[¶ 1] Pаtricia Lynn Olson appeals from a judgment affirming a decision of the Department of Transportation to suspend her driving privileges for two years. Because we conclude the Report and Notice form was sufficient to give the Department authority tо suspend Olson’s driving privileges, and because we reject her constitutional arguments, we affirm the judgment.
I
[¶ 2] In the early morning hours of May 16, 2014, Morton County Deputy Sheriff Gordon LeClair provided backup for another officer on a traffic stop in Hebron. Officer LeClair testifiеd that “while [the other officer] was putting his prisoner in the backseat[,] his prisoner wanted me to talk to his friend and say, ‘hey, can they bail him out of jail.’ ” Officer LeClair asked the prisoner, “are they going to be under the influence? He said apparently.” Officer LeClаir asked the prisoner “which vehicle is it? And he told me that it was the SUV that was parked by his vehicle.” Officer LeClair approached the vehicle, and noticed a female, identified as Olson, in the driver’s seat. According to Officer LeClair, Olson “grabbed her keys, put thеm in the ignition and rolled down the window approximately an inch.” Officer LeClair noticed
[¶ 8] The Report and Notice form completed by Officer LeClair listed the date of the occurrence and the “Time of Driving/Physical Control/Crash” as “0189” а.m. Officer LeClair listed the county and city of the occurrence and in the line for “Location of Arrest or Where Detained” wrote “Brick City Motel Parking Lot.” Officer LeClair indicated, “On the above date, there. existed reasonable grounds to believe that- the above-named person was operating ... Non-Commercial motor vehicle.” Officer LeClair checked the box stating Olson “Was lawfully arrested and informed that he or she will be charged with the offense of driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.” In the officer’s statement of probable cause portion of the form, under the category “Reasonable suspicion to stop or reason. lawfully detained,” Officer Le-Clair checked the box “already stopped” and explained: “A friend wanted me to tell her he would need to be bonded out of jail.” Under the category “Probable cause to arrest/lawfully detain,” Officer LeClair checked the boxes “odor of alcoholic beverage,” “poor balance” and “failed field sobriety test(s),” and explained “odor of alcoholic beverage” and “Failed S.F. St.”
[¶ 4] Olson requested an administrative hearing to contest the Department’s intention to suspend her driving privileges. Following the hearing, the Department found Officer LeClair had reasonable grounds to believe Olson was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under' the influence of alcohol, she was placed under arrest and tested in accordance with the law, аnd she had an alcohol concentration above the legal limit. The Department suspended Olson’s driving privileges for two years and the district court affirmed the Department’s decision.
II
[¶ 5] Olson argues the Department erred in suspending her driving privileges.
[¶ 6] In
Kroschel v. Levi,
“We review аn administrative revocation of a driver’s license under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46.” Vanlishout v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp.,2011 ND 138 , ¶ 12,799 N.W.2d 397 . We must affirm the Department’s order unless:
“1. The order is not in accordance with the law.
2. The order is in violation of the ■ constitutional rights of the appellant.
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the ■proceedings before the agency.
4. The rules or prоcedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.
8. The conclusions of law and -order of the agency do not sufficiently explain thе agency’s rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.”
N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46. “When an appeal involves an interpretation of a statute, a legal question, this Court will affirm the agency’s order unless it finds the оrder is not in accordance with the law.”
Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp.,
A
■ [¶ 7] Olson argues the Department lacked authority to suspend her driving privileges because the Report and Notice form completed by Officer LeClair failed to designate how law enforcement believed she was driving or in physical control of a vehicle. Olson further argues the form does not state she was driving or in actual physical control.
[¶ 8] In
Aamodt v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp.,
[¶ 9] We have upheld the sufficiency of the Report and Notice form in other cases.
Brewer v. Ziegler,
In this case, the deputy checked the boxes indicating “already stopped,” “odor of alcoholic beverage,” “poor balance,” and “failed field sobriеty test(s).” The boxes indicating “poor balance” and “failed field sobriety test(s)” show that the deputy observed that Maisey was physically or mentally impaired. The box indicating “odor of alcoholic beverage” shows the deputy had reason to believe thе impairment was caused by alcohol. Maisey reads Aamodt to mean an officer must always provide a more detailed written statement of the facts supporting probable cause to believe the driver was driving under the influence of alcohol. This requirement is not found in N.D.C.C. §§ 39-20-03.K [4]), 39-20-04(1), or in Aamodt. The hearing officer’s determination that the Report and Notice showed probable cause to believe Maisey was driving under the influence of alcohol was in accordance with the law.
Id.
at ¶ 13. Our case law does not imposе a requirement that an officer provide a written statement detailing in actual physical control cases why the officer believed the arrestee was in actual physical control of a vehicle, or in driving under the influence cases why the officer believed the arrestee was driving a vehicle. A law ■ enforcement officer does not need reasonable suspicion to approach an already stopped vehicle.
See Abernathey v. Dep’t of Trans.,
[¶ 10] Here, Officer LeClair indicated on the Report and Notice form that “there existed reasonable grounds to believe” Olson “was operating ... Non-Commercial motor vehicle” and wrote a “Motel Parking Lot” as the location of the arrest or detention. In the reasonable suspicion to stop or reason lawfully detained portion of the form, he checked the box “already stopped” and wrote an explanation why he lawfully approached Olson’s vehicle. Officer LeClair checked three of the boxes under the probable cause to arrest or lawfully detain category and further wrote the reasons he believed Olson’s body contained alcohol. Under this Court’s precedents, we conclude the Report and Notice form contained sufficient reasonable grounds information to authorize the Department to determine whether Olson’s driving privileges should be suspended.
[¶ 11] Olson raises several arguments claiming the implied consent laws are unconstitutional. Most of these arguments have already been rejected by this Court.
[¶ 12] In
State v. Smith,
[¶ 13] Olson argues the criminal refusal statutes violate N.D. Const, art. I, § 20, which provides “[t]o guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declarе that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate.” “[T]his restriction is a limitation on legislation only.”
Larkin v. Gronna,
Ill
[¶ 14] The judgment is affirmed.