104 Minn. 491 | Minn. | 1908
This is an action by the owner of a house and lot to recover damages resulting from water claimed to have been negligently allowed to flow upon the lot by appellant after grading and improving certain adjoining school grounds. The trial court found that before the property was graded and the retaining wall built the natural slope of the school ground was such that the surface water flowed in a southwesterly direction across a portion of the lot now owned by respondent, but that it did not flow in sufficient quantities to cause damage; that at that time respondent’s lot was substantially on a level with the westerly portion of the school property; and that the grading of the school lot and the building of the wall changed the watercourse so that it flowed over the wall onto the lot owned by respondent in sufficient quantities to cause damage. The court also found that a gutter had been constructed along the side of the wall for the purpose of carrying the water off the school property, but that for three years last past the same had been permitted to fall into decay and become clogged, so that the water ran over the wall and onto respondent’s premises. Respondent recovered a verdict, and appellant insists on this appeal that the city is not liable for the reason that the public school system of the city of St. Paul constitutes an independent school district, and that the care and custody of school property is entirely under the control of the board of school inspectors, and under the rule laid down in Bank v. Brainerd School District, 49 Minn. 109, 51 N. W. 814, the district is not liable for whatever damage may have been occasioned by the grading of the lot.
This question is one of great importance to the citizens of St. Paul and other municipalities governed by similar charters, and, having concluded that the case must be decided in favor of appellant upon the
. The rule above stated in Brown v. Winona & S. W. Ry. Co., supra, has often been referred to and approved, and for the sake of clearness may be stated here: “An owner may improve his land for the purpose for which such land is ordinarily used, and may do what is necessary for that purpose. He may build upon it, or raise or lower its surface, even though the effect may be to prevent surface water which before flowed upon it from coming upon it, or to draw from adjoining land surface water which would otherwise remain there, or to shed surface water over land on which it would not otherwise go. * * * ” The Brown case directly involved the question whether it made any difference that the water spread over other land passed to it in a stream,
The complaint charges that appellant was negligent in maintaining improper gutters, and the court so found. But appellant was not obliged to construct any gutter in the first instance, and, there being no continuing duty upon it to maintain the same, the mere fact of ceasing to maintain it did not render the city liable. This case does not belong to that class of cases considered in Pye v. City of Mankato, 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St. 671,’where the city was held liable for intercepting the natural flow of certain waters, gathering them up, and conducting them in another direction by an artificial channel, to the damage of another. Respondent had • acquired no right by prescription, and it is not a case similar to Stoehr v. City of St. Paul, 54 Minn. 549, 56 N. W. 250; nor does the rule of equitable estoppel apply, as defined in Canton Iron Co. v. Biwabik Bessemer Co., 63 Minn. 367, 65 N. W. 643.
Reversed and judgment ordered for appellant.