REQUESTED BY: Dear Senator:
You have sent us a copy of L.B. 140, and have asked us about the constitutional validity of two provisions of the statute which would be amended by this bill. Ordinarily, in accordance with the policy outlined in the letter from Mr. Clarence A. H. Meyer, then Attorney General, to the Clerk of the Legislature, dated December 28, 1972, and found on page 36 of Volume 1 of the 1973 Legislative Journal, we do not give opinions to individual senators as to the constitutionality of bills which have already become law.
On the surface, it would appear that we would be precluded from giving you an opinion on the matters you ask about because of this policy. However, we have discussed this matter with you verbally, and we understand that one of the purposes of the bill is to repeal a possibly unconstitutional provision, and that you therefore need this opinion to determine the necessity of the passage of the bill.
Section
After examining Chapter 6, article 4 of the statutes, we have concluded that it is not necessary for us to render an opinion as to the constitutionality of this provision, because it appears to be inoperative.
We have gone through all of Chapter 66, article 4 of the statutes, as amended, and find no provision therein for the transfer of any funds by the State Treasurer to the counties. At one time, section
You also ask about the constitutionality of having an appointed official such as the Tax Commissioner removing or suspending an elected official. We gather that you are referring to the portion of section
". . . Failure or refusal by any county officer to take the necessary corrective action according to law shall in and of itself be deemed grounds for suspension and removal of such officer in accordance with the procedure outlined in sections
25-21,147 and25-21,148 . . . ."
We will discuss this question with the same understanding that we had with respect to your first question, that the purpose of your asking is to determine the necessity of repealing a possibly unconstitutional provision.
We believe your question involves a misunderstanding of the procedure authorized by section
