History
  • No items yet
midpage
Omar Alomari v. Ohio Dep't of Public Safety
626 F. App'x 558
6th Cir.
2015
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 from defense counsel’s drawn ence to be argument.”). of evidence and

presentation suggestion counsel’s defense

Given wit-

closing prosecution argument had a Washington

nesses fabricated regarding remarks

gun, prosecution’s supporting defense

the lack of evidence improper. rendition were

counsel’s Forrest, United

See States (6th Cir.2005) (observing prosecu- response

tion’s “made comments were closing presented in the theories factual defense, prosecu- and the

argument point out the lack of

tor was entitled theories.”) supporting those by plainly err

The district did sponte sua that the Govern-

failing to find or com- indirectly

ment the burden shifted Washington’s testify. failure to

mented plainly

Nor err

failing prosecutor’s re- find directly impugned or implicitly

marks

integrity or institutional role defense

counsel; prosecutor’s remarks were counsel’s at the merit defense

directed

arguments, counsel. not at defense

We affirm. ALOMARI, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Omar DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

OHIO

SAFETY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-3922. Appeals, Court of

United States Circuit.

Sixth 9, 2015.

Sept. *2 sessions, Plain-

During training these tiffs conflicted with the views views often example, law officials. For enforcement training session at November officials, Plaintiff Ohio law enforcement explained presentation which he made *3 generally into four cate- that Muslims fell Islamists, Fundamentalists, Jihad- gories: ists, Af- Moderate Muslims. and Secular remarks, Sheets, an Plaintiffs Todd ter Depart- Police Officer with the Columbus (“CPD”), in- gave presentation a on ment SUHRHEINRICH, BEFORE: com- Officer ternational terrorism. Sheets CLAY, BATCHELDER, and Circuit said, He mented Plaintiffs statements. Judges. Fundamentalist, Is- “I’m not sure about Muslim, stop I a or Jihadist. When lamist SUHRHEINRICH, Judge. Circuit Fundamentalist, they’re ask if a I don’t me, they’re To all Islamist or Jihadist. (“Plaintiff’) suit filed Omar Alomari Officer Sheets claimed that same.” of Public Department the Ohio in Central Ohio had links Arab Muslims (“ODPS”), Thomas Director Safety terrorism, vio- that Islam commanded and Charles, Thomas Director former ODPS Afterwards, complained Plaintiff lence. Stickrath, Ohio Homeland Se- former and com- Director Vedra about Officer Sheets’s (“OHS”) curity Director William Vedra ments, they alleging implied all Arabs “Defendants”), alleging, inter (collectively, suspects, Muslims were terrorist and alia, Defendants discriminated presentation. Plaintiffs which contradicted origin, against him on national the basis Plaintiff the inconsistent believed further al- religion, race. and messages confuse enforcement. could law against his exercise of leged retaliation a January In attended speech. The First Amendment protected training at two-day session the Columbus granted summary judgment district court session, Academy. pre- At a Police this following rea- for Defendants. For Christianity claimed that and Islam senter sons, we AFFIRM. 1,400 than have been conflict more OHS, In a division November Muslims use violence to years, and will ODPS, Plaintiff as contract within hired conquer the entire world to and convert full- employee. permanent, He became that he presenter Plaintiff told the Islam. Liaison Officer Multicultural one time opinions, irresponsible “giving year reported later. Plaintiff John Ov- commu- to the law enforcement facts” OHS, and then erly, Director immediately Executive nity. During and after Vedra, Overly’s session, successor. training complained William (1) building pro- officials, Deputy including Plaintiffs duties included numerous CPD OHS, Rockwell; relationships Deputy law ductive between Director Chief John enforcement, com- Depart- Arab and Muslim Martin the Ohio Sheriffs Steve ment; munities; (2) Regional Unit researching authoring Coordination OHS Stefanik; Fusion Supervisor commu- Andrew OHS publications on Arab Muslim Ana- nities; Research to Center Counterterrorism research presenting Presson; Strate- Senior lyst OHS training law Ben enforcement sessions. Tracy port Plain- titled “A Guide to Arab and Islamic gic Planning Officer Proud. Selim, Policy Culture.” George tiff also emailed Department

