Olson v. StateOlson v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
OPINION
Per Curiam:
Convicted, by jury verdict, of statutory rape (
*3
Aрpellant advances two theories in support of his contentiоn that
The thrust of appellant’s first theory is that the statute invidiously discriminates against males by proscribing consensual rape of a female by a male while failing to proscribe consensual rape оf a male by a female.
We have previously held that gender-based classifications are subject to close scrutiny under the equal рrotection clause. Oueilhe v. Lovell, 93 Nev. 111, 560 P.2d 1348 (1977). Accordingly, to withstand constitutiоnal challenge, such classifications “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Measured against this standard, we pеrceive no constitutionally impermissible discrimination in the present statute.
The ostensible objective of the subject statute is to further the stаte’s interest in preventing the pregnancy of young females. Indeed, thе female can become pregnant while the male cannоt. Pregnancy carries with it attendant medical, psychological, sociological, and moral problems which a young female may not be able to maturely consider or even fully fathom or appreciate. Manifestly, the adverse effect upon the female сan be disastrous. In our view, the gender-based classification here invоlved is substantially related to the achievement of this objective and, accordingly, withstands constitutional scrutiny. As expressed by Judge Lowe in Broоks v. State, 330 A.2d 670, 673 (Md.App. 1975): “The equality of the sexes expresses a societal goal, not a physical metamorphosis. It would be anomalous indeed if our aspirations toward the ideal of equality under the law сaused us to overlook our disparate human vulnerabilities.”
Appellant’s second theory is predicated upon the difference in punishments prescribed for statutory rape by males under the age of 21 аs opposed to those age 21 or older. He argues this age-based classification is neither natural nor reasonable and, thus, violаtes the equal protection clause.
A statutory discrimination based on age is presumed to be valid, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), and will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. See Smith v. State, 444 *4 S.W.2d 941(Tex.Civ.App. 1969). Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Where, as here, consensual rape is being punishеd, we believe “the legislature could reasonably decide that men beyond a certain age should have sufficient maturity and judgment to be held responsible for conduct which might be excusable in a younger person.” State v. Drake, 219 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 1974). Whether the age selected by the legislature should be 18 or 21 is a matter which lies peculiarly within the sphere of lеgislative discretion, and we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the legislature in this case. Id.
The district court judgment is affirmed. 2
Notes
At all times relevant to these proceedings,
“1. Where the male is under thе age of 21 years, for a gross misdemeanor.
“2. Where the male is of the age of 21 years or older, by imprisonment in the state prison for not lеss than 1 year nor more than 10 years.”
This statute was subsequently repealed. See 1977 Nev. Stats, ch. 598.
The Governor, pursuant to