Olmstead v. Miller

units, court, upon days’ and, modified, period more the ten tion as so we affirm good mortgagor, may, upon notice to foreclosure; the judgment we affirm shown, being appoint cause a trustee to judgment the foreclosing mortgage the on possession premises. Any take apartment complex, but we reverse person, other mortgagee, part of judgment foreclosing agents employees, may act as trustee mortgage court; second on the mobile-home if qualified.” the court deems them and we affirm the appointing a re- ceiver. provision, Under the foregoing

may appoint “upon good a trustee3 cause being possession take ERICKSTAD, shown” to C.J., LEVINE and premises property. of a rental Sec- MESCHKE, Under JJ., PEDERSON, Surro- 32-19.2-02, N.D.C.C., tion the trustee is Justice, gate concur. given to, authority among things, other PEDERSON, Justice, Surrogate sitting utilities, pay taxes, receive rentals and “all GIERKE, in place J., disqualified. request insurance.” United’s for a primarily ground receiver was based on the pay the Boehms had failed to on taxes properties years for numerous and had payments

failed to make the debts se- by mortgages properties.

cured on the 32-19.2, enacting Chapter

C.C., apparent Legislature it is court, upon intended to authorize Kelly Olmstead, Kevin OLMSTEAD and proper in showing in foreclosure action Appellees, Plaintiffs and volving ap rental property, commercial point possession a trustee to take premises pay necessary expenses and to MILLER, S. Defendant Charles with available funds. In view intend of its Appellant, purpose, appli ed chapter we believe the cable to the mobile-home court and apartment case, Fargo complex this both National Bank & Trust improved Company, which are commercial facilities Defendant. invоlving required number of rental Civ. No. 11006. units. We further conclude that Supreme Dakota. Court of North record, affi undisputed which contains showing davit of un substantial amounts March 1986. paid property prop on the mortgaged taxes erties, “good demonstrates cause” for the

appointment Accordingly, of the receiver.

we hold that trial court err in did not

appointing a receiver under the circum

stances of this case.4

We remand with instructions that judgment

trial court fore- modify mortgage

closure of the first on the mobile- one-year redemp-

home court to include case, purposes Having 3. For the trial court and concluded that the court had au- thority appointment parties interchangeably to make its under used the terms N.D.C.C., 32-19.2, unnecessary for this objection being "receiver" with and “trustee" authority determine court to appointment whether party regard. raised either in that Chap- have also derived from 32-10, ter

thrown over island open counter into an breaking refrigerator, the shelves with his back. was in the hallway of the home and was bounced back and forth be- knees, falling tween the walls before to her The Olmsteads were examined hospital at a emergency room after the and accident were released. sued Fargo Olmsteads Miller and ‍​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‍the Garaas, Fargo, David plaintiffs for and National and Company Bank Trust

