Onorato v. LupoliOnorato v. Lupoli
— In an action, inter alia, fоr specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to convey a parcel of real property, the plaintiff appeals (1) as limited by his brief, from so much of an order оf the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Burstein, J.), dated June 17, 1986, as granted those branches of the defendants’ motion whiсh were for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s first and second causes of action for specific performance, and denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a cause оf action for imposition of a constructive trust, and, (2) from an order of the same court dated Novеmber 19, 1986, which granted the defendants’ motion, inter alia, for cancellation of the lis pendens filed by the plaintiff on thе subject property, subject to certain conditions.
Ordered that the order dated June 17, 1986, is affirmed insofаr as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated November 19, 1986, is affirmed; and it is further,
New York’s Stаtute of Frauds provides, in pertinent part, that a contract for the sale of real property is void unless memorialized in a writing subscribed by the party to be charged (see, General Obligations Law § 5-701 [a]; § 5-703 [2]). The law further рrovides that part performance of an oral contract for the sale of real property can remove it from the bar of the Statute of Frauds and give rise to a cause of actiоn for specific performance (see, General Obligations Law § 5-703 [4]). However, it is well settled that in order to come within the exception permitting enforcement of an oral agreement based on pаrt performance, "[tjhere must be performance 'unequivocally referable’ to the agreement, performance which alone and without the aid of words of promise is unintelligible or at least extraordinary unless as an incident of ownership * * * 'An act which admits of explanation without reference to the alleged oral contract or a contract of the same general nature and рurpose is not, in general, admitted to constitute a part performance’ ” (see, Burns v McCormick,
In the instant case, thе plaintiff and his wife exchanged residences with his wife’s brother and each lived in the other’s home for almоst two years. Each party paid the mortgage and taxes on the residence lived in, but took tax deduсtions on the other residence. Although the plaintiff allegedly expended some $5,000 to $10,000 on maintenanсe, repairs and improvements on his brother-in-law’s property during the nearly two years he and his family lived thеre, such expenditures are not "unequivocally referable” to and do not prove the existence of an oral agreement to convey that property. Such expenditures may be satisfactorily explained by the plaintiff’s desire to improve the surroundings in which he and his family were to live (see, Liebowitz v Mingus,
Furthermore, the court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s
Lastly, with respect to the court’s order canсeling the plaintiff’s notice of pendency on the property in question, we find that since the plaintiff hаs failed to state a cause of action for specific performance, it was appropriate for the court to cancel the lis pendens filed against the property (see, Riina v Bitterlich,