Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.

plunge erable downward eyes in the

women opinion, who read the Court’s

likely well, their menfolk as of which I am justice

one. Neither as a nor as an ordi-

nary person of join reason am I able to

opinion upholds the admission of the

shoes upholds and all in the same breath telling “No,

the trial plaintiff, court

you will not display be allowed to

jury you encounter no difficulty in

walking with them.” majority seeks to ameliorate its me-

andering with a discussion of this third by pointing

issue out that the harm of

admitting the shoes was itself ameliorated testimony concerning the admission of plaintiff's ability to walk and dance in circumstances, light

heels: “In of these we

do not the trial believe court abused its excluding

discretion in the demonstration.” added). (emphasis

At 791 P.2d at 1278 explana-

How this suffices as a reasonable me, escapes clearly portrays

tion but

frivolity of this rhetorical exercise under- majority

taken in attempting jus-

tify unjustifiable. grossly

It is inappropriate for this Court muddy waters the new trial

discussing evidentiary old issues and old

circumstances. Rather the Court should error,

simply declare the and remand for a

new trial. Idaho Code 1-205 neither re- quires appellate nor allows such interfer-

ence. OLSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

David

Cross-Respondent, COMPANY, Corporate J.A. FREEMAN Defendants-Respondents, I-V, I-V, Does and Individual Does Cross-App ellan ts.

No. 17471.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

7,May Schlender, Chartered,

E. Lee Hailey, for plaintiff-appellant, cross-respondent. Benoit, Alexander, Sinclair, Harwood & High, Falls, defendants-respon- Twin dents, Doerr, cross-appellants. John A. ar- gued.

BOYLE, Justice. (hereafter “Olsen”) appeals

David Olsen granting from the district court’s order summary judgment in favor of defen- Summary judgment granted dants. was the basis that Olsen’s cause of action was by products liability foreclosed the Idaho 6-1303,1 repose, [6-1403], statute of I.C. § presumption which creates a rebuttable product’s that a “useful safe life” has ex- pired in those claims that involve harm or occurring injury more than ten after statute, delivery. time of Under the failure to rebut with clear and convincing evidence bars a claim. 30, 1986, injured Olsen was on June operating by hay while baler owned his employer, According Loren Strode. to Ol- incident, sen’s account of the the baler’s pickup jammed required roller became repair. attempting repairs While those object, thought spring- unseen roller, pickup loaded tine on the baler’s causing struck Olsen in the face retinal hemorrhaging eye. and blindness in one brought suit Olsen baler’s Co., manufacturer, J.A. Freeman and Lor- complaint against en Strode. The Freeman warn, properly alleged failure to failure to instruct, dangerous de- and defective and sign. complaint against alleged Strode entrustment, negligent intentional endan- germent, negligent supervision and failure properly and instruct. Defen- warn alleged dants’ answers denied part of misuse and misconduct on the Ol- sen, and Freeman asserted that Olsen’s provisions of the by claim barred was designations designation were insert- notes the bracketed section 1. The bracketed section was compiler, necessary changes but will be deleted from the ed indicate the inserted to balance of the Court’s discussion for conve- numbering law as enacted. from the compiler’s purposes. As stated in the nience showing invalidity and must overcome repose. products liability statute Idaho strong validity. presumption of 6-1403(l)(a). I.C. § Leliefeld Johnson, Freeman filed a motion Defendant Co., (1983); Cummings Simplot v. J.R. offering judgment summary affidavit (1973); Idaho Tel. Idaho hay deposition evidence that the baler Baird, Co. sold to J.A. Freeman manufactured grounds on other Sim ovrl’d a Twin Falls dealer and delivered Comm’n, 111 Tax mons v. State purchaser injury in 1968. oc- first Olsen’s gener It 30, 1986, approximately curred on June legislative presumed acts are con ally eighteen years hay baler was after stitutional, legislature has the state purchaser placed delivered to its first powers, its constitutional acted within upon Based the evidence sub- into service. concerning interpretation any doubt defendant, presump- mitted rebuttable in favor of that statute is to be resolved 6-1403 tion arose based on I.C. § the statute constitutional. which will render expired safe life had hay baler’s useful 308, Rawson, P.2d 100 Idaho 597 State v. injury. This prior to the time of Olsen’s (1979); Bingham Memorial 31 see also statutory was unrebutted Hosp. Welfare, & Dep’t v. Idaho Health of court Accordingly, Olsen. the district 1094, (1987); P.2d 393 Moon 112 Idaho 739 granted summary defendants’ motion for Commrs., 111 Idaho Bd. Land v. State of judgment on the of the statute of basis (1986); 389, P.2d 125 Idaho State 724 repose in I.C. 6-1403. § 691, Leroy, 110 Idaho 718 v. AFL-CIO 1) appeal, Olsen contends that On (1986); v. Mining Co. Ida P.2d 1129 Hecla repose of product liability statute Idaho 147, Comm., 108 Idaho 697 Tax ho State due plaintiff equal protection denies and Newman, (1985); v. 108 P.2d 1161 State 2) process; of is uncon- the statute (1985); 5, ex rel. Idaho 696 P.2d 856 State “open in that it stitutional violates Inc., 102 Mktg., Kidwell v. United States 1, of art. of the Idaho provision court” 18§ 451, (1981); 25 A.L. Idaho 631 P.2d 622 Constitution; 3) and of fact material issues (1981); 25 v. R.4th 381 School Dist. No. precluding granting summary of exist 283, Comm., P.2d 101 Idaho 612 Tax State judgment in favor of defendants. (1980); v. Bd. 126 Lindstrom District of 1, Health, No. 109 Idaho Panhandle Dist. 956, (Ct.App.1985); Flores v. 712 P.2d 657 I. 182, State, (Ct.App. 71 109 Idaho 706 P.2d 162, Attacking 1985); Reed, For Standard 107 Idaho 686 v. State Constitutionality (Ct.App.1984). P.2d 842