Advisor at the U.S. Home- 18, 2010, On March soon after Plaintiffs (“DHS”) Security’s of Civil land Office testimony Congress, The Re- before Jawa Liberties, Rights and Civil to voice his port, anonymously-authored internet public supported concern that funds DHS blog, published an article titled “Muslim training Finally, biased because sessions. Security publish- Ohio Leader: Homeland ” session, did not Vedra attend ‘classic ing propaganda.’ Islamiát On report summarizing drafted April Report published Jawa event The report and sent it him. asserting destroyed article that OHS training stated the first day “Agents thousands of Radical- full of history inaccuracies about the and ization” brochures the brochures Islam, tenets of as well as Arab culture. promoted groups that the FBI linked to *4 19, April 2010, terrorism. And on The 15, 2010, April 13 CPD Between Report posted criticizing Jaiva an. article a day training held two-and-a-half session Plaintiff and Director Vedra for their in- “Understanding entitled the Threat quoted teraction with CAIR. The article an Although America.” not at- anonymous source who stated that at a event, tend the someone in attendance enforcement, meeting with law Director pre- called Plaintiff and him that the told “explained Vedra that we continue to work disparaging senter made remarks about just gang- with CAIR like meet we with him. Specifically, presenters showed dealers, bangers, drug underlings, mafia picture a audience taken of Plaintiff guys’ criminal informants and other ‘bad a representative and Director Vedra with gather information.” from on the Council Re- American-Islamic 2010, 20, April Report On The Jawa (“CAIR”). presenter lations The deemed precipitated released an Plain- article a organization” CAIR to be “terrorist discharge piece tiffs The re- from OHS. thus that Plaintiff alleged and Director previous employer, vealed that Plaintiffs Vedra “met with terrorists.”1 On the eve- (“Co- College Community Columbus State 13, 2010, ning April Plaintiff notified State”), lumbus had fired Plaintiff en- presenters Director that these Vedra made gaging relationship in a sexual with fe- “personal” “destroy” attacks and tried day, male The Jawa student. next con- subsequently him. Director Vedra Report again reported Columbus Deputy tacted and met with CPD “violating State had fired Plaintiff for their Rockwell, agreed and the two that CPD policy by sleeping sexual harassment allow OHS and Plaintiff “vet” would taking infidel coeds his It also classes.” speakers. future reported employee, that another ODPS Martin, presented argument Plaintiff also his Olen his falsified credentials. concerning Islamic the Unit- Martin for the radicalism Coordinator North- Initiative, operation ed States House on Homeland ern Border Committee 17, Security part gathered security intelligence on March 2010. As national on his presentation, produced waterways a brochure between Ohio and Canada. contention, “Agents of To in- support titled re- this the article Radicalization” CAIR, keep open some CAIR were under from allowed Because officials but it them to investigation, agents organization. FBI FBI ordered its lines of with the communication personally representatives adopted position. not meet with OHS the same in- background pro- ployment application image Linkedln of Martin’s eluded file, packet, from found no reference degrees vestigation two Suffield which listed Report described University. The Jawa in ei- employment at Columbus State “illegal diploma mill.” as an that institution Although computer- ther document. blog another issued April On during employment ized credit check concerning lawsuit report investigation Columbus background listed conduct- with whom he against the student that infor- employer, a previous State as relationship.2 ed a sexual not mation was listed elsewhere articles, reporters background investigation packet. Botos As a result these inquire whether the May contacted ODPS Plaintiff on then interviewed previ- of Plaintiffs department was aware conceded that he did 2010. Plaintiff history with Columbus employment ous employers “many” previous include approached Plain- Director Vedra State. application, in- employment on the ODPS allegations him if the tiff and asked cluding State. Plaintiff stated Columbus that he did true. Plaintiff admitted resigned Columbus State as that he Columbus State include agree- part of an arbitration settlement relationship that he had application and confronted Plain- ment. But Botos when teaching there. After while with student showing Plaintiff tiff with documentation conversation, spoke Director Vedra wrongful filed a termination Cathy Collins-Taylor. supervisor, with his Rights Ohio Civil State with Columbus *5 two administrative decided Commission, Plaintiff instead claimed in appropriate would be investigation to terminate State threatened Columbus situation, that human re- Plaintiffs but inquired why his Botos then employment. allegations con- sources could handle investigation while at Plaintiff was under reasoned cerning Martin. Director Vedra averred Columbus Plaintiff State. for essentially paid if his that even Martin “relationship” a with Columbus had mill,” his miscon- degrees “diploma from a student, that she was but asserted State than that of still less serious duct However, Plaintiff subse- not his student. degrees Plaintiff those himself, stating that quently contradicted posi- for Martin’s requirements minimum classes, in of his the student enrolled one tion. him to end the relation- prompted which 7, 2010, May assigned Kath- On ODPS ship. Botos to conduct the administrative leen interview, Botos with After the worked that Plaintiff investigation allegations into records in-house obtain ODPS counsel job information about his to include failed public via records from Columbus State employment ap- in his at Columbus State requests. on these records and her Plaintiffs em- Based plication. Botos reviewed discharge. years grievance After two professor after 2. Plaintiff worked as a at Columbus 1996, litigation, parties ultimately In reached to 1996. June State from 1991 1999,. 19, January relationship agreement. On began settlement Plaintiff an intimate Lenk, County in Lenk the Franklin State. Plaintiff sued Sheri student at Columbus Pleas, (1) alleging relationship inten- September in Court of Common Lenk ended the distress; (2) 1996, neg- attempted tional infliction of emotional to restart it numer but then distress; (3) 1996, However, ligent tor- infliction of emotional ous times. December contract; (4) with a tious interference Lenk a sexual harassment claim filed summary judg- investigation, negligence. for conducting moved Lenk Plaintiff. After 31, 2000, the court em ment on March which removed Plaintiff as an State Columbus 9, granted August ployee filed a same month. Plaintiff, interview with Botos mately drafted a decided to terminate Plaintiff. He report on report June 2010. The reasoned probably would First, four reached conclusions. have hired Plaintiff if he had disclosed his purposely past employers omitted several full employment history in application. his employment from application, including On June Plain- ODPS terminated Columbus State. employment. indi- tiffs cated that Columbus State terminated 13, 2011, On July a com- filed Plaintiffs employment after discovering (1) plaint, alleging six claims: national ori- student,3 his relationship awith which con- discrimination, gin VII; in violation of Title tradicted resigned that he Plaintiffs (2) religious discrimination, in violation of Third, although Columbus State. VII; (3) discrimination, Title racial in vio- Plaintiff declared that he omitted his work 1981; (4) § lation of 42 U.S.C. retaliation at Columbus State because it was irrele- violation, discrimination, opposing vant to the position sought, in reality (5) 1981; § 42 U.S.C. equal pro- denial of performed relevant duties such as tection, 1983; § of 42 violation U.S.C. teaching an Arabic class coordinating retaliation, First Amendment courses on Islam and the Middle East at § violation 42 U.S.C. parties 1983. The Columbus State. Finally, Plaintiff disre- filed cross motions for summary judgment. garded the on his instructions granted The district court Defendants’ mo- application, which required disclosing all tion for summary judgment and denied previous employers. Given the circum- Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. stances departure from Co- First, the district court dismissed Plain- State, lumbus his failure to disclose origin, tiffs national religion, and race dis- employment history created the appear- crimination claims under Title VII ance impropriety. § holding U.S.C. that no reasonable After conducting pre-disciplinary juror hear- objectively could conclude that Plain- ing Plaintiff, ODPS Director race, Stickrath tiffs religion, or origin national im- *6 29, 2010, meeting held a on to June discuss properly motivated the decision to termi- the results of Botos’s administrative inves- him. nate the court refused to tigation to and make a decision concerning address Plaintiffs hostile work environ- Plaintiffs discipline. claim, Various offi- which ment Plaintiff raised for the cials, Vedraj including Director first time summary attended on judgment, because meeting. In-house counsel Heather Plaintiff not properly plead did such a Reed-Frient also Third, attended the meeting. claim. dismissed Plain- Director input Stickrath received from the tiffs race discrimination and retaliation meeting, individuals at the and ulti- § 1981, claims 42 under U.S.C. concluding argument, At parties oral disputed relationship ment related with Lenk. actually whether Columbus State panel fired Plain- informed Plaintiff that would be Overwhelming tiff. separated evidence the record if resign. he did not choose to indicates that Columbus State terminated resign "said that he would not and employment. 16, Plaintiff's On December grieve separation that he wished deci- 1996, Montanaro, Doug Later, the Chair of faculty Colum- sion.” when members wrote Department, bus State’s Humanities sent a letters President of Columbus State Zitlow, memorandum to alleging Erv disciplinary process that Plaintiff’s Human Montanaro safeguards, Resources. described a they lacked sufficient referred meeting during panel charged which the "firing” "discharge." Plaintiff’s Finally, investigating Plaintiff's misconduct him found the Vice President for Academic Affairs ex- guilty professional plicitly misconduct and harass- upheld “discharge.” Plaintiff’s 564 claim are disparate Title VII treatment acting [a] under color state individuals Cnty. Deleon v. Kalamazoo alleged § viola- same.” 1981