appellees. personal injuries property and dam- Timothy McLarnan, J. Gjevre, McLar- age sustained in the accident. nan, Hannaher, Vaa, & McLar- Skatvold liability part found Fargo no Moorhead, nan, Minn., for defendant and National and Company, Bank Trust but appellant. negligent found Miller and awarded compensatory damages Olmsteads in WALLE, VANDE Justice. $60,000 amount of and damages in $25,000. amount appealed Defendant Charles S. Miller judgment a district court entered on a Miller raises numerous issues in this in negligence verdict a award- action appeal, most of which relate to the award plaintiffs ing Kevin and Olmstead The issues raised rе $85,000, damages in the total amount liability late were by either conceded from an denying and motion for a during argument Miller’s counsel oral or judgment new trial. We affirm the as to Accordingly, are without merit.1 af we liability, reverse as to and re- judgment firm the insofar as it holds Miller mand for a new trial on the of dam- issue damage liable for the caused as a result ages alone. the accident. 21, 1980, Miller, September On while reaching dispositive in Before issue president Fargo National Bank and case, first this consider Miller’s asser- Company, driving Trust was bank-owned a governed tion that the Olmstеads’ action is Edgewood Court in vehicle Trailer by of the North the terms Dakota Auto Fargo when left the road and crashed Reparations Act, 26-41, Chapter Accident into Olmsteads’ home. anchored trailer [commonly No- N.D.C.C. known as the Miller was under the alcohol at influence of plaintiffs Act],2 Fault failed to the time of the accident. injury prior meet the threshold level inju- maintaining personal The Olmsteads were inside their trailer a tort action for Coverage when home the accident occurred. Accord- Act ries. No-Fault Kevin, extends, ing part, bodily he wаs in the and was kitchen accidental ensued, against you directly Miller 1. The action was must view those negligence. premised trespass damages you damages just on theories of talk as when about Although Miller though in his brief to this court has this there was no alcohol involved in aspects attacked various of the trial court's deci- Mr. Miller has he case at all. admitted that against to direct a property sion verdict on the issue trespassed particular him on that on that trespass, during arguments oral Miller’s day that he caused that [sic] conceded that not raisе the counsel trespass he could point plays part alcohol this at that appeal issue on had ad- because case.” liability during trespass trial. mitted Mil- 26-41, N.D.C.C., closing argu- jury during repealed by counsel Chapter ler's told the 2. Legislature ments: and was reenacted with some 26.1-41, changes Chapter and recodified at you get ”[W]hen C.C. N.D.Sess. Laws Ch. case, § See 1985 you’ll right get away this to that provisions this case we are concerned with the always freely because we’ve that Mr. admitted 26-41, N.D.C.C. responsible Miller is in the No- “pedestrian” use of the term occupying by persons while sustained legislative inten- “[wjhile pedestrian as Act thus evinces Fault motor vehicle placed being practical a motor ve- limitation be struck some the result of tion that 26-41-07(l)(b), Mil- Legislature N.D.C.C. meaning. If the had upon hicle ...” § applica- Act is applicable that the No-Fault ler asserts Act to be intended the No-Fault the Olmsteads case because ble in this injured by a motor vehicle re- anyone meaning of within the “pedestrians” circumstances, were it could have gardless of the disagree. 26-41-07(l)(b), generic a more through § so the use of done term, “pedestriаn,” using rather 26-41- “pedestrian” A is defined limited connotation. such a word with N.D.C.C., person not occu- 03(13), “any designed to be driven any vehicle pying Although Legislature not pow- muscular by power other than drawn type contemplated particular case that the disputed It is er.” case, in this a fair accident which occurred occupying the trailer were Olmsteads reading used the No-Fault of the terms residential house, located in a which was it would not have intend Act indicates that court, time of home at the as their trailer “pedes considered ed Olmsteads to be “рedestri- Although the term accident. Cf., Act. v. under the Weber State trians” broadly in the appears to be defined an” Co., 284 N.W.2d 299 Mut. Auto Ins. Farm in- Act, Legislature do not believe (N.D.1979). attempting specifi Without encompass persons all tended the term parameters precise cally deliniate regardless of the injured by a motor vehicle “pedestrian” a person is or is not when a injuries oc- under which the circumstances Act, persons we conclude under curred. accident while injured in an automobile construed to avoid must be Statutes do not fall they secure their homes results, and if adher ludicrous absurd and “pedestrian” under the definition of within would letter of a statute ence to the strict 26-41-07, 26-41-03(13) N.D.C.C.3 §§ result, court resort to such a lead governed by is not The action interpret the statute. aids to extrinsic 26-41, N.D.C.C., the terms Historical County v. State Stutsman concluding. in so court was correct the trial (N.D.1985). Soc., The 321 court erred in that the trial asserts Miller a generally connotes “pedestrian” term jury that it could award instructing the and on or about person who is on foot pain, damages for their future Olmsteads motor ve public highway or street where discomfort, pеrma- anguish, the Burrus, and mental apply. hicle See Braswell laws the resultant injuries and nence of