Dear Mr. Lafser:
This is in response to your request for an opinion on the following question:
Was the Land Reclamation Program within the Division of Environmental Quality, Department of Natural Resources, placed under Chapter 36, RSMo, by the State Personnel Law of 1979?
In Opinion No. 237, Bond, 1974, we held that employees of the Land Reclamation Commission were not subject to the merit system provisions in Chapter 36, RSMo, in effect in 1974. Our opinion was based on Section 10.6 of the Omnibus State Reorganization Act of 1974, Appendix B, RSMo 1978, which provides that "all necessary personnel required by the [land reclamation] commission shall be selected, employed and discharged by the commission." We interpreted this provision to constitute a specific exception to Section 10.2 of the 1974 Reorganization Act, which provided that all employees of the Department of Natural Resources were to be appointed by the Department director in accordance with the merit system. Because Land Reclamation Commission employees were to be appointed by the Commission, not the Department director, we found Section 10.2 of the Reorganization Act inapplicable to Commission employees.
Chapter 36 was substantially revised in 1979. Laws 1979, CCS for HB 673. Included was a revision of Section
A system of personnel administration based on merit principles and designed to secure efficient administration is established for all offices, positions and employees, except attorneys, of . . . the department of natural resources [and other designated departments, divisions and agencies]. . . .
The provisions of Section
The primary role of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent from the language used, and where possible to consider the words used in their plain and ordinary meaning.City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian,
As noted earlier, Section
Further, there appears to us to be no rational way to reconcile the differences between the coverage of the merit system as expressed in Section 10 of the 1974 Reorganization Act, with the broadened coverage as expressed in present Section
Our conclusion is buttressed by the familiar rule of statutory construction that a change in a statute is ordinarily intended to have some effect, and the legislature will not be presumed to have intended a meaningless or useless act. City of WillowSprings v. Missouri State Librarian, supra. The legislature had previously amended Section
We would note that our opinion that the provisions of present Section
Section
CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of this office that pursuant to Section
The foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve, was prepared by my assistant, Dan Summers.
Very truly yours,
JOHN ASHCROFT Attorney General