law committed (6th Comm’n, 914, F.3d 917-18 Rd. tions, prose- 739 properly and Plaintiff Cir.2014). analysis therefore single A will 1983, § claims under the sole cute these claims. suffice Plaintiffs Fi- address such remedy misconduct. available rejected consti- nally, the court Plaintiffs analyze this under mixed- We argument, reasoning retaliation tutional gave suf analysis motive protect First did not Amendment discrimina notice of mixed-motive ficient because it speech Plaintiffs related for sum complaint tion in his and motion Offi- as Liaison job a Multicultural duties plaintiff mary judgment. VII “[A] Title cer, no connection be- causal existed asserting only claim need a mixed-motive speech his termi- tween produce sufficient to convince a evidence This appeal nation. followed. that: took ad jury the defendant plain action

verse sex, tiff; (2) race, color, religion, II. or motivating factor for origin national grant a district court’s We review employment ac the defendant’s adverse v. judgment de novo. Smith summary Inc., Marine, Spees James tion.” v. 617 821, Educ., Bd. 708 825 Perkins F.3d 380, 390 Cir.2010) (6th (quoting F.3d White (6th Cir.2013). Summary ap- is judgment 381, F.3d Corp., v. Baxter Healthcare “if the movant there propriate shows that (6th Cir.2008)). Plaintiff can establish dispute material genuine is no as by introducing di discrimination “either judg- the movant fact and entitled prov byor of discrimination rect evidence ment as matter law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. ing inferential and circumstantial evidence 56(a). support which inference dis would To the Plaintiff also raises issues extent Potter, crimination.” DiCarlo concerning discovery on appeal on limits (6th Cir.2004) 408, 414 Kline v. (quoting however, sanctions, we re- discovery (6th Auth., 337, Valley Tenn. F.3d those for an of discre- view claims abuse Cir.1997)), grounds by, overruled other Magazine, v. Scene tion. Bentkowski Servs., Inc., Fin. 557 U.S. FBL Gross Cir.2011). F.3d L.Ed.2d 119 129 S.Ct. (2009). both Although addressed Claims A. Discrimination below, and circumstantial direct circumstantial evidence on only he cites the district *7 appeal. origin improperly his national dismissed brought religious claims and discrimination 1. Remarks Director Vedra § 1983 be-

under Title U.S.C. VII remarks provide or Plaintiff identifies several cause Plaintiff direct failed as discriminatory by Director evi Vedra circumstantial circumstantial evidence discriminatory to fire intent to terminate dence animus motivated the decision First, hearing civil establishing at a service “The him. him.4 elements § Plaintiff’s before the Person appeal 1983 and State Equal Protection claim under (“SPBR”), Board of Review establishing a violation of nel elements for appeal. origin religious discrimination Plaintiff also cited racial discrimination 4. complaint, only national his but he addresses treatment, replaced Vedra plaintiff stated he must demonstrate with a woman “to a signal send to- the comparable employees nearly are community you’re America,” that —that aspects. identical in all relevant Noble v. Int’l, Inc., and that 715, (6th he believed Plaintiff Brinker overempha- 391 F.3d Cir.2004). sized outreach to community. the Arab that he and allegedly Director Vedra told Martin similarly employees were situated group of law First, enforcement officials that in two respects. “we Plaintiff contends continue to just work with CAIR like we their misconduct was similar. Al- dealers, gangbangers, meet with drug though ma- employment history omitted underlings, informants, fia criminal application, from his reasons, other guys’ gather ‘bad Martin “provided information.” false information regard- ing his educational during achievement Plaintiff claims that the district court employment process by intentionally [mis- erred because it did not wheth evaluate representing legitimate that he had de- er these remarks circumstan constituted grees.” disagree. We Plaintiff omitted tial evidence of discriminatory intent. past his employment history with Colum- argument, however, waived this bus seemingly State discovery avoid because he claimed in his motion for his sexual misconduct at that institution. summary judgment that Director Vedra’s contrast, In Martin disclosed his actual remarks comprised only direct evidence credentials, albeit from a “diploma mill.” of discrimination. not presented “[I]ssues Guard, Inc., Wright See v. Murray to the district court but raised for the (6th Cir.2006) F.3d (holding that appeal first time on are not properly be employees two similarly situated fore this court.” Wyckoff J.C. Assocs. & alleged where “their acts of misconduct Co., Standard Fire Ins. nature, very are different there (6th Cir.1991). Plaintiff does not legitimate are why reasons supervisor] [a dispute the district court’s determination differently”). would treat them that these remarks did not amount to di rect discrimination because Plaintiff further contends Martin’s they required jurors to draw inferences misconduct was to Plaintiffs analogous that discriminatory animus Di motivated provided misdeeds because Martin false rector Vedra’s remarks. See Johnson information about when he obtained his Co., Kroger Cir. degrees length time he attended 2003). Accordingly, argument Plaintiff’s University. example, Suffield For Martin fails. deposition testified at his that he obtained both of degrees his but his em- Disparate 2. Treatment ployment application stated that he re- Plaintiff further claims Di degree ceived one 1996 and another in rector investigate Vedra’s decision to Similarly, Martin testified Plaintiff for omitting job history his full complete did not coursework obtain employment application, but not his degree, but application investigate including Martin for a “di *8 years stated that it took two complete ploma mill” his employment application, on degree one years and three to complete an example was of disparate treatment However, the other. the not record does prompted by discriminatory intent. indicate that Director Vedra knew these In order to establish the existence of a false details at the time he decided to discriminatory disparate motive on investigate based Plaintiff and not All Martin. degree had,” investigated. he was not that concerning

