Lead Opinion
¶ 1.
This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals
¶ 2. We conclude that LIRC incorrectly denied Operton unemployment benefits. Operton was entitled to unemployment benefits because her actions do not fit within the definition of substantial fault as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a) (2013-14).
f 3. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment compensation Operton is owed.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4. The following undisputed facts, unless otherwise noted, are based on the findings of the Department of Workforce Development's (DWD) administrative law judge (ALJ) that LIRC adopted. From July 17, 2012 to March 24, 2014, Operton worked as a full-time service clerk for Walgreens. Operton's employment sometimes entailed more than one hundred cash-handling transactions in a day during the twenty months she was employed full-time by Walgreens. She completed an estimated 80,000 cash-handling transactions
f 5. During her period of employment, Operton made various cash-handling errors. First, on October 19, 2012, Operton accepted a Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) check for $8.67 when the check should have been for $5.78. As a result, Walgreens lost $2.89 and gave Operton a verbal warning as punishment for her mistake.
f 6. Next, on February 12, 2013, Operton accepted a WIC check for $14.46, but did not get the customer's signature on the check. On March 6, 2013,
¶ 7. A few months later, Operton took a WIC check for $27.63 before the date on which it was valid. Walgreens was unable to process the check, and Oper-ton received a final written warning.
¶ 8. On January 1, 2014, Operton returned a WIC check for $84.95 back to a customer that the customer had tried to use to purchase $84.95 worth of goods. Walgreens suffered a monetary loss of $84.95 because of this error and gave Operton an additional final written warning. And, on January 29, 2014, Operton received another final written warning as well as a two-day suspension after she accepted a check for $6.17 even though it was valid for $6.00, thereby causing Walgreens to lose seventeen cents. Soon after, a customer attempted to pay for $9.26 worth of items using a food share debit card, but the customer left the store without completing the transaction on the pin pad, which caused Walgreens to suffer a monetary loss of $9.26. Operton was issued another final written warning, which stated that any additional cash-handling errors would lead to her termination.
¶ 9. Furthermore, on March 22, 2014, Operton allowed a customer to use a credit card to purchase $399.27 worth of items, but did not check the customer's identification in violation of Walgreen's policy that employees must check a customer's identification on credit card purchases over $50. As a result, Walgreens suffered a monetary loss of $399.27. Walgreens later found out that the credit card was stolen when a manager was contacted by police.
f 11. After being terminated, Operton filed for unemployment benefits. Walgreens contested her request and contended that she was terminated due to an inability to perform her job. And, initially, the DWD denied Operton unemployment benefits based on misconduct.
¶ 12. Operton appealed and an ALJ for the DWD held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Operton was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The ALJ found that there was "no evidence that the employee intentionally or willfully disregarded the employer's interests by continuing to make cash-handling errors. Additionally, her actions were not so careless or negligent so as to manifest culpability or wrongful intent."
¶ 13. However, the ALJ denied Operton unemployment benefits and concluded that Operton was terminated for substantial fault. The ALJ reasoned that Operton "did not dispute that the transactions for which she was given disciplinary action occurred, nor did she provide any testimony to establish that she did not have reasonable control over the actions that led to her discharge. She was aware of the employer's poli
f 14. On September 19, 2014, LIRC adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. Referring to the instance in which Operton failed to check an individual's identification when processing a credit card payment, LIRC stated: "This major infraction, taken together with the final warning regarding earlier cash transactions, persuades the commission that the employee's discharge was due to substantial fault."
¶ 15. The circuit court affirmed LIRC's decision. In doing so, the circuit court deferred to LIRC in its entirety.
¶ 16. The court of appeals set aside LIRC's decision. The court concluded that LIRC "erred in its construction and application of 'substantial fault' to the facts presented."
¶ 17. This court granted LIRC's petition for review. We now affirm the court of appeals and remand to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment compensation Operton is owed.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 18. "When there is an appeal from a LIRC determination, we review LIRC's decision rather than the decision of the circuit court." Masri v. LIRC,
¶ 19. In contrast, this court is "not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute." Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC,
f 20. "Which level is appropriate 'depends on the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the court and the administrative agency.' " UFE Inc. v. LIRC,
f 21. "In according due weight deference, we defer to an agency's statutory interpretation only when we conclude that another interpretation of the statute is not more reasonable than that chosen by the agency." Id., ¶ 105. As such, under due weight deference, the court is tasked with determining whether there is a more reasonable interpretation of the statute. "In order to decide that question, we make a comparison between the agency's interpretation and alternate interpretations. This comparison requires us to construe the statute ourselves." Id.