their 41 Md.App. 284 A.2d Simp have relied on Smith The Olmsteads Mut. Ins. Co. v. on Cotton States 3. Miller relies son, (Colo.Ct.App.1982), in which 648 P.2d Statiras, Ga.App. 276 S.E.2d 853 plaintiffs, who were that the Mason, the court held asleep Kentucky Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. family when home their beds in (Ky.Ct.App.1980); and Fox v. 600 S.W.2d 483 of her car lost control the defendant Co., Pa.Super. Mut. Ins. State Auto. them, injuring were not into the home crashed (1983), argument support of his A.2d meaning Colora “pedestrians” "pedestri- be considered the Olmsteads should Colorado note that the No-Fault Act. We do We find these the circumstances. ans” under Trinity Co. v. Supreme Universal Ins. Court in unpersuasive. Statiras and Mason cases 1984), Hall, (Colo. specifically over P.2d 227 arose occurred accidents in which portion Simpson which limited ruled statutory Fox, Although along public highways. on or "pedestrian.” We never definition supra, a situation A.2d at involved reasoning Simpson theless find of a into the side a motor vehicle crashed which per that case to be applied the facts of injuring occupant, issue in that home an injured plaintiff did not involve suasivе. Hall occupant was of the home whether the case was a situation in which but involved in the home meaning the No-Fault a “victim” within buying injured refresh plaintiff while was Act, term as "an individual defined that parked auction off at a farm from a truck ments public arising of the mainte- out who suffers awning collapsible highways side when a vehicle ...” nance use of a motor head. struck her the truck fell and attached to impairment earning Friedman, of their capaci- Injury, Personal Damages ties, 3.03[2], pp. (1984): and their future at expenses. medical 93-94 Miller contends that the Olmsteads did opiniоn “Whether the of a medical ex- present sufficient evidence to pert warrant sub- is loss, to establish future pain mission of these suffering, elements of future dam- permanent ages injury, depends jury. agree. on the inju- nature of the ry. Obviously, such testimony is not re- expert No medical quired if the arm, has lost an presented during the trial. Kevin testified leg, eye, or has any sustained inju- other that he continues to suffer from back and ry layman competent to ascer- leg pains accident, as a result of the but tain on the basis of his common knowl- sought admitted that he had not medical edge experience. But where inju- injuries, undergone treatment for those nor ry subjective in character and of such treatment, during of medical course layman nature that a cannot with reason- years following the four his initial emer- certainty able know whether or not there gency-room visit. Kevin stated that his pain will be future suffering, “leg pains aren’t as bad as used to be competent must expert opinion testi- pain but the back is the same.” Kevin mony bearing on permanency of such testified that order to relieve back injury, or the likelihood injured pain gives him his wife baсk rubs at least person will endure future and suf- day, once a “[ajnywhere which last fering. unsupported subjective ten minutes half an hour.” testi- injured statements of the party, not physical injuries fied that her consisted of expert, medical are not sufficient.” “[njothing other than a stiffness for a few [Footnotes omitted.] days.” She further testified that after the For discussions of the case law in which accident she suffered gen- from “an overall principle has implicitly been either or sickness,” feeling eral of in which resulted explicitly applied regard in to various ele- appеtite weight, inability a loss of and to Annot., damages, ments of future see sleep, Kelly and a loss of friends. testified evidence, Sufficiency A.L.R.3d of physician that she did see another concern- action, personal injury prove to future ing problems these after the initial emer- and and to warrant in- visit, gency-room but said that the doctor (1968); Annot., jury structions to thereon nothing physically could find wrong with evidence, 18 A.L.R.3d Sufficiency of Kelly during her. testified that the last action, personal injury prove impair- to eighteen months she had “settled down” earning capacity ment and to warrant of and myself “tried to ease back into a nor- (1968); jury instructions to thereon and ‍​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‍mal routine.” Annot., 170, Sufficiency 18 A.L.R.3d of to day Both Kevin and missed one of evidence, action, personal injury work as a result of the accident. Kevin prove permanence injuries to war- and attending college part-time and had a jury rant instructions to thereon job at the time. He college has since left adopt We decline to an rule absolute job. Kelly and has a full-time has been jury which would make submission of in employed company with the same since the damages structions future on in the ab promotions. accident and has received expert depend sence of medical wages lost approximately Kevin’s totaled plain ent on a determination of whether a Kelly’s wages approxi- $25 lost totaled “subjective” tiff’s fall within a or mately $114. “objective” category. Every differs case urging In that it was error for the trial and we adhere to our view “that each case give court to instructions on future dam- particular must be evaluated on own ages, Miller relies on the rule which is facts and circumstances.” Cook v. Stens aptly lie, (N.D.1977). summarized in 3 L. Frumer and M. 251 N.W.2d damages proved must submission of instructions on future dam-