the these falsehoods testimony, subsequently whether he felt deposition comes When asked from Martin’s being target investiga- of an long the decision to Plaintiffs the which after occurred fact something tion “had to do terminate Plaintiff. America,” Arab Di- Deputy that was he avers that he and Mar- Plaintiff replied, Mack “I sure did.” Howev- rector similarly their tin situated because er, testimony si- Deputy Director Mack’s “unique.” both Martin was positions were multaneously disparate reveals that Border the Northern Coordinator treatment between Plaintiff and Martin Initiative, that “important project” by different miscon- motivated their security intelligence on gathered national duct, According Deputy not animus. waterways and Canada. between Ohio Mack, told him Director Director Vedra Liaison a Multicultural Offi- Similarly, as just “you that don’t like his de- cer, position a that was “one Plaintiff held [sicj grees degree.” it’s not a don’t mean However, Plain- country.” of a kind in such, beyond pure speculation, Deputy As superficial, generalized com- tiff offers a provide Director Mack’s no evi- assertions parison. plaintiff employee and the “[T]he discriminatory dence a motive behind plaintiff compare with whom the seeks disparate of Plaintiff and treatment must similar ‘all of himself or herself be ” ju- Consequently, Martin. no reasonable Ercegovich aspects.’ v. relevant discriminatory ani- ror could believe that Co., Goodyear Tire Rubber & in- mus motivated Plaintiffs administrative (citation omitted). (6th Cir.1998) vestigation or termination. positions may have been While both disparate unique, disparity in treat- B. Hostile Work Environment Claim Plaintiff and Martin be ment can between the district explained by prominence Plaintiffs in concluding that Plaintiff did erred job public position. Plaintiffs a present work environment hostile scope: national he attended law enforce- judgment phase. the summary claim until present training order ment sessions alleges pleaded that he sufficient topics on like Islamic cul- research broad complaint put facts in his on Defendants radicalization, ture testified claim. notice before the U.S. House Committee Security on one occasion. In Generally, plaintiff Homeland a cannot raise contrast, summary local Martin’s role was and less the first at the time prominent coordinating operation judgment stage. Carter Ford Mo- See — (6th Cir.2009). waterways Co., between Ohio monitored tor security time, for national threats. “magic Canada At in the the same no words” complaint necessary are state a claim— lastly'argues courts must instead “examine the sub- ignored deposition testimony plaintiffs allegations.” stance of Stevens Deputy Director Earl Mack. In his OHS Ctr., Inc., Med. Saint Elizabeth Mack deposition, Deputy spec- Director Cir.2013). Fed.Appx. discriminatory animus ulated that motivat- undisputed It investigate did not ed Director Vedra’s decision explicitly allege legal theory of hostile Deputy Plaintiff over Martin. complaint. in his At Mack did understand work environment explained time, why complaint of an subject the same Plaintiff was investi- Martin, to harassment its gation who make some references “lie[d] while *9 complaint alleged argues, part, facts section. The speech Plaintiff that his “presenters trainings constitutionally protected had perpetrat- at the because he spoke a “as citizen.” v. two-year campaign Geauga a Weisbarth harass and ed Dist., (6th 538, Park reputation Cir. destroy Plaintiffs and character 2007) (citation omitted). However, Plain reason is an simple based that he tiff pursuant his made criticisms his Muslim,” in- Arab individuals official duties as cultural liaison. volved Ohio law enforcement counter- public employees “[W]hen make state training terrorism published obtained and duties, pursuant ments to their official public records order Plaintiff. harass employees are not as speaking citizens for But these to raise a facts were insufficient purposes, First Amendment the Con claim for hostile work environment be- stitution does not insulate communi their they cause not this indicate that employer cations from discipline.” Garcet by harassment non-ODPS out- employees Ceballos, 410, 421, ti v. 547 U.S. 126 S.Ct. workplace impacted side the official 1951, (2006). 164 L.Ed.2d 689 The court performance Plaintiffs work or affected looks at the “content and context” v. work environment. See Hunter speech it to determine whether made Sec’y Army, U.S. F.3d duties, pursuant including to official “the Cir.2009) that a envi- (holding hostile work impetus for speech, setting [the] ronment claim must “the demonstrate that audience, speech, speech’s [the] and its workplace permeated with discriminato- general subject Handy-Clay matter.” intimidation, ridicule, ry and insult that is Tenn., City Memphis, sufficiently pervasive alter severe (6th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). the conditions the victim’s The record reflects that one Plaintiffs working create abusive environ- primary job educate duties was to law (citation omitted)); ment” Whitaker sessions, during training enforcement (5th Cir.1985) Carney, 778 F.2d function, part analyze as of that (noting not employers generally are of the information communi- effectiveness by liable for nonemployees harassment instance, following January cated. For workplace). Accordingly, outside training by session Plaintiff attended plead properly failed to Vedra, by but not draft- for hostile work environment. report ed a compiling the inaccuracies at observed the session. Similar- C. First Amendment Retaliation ly, heavily April after Plaintiff criticized Claim training 20Í0 CPD because of a session remarks, presenter’s inflammatory asserts the district speakers let Plaintiff vet future CPD dismissing court erred in Amend First training sessions in bias. order eliminate ment retaliation claim5 speech criticizing law enforcement train if even Plaintiffs duties did not And — ing funding sessions and DHS of those training officially include analyzing ses- duties, part sions, of his official sessions—was hoc or can fall “ad de facto duties present and Plaintiff evi concrete employee’s failed within of an scope official showing the decision to responsibilities despite appearing dence termi Weisbarth, nate job him was motivated his speech. description.” written § 5. Plaintiff also in his raised retaliation claim discrimination under 42 U.S.C. but complaint stemming opposition appeal from his he does issue. *10 plaintiff; true if adverse action taken the especially This is 499 F.3d at (3) a the public to a causal connection between its existence and speech the “owes action). and the protected speech responsibilities.” adverse professional employee’s such, Garcetti, First 1951. As Plaintiff’s Amendment at 126 S.Ct. 547 U.S. training sessions fails. responded job, and part of his he that he attended as of for D. Denial Motion an impacted presentations that the criticized Adverse Inference job. Haynes City functioning See of (6th Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d argument At the motions oral of Cir.2007) trainer for that a (holding canine Plaintiff moved summary judgment, a who wrote memo- police department based on the destruc an adverse inference department’s the reduc- criticizing evidence, randum citing of failure to tion ODPS’s pursuant dog-training tion in hours acted that should have been retain documents resume, still record, to his official duties because such as Plaintiffs public responsibili- “carrying professional application, out his handwritten and ODPS’s dogs). training complete background investigation, ties” of includ ing professional Plaintiff’s references. emphasizes he com- Plaintiff also plained training party seeking the sessions and A an adverse inference beyond his im- must funding regarding to individuals the destruction of evidence DHS the including party CPD that the in control of supervisor, mediate demonstrate Selim, (1) George obligated preserve of Police Deputy the Chief evidence (2) of Policy destroyed; the Civil it the it at DHS Office at time was Advisor the destroyed culpable Yet “de- Rights Civil Liberties. evidence “with a the (3) mind”; assessing destroyed whether factor” of terminative state an protects employ- or First Amendment relevant the claim de- evidence was person to inference. speech party seeking “not where the fense is ee’s Justice, employee Dep’t fit Beaven v. 622 F.3d communicated U.S. whom Cir.2010) (citation omitted). command, 540, (6th employer’s within the chain employee rather commu- courts broad discre- but whether Because have district spoli- to his her official pursuant or tion to craft for the proper nicated sanctions Weisbarth, evidence, 545. Fur- we a district duties.” F.3d ation review thermore, impose with whom not to sanctions for of the individuals court’s decision all Wolever, way spoke some affiliated abuse of Adkins v. discretion. (rea- (6th Cir.2012). id. training See sessions. to a soning employee’s speech mo- court below denied Plaintiffs communi- third-party consultant was still the sec- tion because failed establish claim, reasoning official pursuant employee’s to the cated ond element duties). not shown ... “Plaintiff has destroyed with a state culpable the records establish Because Plaintiff disputed of mind” that “there activity required for protected existence of pos- fact ever issue of material that ODPS claim, not address retaliation we need place.” sessed resume the first See question a causal connection. Johnson, Although proffers several facts Bell Cir.2002) destroyed culpably (listing estab- as evidence that ODPS three elements sought, we address lish retaliation claim: need a First Amendment (2) argument because he protected culpability an Plaintiff’s speech plaintiff; sought legal of the cannot establish first element Defendants the advice *11 First, reporters counsel. after test: whether ODPS contacted adverse inference to the ODPS with about Plaintiffs obligated preserve inquiries was evidence em- destroyed. ployment history, it “An Director sought at the time was and Vedra Reed-Frient, Heather counsel for obligation preserve may arise when a in-house to ODPS, April met Plaintiff in 2010 party have known that to should the evidence but, discuss Plaintiffs time at may litigation, to if Columbus State be relevant future pending litigation, prepare response and to for the there was no notice media. began investiga- Botos point the destruction when her evidence does Beaven, misconduct, previous tion into to ... Plaintiffs intentional destruction.” (citations Reed-Frient, quotations 622 she contacted as well as F.3d at 553 omitted). also ODPS counsel Krista See Johnson v. Metro. in-house Weida Cnty., Engel, making public Josh Gov’t Nashville & Davidson 502 records (6th Cir.2012) (“[T]he requests to Fed.Appx. 532 obtain documents order Finally, from obligation element met where defen- Columbus State. Reed- Frient might meeting dant relevant to the June 2010 knows evidence be attended Director litigation.”). Stickrath held to Plain- potential future discuss discipline. tiffs no when gives date as to Defen- compel a motion or to the intentionally negligent- filed destroyed dants (1) discovery of the communications at the ly sought. lost the documents While those (2) April meeting; communica- allegedly documents ODPS’s the came into tions at the June 2010 possession meeting; in Fall the earliest ODPS Reed-Frient, Weida, deposition the litigation would for potential be notice Engel concerning they the April Report when documents The Jawa sought from State. negative Columbus publicly revealed Plaintiffs em- ployment history. may But ODPS have magistrate judge an initial issued destroyed long or lost these documents opinion denying Plaintiffs mo order receiving potential before of that notice during as to tion the communications Therefore, litigation. more evi- without April meeting, concluding dence, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden for attorney-client protected those privilege Ross v. Am. adverse inference. See communications because the record indi Cross, (6th Red Fed.Appx. purpose meeting cated that Cir.2014) (affirming of a motion the denial questions to ask for Reed-Frient for an inference the movant adverse where order to on how to legally advise ODPS demonstrating did not point evidence respond inquiries. Regarding media liti- potential defendant’s awareness of however, meeting, judge June 2010 gation prior to the date it received letter ordered submit for cam Defendants attorney). Accordingly, the movant’s inspection forth setting era an affidavit its the district court discre- abuse during of communications substance denying tion in for an Plaintiffs motion meeting. Finally, judge ordered the adverse inference. parties brief whether Shelton Ameri Motors Cir. Corp., can 805 F.2d 1323