Statute judg- challenging legislative Those constitutionality attacking first turn to the claim I.C. ment and We the courts that the equal protection denies Olsen statute must convince 6-1403 § legislative which the classification art. 1 2 of the Idaho facts on the law. Olsen cites reasonably be apparently based could and the amend- Constitution fourteenth governmental and to be true Constitution conceived ment to the United States Clover maker. Minnesota v. statutory classification of decision asserts that Leaf 464, Co., 101 Creamery 449 S.Ct. liability plaintiffs all with causes (1981), 715, 724, 659 reh. den. products in 66 L.Ed.2d involving the stream of action (1981). ten offends his commerce more than guarantee equal protec-

constitutional constitutionality of At issue is the tion. of re products the Idaho pass upon asserting required are pose. the unconsti We party questions presented of law of determine all tutionality of a statute bears the burden 710

upon appeal and necessary to the final de- been the subject analysis by extensive termination the case. 1-205. It Appeals Court and Idaho Court is well established that a case when can be both criminal civil cases. In criminal ground decided upon than a other consti- law the three standards been ana- ground, tutional lyzed the Court will not applied variety address to a wide of cases ranging constitutional issue it is municipal unless neces- from a control over es- sary for a determination Poe- case. sell beverages tablishments that alcoholic sy Bunney, Bowman, v. 98 Idaho State v. dancing, and allow Inc., (1977); Buildings, Swensen (1982), regulations 93 Ida- Idaho ho P.2d This controlling drug para- case the enactment of Newman, solely phernalia should not be resolved legislation, the sum- State v. mary judgment (1985), issues we because are P.2d and to squarely presented cases, with the murder Fetterly, State v. capital constitutional issue proper for a State v. resolved Beam, and full determination issues 115 Idaho presented. In civil the three cases standards have adopted applied variety been to a recognized This Court has three ranging cases from recreational use of employed standards review to be land, Mining Johnson Sunshine equal protection analysis. Jones v. State residen- Medicine, Bd. cy requirements appointment to a local denied, cert. (1976), 914, 399 431 U.S. 97 planning zoning board, Langmeyer v. and 2173, (1977); 53 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 223 Leliefeld State, 53, (1982), 104 656 Idaho P.2d 114 Johnson, v. 357, 104 Idaho 659 P.2d 111 General rate-setting powers, commission’s (1983). Where the classification is based I.P.U.C., Tel. Co. v. 942, 109 712 Idaho P.2d suspect on a classification involves a (1986), 643 constitutionality and to the of á right employed fundamental we have damage recovery limitation on under the scrutiny” “strict test. “the Where discrim Idaho Tort Claims Act. Packard v. Joint inatory challenged statutory character 171, School 604, Dist. No. 104 661 Idaho apparent is classification face and P.2d 770 (Ct.App.1983).2 patent is also where there indication of a relationship lack of between the classifica It is well established that tion purpose and the declared the stat equal protection analy three standards ute,” applicable. the “means-focus” is test sis, i.e., means-focus, scrutiny, and strict In other basis” test cases “rational is basis, applied adopted, rational have been Mining Johnson v. Sunshine employed. repeatedly appellate and affirmed Co., 866, 268, 870, 106 Idaho 271 684 courts It well of this state. is likewise (1984). test, or the settled that the “rational basis” equal protection is often three standards of standard as it “restrained-view” Idaho, analysis recognized described, applicable in strict where classification scruti- is means-focus, ny, and basis economic matters or rational statutes deal with 357, (1977), Johnson, v. Idaho 2. In Packard Joint School Dist. the Court of and v. 104 Leliefeld fashion, Burnett, Appeals carefully, scholarly Judge writing 659 P.2d and in a 111 Appeals, origin history of standards of for the traced the reviewed the the three Court of standards, Appeals in Packard refinement three and reference review. The Court of cited Dist., Loveland, 621, is v. Joint 104 Stucki v. (1972); 94 Idaho 495 P.2d 571 directed to Packard School 653, 607, 773, Cantrell, P.2d at historical v. 94 Idaho 496 P.2d Idaho at 661 for that State (1972), Hagan, language dealing Thompson perspective. 96 Idaho of Packard 276 v. 19, (1974), reviewing placement with of "fair and substantial" into 523 P.2d 1365 the devel tests, opment primarily the three the “ration one of the three standards was clarified Medicine, Mining explained Bd. v. Sunshine al basis" test. See Jones v. State in Johnson 5, 859, denied, 866, (1984), (1976), 106 P.2d 268 see fn. at 97 Idaho cert. Idaho 684 914, 870, 2173, p. 268. 97 S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d 223 684 P.2d 431 U.S.

7H statutory A discrimination equality. welfare such as Idaho matters social set aside statement in the will not be products liability statute if conceived to See, reasonably appeal. e.g., State v. Bow present facts 39, added.) man, (1982); (Emphasis justify it. 357, Johnson, 104 Idaho 659 v. Leliefeld Medicine, 97 Idaho Bd. Jones v. State Bd. Jones v. State denied, 859, (1976), cert. 555 P.2d Medicine, 859, Idaho 53 L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. denied, (1976), S.Ct. 431 U.S. cert. (1977), Maryland, quoting McGowan (1977).3 Under the 53 L.Ed.2d 223 420, 425-56, 81 S.Ct. 366 U.S. test, equal protection is “rational basis” L.Ed.2d only if classifications are based offended econom- impacts 6-1303 social and I.C. totally solely on reasons unrelated to the under the must be evaluated ic areas and only if no goals of state’s pursuit provides that which rational basis test justify those grounds can be advanced and offended equal protection denied Knieriem, 107 goals. City Lewiston v. solely on only if the classification based 685 P.2d Leliefeld totally pursuit reasons unrelated to Johnson, only grounds if no can goals state’s appropriate this Court held that goals. For justify those be advanced impacts so test review a statute which II the stat- in Part we find reasons stated basis or economic areas the rational cial basis under the rational ute constitutional requires only test that the statute having reasonably conceived ob- test legitimate legislative goals “advances advancing legitimate legislative jective and rational fashion.” goals in a rational fashion. Furthermore, such classifica P.2d at 128.4 test do not tions under the rational basis equal protection clause because

violate II. they inequality. Mathemati result some Repose Idaho Statute of scrutinizing precision required is not cal constitutionality Lang the statute. of typical repose” of en “statute State, meyer v. Idaho 656 P.2d jurisdictions provides many an ab acted on claims and causes of time limit solute from the Idaho’s statute differs equal action. safeguard