Future be they certainty; speculate cannot be to ages jury only allowed with reasonable speculative possi amount, very on the basis of to awarded but as exist- Teegarden conjecture. See v. bilities damages. ence of future On the (N.D.1965); Dahl, Leon 138 N.W.2d us, record before we conclude that the evi- Co-op. Dakota Mar v. North Wool ard as a dence was insufficient matter law Ass’n, N.W.2d ket. the trial court’s to to warrant instructions 32-03-03, N.D.C.C. This jury that could award the Olmsteads probative evi held that must has disсomfort, damages pain, for future permanent jury before a dence anguish, permanent injury mental and im- impairment that future instructed can be pairment earning capacity, future general dam earning capacity is item expenses.4 future medical ages. Loyland, 132 N.W.2d Spalding (N.D.1964). We also held form, special verdict recover for $60,000 compen awarded the Olmsteads services there must be “substantial medical $25,000 satory medi with reasonable establish impossible it is Because for us certainty ser cal such future medical determine from the verdict what amount necessary.” are v. National vices South have attrib Passenger Corp., R.R. damage, personal injuries to property uted (N.D.1980). Damages on mere based trial, up the time will possibility of future medical treatment that the trial we conclude court’s submis Janke, 171 not be allowed. Holecek sion instructions fu (N.D.1969). N.W.2d 94 prejudicial ture constituted error requires that we reverse award in this case have Olmsteads compensatory damages. re any degree of cer Because we failed to establish with fu tainty will remand this case for a new trial whatsoever suffer verse and pаin, anguish, compensatory damages, or mental ture discomfort on the will permanent we also consider it impairment in future result the of their for a new circumstances remand trial on Likewise, capacities. earning the Olm- punitive damages. the of presented steads evidence establish are that there is no We aware certainty that fu with reasonable medical requirement jurisdiction necessary, or