E. Denial of Motions 1986), a a test for case articulated Compel Discovery counsel, parties depose opposing can when applied deposition of the three points throughout At the contro- various termination, resulting attorneys. versy a. Communications mate- supplemental reviewing the After Meeting April 2010 Plain- rials, judge denied magistrate points. remaining two on the motion privilege tiffs the assertion challenging In in camera review First, on the relying meeting between April over the Reed-Frient, Yedra, Plaintiff, and Reed- supplied affidavit ap- failed privilege Frient, “ODPS judge determined Reed-Friend during the June provide plied to communications provide in order affi- [Plaintiff! Reed-Frient’s interviewed meeting *12 legal of that advice.” purpose primary the davit revealed legal advice obtain to meeting was concluded, correctly As the district of Plaintiffs results concerning ODPS of purpose record indicates “the judge The termination. investigation and to meeting for ODPS was [April 2010] foreclosed that Shelton inqui- further held regarding media legal advice seek light attorneys “[i]n of deposition ODPS’s termi- employment and Plaintiffs ries into action well in this involvement The of counsel’s State.” district nation from Columbus lawsuit, as well in pieces into of evidence it two before blossomed court relied on First, Di- would depositions making determination. danger that as the deposition in his litigation strategy.” rector stated Vedra expose counsel’s of “enough an inquiries of the the media to both objections Plaintiff filed legal to with needed “consult issue” The district he orders. judge’s magistrate stat- fromgo there.” arid claims Plaintiffs judge reconsidered 2010 April that at the in his deposition ed adopting the compel, to motion denied him that she told meeting, Reed-Frient points. on all reasoning judge’s magistrate circumstances to wanted understand Plaintiffs termination surrounding Attorney-Client Privilege ODPS help in order to Columbus State applies privilege inquiries. attorney-client to those response prepare The is kind legal advice ]here “[w seeking ad whether disputes 351, Baxter, 134 F.3d v. sought.” Reed is consid to the media response vice for a Cir.1998). “Fundamentally, legal place, al in the first “legal ered advice” ap interpretation advice involves circuit has this recognizes though future guide to legal principles plication Plaintiff cites issue. addressed re In past conduct.” or conduct to assess cases that deemed several district (2d Erie, Cir. Cnty. to relations attorney's media advice about 2007). involves a communication See, When re Chevron e.g., In non-legal. be matters, “con non-legal we legal (S.D.N.Y. both F.Supp.2d Corp., purpose predominant sider 2010) attorney’s whether communi that an (holding solicit to or is render the communication “substan privileged cations were not when predomi This Id. at 420. legal predominant suggested advice.” tial evidence” dynami assessed professional “should be purpose nant “not rendition role was being lobbying, and services, politics, advice cally light but legal and in relations”); City rendered, the relation public as well as sought or media and 196 F.R.D. Corp., rendered Rexnord Springfield be ship advice can between an attor (D.Mass.2000) (finding that legal authorities consulting the only by anticipation “prepared non-lawyer.” ney’s given by a documents be advice can privileged). were not inquiries” of media Id. at 420-21. However, organization’s as the court noted house counsel and an em- denying objections magis- employee Plaintiffs to the must ployee, “sufficiently be judge’s trate order: being questioned aware” that or she provide organization order present is distinct from the case legal Upjohn States, advice. Co. United that Plaintiff cites cases 383, 394, April of the 2010 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. principal purpose (1981). above, meeting Attorney explained L.Ed.2d 584 As was Reed-Frient however, deposition gather information so that she could Plaintiffs own testi- respond mony her on advise client how indicates that he aware Reed- Frient, merely was not in- a lawyer, present gather the matter. She in making volved or media business information in order advise on decision, sought but rather advise her to respond inquiries, how to the media respond inqui- great client how to media legal act with ramifications. Accord- into ries Co- ingly, the district court did not its abuse lumbus State. Plaintiffs claim. denying discretion *13 (cid:127) Advising respond to a client on how to b. at Communications inquiries important legal impli