¶ 22. "We note here that there is little difference between due weight deference and no deference, since both situations require us to construe the statute ourselves. In so doing, we employ judicial expertise in statutory construction, and we embrace a major responsibility of the judicial branch of government, deciding what statutes mean." Cty. of Dane,
¶ 23. In the present case, the level of deference we afford LIRC is inconsequential as LIRC did not provide an articulated interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04 in denying Operton unemployment benefits.
I 24. Specifically, there are three types of actions exempted from the definition of substantial fault. However, the ALJ concluded that Operton's conduct did not fall within any of these categories without reasoning through each provision individually. Importantly, the ALJ never examined Operton's errors to determine if the errors were "inadvertent" under Wis. Stat. § I08.04(5g)(a)2.
The employee did not offer any explanation for not checking the ID which would lead the commission to conclude that she lacked the ability to conform her conduct to the employer's reasonable requirement to check ID for large credit card transactions. This major infraction, taken together with the final warning regarding earlier cash transactions, persuades the commission that the employee's discharge was due to substantial fault. [14 ]
Absent from this reasoning is any discussion of "inadvertent errors" or the conduct the legislature explicitly exempted from the definition of substantial fault.
¶ 26. Accordingly, LIRC did not provide an articulated interpretation of the statute that it then applied. As such, whether we afford LIRC due weight deference or no deference is of no consequence. See deBoer Transp., Inc. v. Swenson,
f 27. It is axiomatic that "the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty.,
¶ 28. "Context is important to meaning." Id., ¶ 46. Accordingly, "statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 29. Moreover, we need not consult extrinsic sources of interpretation if there is no ambiguity in the statute. Id. And, "a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses." Id., ¶ 47 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty.,
¶ 30. These principles guide our interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 108.04 in the present case.
C. LIRC'S Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)
¶ 31. Wisconsin's unemployment compensation statutes embody a strong public policy in favor of compensating the unemployed. This policy is codified in Wis. Stat. § 108.01, which provides: "In good times and in bad times unemployment is a heavy social cost, directly affecting many thousands of wage earners. Each employing unit in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this social cost, connected with its own irregular operations, by financing benefits for its own unemployed workers." Wis. Stat. § 108.01(1).
¶ 32. Consistent with this policy, Wis. Stat. ch. 108 is "liberally construed to effect unemployment compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent upon others in respect to their wage-earning status." Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR,
¶ 33. Nevertheless, not all employees are entitled to unemployment benefits. Under Wis. Stat. § 108.04, an individual may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.
¶ 34. In 2013, the legislature changed the standard an employer must meet to disqualify an employee from receiving benefits. The legislative amendment created a two-tier system for determining when an
one or more actions or conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of his or her employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design of equal severity to such disregard, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer's interests, or an employee's duties and obligations to his or her employer.
§ 108.04(5). The statute then provides examples of several actions that constitute misconduct. § 108.04(5)(a)-(g). If an employee is terminated as a result of any of the statutorily delineated actions or under the general definition of misconduct, then the employee's termination was for misconduct, and the employee is ineligible for unemployment benefits.
¶ 35. After the legislative amendments to the unemployment benefits statutes in 2013,
An employee whose work is terminated by an employing unit for substantial fault by the employee connected with the employee's work is ineligible to receive benefits until 7 weeks have elapsed since the end of the week in which the termination occurs and the employee earns wages after the week in which the termination occurs equal to at least 14 times the employee's weekly benefit rate under s. 108.05(1) in employment or other work covered by the unemployment insurance law of any state or the federal government. For purposes of requalification, the employee's benefit rate shall be the rate that would have been paid had the discharge not occurred.
§ 108.04(5g)(a).
¶ 36. Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(5g) defines substantial fault broadly. It includes "acts or omissions of an employee over which the employee exercised reasonable control and which violate reasonable requirements of the employee's employer." Id. However, the legislature did not disqualify every employee who commits such errors from receiving unemployment benefits.
¶ 37. Instead, the legislature provided three types of conduct that are explicitly exempt from the definition of substantial fault. Under the statute, substantial fault does not include:
1. One or more minor infractions of rules unless an infraction is repeated after the employer warns the employee about the infraction.
2. One or more inadvertent errors made by the employee.
*20 3. Any failure of the employee to perform work because of insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.
Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a). Accordingly, if an employee is terminated for conduct that falls within any of the types of actions described by the legislature in para, (a), an employee's termination was not due to the "substantial fault" of the employee. § 108.04(5g)(a)1-3.
¶ 38. The burden is on the employer to show that the termination was due to the substantial fault of the employee. This is consistent with our past cases interpreting the unemployment benefits statutes in which we have held that "the party (the employer here) resisting payment of benefits has the burden of proving that the case comes within the disqualifying provision of the law. . . ." Brauneis,
¶ 39. Each of the provided-for exceptions are similar in nature insofar as they remove a type of conduct from what is considered substantial fault. Specifically, the statute exempts from the definition of substantial fault conduct that suggests the employee was prone to accidental errors or simply unable to adequately perform his or her job.
¶ 40. A review of the three types of actions the legislature exempted from substantial fault gives context to the definition of substantial fault. Wisconsin Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. removes minor infractions from the type of conduct that is substantial fault, unless the
¶ 41. Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)3. provides that an employee was not at substantial fault for his or her termination if the employee was incapable of performing the work the employment required. By its plain language, this provision includes employees who are terminated for a lack of skill as well as employees who are not able to master job performance.
¶ 42. Operton does not contend that her conduct is exempt from substantial fault under either Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. or § 108.04(5g)(a)3. Rather, Op-erton contends that her conduct does not fall within the definition of substantial fault because the errors for which she was discharged were "inadvertent" errors.
¶ 43. Accordingly, at issue in the present case is LIRC's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., which exempts from substantial fault, "One or more inadvertent errors made by the employee." As discussed above, LIRC's decision contains no articulated interpretation of this subparagraph. Accordingly, we
¶ 44. Under Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., an employee's termination is not for substantial fault if the termination resulted from one or more inadvertent errors. Inadvertence is defined as "[a]n accidental oversight; the result of carelessness." Inadvertence, Black's Law Dictionary, 827 (9th ed. 2009); see also Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Kaiser,
¶ 45. It is important to view Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. in context to ascertain the types of conduct to which it applies. Notably, § 108.04(5g)(a)1. makes a distinction that § 108.04(5g)2. does not. Specifically, § 108.04(5g)(a)1. provides that one or more minor infractions does not constitute substantial fault unless an infraction is repeated and the employer has previously warned the employee about the infraction. In contrast, § 108.04(5g)(a)2. contains a different definition. There, an employer's warning is not dispositive
¶ 46. Finally, the statute does not state whether there is a limitation on the number of inadvertent errors an employee may commit before the employee's errors are no longer inadvertent. However, we need not determine if a numerical limit exists. Under the facts of this case, it suffices to interpret the statute to mean that multiple inadvertent errors, even if the employee has been warned about the errors, does not necessarily constitute substantial fault.
D. Application of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)
¶ 47. In the present case, we must determine whether Operton's errors are exempted from the statutory definition of substantial fault. Specifically, we must determine whether Operton was terminated by Walgreens for "one or more inadvertent errors" during the course of her employment. We conclude that she was, and therefore her actions are exempted from the definition of substantial fault, and she is entitled to unemployment compensation.
¶ 48. At the outset, we note that LIRC's findings of fact within its misconduct analysis support our conclusion. LIRC found that none of Operton's errors was intentional or willful. Specifically, LIRC found that "there is no evidence that the employee intention
¶ 49. However, despite these findings, LIRC concluded that Operton was not entitled to unemployment compensation because she was terminated from Wal-greens for substantial fault.
¶ 50. However, Operton's eight cash-handling errors were not so egregious as to warrant the conclusion that the errors were transformed from inadvertent to reckless or intentional under the facts of this case. Her errors occurred over a 21-month time period when Operton completed approximately 80,000 cash-handling transactions. Accordingly, we conclude that Operton's eight accidental or careless errors were, as a
¶ 51. The length of time between Operton's errors supports this conclusion. Operton went months without making an error. For example, after Operton's cash-handling error on October 19, 2012, she did not commit another error until February 12, 2013. Likewise, after her cash-handling error on July 26, 2013, she did not commit another error until January 1, 2014. Therefore, there were substantial periods of time in which Operton performed the duties of her job error-free.
¶ 52. Moreover, Operton was not repeatedly making the same error.