The constitutional [of repose of in that it does not only typical statute protection] the clas- is offended if action, rather absolutely to bar an but act ground wholly irrel- rests on sification defense separate a affirmative establishes the state’s evant to achievement of Idaho’s statute can be rebutted. pre- which objective. legislatures State are provision that a “useful safe life” contains consti- to have acted within their sumed begin that, age product, upon the in focuses power despite the fact tutional delivery of the first ning in- at the time to practice, their law results in some (Citations means-focus, Johnson, basis. and rational 104 Idaho 3. Leliefeld Dist., omitted.) School and Packard v. Joint (Ct.App.1983), have at at 127. among uphold- widely cases cited as those been ing scholarly analysis of the various standards A damages recoverable a limit on 373-75, Leliefeld, is contained government Tort tortfeasors. See Government 127-29, applicable and is 659 P.2d at Statutes, 3[a], p. Damages 29. 43 A.L.R.4th 19 presented restate here here. Rather than issues analysis reference is and the in the standards observed: this Court 4. In leliefeld v. Wil See also Schweiker directed to Leliefeld. constitutionality a is chal- of When the lenged tion, son, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 U.S. 101 S.Ct. equal protec- grounds it denies Smith, Dep’t Employment of question address is what first to 54 L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. 434 (1977). applied. Three is to be review standard analysis protection equal standards scrutiny, recognized in Idaho: strict been purchaser lessee, or and a “statute of re- safely period longer for a (10) than ten pose” presumes the useful safe life of years, period repose, after which product a expired to have years ten after created in subsection delivery product. of the (2)(a) arises, hereof shall be extended according warranty to that promise. or

The full text of the section of the statute (10) year 2. The ten period in question repose provides as follows: (2)(a) established subsection hereof Length product of time sellers are sub- does apply if product, seller ject liability. (1) Useful safe life. — intentionally misrepresents facts about (a) Except provided as in subsection product, its or fraudulently conceals (1)(b) hereof, product seller shall not it, information about and that conduct be subject to a claimant for was a substantial cause of the claim- harm under chapter this the product if ant’s harm. proves seller by preponderance Nothing (2) contained in subsection evidence that the harm was caused af- of this section shall right affect the product’s ter the had “useful safe life” any person found liable under this chapter to seek and obtain contribution begins at the time “Useful safe life” indemnity or person from other delivery product and extends responsible who is for harm under this the time during product which the chapter. normally likely perform be (10) year period 4. The ten be stored in a manner. For the safe (2)(a) established in subsection hereof purposes chapter, of this “time deliv- apply shall not if the harm was caused ery” means the time delivery by prolonged exposure to a defective product purchaser or lessee first product, or if injury-causing aspect engaged who was not in the business of product that existed at the time selling either products such using of delivery was not discoverable them component parts of another ordinary reasonably prudent person product to be sold. (10) until more than ten after the (b) A product subject seller be delivery, harm, time of or if the caused liability for harm product caused (10) years within ten after the time of beyond used its useful safe life to the delivery, did not manifest itself until extent seller has ex- after that time. pressly long- warranted the for (3)Statute period. er of limitation. No claim under chapter may brought more than (2) repose. Statute of (2) years two from the time the of cause (a) Generally. In claims that involve action accrued in as defined section 5- (10) harm years caused more than ten added.) (Emphasis Idaho Code. delivery, time presumption a after arises that the harm of legislative purpose The of was caused Idaho’s statute after repose expressly the of had was stated in the 1980 This useful safe life Laws, presumption may only p. provide be Session ch. “to rebutted convincing length clear and for the products evidence. maximum of time subject liability.”5 sellers are to (b) Limitations repose. on statute of product 1.If a expressly seller The origin war- Idaho statute has its in the product rants that its can be utilized Model Liability Uniform Product Act. Fed. subject conceptual practical problems, particular- 5. One commentator on the identified the and practical problems defending inherent in ly a problems for the defense. These include product liability passage evidence, claim after the of a admissibility concept the of the of significant period of time. defect, defect, proof availability the of the of defenses, defenses, abnormally long period proof damages. The of time of between addition, product unique jury’s tendency lawsuit created In a natural to em- diving injuries for sustained while Act was board Reg., 211. The model Vol. No. De- pool. diving in 1979 the United States The board had been drafted into a Commerce, one partment of and Idaho is in thirteen purchased and installed The only adopted to have it. three states in The years before the accident 1982. to virtually identical Idaho statute is summary granted judgment trial court examples of except Act it deleted model applying the useful safe the manufacturer Although of “useful safe life.”6 evidence Washington In life statute. portion deleted, examples were the Idaho stat- Ap- Washington Court of reversing, extending life” as ute defines “useful safe peals stated: during product time “for Here, the affidavit provided the Morses normally likely perform ... Orphan, A. who expert, of an Dr. Milton 6-1403(l)(a). manner.” a safe safe life of a four- indicated the useful states which have only The other two diving in excess teen-Duraflex board of the model Act are adopted any version years of constant sixteen of fifteen to Washington Kansas. The statutes of less injury occurred use. Daniel Morse’s Idaho, states, including are essen- all three delivery of fourteen after than and to the tially identical to each other brought diving His claim was board. twelve-year Washington has model Act. a discovery of the years from within three period repose, pre- and the presumptive also indicated the The affidavit harm. may preponder- sumption be overcome a use, diving constant board was compared to Ida- of the evidence as ance during the winter. since it was stored convincing The ho’s clear standard. question Orphan affidavit created a the model The Kansas identical Thus, summary judgment based Act. of fact. 4.16.310 must be reversed on RCW Washington interpreted statute was The plain- The remanded for trial. the case City Toppenish, Morse 46 Wash. of overcom- tiff will still have burden rev. den. App. Morse, by a ing useful life safe plaintiff brought diving preponderance of the evidence. a manufacturer action hindsight virtually impossible grounds policy ploy and as statutes makes it judged "designed protect from stale ensure that a 1950 the citizens gathered Evidence after the sale standards. and to make an end and vexatious claims limiting product, even if admitted with a lapse possibility litigation after the charge, jury judgment based forces a to make time.” reasonable upon retroactive and unrealistic standards. Stripping Hargraves Mach. v. Brackett Further, might refrain from a manufacturer (E.D.Tenn.1970). F.Supp. making product more efficient out safer and changes might any design be used of fear that especially proba- Examples of evidence that Although product against him at trial. determining product’s useful whether tive ten-or-twenty- safely been used over a expired had include: safe life year period, defendant still faces enor- (a) and tear to which The amount wear problems proving the defenses mous alteration, subject; product had been modification, or misuse. (b) natural effect of deterioration from McGovern, Variety,Policy and Constitution causes, conditions climate and other and from Liability Repose, ality Product Statutes of stored; which the was used under Am.U.L.Rev. user, (c) practices sim- The normal products involving over of cases The number users, respect product the seller with ilar and small, relatively proponents years but ten old is circumstances, frequency, purposes and to the repose of contend that their effect of statutes upon use, respect re- product’s with the of significant planning is out of business renewals, replacements; pairs, proportion the number cases that have with (d) Any representations, instructions Act, Liability Product arisen. See Uniform warnings by product the seller concern- made 62,733-34 62,714, (1979), citing Fed.Reg. Closed maintenance, storage, ing proper and use of Survey Analysis Survey: A Technical Claim expected product useful safe life of or the the Results product; statutes, having denying the the effect of Such (e) Any of the or alteration modification any judicial remedy of an for the enforcement claim, by party. justified a user or third valid are otherwise 729 P.2d at 641-42. There is no further dence. Accordingly, there is no defect in discussion Toppenish in Morse v. City the as placing statute a result of the bur- defining the term plaintiff “useful safe life” and den on the presump- to rebut the although plaintiffs expert the affidavit of The validity tion. ques- the statute in expressed opinion depends upon tion to the safe the repose useful statute of diving board, life of concept the Washington recovery the under the Court Appeals liability did statute precluded not address that is- is if the harm sue. product’s occurs after “useful safe expired. presented life” has The issue is There are two cases citing the Kansas whether the trial in granting court erred statute. In Mfg. Chamberlain v. Schmutz summary judgment question on the (D.Kan.1982), 532 F.Supp. 588 whether the useful safe life of the baler United States District Court defen denied expired prior had injury. to Olsen’s dant’s motion to amend his to add answer the defense Kansas limited statute The record before trial court liability prod to the useful safe life of clearly hay established that the baler had uct. The district court denied the motion by been owned several different individu to amend on the basis that the useful safe als, was worn out and been had rebuilt at life limitation contained in the Kansas stat parts with least twice from borrowed other applied ute retroactively. would not be machinery. Olsen did not establish how his Corp., Tomlinson v. Celotex 244 Kan. injury absolutely occurred and offered no Supreme the Kansas evidence in the form of affidavit or other Court question was faced with the of the oppose wise to for summary motion limitation of relating actions to asbestos judgment. Prominently absent before the produced by and sold One defendant. any district court was evidence submitted of the presented issues whether the statutory presumption rebut con useful had any application safe life to the Although tained in I.C. 6-1403. an ex § Supreme claims. The Kansas held Court pert deposition was hired Olsen his that useful safe life did not because apply record, is in the a careful review of the repose the statute of did not other amend deposition expert reveals that the had nev specifical Kansas limitation statutes which hay question er seen the baler or one ly applied to asbestos claims. similar to it manufactured Freeman. provisions of I.C. consti- 6-1403 § Although expert Olsen’s testified witness repose limiting recovery tute a statute of deposition hay in his that the baler did not for which there otherwise be standards, with comply ANSI that it had a under product liability I.C. statutes. warn, design defect and failed to the record limitations, 6-1403 is not statute of § completely devoid of evidence to (3) although subsection does statutory presumption rebut the provide two-year statute of limitations product’s useful safe life had barring any which is more than claim filed repose poli- Idaho’s statute of advances a two the time the from cause of action cy finality legal relationships and thus portion accrued. The statute limitation legislature objective furthers I.C. 6-1403 not involved § providing length for “the maximum of time action. products subject liability.” sellers are ten-year period I.C. 6-1403 cre- The classification established ates a favor of a manufac- bears a rational relation to the 6-1403 proof turer and objective. shifts burden legislative The statute plaintiff presumption. Rule to rebut test falls within “rational basis” pro- Rules generally appropriate of the Idaho of Evidence use when re- viewing impact vides that statutes shift the burden of statutes which social or eco- going producing forward and some evi- nomic areas and the classification advances

