300 N.W. 359 | Wis. | 1941
Lead Opinion
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *498
Action brought by John A. Onsrud against S. V. Kenyon to recover the balance of $4,000 due as principal on a promissory note. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was commenced in violation of sec.
On this appeal from the judgment plaintiff contends that sec.
These contentions cannot be sustained. Plaintiff, as sole owner of the note and mortgage involved herein, is not deprived, as he contends, of valuable rights for a long and indefinite time. As such sole owner, he could and, on October 5, 1940, did bring an action to recover on the note and mortgage by the foreclosure thereof; and if there is a deficiency judgment upon the confirmation of a foreclosure sale, he can proceed to enforce payment thereof by attachment, garnishment, or execution as in the case of any judgment in an action based on solely the note. His contract is intact; he has not actually lost any contract right; and his property right survives. There is a change in but the order or method of procedure in that his *500 remedy is in part postponed, but the limitation does not exceed the bounds of reason.
As was stated in Conley v. Barton,
"It is recognized that the legislature may modify or change existing remedies or prescribe new modes of procedure without impairing the obligation of contracts if a substantial or efficacious remedy remains or is given, by means of which a party can enforce his rights under the contract." See alsoNorthwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Neeves,
By express provision in sub. (1) of sec.
"that a public economic emergency does, and continues to, exist in the state of Wisconsin. A widespread drought within the state has aggravated and made more serious the conditions already existing. This economic emergency has deprived thousands of people in this state of employment, has necessitated the expenditure of many millions of public funds within this state to prevent starvation, has thrown the burden of support of thousands on the state and nation, has destroyed property values, and has caused many of the people of this state to lose their homes, their farms and their places of business by foreclosure of mortgages or execution upon judgments, and threatens the loss of homes, lands and business which furnished those in possession the necessary shelter and means of subsistence and livelihood, and resulting in increased burdens on the state. In view of this emergency it is deemed necessary to *501 adopt reasonable means to safeguard and preserve through this crisis the vital economic structure upon which the good of all depends. Such measures are designated `emergency legislation.' All laws so designated shall expire when the emergency ceases, which shall be so proclaimed by the governor, and in any event, not later than April 1, 1939, unless another date is specifically provided."
To such a legislative declaration and judgment there are applicable the rules stated by Mr. Justice STONE in SouthCarolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.,
"Being a legislative judgment it is presumed to be supported by facts known to the legislature unless facts judicially known or proved preclude that possibility. Hence, in reviewing the present determination we examine the record, not to see whether the findings of the court below are supported by evidence, but to ascertain upon the whole record whether it is possible to say that the legislative choice is without rational basis."
Upon the hearing in the circuit court there was considerable proof in respect to farm land values, prices paid for agricultural products and farmers' purchasing power in the prewar years of 1912 to 1914, and the years following until 1940, and although there were conflicts in the evidence, it reasonably admitted finding that in this state there was a gradual rise in such values and prices until about 1921, the year in which the note and mortgage involved herein were executed, when farm values were one hundred sixty-eight per cent of the prewar level; and that there was then a decline until in 1933 and 1934 there was reached the low point in farm values and they were but eighty per cent of prewar values, and that although there were some fluctuations in March, 1940, they were still but eighty-four per cent thereof, which was still but half of the values in 1921. In view of the proof establishing the existence of such facts and other distressing economic conditions, it cannot be said that there was no rational basis for the legislative *502 declarations in enactments in 1935 to 1939 as to the continuing existence of the disastrous and distressing conditions and the consequent public economic emergency stated therein. Whether under the facts known to the legislature the existing conditions constituted such an emergency, the extent and effect and duration thereof, and what relief by legislation was necessary and appropriate to alleviate the disastrous consequences and afford due protection to all parties concerned, were matters to be determined by the legislature, and its judgment is presumed to be supported by facts within its knowledge, unless facts are proven that preclude that conclusion.