¶ 54. Consequently, as a matter of law, Operton's errors are the type of conduct the legislature intended to exempt from substantial fault.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that LIRC incorrectly denied Operton unemployment benefits. Operton was entitled to unemployment benefits because her actions did not fit within the definition of substantial fault as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g). Stated more fully, Operton was terminated for committing "One or more inadvertent errors" during the course of her employment, and therefore pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2., she was not terminated for substantial fault. We further conclude that, as a matter of law, Operton's eight accidental or careless cash-handling errors over the course of 80,000 cash-handling transactions were inadvertent.
By the Court.—The court of appeals is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the Labor and Industry Review Commission.
Notes
Operton v. LIRC,
The Honorable John C. Albert of Dane County presided.
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.
Neither side disputes that this is roughly the number of cash-handling transactions that Operton completed.
In the matter of Lela Operton, Hearing No. 14001606MD (June 4, 2014).
Id.
Id.
Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC, September 19, 2014).
Operton,
Id., ¶ 32.
It is not entirely clear what role the substance of an agency's interpretation does or should play in determining the level of deference. Many of our cases discussing the levels of deference focus not on the presence or substance of an agency's
As discussed more in depth below, Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. exempts inadvertent errors by an employee from the type of conduct included in substantial fault.
In the matter of Lela Operton, Hearing No. 14001606MD (June 4, 2014).
Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC, September 19, 2014).
Though enacted in 2013, these amendments became effective on January 5, 2014.
This definition of inadvertent is not inconsistent with the way in which the court of appeals defined inadvertent in Easterling v. LIRC,
Lela Operton v. Walgreen Co., ERD No. 14001606MD (LIRC, September 19, 2014) (adopting DWD administrative law judge's findings).
Id
We agree with LIRC that Operton's actions fall within the general definition of substantial fault before the exceptions are considered. Operton exercised reasonable control over the cash-handling transaction, and Walgreens' expectation that she handle such transactions properly was reasonable.
It is worth noting that LIRC found that Operton was a conscientious employee, and her supervisor offered to serve as a reference for her following her termination from Walgreens.
We leave open whether there is a point at which the number of errors that seem inadvertent in isolation cease to be inadvertent when viewed in their totality. Because we conclude that, under the facts of this case, Operton's eight errors were inadvertent, we need not reach this issue.
Concurrence Opinion
¶ 57
{concurring). Wisconsin was the first state in the nation to have an unemployment compensation law.
f 58. I agree with the court's mandate. The employer has the burden of proving that Lela Operton is not eligible for unemployment benefits. It has not met this burden. Lela Operton wins.
f 59. I do not join the majority opinion for two principal reasons: (1) This is a "no deference" case.
(1)
¶ 60. This is a "no deference" case. The court of appeals got it right: De novo review is appropriate because LIRC "is applying a new statute to a new concept." Operton v. LIRC,
(2)
¶ 61. The majority opinion's analysis of Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. significantly strays from the statutory text. It injects two extra-statutory considerations into its analysis of § 108.04(5g)(a)2.
¶ 62. The first statutory misstep is that the majority opinion adds the idea of a "warning" to Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. The court of appeals got it right, concluding that "[t]he ALJ and LIRC erred in merging the 'warning' component set forth in the 'infraction' exception in § 108.04(5g)(a)1. with the 'inadvertent error' exception in § 108.04(5g)(a)2. ... Inadvertent errors, warnings or no warnings, never meet the statutory definition of substantial fault." Operton,
¶ 63. Although the majority opinion concedes that the "inadvertent errors" language in § 108.04(5g)(a)2.
¶ 64. I agree with Judge Lundsten's concurrence in the court of appeals: "Warnings are not relevant under the 'inadvertent errors' alternative." Operton,
¶ 65. The second statutory misstep occurs when the majority opinion "leave[s] open whether there is a point at which the number of errors that seem inadvertent in isolation cease to be inadvertent when viewed in their totality. ..." Majority op., ¶ 54 n.21. By reserving this question, and thus including this extra-statutory consideration in its analysis, see majority op., ¶¶ 51-53, the majority opinion once again performs a statutory analysis that is not tethered to the statutory language.
¶ 66. The statutory language provides that substantial fault does not include "one or more inadvertent errors . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)2. According to this text, the "inadvertent errors" analysis contains no numerical limits.
¶ 68. These missteps demonstrate that the majority opinion does not apply the rule that the unemployment compensation law is to be "liberally construed to effect unemployment compensation coverage for workers who are economically dependent upon others in respect to their wage-earning status." Princess House, Inc. v. DILHR,
f 69. For the reasons set forth, I conclude that Lela Operton prevails, but I do not join the majority opinion.
