In re: EDUCATION-SCHOOL PROPERTY-LEASES
Op. Atty Gen. 622a6; cr. 161B-11
Office of the Minnesota Attorney General
November 13, 2023
KEITH ELLISON, Attorney General
Correcting citations in Op. Atty Gen. 622a6; cr. 161B-11(Oct. 25, 2023)
(correcting citations in Op. Atty Gen. 622a6; cr. 161B-11(Oct. 25, 2023))
November 13, 2023
Christian R. Shafer
Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A.
444 Cedar Street, Suite 2100
St. Paul, MN 55101
Re: Request for Opinion
Dear Mr. Shafer:
Thank you for your letter of September 21, 2023, which requests an opinion from this Office on whether an education district may purchase a property subject to private commercial leases. You represent the Hiawatha Valley Education District (HVED), an education district created under
BACKGROUND
The facts as you present them are that HVED is comprised of twelve-member school districts and two charter schools. HVED provides special education, out-of-school placement options, alternative education programs, and other education-related programs and services to children, particularly children with disabilities.
HVED currently houses its operations at five sites and seeks to consolidate its facilities. The district is in discussion with a mall property at a central location that would be substantially renovated to meet the district‘s needs. Your letter indicates the mall has sufficient space (approximately 83,000 square feet) and flexibility for current programming and anticipated future expansion opportunities. Having all HVED staff at one location will enhance the safety and security of students given the increased total number of staff near a student at any given time.
HVED will be using at least ninety percent of the property under consideration to house its educational programs. The remaining ten percent of the property is subject to commercial tenant leases of varying duration and terms. At least one lease extends to 2032 but allows either the
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
- Is an education district authorized to purchase a mall property subject to private tenant leases if the primary purpose of the purchase is to house educational programs, and if the leased spaces are not necessary for, and the lease does not interfere with, the educational programs taking place on the mall property?
- Would the purchase of a property subject to existing leases qualify as a purchase for a valid public purpose?
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
Where the education district will use ninety percent of the purchased property for its current and anticipated educational programs and leases for the remaining ten percent are for commercial operations that do not interfere with district educational programs, the existing leases do not disqualify the purchase of the property. Under these facts, purchasing the property subject to existing commercial leases is a purchase for a valid public purpose if the terms of the leases are determined to be in the best interests of the district.
ANALYSIS
Authority to Purchase Property Subject to Leases. Your letter acknowledges that school boards are statutorily authorized to purchase property and lease out property, but it is not readily apparent whether school districts can purchase property subject to an existing lease. You argue that such authority can be implied based on various principles of statutory construction.
First, however, as you note the board of an education district formed under
School boards of independent school districts are authorized to purchase property necessary for school purposes.
You argue that the power to purchase real property subject to a lease must be implied to give effect to both the purchase authority and lease out authority of
We agree that the authority to purchase subject to an existing lease may be fairly implied from subdivisions 1 and 4 of
To effectuate the legislative intent in subdivision 4 that the board “may determine terms and conditions of the lease,” the school district must examine the terms of the existing leases to ensure not only the absence of a conflict with the district‘s educational uses of the building, but that the terms of the leases are reasonable and that assuming them is in the district‘s best interests. See Op. Atty. Gen. 622a6 (Sept. 25, 1946) (in opinion predating
Public Purpose. You also ask us to opine whether the described purchase would qualify as one for a valid public purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court has construed “public purpose” to mean “such an activity as will serve as a benefit to the community as a body and which, at the same time, is directly related to the functions of government.” City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 N.W.2d 594, 599 (1970). As noted in your letter, the applicable caselaw holds that an “incidental” private benefit does not disqualify a transaction as being fundamentally for a valid public purpose. See Visina v. Freeman, 89 N.W.2d 635, 643 (Minn. 1958). We agree that the benefit accruing to private commercial lessees who occupy approximately ten percent of school property that is not necessary to the district does not necessarily negate the public purpose.
This office analyzed the public purpose question in an opinion regarding whether a municipal liquor store could extend credit to business customers. Op. Atty. Gen 218-R (Sept. 26, 1978). That was a somewhat analogous situation in that the authority to extend credit was not express in statute. After determining that this authority could be fairly implied from the authority to operate the liquor store, we concluded that credit liquor sales could serve a public purpose because the Legislature had determined that operation of municipal liquor stores serves the public good. However, our opinion cautioned that business practices must comply fully with applicable statutes, and credit could not be extended indiscriminately.
Similarly, the Legislature has determined that leasing out property not needed by school districts is a valid function of a district and serves the public good. See
Thank you again for your inquiry, and we hope this opinion is helpful to you.
KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General
Encl: Op. Atty. Gen. 469-a-15 (Nov. 20, 1969)
Op. Atty. Gen. 622a6 (Sept. 25, 1946)
Op. Atty. Gen. 218R (Sept. 26, 1978)
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