media has Meeting June 2010 public cations when that client will issue Dong statement an employee. about See attorney-client that the Univ., 113,122 guk Univ. v. Yale not privilege did cover communications (2d Cir.2013) (involving defamation claim that at 2010 meeting occurred June the stemming response inqui to media purpose because the of to meeting the ries). potential legal liabili Given the concerning make a business Plain- decision ty, input Reed-Frient’s on how to draft a tiffs employment discipline, not to response media was essential. legal magistrate render advice. But the judge made a fact finding of that “the if Plaintiff further claims that even the render, of purpose meeting the was to secure of that purpose meeting towas legal to advice, [Reed-Frient’s] advice related the legal to Defendants needed estab- investigation,” of results the administrative actually lish that Reed-Frient used an crediting supplied affidavit Reed- information at gathered meeting she that Frient camera that detailed the sub- by advising depart- the communications meeting of the at that stance discussion respond ment on how to the media legal role as and clarified Reed-Frient’s inquiries. But privilege protects com- judge The relied on advisor. “necessary legal munications to obtain ad- magistrate judge’s factual con- finding vice.” In re Healthcare Columbia/HCA cluding privilege applied that com- Corp. Billing Litig., Practices during meeting. (6th Cir.2002) (citation the June munications omitted added). emphasis sug- No caselaw alleges that Director Stickrath’s gests that privileged communications are deposition testimony contradicts Reed- only they dispense when are utilized instance, For Frient’s affidavit. legal advice. “[p]urpose stated Stickrath personally meeting investigation also asserts to talk no had reason to believe that Reed-Frient and the decision be made [Plaintiff] Furthermore, to provide any collected information in discipline.” order terms legal privilege advice. In order for the to Director not “recall” Stickrath did whether meeting attach to in- purposes litigation communications between was for being prin- an legal present repeatedly at denied assistant or whether counsel was However, meeting. cipal the district court Id. at *1. The district court position. compel disposal, including plaintiffs at motion the record its denied the had during deposition, and still held Director Stickrath’s disclosure conversations to credit affidavit. session of the school board on decided Reed-Frient’s executive position attorney-client privilege. “A district is in the basis of Id. best weigh the evidence and evaluate witness Fifth Circuit held that the district Preciado, credibility])]” United States v. its discretion mak- court did abuse (8th Cir.2003). determination, ing reasoning just F.3d privilege protected as the full and frank further that even if contends legal advice discussions facilitate be- meeting pro Reed-Frient attended corporation its attorneys, tween a advice, presence legal her vide policy encouraging full dictates “[s]imilar oc all communications that immunize communication a school board and between meeting. curred at the reliance Id. *2. its counsel.” at The court noted: Inc., Freight Sys., v. Yellow Marten partici- attorney The [school] District’s 96-2013-GTV, A. WL 13244 No. CIV. sessions, pated in all executive (D.Kan. There, 6, 1998), misplaced. Jan. each of which discussed the Board the minutes found legality plain- refusing to rehire [the (“ERC”) Employee Review Committee nothing tiff]. There is in the record meeting by counsel were non- attended indicating of the communica- privileged primary function “[t]he purposes tions was for other than the was to “what of the committee” decide *14 of procurement advice. While the legal employment action to take em Board did their members discuss rea- sought ployee.” Any legal Id. at advice *8. plaintiff], for refusing sons to [the rehire during meeting was' “inci or received the the discussions occurred the context of is dental to considerations what most of of inquiring legality about the those of operation for the prudent successful the reasons. empha The business.” Id. court further of voting “[a]s sized member the Id. court thus The concluded that “the acting merely ERC ... was not [counsel] attorney-client all privilege protects com- attorney rendering legal advice.” as an meeting during munications between a voted, beyond Id. counsel he went When pur- board for the attorney school and its legal simply providing advice and instead advice, pose obtaining of even legal those an act of “perform[ed] the business.” Id. directly not communications addressed attorney.” the Id. properly court found Mar- The district distinguishable ten “Reed-Frient to all privilege applied because Just as the the part during of communications school was committee determine the board status, ... and session in Rush the pri- was executive because only brought meeting mary purpose meeting into the Plain- of that was ob- after advice, represented by legal privilege similarly had counsel in tain tiff been the disciplinary proceedings.” all from the previous Rush covers communications June District, Municipal meeting purpose v. Columbus School its was to 99-60910, acquire legal Although Cir. No. WL 1598021 advice. 28, 2000), plaintiff is Sept. point. testimony suggests on The Stickrath’s the dis- of employer, primary purpose in Rush sued a school the June meet- trict, ing provide after advice alleging racial discrimination was business instead advice, of in- applied deposition not Shelton the legal of the Id, house The Massillon Man- relying its on the counsel. abuse discretion determination, agement court first that Shel- magistrate judge’s which determined affidavit, to the squarely applied deposition ton credited Reed-Frient’s purpose meeting was to in-house counsel: “Given that the Shelton primary the developed applied ... the legal case itself advice. provide to a heightened deposition standard Deposition of In-House Counsel attorney, it opponent’s in-house could be clearer that the standard was intended adopted This circuit has the so- apply attorneys engaged by in-house rule,” called states that a “Shelton which opposing party the with involvement the party depose opposing only can counsel *4, being litigated.” matter Id. at The (1) it no where has “shown that other plaintiff then concluded that ...; means to obtain exist the information depose could not in-house defendant’s (2) information is sought relevant and attorney played a counsel because the role nonprivileged; information ensuing litigation. The defendant’s crucial to the case.” preparation “responsibility planning counsel bore Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Home Ins. Co. directing aspects company’s all Co., (6th Cir.2002) (quot affairs, legal overseeing all of litigation, its