¶ 70. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wisconsin State AFL-CIO; Brief of Amicus Curiae Wisconsin Employment Lawyers Association.
I have difficulty with footnote 12 of the majority opinion. I do not understand the nature and scope of the majority opinion's reference to the "facts that pertain to the nature of the legal issue" or to the "substance of an agency's interpretation," which it refers to as a "threshold question." Nothing suggestive of this remark has been raised or briefed in the instant case.
See also Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State, Div. of Hearings & Appeals,
Thus, due weight deference and no deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute are similar. Under both due weight deference and no deference, the reviewing court may adopt, without regard for the agency's interpretation, what it views as the most reasonable interpretation of the statute. When due weight deference is accorded an agency, however, a reviewing court will not reverse the agency's statutory interpretation when an alternative interpretation is equally reasonable. In contrast, in a no deference review of an agency's statutory interpretation, the reviewing court merely benefits from the agency's determination and may reverse the agency's interpretation even when an alternative statutory interpretation is equally reasonable to the interpretation of the agency.
Compare Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a)1. (Substantial fault does not include "[o]ne or more minor infractions of rules unless an infraction is repeated after the employer warns the employee about the infraction.") (emphasis added) with § 108.04(5g)(a)2. (Substantial fault does not include "[o]ne or more inadvertent errors made by the employee."). See also Operton,
Operton,
For a more complete evaluation of the court's characterization of existing law in Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC,
Concurrence Opinion
¶ 71.
(concurring). I join the court's opinion. I write separately to make a brief observation about agency deference. While the subject of agency deference may currently be a "hot button" issue, the law in Wisconsin on the subject is well-established: under proper circumstances this court will defer, to varying degrees, to an agency's interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp.,
¶ 72. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
Concurrence Opinion
¶ 73.
{concurring). Although I join the majority opinion, I write separately to question whether this court's practice of deferring to agency interpretations of statutes comports with the Wisconsin Constitution, which vests judicial power in this court—not administrative agencies. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) asks this court to give "great weight" deference to its interpretation of the term "substantial fault" in Wis. Stat. § 108.04(5g)(a) (2013-14). Because "LIRC did not provide an articulated interpretation of § 108.04 in denying Operton unemployment benefits," the majority properly conducts an independent interpretation of § 108.04 without giving deference to LIRC. Majority op., ¶¶ 23-26. The doctrine of deference to agencies' statutory interpretation is a judicial creation that circumvents the court's duty to say what the law is and risks perpetuating erroneous declarations of the law. Because the court in this case fulfills its interpretive duty, I join the majority opinion but urge the court to reconsider its decades-long abdication of this core judicial function.
f 74. This court's current deference framework arises out of two cases from the mid-1990s. In Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC,
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of administering the statute; (2) Q the interpretation of the agency is one of long-standing; (3) [] the agency employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the interpretation; and (4) [] the agency's interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute.
Id. at 660 (citing Lisney v. LIRC,
¶ 75. In UFE Inc. v. LIRC,
¶ 76. Examination of the pr^-Harnischfeger standard for reviewing agency interpretations of statutes suggests that the Harnischfeger court did not simply apply existing law—it recast it.
¶ 77. Harrington presented this court with a dispute over the interpretation of a statute. Observing that "[t]he statute in question was enacted and has been
¶ 79. Acknowledging respect for a longstanding interpretation of a statute is a far cry from a judicial doctrine of "great weight" deference that relinquishes the court's responsibility to independently interpret statutes. Equally troubling is the possibility that seven elected justices—or, indeed, any elected judge accountable to the people of Wisconsin—might give "great weight" deference to an agency decision by a single, unelected administrative law judge or hearing examiner against whom the people have no recourse. Administrative rulemaking already shifts some lawmaking power to unelected officials and away from the processes of passage and presentment contemplated by our constitution. Judicial deference to executive interpretations further widens the gap between the people and the laws that govern them.
f 80. The framers of our constitutions chose to disperse authority within the federal Republic and our state because they recognized that "[t]he accumulation
¶ 81. I am authorized to state that Justices MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN and DANIEL KELLY join this concurrence.
See, e.g., Lisney v. LIRC,
Latin for "an entire thing," as a legal term res integra refers to an "undecided question of law" or a "case of first impression." Res Integra, Black's Law Dictionary 1503 (10th ed. 2014) (citing Res Nova, id. at 1504).
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court also cited Edwards' Lessee v. Darby,
"In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people." The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).