715 otherwise, language its where goals Lel- stated legitimate in a rational fashion. intelligence 357, is that men of common Johnson, such v. iefeld meaning. guess necessarily (1983). 111 818, Am.Jur.2d, Law 16A Constitutional expressed logical is to infer from the It p. 988. legal legislative finalizing intent rela- establishing tionships the maximum incor vagueness” doctrine The “void for length subject are of time manufacturers no notions fair porates process the due that statute has a reason- law liability, warning,7 and mandates that tice or ably reasonably guidelines for objective, conceived has a rational ba- set clear makers “arbitrary prevent equal sis and must be under the of fact in order sustained triers discriminatory enforcement.” Smith protection clauses. 566, 1242, 39 415 U.S. 94 S.Ct. Goguen, v. Casbah, (1974); Inc. v. L.Ed.2d 605 see also m. Thone, F.Supp. 474 512 aff'd (8th 651 551 Cir. part, part, rev’d in F.2d is Not Unconstitu- “Useful Safe Life” 1981), 102 S.Ct. cert. den. 455 U.S. tionally Vague (D.C.Neb.1982). 874 71 L.Ed.2d Olsen contends that the Idaho challenge evaluating a constitutional vague so as vague- for basis of void to a statute disagree. deny process due him law. We ness, must consider both the Court any No shall make or enforce law state im- fairness of law essential abridge privileges or im- which shall practicability drafting legislation with States, munities of citizens of United Kennedy, greater specificity. Arnett v. any deprive any person nor shall state 1633, 1647, 134, 161, 94 40 416 S.Ct. life, liberty or due property, pro- without (1974); v. Civil L.Ed.2d 15 Fabio Serv. law____ cess of Comm’n, A.2d 489 Pa. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.§ Similarly, the Idaho Constitution states: meet that a fails to It is established law requirements of the Due Process life, person deprived No shall ... vague if it so and standardless Clause process liberty property without due public uncertain as to that it leaves the of law. prohibits judges or leaves the conduct it art. 13. ID. CONST. decide, without jurors free vague, found Statutes are to be standards, prohibit- what is legally fixed or uncertain are in violation of indefinite particular not in each and what ed provisions and as such these constitutional case____ Certainly pur- the basic one of are unconstitutional. Florida Business has poses Due Clause Process State, F.Supp. Free v. men Enter. protect person been always (Fla.1980). having impose burdens the Government except in upon him accordance with statutory general principle It is law Implicit in this of the land. valid laws statute must be definite to be safeguard premise is the constitutional recognized that a stat- It has been valid. carries an the law must be one that vague as to violate the due ute is so legal meaning with stan- understandable process clause of the United States Con- enforce. dards that courts must language does not stitution where its warnings sufficiently definite convey 382 U.S. Pennsylvania, v. Giaccio 518, 520-21, 402-03, 15 L.Ed.2d proscribed conduct when measured S.Ct. . (1966) understanding practices, by common Jacksonville, 104, 108-09, pachristou Rockford, 405 U.S. Grayned 408 U.S. 839, 843, 2294, 2298-99, L.Ed.2d 110 L.Ed.2d 222 Pa- S.Ct. S.Ct. (9th Cir.1985). This Court has examined criminal stat- A civil or non-criminal utes Marek, under this test. In State v. vague statute is not unconstitutionally if 860, (1987), 736 P.2d 1314 we persons intelligence of reasonable can de- stated: meaning rive core from it. Cotton States Anderson, Mut. Ins. Co. v. 749 F.2d 663

