177 Ga. 491 | Ga. | 1933
J. E. Whitley, a resident of the City of LaGrange, made to the municipal authorities a return of property for taxation for the year 1933. He omitted from his return certain tangible personal property which was not actually situated within the limits of the municipality. The city authorities caused this property to be assessed and added to his return. Whitley brought a suit against the mayor and council to enjoin the assessment. The defendants filed an answer, and the case was submitted to the trial judge upon an agreed statement of facts. An injunction was granted, and the mayor and council excepted. The agreed statement was as follows:
“1. J. E. Whitley resides in and has his legal domicile in La-Grange, Troup County, Georgia. J. E. Whitley does business under the trade-name of the Whitley Construction Company, and as such is engaged in the business of a paving contractor, paving streets in cities and highways. The said J. E. Whitley and Whitley Construction Company have only one office and place of business, which office and place of business is located in the City of LaGrange, Troup County, Georgia.
“2. J. E. Whitley, trading as Whitley Construction Company,*492 on January 1, 1932, and at all times thereafter, owned certain road building and paving equipment consisting of paving machinery, concrete mixers, pumps, trucks, and other machinery used in the business of a paving contractor, which equipment was of the value of at least $25,000.
“3. On January 1, 1932, none of this equipment was in the City of LaGrange, nor has any of said equipment ever been in the City of LaGrange. On January 1, 1932, part of this equipment was located in Bulloch County, .part in Stewart County, and part of it in Pulaski County.
“4. This equipment is moved from place to place, wherever the said Whitley might have use for it in carrying on the business of a paving contractor, and the equipment is left in such city or county where it has been used, after the completion of the contract, either for the paving of a highway or a city street, until such time as another contract is obtained and said equipment is needed, when said equipment is then moved from such place to a location where it is needed for use in fulfilling another paving contract. That none of said equipment is kept permanently in any one place.
“5. J. E. Whitley has never returned said equipment or any part thereof for taxes in any municipality in Georgia, nor has he paid any taxes on any of this equipment in any other municipality. This equipment has not been in any municipality during the year 1932.
“6. J. E. Whitley returns equipment for State and county taxes in Troup County, Georgia, and did return equipment for taxes in said county for the year 1932.”
A municipal corporation can levy no tax, general or special, upon its inhabitants, or upon the property therein, unless the power to do so has been plainly and unmistakably conferred by the State. Southern Express Co. v. Rose Co., 124 Ga. 581 (3), 588 (53 S. E. 185, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 619); Lane v. Mayor &c. of Unadilla, 154 Ga. 577 (114 S. E. 636). The charter of the City of LaGrange provides that the mayor and council “shall have full power and authority, and shall provide by ordinance, for the assessment and collection of an ad valorem tax on real and personal property within the corporate limits of said city, which is subject to be taxed by the State.” Ga. L. 1901, pp. 477, 486, § 25. In view of the authority as thus expressly granted to the City of LaGrange, the
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Lamar in County of Walton v. County of Morgan, 120 Ga. 548 (48 S. E. 243), it was the general policy of this State prior to 1868 that the situs of all property for taxation, whether real or personal, was determined by the residence of the owner, and that in the absence of statute “personal property is to be taxed where the owner resides.” With the exception of a statute relating to railroad companies (Civil Code of 1910, § 872), there has been no general legislation upon this subject affecting municipalities. The decisions in Greene County v. Wright, 126 Ga. 504 (54 S. E. 951), and Fulton County v. Wright, 146 Ga. 447 (91 S. E. 487), depended largely upon the statute relating to railroads, and, with the exception of some general statements, these decisions do not shed any considerable light upon the present con
In County of Morgan v. County of Walton, 121 Ga. 659, 661 (49 S. E. 776), it was said: “Prima facie, personal property is returnable where the owner resides. Under the constitution, the legislature may fix a different situs for all personal property.” See also 44 C. J. 1291, § 4322; 61 C. J. 522, § 635. In City of Blakely v. Hilton, 150 Ga. 27, 35 (102 S. E. 340), it was said that the delegation of authority to the City of Blakely to “put an ad valorem tax . . on all the property in said city,” must be construed in the light of the general rule applicable thereto. Where the language of a statute requires interpretation, it is proper to consider the existing general law as illustrating the intention of the legislature; and unless the contrary appears, it will be presumed that the words of the particular act were used by the legislature in their
If the machinery and equipment sought to be taxed by the City of LaGrange were permanently located without the limits of the State of Georgia, the authorities of this State would have no juris
It is contended by the defendant in error that the property should not be taxed by the City of LaGrange, because it has' received no protection from the laws of. that .city. It is true that the power of taxation is exercised upon the assumption of benefits rendered
Judgment revm'sed.