Shelton, 1327). ing F.2d at providing legal compa- advice to litigation in Shelton stemmed from ny’s at departments.” various Id. *5. of a in a car death child “rollover” Moreover, he was involved with the lease accident, and the case involved the at negotiating at beginning, issue tempted deposition of in-house counsel terms, drafting some its as well as company inquire an automotive advising plaintiff legal related is- the existence of rollover documentation “early sues. Id. The counsel also told company. tests and accidents held litigation on” that if could ensue the mat- Eighth 805 F.2d at 1325 n. 2. The Consequently, ter was not resolved. Id. party seeking Circuit determined the court determined the in-house deposition not satisfy governing could “intimately in this counsel involved test. Id. 1327. But Plaintiff *15 dispute since well before it blossomed into erroneously applied district lawsuit, played integral and has role pre-litigation the Shelton test to matters developing in litigation Defendant’s strate- involving three attorneys attempts ODPS — gy.” Id. obtain to documentation from Columbus employment. distinguish to Massil- attempts State about Plaintiffs former Management. argues im that unlike claims that the district court lon He case, in properly Management played relied on Massillon counsel that who “an inte- Trust, gral developing litigation strategy role in Realty v. Americold No. 5:08CV0799, (N.D.Ohio prior during litiga- to the course of 2009 WL 614831 tion,” 21, 2009), not develop Jan. to that determination. counsel ODPS did make litigation merely but strategy, assisted Bo- plaintiff Management, The in Massillon obtaining public requests tos in records operator the owner and of a commercial in from Columbus State to aid her investi- property, sought depose to the defendant gation of Plaintiff. tenant’s in-house as to pre-litiga- counsel in its dispute tion matters over a commer- The district court did abuse dis- Manage- property by applying cial Massillon lease. WL cretion objected, asserting Similarly *1. that ment to the facts to the The defendant below. CLAY, dissenting. attorney Judge, in Shelton Massil Circuit in-house attorneys Management, lon OSPS’s three summary judgment In order to survive gathered about Plaintiff from documents claim, on a mixed-motive discrimination in order conduct Columbus State plaintiff only introduce need sufficient evi investigation, something administrative jury dence a reasonable conclude legal dispute. rise to a As give could took an “the adverse defendant correctly noted: employment plaintiff,” action provided Attorney legal Reed-Frient ad- (2) “race, color, sex, religion, or na regarding vice to ODPS the decision to origin motivating tional was a factor for Plaintiff, which terminate the court the defendant’s adverse ac in Man- found to be sufficient Massillon tion.” Baxter Healthcare Corp., White v. Further, agement. the other two attor- Cir.2008). (6th F.3d neys seeks to depose who onerous,” acquiring plaintiffs is “not sum handing in docu- task involved mary judgment only to the investigation granted ments should be related termination, led to which record is defendant when “the devoid found to court in Shelton sufficient be reasonably of evidence that could be con involvement. plaintiffs strued to support claim.” added). Id. at 400 (emphasis involved This rela gathering Reed-Frient burden, tively which insignificant documents from Columbus State as well. is lesser than plaintiff pleading what a a different Finally, unlike face, type might discrimination is Management, Shelton or Massillon he did by the limited counterbalanced relief avail attempt depose opposing counsel able for Specs mixed-motive claims. litigation information order obtain about Marine, Inc., communications, (6th James strategy or but privileged Cir.2010). question rather information gather docu- ultimate is “[T]he ments obtained from evidence, Columbus presented whether [Alomari] di State. not a meaningful circumstantial, This is distinc- rect or from which a rea First, depo- tion. Shelton itself involved a jury sonable logically could infer that [his] sought sition information about docu- origin] motivating [national a] fac [was possessed. ments in-house counsel tor[ ] [OHS’s] decision terminate [his] possession F.2d at 1325 n. employment.” Ondricko MGM Grand may integrally certain documents be tied Detroit, LLC, Cir. litigation process. “In cases 2012) added). (emphasis Alomari appears involve reams documents and extensive to have satisfied this burden. discovery, document selection and This is case riddled factual dis- compilation of documents more often *16 putes. testimony, along Alomari’s legal crucial than research.” Id. at 1329. that of Overly, sup- former OHS Director case, Shelton, This attorneys like involved ports of an Alomari’s claims innocent ex- who po- obtained relation to documents planation for the on his applica- omissions Accordingly, tential litigation. namely, that Alomari was directed argument fails. tion— incorporate only employ- the most relevant III. history ment application because the was merely a reasons, “formality,” previ- For OHS had foregoing AFFIRM we ously complete of the district in all received Alomari’s resume decision respects. applied when he first the contractor position. dispute agency employment Also in is whether Alo- on their applica- actually believed, man fired Columbus tions. Mack based con- College although Community State negative stant harassment attention — agreement settlement on the record should being drawn OHS due Alomari’s eth- Further, likely dispute. settle there nicity and Muslim outreach to the commu- legitimate is a as question to what OHS nity, investigate the decision Alo- actually meant Vedra when mari and not by Martin was influenced communicated his desire announce fact that Alomari was an Arab-American. community you’re “that America” should It be the fact-finder’s task to deter- connection with his selection Alomari’s mine belief whether Mack’s was reason- replacement. Significantly, there is supported by able and evidence. prototypical, difficult resolve on-the-rec- Factual disputes be cannot resolved on ord, dispute in every factual involved Moreover, summary judgment. “the evi- the employ- mixed-motive claim: whether dence—all [must] be evidence— protected played ee’s characteristic a role light viewed in favorable to the most employer’s take decision to the ad- nonmoving Logan Denny’s, v. party.” Spees, verse action. See Inc., (6th Cir.2001). Be- (“Inquiries F.3d at into what motivat- proffered cause Alomari has sufficient evi- ed an employer’s very decision are fact to justify submitting dence the non-trivial generally intensive and will be difficult to disputes I jury, respectfully factual to the summary judgment determine dissent. (internal stage.” quotation marks omit- ted)). argued