This Court has held that a statute which (11th Cir.1984). requires either or doing forbids of an vague act terms so that men of com- previously, As stated the Idaho intelligence necessarily guess mon must origin statute derives its from the Model meaning, appli- at its and differ toas Liability Fed.Reg., Uniform Product Act. cation, violates the first essential of due 44, legislature Vol. No. 211. The Idaho process of law. adopted suggested “useful safe life” 866, 112 Idaho at 736 P.2d at 1320. See provision upon age that focuses Lenz, 632, also State v. 651 P.2d product, beginning delivery at the time of (Ct.App.1982); v. Carringer, State purchaser lessee, to the first or and the (1974); State v. repose” provision pre “statute of Groseclose, sumed the “useful safe life” of a (1946). Although invoking most decisions expire delivery ten after vagueness” the constitutional “void for act, product. The model unlike the Idaho doctrine have dealt with criminal statutes statute, examples sets forth a series of ordinances, applies equal- this doctrine determining assist whether the “useful ly to civil statutes. City Jones v. Lub- expired.8 safe life” has The drafters of the bock, (5th Cir.1984), den., 727 F.2d 364 reh. acknowledged prob model act that a basic (C.A.Tex.1984); 730 F.2d 233 In Interest of vagueness lem with the model act has been D.L.H., 198 Neb. 253 N.W.2d 283 concept as to life. useful safe How ever, process a statute denies due of law Supreme The U.S. Court Giaccio re- question only and raises constitutional constitutionality viewed the of a state stat- vague when it is so that men of common payment ute requiring the of costs and intelligence necessarily guess at its rejected argument that the statute was meaning application. and differ as to its vague not unconstitutionally solely because Cantrell, v. 234 Kan. State it was of a “civil character”. den., cert. 469 U.S. liberty property specifically Both are (Kan.1984); S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d 31 State v. protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Inc., Investigations, O’Neill against any deprivation state does (Alaska 1980); Fabio v. Civil Serv. process, not meet the standards of due Comm’n, 489 Pa. 414 A.2d 82 protection and this is not to be avoided State, 121 Ariz. Cohen simple label a State chooses to (App.1977). upon fasten its conduct or its statute. So here this state Act whether labeled validity products of the Idaho challenge “penal” or not must meet the depends upon statute of unconstitutionally vague. it is concept recovery precluded if the 382 U.S. at 86 S.Ct. at 520. product’s harm occurs after the “useful Although pro the Idaho statute safe life.”

However, greater per tolerance is criteria, specific example guide or vides no addressing civil or non-crimi mitted when “useful safe life” of lines to determine the opposed nal statute as to a criminal statute product, of definitions does not vagueness absence under the void for doctrine. vague- necessarily render a statute void for City Angeles, Los 762 F.2d Chalmers noted, likely perform be stored in a manner.” 7. As the Idaho statute defines 8. See fn. safe added.) extending 6-1403(l)(a). (Emphasis "... for the time life" “useful safe during normally which the rights modify common law interpreted as to abolish ness when such terms can be Medi v. State Bd. taking ordinary, contemporary or and remedies. Jones their of (1976), cine, 859, P.2d 399 97 Idaho 555 meaning. See v. United common Perrin 2173, denied, 914, 53 States, 37, 42, 311, 314, 431 97 S.Ct. cert. U.S. 444 100 S.Ct. U.S. (1977). limi placing A statute (1979). L.Ed.2d 223 199 The relevant 62 L.Ed.2d does not contradict products liability to tations on remedies factors consider a Constitution that provision of the Idaho evidence to establish wheth action include open evéry be to product justice courts of shall safe life” of a has er “useful for remedy afforded person speedy and a Farmer International v. Cf. Jones, person. In this Co., 742, every injury of Id. 97 Idaho Harvester Farmer, legislature may at (1976). of Court stated: “The As held addition we of repeal any part age by legislative time a act product, is the of a al relevance or use, expressly law either severity of of the common length and its state passage an act inconsistent therewith repair expected its useful life. 97 and Vogts v. 748, legisla any particular subject.” P.2d Guer Idaho at 553 at 1312. 851, rette, 527, 865 351 P.2d of the Idaho Products Lia 142 Colo. ture’s enactment Co., bility (1960). Simplot Act include a and v. Cummings to statute In J.R. (1973), life of the useful safe consideration 95 Idaho 511 P.2d provided in that context is not inconsistent that constitutional which was held holdings prior with the of this Court. for making a claim an industri the time for Farmer v. International Harvester commence to run from the injury al should 97 Idaho We accident, from date of date not of the vague is hold that the statute not so as injuries, compensable even manifestation deny process. due preclude though statute acted to recov group

ery particular claimant for is that the It well established claimants. IV. “open provision governing access courts” prohibit not justice does courts Open Court Provision Idaho legislature abolishing modifying from Constitution right common-law of action. Twin Falls that Olsen contends Idaho’s statute Hamill, 103 Hosp. Corp. v. Bldg. Clinic & notwithstanding repose, pre- its rebuttable 644 P.2d Jones sumption provision, effectively blocks free Medicine, 859, 555 State Bd. of guaranteed by access to the courts as Ida- (1976), denied, 431 cert. U.S. 1, 18, commonly art. re- ho Constitution § S.Ct. L.Ed.2d “open provision. courts” ferred freely speedily 18. Justice to leg principle which allows the justice shall be administered. —Courts modify rules of the common islature to open every person, speedy reme- change recent the law of law is not a person, injury dy every afforded Bullock, In jurisdiction. Moon v. character, right jus- property or (1944), Supreme sale, administered without tice shall be stated, recognize it Court “[W]e denial, prejudice. delay or Legislature, not province CONST, court, modify the rules of the of the ID art. 607, 151 at common law.” of the that this article Con- Olsen asserts certainly unique principle not 771. This legislature from prohibits the stitution v. Clover to Idaho. Minnesota Leaf abolishing existing right of at com- action Co., 449 Creamery S.Ct. substituting some other mon law without the United States 66 L.Ed.2d means for redress. Supreme stated: Court may be outset, again Supreme Court observe The Minnesota

