By this action commenced in the Superior Court the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident involving her and the defendant. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment entered thereon. We affirm. 1
The accident occurred on Pleasant Street in Belmont, a four-lane street with two lanes of traffic travelling in both northerly and southerly directions. The plaintiff was proceeding in a northerly direction on Pleasant Street when she stopped to make a left turn into the parking area of a store. As she made her turn and was entering the parking area the right rear end of her automobile was hit by the defendant’s automobile, which had been proceeding in a southerly direction on Pleasant Street. The parties dispute how much of the plaintiffs car remained extended into Pleasant Street when the collision occurred. The plaintiff contends that only one foot of the rear of her car extended into the street while the *167 defendant claims that at least half of the car extended into the street.
1. On re-redirect examination the plaintiff was asked: "But you recall [the defendant’s counsel] having said ... on cross-examination, re-cross, that if your car had waited another three or three and a half seconds, [the defendant’s] car would have passed, do you recall that?” After the plaintiff answered in the affirmative, she was asked: “What would have happened if during the same three or three and a half seconds, the defendant had stopped his car?” The trial judge excluded this question on the ground that any response to it by the plaintiff would have been too speculative.
The judge’s ruling was proper because the question did not seek to elicit facts observed by the witness but, instead, asked the witness to speculate as to what would have happened had the facts been different from what actually occurred. As a general rule a witness may testify only to facts that she has observed and may not give an inference or opinion based upon those facts. See
Barrie
v.
Quinby,
2. The plaintiff argues that the judge committed error by making certain remarks during cross-examination of the defendant. The plaintiffs counsel sought to show that the defendant had stated in his deposition that an exhibit (exhibit 2) showed the position of the plaintiffs car at the *168 time of the collision. On direct examination the defendant had testified that the position of the plaintiff’s car when the accident occurred was shown in another exhibit (exhibit 3), which indicated that much more of the plaintiff’s automobile was extending into the street than was shown in exhibit 2. The plaintiff was apparently attempting to point out the discrepancy in the defendant’s testimony when, during the colloquy that ensued, the judge said, "Well, I think that exhibit #3 explains it better than exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 is absolutely, well, I won’t comment on exhibit 2, exhibit 3 shows the point of contact.” The plaintiff asserts that the judge’s comments regarding the evidence prejudicially influenced the jury and deprived her of a trial before an impartial judge.
Clearly, "parties to an action are entitled to a fair and unprejudiced submission of the testimony and the issues to the jury, without indication of the opinion of the judge upon the weight or effect of evidence or as to who should prevail upon any issue where a material fact is left in doubt by the testimony or there are inferences to be drawn from the facts in proof, save as such indication may flow from a clear analysis of the evidence and unbiased statements of testimony.”
Federal Natl. Bank
v.
O’Keefe,
If there was any prejudicial impact caused by the judge’s remarks, we believe it was cured by his subsequent comments and his charge to the jury.
Partelow
v.
Newton & Boston St. Ry.,
3. The plaintiff also argues that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded several of the plaintiffs questions directed to the defendant’s medical witness, Dr. Epstein, on cross examination. We do not agree. "The scope of cross-examination, including to what extent the accuracy, veracity, and credibility of a witness may be tested, rests largely in the sound discretion of the judge.”
Commonwealth
v.
Makarewicz,
The judge excluded a question designed to elicit comment on the credibility of another medical doctor witness. The question was properly excluded, as no witness can give an opinion as to the honesty of another witness’ testimony. See
Eastman
v.
Boston Elev. Ry.,
Dr. Epstein went on to testify on cross-examination that he had been employed by the defendant to give an opinion at trial, based on his review of the hospital rec *170 ord. When the plaintiffs counsel asked whether he was "being paid by the defendant for [his] testimony,” defendant’s counsel objected to the form of the question, and it was excluded by the judge. The plaintiffs counsel then asked, "How much are you being paid to come in and give this expert testimony, Dr.?” This question was also excluded. There was no error.
The plaintiff, of course, is entitled to show, if possible, that the witness was not disinterested, by showing that he had been employed by the defendant.
Dempsey
v.
Goldstein Bros. Amusement Co.,
4. The trial judge did not err in denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial. Whether to allow or deny a motion for a new trial is a matter for the judge’s discretion. We find nothing in the record to indicate that there was an abuse of that discretion or a clear error of law requiring reversal of the judge’s decision.
Saeli
v.
Mangino,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Permeating this entire appeal are the plaintiffs assertions that the conduct of the trial judge (e.g., she charges that he demonstrated disbelief in her credibility, showed hostility toward her attorney, and shielded the defendant and his medical expert witness from effective cross-examination) deprived her of the fair and impartial trial to which she was entitled. Compare
Commonwealth
v.
Williams,