Defendants that Alomari’s al

leged impropriety failing to disclose that — resigned auspicious than cir under less than im

cumstances —is worse Martin’s

propriety lying having attended

college. majority argu bolsters this

ment interpreting ambiguous hearsay to find that Vedra treated Martin more LETVIN; Phillips, Michael Keith favorably because whether Martin’s de Plaintiffs-Appellants, grees bogus consequence of little if majority correctly him. Even has LEW, Secretary Treasury; Jack identified one Vedra’s motivations for Donovan, Secretary HUD; Shaun treating favorably, Alomari less Alomari’s Flagstar Bank, FSB; Bank of Amer claim would be foreclosed. “Mixed- ica, N.A., Home Successor to BAC means that could still motive” Defendants Servicing, L.P., Country Loans fka many legiti be even if liable Vedra had Servicing, L.P., wide Home De Loans action, taking mate reasons for the adverse fendants-Appellees. long so as of his one reasons was the unlawful No. 14-2147. consideration Alomari’s Arab heritage. Fine Fur See Wexler White’s of Appeals, United States Court niture, Inc., Cir. Sixth Circuit. 2003). Mack, Alomari’s Deputy Director *17 Sept. supervisor, direct informed Vedra agency needed treat Alomari and Mar

tin they deceiving alike both

Case Details

Case Name: Omar Alomari v. Ohio Dep't of Public Safety
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 9, 2015
Citation: 626 F. App'x 558
Docket Number: 14-3922
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
Read the detailed case summary
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In