At the we not a sensible’ power has the correct the act legislature clearly conserving energy. among upholding means of But we is found court decisions legislatures, constitutionality up reiterate that “it is repose. courts, Many statutes of courts have ex to decide on the wisdom and pressed interpretation concern that a strict utility legislation.” open court clause would restrict the 101 S.Ct. at 726. legislature’s ability to enact new laws and urges Olsen this Court to follow the deci- repeal old laws and that such restrictions Supreme sion of the Court of Utah Ber- upon legislature freeze could common Corp., ry Beech Aircraft rights in perpetuity. law Reeves v. Ille (Utah 1985), which held a similar statute Co., Elec. 170 Mont. unconstitutional where there is no substi- Burns, Josephs v. 260 Or. remedy provided. tute or alternative The (1971). Pennsylvania The Su abrogation remedy Utah court held of the preme expressed Court its concern and ana may justified or cause of action under be lyzed the issue as follows: open provision the courts of the Constitu- Leg- upon This court would encroach the if only tion there is a clear social or eco- ability guide develop- islature’s to the nomic evil to be and the elimina- eliminated legisla- ment of the law if we invalidated existing legal remedy tion of an is not an simply by the rule enacted tion because arbitrary for or unreasonable means Legislature rejects cause of the some achieving objective.9 Unlike Idaho’s by currently preferred action the courts. repose, statute of the Utah statute was place To do so would to certain rules legal absolute and barred all actions non- of the “common law” and certain death, damage personal injury, prop- to the courts constitutional decisions of erty by product, if the caused defective rules of the “common law” and above all years action is filed more than six after the decisions of certain non-constitutional consumption,” of first sale for “use or date change except all consti- courts above or ten after the date of manufacture. tutional amendment. Such a result U.C.A.1953, Although Berry is 78-15-1. § of the checks would offend our notion glance, persuasive at first attractive the various and balances between analysis careful review and reveals sub- government, and of the flexi- branches of growth stantial differences the Utah statute and bility required healthy for the 6-1403, primarily presence in the I.C. the law. § presumption the Idaho stat- rebuttable Armstrong Cork Storage, Freezer Inc. pre- and the of a rebuttable ute absence Co., 382 A.2d 476 Pa. sumption in the Utah statute. for the District Court United States addressed Despite differences and variations in le- District of Tennessee Eastern statutes, reasoned as follows: common theme this issue and gal theories and changing analysis society’s needs. The 1971 Berry The Utah Court in v. Beech Aircraft provision changes Corp., open sweeping legislature held that the courts in the made injured only provides if the law satisfied of the Idaho common law the enactment person reasonable alternative an effective and Act, seq., and the I.C. 6-901 et § Tort Claims remedy by for vindication of due course law negligence comparative adoption laws "rebuttable his constitutional presumption" interest. Idaho’s clearly these statutes 6-801. Both of § language constitutional satisfies en- preexisting common law. The modified the analysis, scrutiny and I.C. 6-1303 under this Claims Act and actment of the Idaho Tort distinguishable its Utah coun- from is therefore negligence comparative laws of this state would Berry. terpart wise, Like- ruled unconstitutional prevented if a strict and inflexible have been Sears, Roe- reliance on Heath v. Olsen’s legisla- limiting the discretion of standard N.H. 464 A.2d 288 buck & imposed. Accordingly, a strict were to be ture distinguishable New misplaced because open interpretation court clause art. of the Hampshire contains an absolute Statute 507-D:2 not violated Constitution is 18 of the Idaho provi- bar without the rebuttable ability legislature’s prohibit not and does given legislature must be the sound sion. repeal the need old laws as new laws and enact society’s law as needs to amend the discretion require. arises. prohibiting adopt rule an inflexible To deny ever- legislature the need for an rights, it is “absolutely” potential led to the cut off policy Reasons of sound have general descrip- adoption of laws of both fatally his flawed and nevertheless violates repose], tions of limitation and [statutes process rights. He due asserts validity questioned. and their cannot be presumption, requiring rebuttal operation, The time manner of their evidence, convincing” imposes “clear and them, exceptions acts and the from upon common an unreasonable standard run, begin limited which time shall protected rights. law generally depend sound dis- will on the jurisdictions have determined that Some legislature, according cretion of the power enact statutes titles, the nature of the the situation of implicit emergency preclude in the country a cause action leads to their enactment. Cases legislature’s rights power to abolish provisions occur where the law on Rosenberg vested. v. Town yet may be subjects those so unreasonable 662, 667 61 N.J. 293 A.2d Bergen, N. right, as to amount to a denial of a and (1972); Corp., 275 Dague Piper Aircraft court; interposition call for Ind. 418 N.E.2d 207 In Rosen- present is not but one. Jersey berg, Supreme Court New Hargraves Stripping Brackett Mach. v. explained of action does not that cause 676, Co., (E.D.Tenn.1970), F.Supp. 317 683 injury accrue until a careless act results v. quoting Jackson ex dem. Hart Lam- that statute damage, or and observed the (3 Pet.) 280, 28 7 L.Ed. 679 phire, question, action; its not bar a cause of ... does judiciary The role the is limited when effect, rather, might prevent is to what considering encountering limitation when action, from ever otherwise be cause including legislation, repose. a statute of arising. injury occurring Thus more The words of former Chief Justice Donald- negligent act than ten after the repeating: son warrant Leliefeld harm, forms allegedly responsible for the constitutional, long So as the statute is recovery. injured party no The basis ability intrinsic to we no review action____ or, unwise, if literally inherent wisdom it seems has no cause of change power the it. Whenever lines of the statute thus rather function may legislation, some seem are drawn rights than to alter define substantive unwise, responsibility for draw- but Legislature modify remedy. legislature ing these rests lines with liberty rights or entirely at to create new judicial is limited. review long ones as no vested abolish old as 375, 129. Idaho at 659 P.2d at right is disturbed. having Accordingly, found 293 A.2d at constitutional, our we limit review be has that the common law This Court held of re- The statute directed Leliefeld. legis- always by the nearly can be modified in I.C. 6-1403 does not pose contained § is not provided lature that the enactment "open provision courts” of art. violate unconstitutional, the common law and that Constitution, 1, Sealey 18 of the Idaho § cf. only to extent it is not is in (1990), effect 387, Hicks, P.2d 435 309 Or. v. princi- legislative repugnant or inconsistent with reaffirm the well-established and we it jurisdiction law in is the ple of this 94 Idaho McCoy, See v. enactments. State modify legislature province (1971); 236, Boiler Doggett P.2d 247 v. common law. rules 93 Idaho Eng’g Supply & (1970). In v. State Bd. P.2d 511 Jones V. Medicine, 97 Idaho Presumption By Clear and Rebuttable “nothing in Art. 18 of held we § Convincing Evidence implic- explicitly or our either Constitution itly legislative modification prohibits that al Olsen further contends Idaho actions.” 97 repose does not common law though Idaho’s statute legislature P.2d at 404. It is clear pleadings, depositions, that the and admissions file, has modified the common together affidavits, law the enact- on any, with if ment of I.C. 6-1403. Were this not so genuine any show there is no issue as to § legislature fact, the 1971 moving Idaho could not have material party and the is enti- sweeping changes judgment made wide in the com- tled to as a matter of law. Boise Waco, Inc., mon law the enactment of the Car & 108 Idaho Truck abolishing governmental (1985); 56(c). Tort Claims Act I.R.C.P. Fur- 6-901, ther, immunity, abolishing I.C. summary judgment the standards for absolute common contributory require liberally law bar of the district court to con- negligence by adoption comparative neg- non-moving strue the facts in favor of the ligence. party 6-801. and to draw all reasonable inferences non-moving from the record favor injury Olsen’s did not occur until after Durtschi, party. Doe v. enacted, the statute of and as (1986); Bowling P.2d 1238 Meridian such, cognizable liberty property inter- Lanes, Ass’n, Inc. Meridian Athlete event, any est has not been affected. no Inc., 105 Idaho showing whatsoever was made Olsen to Ethington, Anderson v. rebut the “useful All doubts are to be re- hay safe life” of the baler had not moving party, solved and the challenge to “clear and Olsen’s convinc- motion must denied if the be evidence ing” requirement evidence is moot because conflicting such that inferences provide any he failed to evidence therefrom, people drawn and if reasonable weight presumption. to rebut the There is might reach different conclusions. Doe v. nothing regard before the Court with Durtschi, argument because Olsen failed to (1986); Hubbard, Ashby v. present any presump- evidence to rebut the tion, and we therefore wait until another day presented when the issue is to us to Decisions this Court demon evidentiary determine whether' the stan- a motion for strate that when faced with convincing” dard of “clear and evidence as summary judgment, party imposes in set forth I.C. 6-1403 an unrea- sought may merely rest on whom it is not pro- upon sonable standard common law pleadings, allegations contained in his but rights. tected produce come forward and evidence

