of the designations that chiropractors are required by [Texas law] to employ. We conclude that it does.
Administrative agencies may promulgate rules when express authority to do so is conferred by statute or when such implied authority is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the statute. [citations omitted] Hence, when a statute expressly authorizes an agency to regulate an industry or profession, it impliedly authorizes the adoption of regulations to accomplish that purpose.
The Texas Attorney General also addressed the fact that Texas law specifically provided that a person licensed by the Texas Board of Chiropractors must use one of the following terms: "chiropractor; doctor, D.C.; doctor of Chiropractic; D.C." The Texas Attorney General said that while Texas law required that one of these terms be used on stationery, signs, etc., the statute did not preclude the use of other properly descriptive terms.
On the other hand, the Attorneys General of Maine, California and Kansas have reached the opposite conclusion about the use of the term "chiropractic physician" based upon the statutes in those states.
As previously noted in this opinion, thoughtful courts and legal practitioners have reached remarkably different conclusions on whether the term "chiropractic physician" may properly be employed by a licensed chiropractor. Under these circumstances, this appears to us to be an issue properly resolved by the Board of Chiropractic.
One important purpose of rulemaking is to resolve ambiguities in a statute. Courts give deference to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes which are rendered by the appropriate rulemaking body. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
In sum, it is our opinion that because Nebraska statutes are ambiguous, it is within the authority of the Board of Chiropractic to resolve this ambiguity and to authorize chiropractors to identify themselves as chiropractic physicians. However, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §
Sincerely,
DON STENBERG Attorney General
