213 F. 18 | 2d Cir. | 1914
These are cross-appeals from a decree in favor of the libelant Olsen, owner, and dismissing the cross-libel of the United States Shipping Company, charterer of the steamer Bergenhus. The charter party was in the government form dated June 24, 1909, for two specified voyages “to be employed in carrying lawful merchandise,” steamer to be placed at disposal of charterer at New Orleans. The charterer ordered the steamer to Mobile and Gulfport to load timber on deck and under deck. The cargo tendered was square log timbers, many of them running 60-70 feet in length. The charterer loaded the cargo.
The claims in controversy are as follows:
The libelant’s are for: (1) Amount deducted by charterer from charter hire for time lost at Mobile during a dispute as to the removal of stanchions. (2) Expenses resulting from the fall of the forward deckload at Gulfport and reloading at Ship Island. (3) Amount deducted by charterer from charter hire for detention at Newport News. (4) Expense of re-stowing cargo at Newport News and of surveys. (5) Amount paid holders of bill of lading for cargo jettisoned. (6) Expenses at Aberdeen in connection with the cargo jettisoned.
Cross-libelant’s claim was for freight lost on cargo jettisoned.
Of the libelant’s claims the district judge disallowed the first, divided the second, and allowed the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth. He dismissed the cross-libel.
We do not think the owners were obliged to cut out the riveted stanchions which were a permanent part of the structure. Timber was of course lawful merchandise, but lo^s 60-70 feet long were not such as the ship was constructed to carry. If she had been built with permanent transverse instead of longitudinal bulkheads, the charterer could hardly have insisted on those bulkheads being taken out in order to accommodate the long timbers. The charterer deducted four days’ hire, which the District Judge allowed. We think this was error because the time lost was due to the charterer’s unreasonable demand. See Keyser v. Duitt, 150 Fed. 328, 80 C. C. A. 212, and Mencke v. Cargo of Sugar, 187 U. S. 248, 23 Sup. Ct. 86, 47 L. Ed. 163.
When the steamer arrived at Ship Island all her ballast tanks were full except No. 2, the largest, which could not be filled because it was leaking as the result of injuries sustained in loading. There was a list of 13 to 14 degrees and the master refused to take on board the logs rafted from Gulfport, At the charterer’s insistence, however, a survey was held which stated that the logs could be reloaded without affecting the seaworthiness of the steamer, and the master received them on board under protest. August 5th the steamer started from Ship Island for Aberdeen vía Newport News for coal, with a list to port of 11 degrees which gradually increased to 22 to 24 degrees, although no heavy weather was encountered. ' The next day the master called a council of his officers which decided that it was necessary for the safety of all aboard to cut the lashings of the forward deckload and let some of it go. This was done and 300 logs went over the port side, doing considerable damage to the steamer. The remainder was secured and the steamer proceeded to Newport News, where the ship was repaired, the cargo restowed, coal taken on board and the voyage resumed. The charterer deducted'hire for the detention at Newport News.
The owners seek to sustain the decree on various grounds. They say that the warranty of seaworthiness was satisfied if the ship was seaworthy when the voyage began, which they say was- at New Orleans, as she certainly was. If this be admitted, it will be no excuse to the owners if the master subsequently made or allowed others to make the vessel unseaworthy.
Then they rely on such analogies as landsmen requiring builders or manufacturers with whom they contract to use certain material or follow certain construction which results in loss. Such relations have no resemblance to the relation of vessel and cargo or to the supreme authority of the master of a ship. There is no such warranty as that of seaworthiness and the builder or manufacturer has no such absolute authority or duty-as has- the master of a vessel.
They rely also on article 30 of the charter providing that the deck-load shall be at the charterer’s entire risk, but this does not cover a risk caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel.
Then they say that clause 9 in which the charterers indemnify the owners against any liability arising from the bill of lading entitles the owner to recover. But the bill of lading did not increase the liability of the owners under the charter party. Indeed it restricted it. The cargo did not belong to the charterers and if it did, the owner’s liability for unseaworthiness would be exactly the same.
Finally cases are cited in which charterers wete owners pro hac vice and therefore could not reclam because of unseaworthiness caused by themselves. Obviously these have no application.
It follows from the foregoing that the claims of the libel, except for detention at Mobile, should have been disallowed and that of the cross-libel for freight on the logs jettisoned should have been allowed. The decree is reversed and both parties having appealed and succeeded, without costs to either of this court. Costs of the court below to follow the usual course.