by way deposition or to contra affidavit moving party dict the assertions of the VI. genuine issue of material fact. establish a Summary Judgment Standard For Prenger, Clarke (1988); State, Worthen the district court Olsen contends that (1974); Nat’l Tri-State granting in abused its defen- discretion Co., 92 Gateway Storage Bank v. Western summary judgment be- dant’s motions I.R.C.P. factual issues were raised cause Catrett, 56(e). also Celotex v. See pleading, depositions. affidavits and 106 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d language proper provides that the of Rule Summary judgment requires entry summary judgment only genuine is no issue of 56 where there discovery against a moving party adequate after time for fact and the is enti material showing party make a suffi I.R. who fails to judgment tled to as matter law. ele 56(c). in the existence of an The law is well established cient to establish C.P. party’s case and summary judg ment essential to that Idaho that on a motion for ment, party bear the burden must determine whether which that will the court advantage oppor- Id., not or not take proof at at 2552-53.10 did trial. S.Ct. pre- tunity present evidence to rebut the simply did not meet his burden Olsen safe sumption that the useful life of rebutting responding to the facts or to expired. The particular product had not presumption. The facts contained being presently fact Freeman that balers hay record reveal that the baler Olsen was identi- are similar to even manufactured injury operating at the time of his was does in this action cal to the one involved in 1968 sold manufactured Freeman judgment. preclude summary Implement. Leslie Son The Davis & application of the upon It is clear that eighteen-year-old initially sold to baler was summary judgment principles governing Hill, Gary who traded it to Twin Falls in this presented proceedings to facts Implement Tractor & on March did not err action district court Falls then sold the baler to Twin Tractor summary failed granting judgment. Olsen subsequently traded the Joe Albertson who present any that the baler’s evidence It baler back to Twin Falls Tractor. expired which is useful life had not safe then to Loren who testified traded Strode statutorily imposed necessary to rebut the by way deposition that the baler was which, had period if that evidence simply had “worn out” that he taken his have allowed presented, been could apart replaced completely the baler 6-1403 and claim to avoid bar of I.C. § parts including parts numerous some taken Accordingly, proceed to trial. the district machinery. from other Strode also testi- summary granting court did not err deposition prior in his fied acci- judgment.11 injury causing totally dent he had re- of the district court judgment built the baler on two occasions. Olsen respects. respon- in all Costs to affirmed disputed precluding contends that the fact dents. summary judgment is the baler BAKES, C.J., being and JOHNSON and injured him was identical to balers McDEVITT, JJ, concur. present manufactured Freeman at the disputed by is not time. This fact BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting: however, defendants, failed to and Olsen holding I must dissent from the come forth with other evidence fac- First, grounds: case majority in this on two summary oppose judg- tual issues to of Olsen’s claim majority’s analysis discovery process ment. was available open courts that the statute violates plaintiff prod- that the to to obtain evidence provision is un- of the Idaho Constitution expired. useful life had not The uct’s safe second, sound; assuming arguen- and even discovery enough proceeded had far constitutional, the statute is do that opin- had and Olsen retained obtained limitation on “useful safe statutory based expert, of an and had taken the ion Olsen applied to Ol- life” should not been have deposition corporate Freeman’s officers. of to warn. Each sen’s claim of failure Nothing by in in turn. the evidence submitted affi- these will be discussed issues deposition in and davits disclosed I. THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION discovery to process raised an issue rebut life of the analysis the evidence that the useful safe of this issue re- majority’s The that, unlike statutes expired. heavily had either could lies on fact Plaintiff baler Beeks, court memorandum deci- district in its In Badell v. 115 Idaho P.2d 11. 10. 8, 1988, (1988), order, spe- granted and this Court cited to Celotex sion and dated March cifically adopted principle mov- summary “[T]he for motion defendant J.S. Freeman’s ing party judgment to when the non- is entitled judgment. In the decision the district same showing moving parly to sufficient fails make granted Loren Strode’s motion court defendant essential to establish the existence of an element regard any allega- summary judgment to in party’s party case on which that will bear to that liability, product but denied the motion tion of proof at Idaho at the burden of trial.” 115 alleged liability. regard in to other theories P.2d 127. rules, of limitation in other states which vided for statute or these been found to open imposes violate those states’ presumption party on the provisions,12 merely courts Idaho’s statute it is directed the whom burden presumption creates rebuttable and thus going forward with evidence to rebut absolutely not plaintiffs’ does bar claims. presumption, meet the but does not shift appears present the surface this On to to such party proof burden of in the However, argument. possi- it is attractive sense of risk nonpersuasion, argument only by to make such an throughout ble upon remains the trial turning judicial practical a blind eye party to whom originally it was cast. present in realities these cases. This the explained As better worded Justices majority do, pro- has chosen to in the Donaldson, special Bistline and in their con- it has also chosen on a rely cess distinc- Brooks, currence in Keenan v. tion without a difference in order to fore- 823, 828, (1980), P.2d once challenge a valid close constitutional arises, presumption “it is the burden statute. going sufficiently dispel the forward presumption which shifts—not the burden majority