108 Kan. 95 | Kan. | 1920
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On June 23, 1919, the plaintiff filed her petition for a divorce from the defendant. Summons was then issued but was not served. An aliás summons was served on September 4, 1919.
The plaintiff and defendant had lived in Jewell county for a number of years previous to their marriage, March 19, 1910, and, until this action was commenced, lived there most of the time after they were married. The abstract discloses that their■ marriage relations were unpleasant; each accused the other of extremely improper conduct. Oh June 21, 1919, the defendant took a child of the plaintiff and defendant away from the plaintiff with her consent, stating that he would return with the child on the Sunday following to partake of a Sunday dinner; the defendant, instead of returning, went to Shawnee, Okla. The plaintiff then commenced this action and followed the defendant and the child to that place, where the defendant commenced an action for divorce against the plaintiff, and caused summons to be served on her on June 25, 1919. The defendant obtained an order from the court in Oklahoma giving to him the custody of the child, and afterward obtained another order permitting him to take the child to Saline county, Kansas, where the defendant was employed. Summons was there served on him in the present action. On September 30, Í919, the defendant filed a motion .to stay proceedings in this action on the ground that he had commenced an action for divorce in Oklahoma, and that summons had been served on the plaintiff prior to the service of summons on the
“The pendency of an action in the court of one state or country is not a bar to the institution of another action between the same parties and for the same cause of action in a court of another state or country, nor is it the duty of the court in which the latter action is brought to stay the same pending a determination of the earlier action, even though the court in which the earlier action is brought has jurisdiction sufficient to dispose of the entire controversy.”
The cases there cited amply support this rule. (Ryan v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., 89 Fed. 397, 407; Hatch v. Spofford, 22 Conn. 485; Wentz’s Appeal, 76 Conn. 405; Seevers v. Clement, 28 Md. 426; Cole, use of Fie v. Flitcraft & Co., 47 Md. 312; Gerke v. Colonial Tr. Co., 117 Md. 579; Fairchild v. Fairchild, 53 N. J. Eq. 678; Bowne v. Joy, 9 John [N. Y.j 221; Smith
The judgment is affirmed.