It is not necessary, as appellant contends, that great and public disaster or calamity result in order to constitute such an emergency as to justify the enactment, in the exercise of the police power, of a temporary legislative limitation on the exercise of a contractual right. An emergency justifying such legislation may exist when there is a great and public need for such relief, although it does not constitute a great public disaster or calamity. As the court said in Home Building Loan Asso. v. Blaisdell,
"The reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may be deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as is the reservation of state power to protect the public interest in the other situations to which we have referred. And if state power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts in the presence of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, flood or earthquake. That power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent public need demanding such relief is produced by other and economic causes." See also Hanauer v. Republic Building Co., supra, p. 57.
The mere fact that the distressing conditions which existed at the time of the re-enactment of sec.
In support of his contentions appellant relies upon the decisions in First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Arp,
"from our knowledge of conditions, or from the evidence in this record, that the legislature had no basis in fact for its conclusion that an economic emergency then existed which called for the exercise of the police power to, grant relief."
Likewise, because of similar considerations in the case at bar, we cannot say that the legislature had no rational basis for its declaration that the economic emergency and the conditions stated in sub. (1) of sec.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
I think the judgment of dismissal should be reversed. The legislation relied on to support the judgment to my mind clearly violates the provision of the constitution of the United States that forbids a state legislature from enacting a statute that impairs the obligation of contracts. The contract here in suit was entered into prior to the enactment of the statute relied on. It is my understanding that it is such legislation as is here involved that the constitutional provision referred to was inserted to prevent. I understand it was the purpose of that provision to prevent the enactment of such statutes as were passed by some of the states for relief of debtors during and following Shays' Rebellion and like disturbances in other states that preceded the adoption of the constitution. If that idea be historically correct, I am unable to see how, if proper consideration were given to it, the Blaisdel Case,
Statutes that affect remedies fall within the contract clause of the constitution, although they do not directly change the terms of the original contract. Cleary v. Brokaw,
It was held in the Blaisdel Case, supra, in respect of the Minnesota moratorium statute, that such a statute can only be constitutional if it is temporary in its application, and that whether the emergency exists on which its operation depends is always open to judicial inquiry. The suspension of the remedy involved in the Blaisdel Case was limited to two years, and the emergency existing in 1933 when the act was passed had begun in 1932. It is also held in the Blaisdel Case that the provision making the suspension of the remedy conditional on paying a sum equal to the rental value of the mortgaged premises during the extended period saved the statute from being unconstitutional because it thereby prevented the mortgagee from being deprived of the use of the mortgaged property during that period without compensation. And it was held in W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,
As counterbalancing the Nebraska and Iowa cases above cited the opinion of the court cites Wilson B. Co. Liq. Corp. v.Colvard,
Our legislature has adopted a series of moratorium statutes like those enacted by the Iowa and Nebraska legislatures. Our legislature adopted its first such statute in 1933, and re-enacted it without change in 1935. These two statutes took away the action at law on a debt secured by mortgage and were held unconstitutional, as to a series of bonds secured by trust deeds, which bonds were transferable by holders and which deeds gave the right of foreclosure only to the trustee. The ground of the holding was that the statute of 1933 did not place a limit to the time during which the right to bring the action at law was suspended. Hanauer v. Republic Bldg. Co.
It is implied in the Blaisdel Case, supra, that if the emergency that forms the basis of a moratorium statute has expired when a case coming under its terms is tried the statute cannot be applied. It seems to me that the evidence in this case, received without objection, shows beyond reasonable controversy that on January, 1941, when the instant case was decided by the circuit court, the "emergency" of 1932 that resulted in the original enactment of sec.
It is further to be considered that the instant statute suspending the remedy of suit on the mortgage debt, and its incidental rights of attachment, garnishment, and execution, gives no compensatory remedial rights in place of them. This *509
brings the statute under the condemnation of the Blaisdel Case,supra, above stated as implied, and fails to bring it under the rule of the South Carolina State Highway Dept. Case,
For the above reasons briefly stated I am of opinion that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed. If the legislature wants to declare sub. (4) of sec. 282.22, Stats., a permanent statute which will then make it apply only to contracts entered into subsequent to its declaration, it will be well within its province to do so. But it should respect the plain mandate of the United States constitution, sec. 10, art. I: "No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts." It cannot by the subterfuge of declaring what is permanent merely temporary avoid and evade that mandate.