opinion refers several times persuasion.” In Bongiovi contrast to provision” presumption “rebuttable Keenan, presumption the “rebuttable” However, I.C. in 6-1403.13 never 6-1403(2)(a) in defined as follows: opinion majority section does the language theoretically discuss of that Length of time sellers are sub- presumption. “rebuttable” If it were to ject liability. (2) repose, Statute of — deign so, to do have to majority (a) Generally. In claims that involve acknowledge that while the statute is cast (10) more years harm caused than ten supposed pre- terms of a “rebuttable” delivery, presumption after time sumption, practical application the rebut- arises the harm was caused after plaintiffs heavy tal burden on that the so safe life the useful had This only. name rebuttable in presumption may only be rebutted convincing clear and evidence. Ordinary presumptions rebuttable should well understood since trial added.) (Emphasis practice, this means opinion bar bench received the Bon- produced that once the manufacturer has Jamison, 734, 738, giovi v. showing de- evidence that the the Court where than ten livered more before the approvingly set forth the text plaintiff produce plaintiff’s injury, of Evidence Rule 301: convincing simply clear and evidence Presumptions general summary judgment entry civil ac- avoid proceedings. resulting all civil ac- dismissal and the denial of the tions and —In pro- jury to have a proceedings opportunity otherwise be the trier tions See, e.g., Corp., Berry be unconstitutional and the Idaho v. Beech was held to Aircraft Sears, (Utah 1985); presence "primarily in the a 670 Roebuck statute is rebut- P.2d Heath (1983). presumption in the the N.H. table Idaho statute and & 123 464 A.2d 288 presumption rebuttable in the Utah absence of a statute”). See, e.g., at 117 1296 Idaho at 791 presumption ("notwithstanding its rebuttable opinion provision”); is found the reason for 117 14.In that same Idaho at P.2d at 1297 Brewster, uncertainty ("Idaho’s language presumption’ sat- created McNabb v. 'rebuttable the ...; namely the scrutiny and Olsen’s constitutional isfies authority Hampshire case "is mis- McNabb to California on a New citation in reliance interchangeably proof Hamp- distinguishable New used burden of placed and because which evidence, producing although in Statute contains an absolute bar and burden shire 507-D:2 provision”); doing California courts were aware the rebuttable so the without (the shifting persuasion. they the burden substan- were not Idaho at P.2d at 1297 828, 606 P.2d at 478. statute which at difference between the Utah tial to warn a life” defense to a failure daunting prospect is a for ful safe fact. Such First, be- the arises Also, duty claim. to warn plaintiff. generally motion for a danger is some inherent in the there cause judgment summary based on a statute (Second) product. of the Restatement use pro- repose fairly early would come (1965). Thus, as to at least of Torts § great discovery ceedings, before deal aspect product of the for which a warn- Yet, context the has been done. in this made, no there is ing should have been plaintiff pre- essentially conduct and product start- life” all—the “useful safe in mini-trial on of the “use- vail the issue condition, dangerous and it ed out in a product life” of the caused ful safe it warning which have made plaintiff cannot injury; otherwise the life” Thus “useful safe for use. “safe” summary judg- being out of court on avoid it product expire cannot because ment motion. existed. never imposition The an onerous re- such life” reason “useful safe The second products plaintiffs is quirement on a claim for is inconsistent with defense to an to the claims tantamount absolute bar ongoing to warn has do with the failure plaintiffs. majority’s of those Since the duty The “useful nature of to warn. reasoning support consti- of the statute’s product, as that term safe life” of a at least demonstrably sus- tutionality rests on this 6-1403, begins to run as is defined I.C. § pect distinction between bar” and “absolute first delivered to its soon as presumption”, reasoning “rebuttable ten presumptively expires purchaser, suspect as well. 6-1403 Idaho Code § other delivery. after that On the effectively forecloses claimant’s cause one, hand, duty ongoing to warn is an truly action before it can be said to have time of deliv- and while it arise at the time, later prima ery, may As such it is a facie viola- it also arise at a much accrued. “useful perhaps presumptive even after the of art. 18 of Idaho Constitu- tion See, Readen- e.g., safe life” has tion. Shovel, Ariz. our v. Marion Power P.2d 1058 Lock- See also A SAFE LIFE” DEFENSE II. “USEFUL S, Inc., v. AC & 109 Wash.2d wood INCONSISTENT A CLAIM IS WITH P.2d 605 v. Ortho Wooderson FAILURE FOR TO WARN Corp., 235 Kan. Pharmaceutical assume, merely Even were one to for the “use- period time established argument, of re- sake of that the statute simply repose is ful safe life” statute of constitutional, it

pose at issue here is continuing nature of with inconsistent dismiss applied should not have been duty to warn. Thus the statute claim failure to warn. Olsen’s apply at all to a claim repose should concept statute of based on asserting that the manufacturer breached product. safe life” “Use- the “useful errone- duty to warn. The trial court’s very logical life” is a defense ful safe predi- repose as a ous use of the statute of of those suits which are based the context dismissal of claim cate for Olsen’s design defect defective manufacture requires failure there- Freeman for to warn foreseeability, Tied as product. it is and/or judgment reversed fore that relatively objec- life” offers a “useful safe vacated, reinstated the claim be point it is no and consistent at which tive proceedings. for further longer reasonable hold the manufacturer the safe use of liable because reasonably foresee- that time was not

after

able. ways logic breaks down in two

This a “use- attempt apply is made to

when the

Case Details

Case Name: Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co.

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: May 7, 1990

Citation: 791 P.2d 1285

Docket Number: 17471

Court Abbreviation: Idaho