8 Ga. 439 | Ga. | 1850
By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
These two Acts, so far as they apply to the motion now before me, do not vary in substance. In the former, the Clerk is required to file the original bill in his office for the inspection of all parties in interest, and send up a copy ; in the latter, he is required to retain it and send up a copy. The filing and the retaining
Now, two things are, in the plainest possible way, required to be done by the Clerk. First, ho is required to file and keep, (or retain,) in his office, the original bill; and, second, he is required to send up with the transcript of the record, a copy of that original bill. Such are the requirements of these two Statutes. They were passed through all the forms of legislation, on the 23d day of February, 1850, and on that day they became the laws of the land, and obligatory upon the Courts of justice. _ They took effect from their date. Such is the judgment of this Court. (See case on this subject determined at Miiledgeville in May last, ante p. 380.) They repealed the former law, which authorized the original bill to be sent up. The bill of exceptions in this case was certified on the 21th March, 1850 — one month and four days after the passage of the new laws. This case, therefore, comes under the new laws, and is to be determined by their provisions. The Clerk has not sent up this case according to those provisions. He has not retained in Ms offce the original bill, nor has he sent up a copy of that bill. The case is not, therefore, before us according to law. It is before us according to a law which is now a dead letter on the Statute book, because repealed. For relief against the consequences of a failure to comply with plain provisions of law, upon a suggestion that the Clerk has diminished the record, we are asked to permit the original bill to be withdrawn, to remand it back to the Clerk, and to instruct him to send up a copy of that bill. For several reasons these things cannot be done. Here are two laws which make it the duty of the Clerk of the Superior Court to retain the original bill, to enable the defendant to inspect it. That he has not done, and the defendant has not, in consequence, enjoyed the privilege which the laws give him of inspection. We are asked to allow to be done now, what the law requires to be done when the bill is certified — to allow the Clerk to retain the bill, nunc pro tunc, and this at the expense of a delay of one term. The reply is, that the laws of tire State are binding Up'dn this Court) if they arO constitutional.
If the original bill had been retained, and no copy sent up, it is possible that the case would then be within the rule for suggesting a diminution. But the insuperable difficulty is, that the original bill has not been retained below. That it shall be retained, is an imperious requirement of the Statutes. This view would seem to me to be conclusive.
If the original bill cannot be remanded and placed in the hands of the Clerk, de novo, from whence will he derive a copy? What is there on his files, or belonging to the record in the case, to be copied? Nothing whatever. The plaintiff in error does not complain of any defect in the record,'except that the copy of .the bill has not been sent up — he suggests no diminution in any other particular. He in effect admits, that as to all other particulars, the record is perfect. The Clerk, then, has sent to this Court the whole record as it stands before him. Wherein, then, does the diminution consist ? Denying that part of the plaintiff’s motion which asks that the bill be remanded, suppose we should grant it so far as to require the Clerk to send up a copy ? In that event, the Clerk would be required to furnish us with a copy of a paper which is neither on the files nor the records of his office. He would be required to do an official impossibility. Under the rule, then, there has been, from the concessions of the plaintiff himself, no diminution of any part of the record. All the record is here which could be brought here.
If we should grant this motion, we place it in the power of the plaintiff in error, by the co-operation of the Clerk, in any case, to prevent a bearing at the first term, and in every case to defeat the constitutional requirement, that cases be tried at the first term.
Motion denied, and the writ of error dismissed.