At the outset we point out this appeal is properly taken only from the judgment. The order for judgment and the order denying the motion to review and modify the judgment are not appealable orders.
1
In
Bielski v. Schulze, supra,
we determined the amount of contribution between joint tort-feasors having a common liability was to be determined in proportion to the causal negligence attributable to each in the verdict. The new rule was applied retrospectively except in three classes of cases. Generally when a court overrules a doctrine of common law, the new rule of the decision applies retroactively.
Will of Allis
*200
(1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 1, 9,
The appellant further contends it is entitled to proportional contribution because this case does not come within any of the three exceptions of the application of the rule retrospectively and also because it properly raised the issue in the trial court and preserved its rights on appeal. The only exception in the retrospective application of the rule which might bar the appellant from its benefits is the language in
Bielski
providing the rule would not apply (p. 19), “where a judgment based upon the old rules has been entered and no motion to vacate it has been made or appeal
*201
taken before this date” (March 6, 1962). The purpose of this exception was to prevent a judgment settled on the old rule from being disturbed on appeal solely on the ground of the new rule: The exception contemplated a judgment was settled upon the old rule unless a motion to vacate it had been made or an appeal had been taken on some ground other than the new rule which had not yet been announced. A judgment which was under attack at the time the
Bielski
decision was rendered is entitled to receive the benefits of the new rule unless it came under the other two exceptions. In
Longberg v. H. L. Green Co.
(1962), 15 Wis. (2d) 505,
This is an unusual case in that prior to the judgment and before the decision of Bielski, the defendant railroad moved the trial court on motions after verdict for contribution on a proportional basis, properly preserved its right on appeal, and thus raised the same issue presented in Bielski. The first excluded class of cases to the retrospective application of Bielski did not contemplate this situation although its-language is broad enough to cover the instant case. It would be unjust to deny the defendant railroad the right to proportional contribution because it did not appeal before March 6th when it at that time had raised the issue in the trial court. The language of this exclusion must be modified to except therefrom the instant case. This requires a reversal of that part of the judgment dealing with the amount of the contribution.
*202 By the-Court. — That part of the judgment appealed from is reversed, with directions to enter judgment of contribution in favor of the defendant-respondents Frederick John Augsberger and Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company against the defendant-appellant Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, and a judgment in favor of the defendant-appellant against the defendant-respondents in accordance with the rule of Bielski v. Schulze.