ture medical services will be damages reasonably punitive award of future possible even what the cost those compensatory to an рroportionate award might the nature services be. view damages. Family v. See Smith American the total the and almost (N.D.1980). Co., 294 N.W.2d 751 or Mut. Ins. required treatment absence medical believe, however, that when a case is of four We sought by couple during the the even trial, compensatory and years the character that both the accident between considerably inju- denying the nature of the a new differ from In its order Miller’s motion for trial, by cited v. A.M. Servic- the evidence the trial court Mabrier ries the Olmsteads and suffered Raytown, ing Corporation 161 180 they presented support N.W.2d of their claim for (Iowa 1968), ruling support Moreover, it was of its the fact situation in proper to the on future instruct necessarily support rule does not the Mabrier Mabri- of this case. In circumstances applied by purportedly court. The Iowa 183, er, supra, stated N.W.2d at court Mabrier, by plaintiff in su- suffered pain right up time that "when is suffered surgical pra, left removal her necessitated plaintiff has not of trial and fully is evidence orthopedic surgeon kneecap, testified at and her recovered, may permanent "'[plaintiff] would have testi- be submitted to the without medical physical impairment her lower extremi- left mony.” ” ty-’ and the The suffered nature of by presented plaintiff Mabrier evidence assessed, punitive damages may be purpose better awarding puni practice procedure require punish tive is to the wrongdoing right him, defendant in to deter others, to and assessment of both should be repetition of the wrongful simultaneously by considered conduct. same Dahlen, supra. While the defendant’s fi jury. Hotel, See DuPuis v. 79th Street nancial necessarily condition will Inc., (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1970); 231 So.2d 532 bearing on the amount that will serve' as Bach, Kaplan Md.App. 373 A.2d meaningful punishment defendant, (1977). We therefore remand this case poverty wealth of the for a new trial on compen- the issue of both irrelevant to this agree consideration. We satory punitive damages.5 jurisdictions with those which hold that evi disposition Our of this case makes it un- plaintiff’s dence of the pecuniary circum many to consider the other is- stances by cannot be considered However, sues raised Miller. because assessing punitive damages. E.g., Griser remaining one of the might possibly issues Schoenbom, 109 Minn. 123 N.W. arise on retrial of the issue of (1909); Weber, 232, 16 Smith v. 70 S.D. following offer the observations. N.W.2d Kemker, Herstein v. Tenn.App. 94 S.W.2d Miller has asserted that the trial note, however, that in cases erred where when it allowed the Olmsteads to sought plaintiff’s and the introduce evidence that were unable wealth or lack of wealth have rele pay many argue their bills and to aspect case, vance to some other desperate financial condition to the trial court carefully should exercise its dis jury during closing arguments. In its or weigh probative cretion and value denying trial, der Miller’s motion for a new against that еvidence danger of unfair the trial court stated that prejudice to the defendant. See Rule argument were allowed “because of N.D.R.Evid. anguish element of mental and the prayer punitive damages,” citing Dah judgment and the trial court’s order Landis, (N.D.1981). len v. 314 N.W.2d 63 denying Miller’s motion for a new trial are reversed, and the case is remanded for a Horob, In Sulsky v. damages only. new trial on the issue of (N.D.1984),we “[ojrdinarily, stated that party financial condition of a is not in ' ERICKSTAD, C.J., and LEVINE and irrelevant, volved in a case and is and un GIERKE, JJ., concur. der such circumstances such evidence is MESCHKE, Justice, conсurring and dis- inadmissible; however, when relevant senting. issues in the case tending prove the financial party may condition of a be I concur that Miller is liable and that admitted.” This court had held that evi by Olmsteads’ action is not controlled dence of a defendant’s wealth or lack of 26-41, But, ‍​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‍I would hold may properly wealth by be considered the that the evidence was sufficient to warrant jury fixing punitive damages. when Dah jury submission to the of Olmsteads’ claim len, Mandel, supra; Tice v. 76 N.W.2d 124 suffering for future and medi- (N.D.1956); Hanson, 85, King v. 13 N.D. expenses. cal I also hold that would evi- (1904). However, 99 N.W. 1085 Dahlen plaintiffs’ pecuniary dence the circum- does not proposition stand for the that And, the properly stances was admitted. since plaintiff’s wealth or lack of wealth is a plaintiffs obviously compen- are to entitled proper jury consideration for the satory damages, when there is no reason to va- awarding punitive damages. punitive damages. cate the award of 5. Because we have concluded that the evidence we likewise conclude that the denying was insufficient as a matter of to law warrant trial court abused its discretion in Mil- jury submission to the of the instructions on ler’s motion for a new trial. physical hardly Kevin effects “It can be said that there was no testified might whatever from which up to the injury of his continued date of plaintiff be deduced that the would be trial. evidence demonstrated a con- This subject pain to in the fu- effect, tinuing however physical modest. ture, degree that to or some his me, For is sufficient evidence to war- that permanent. The not be most that would by jury of rant consideration the expert is is can be said that there no suffering. require pain and It does not testimony opinion testimony or ex- expert infer discomfort that has to perts to this There no re- effect. was will, likely more for months continued quest jury the instruct the not, in the future. continue justifying that there was no evidence support the submission prior Our cases finding these questions. on It is not at jury. to the In of this issue Olson upon all be said the clear it can 263, Wetzstein, N.D. 225 N.W. 459 any record here that error was commit- (1929), plaintiff did not offer medical given. any In ted in the instruction as injury his testimony as effects event, agreed prejudice that no had three doctors who while the defendant could resulted therefrom.” plaintiff their examination tеstified from N.W. at 643. injury. After only temporary that it was And, in Josephson, Clark v. 66 N.W.2d continuing to his plaintiff testified as (N.D.1954), this Court stated: jury injury, court instructed testimony may be “Medical used into whether they could take consideration minimizing purpose increasing or plaintiffs injury temporary perma- Cyclope- amount Blashfield appeal, the defendants claimed nent. On Practice, dia of Automobile Law Vol- was error because of the this instruction I, ume Part 6421. We have Section Olson, testimony. lack of medical found, appellant pointed not nor has to Court stated: holding cases that substantiаl dam- had to continuous “The testified ages may not awarded be absence existing the arm —weakness weakness of testimony.” medical ap- at the time pain I is hold that distress would when improvement in- peared to show —and from the time of the suffered grip before. He was ability lift as trial, damages pain, time for future dis- testimony to submit medical required not anguish, and mental as well comfort behalf, though the absence of own inferred expenses, future medical by could be considered testimony. As jury without medical right jury. had also compensa- to the claim that this verdict expressed by uncertainty consider the excessive, I tory damages is reit- would as to future. rule physicians Landis, erate what was said Dahlen v. Gaines, stated in experts as to Axford (N.D.1981): applicable 195 N.W. times, many deter- “As we have said proper here. for the court to It was suffer- mination of disability submit the character of suscep- comparable ing and losses and leave it to the to deter- Its of an arithmetical calculation. tible mine under whether all circumstanc- must, large degree, ascertainment injuries proba- es of the case the would knowledge, depеnd upon the common bly length a time continue over such good judgment of the practical sense and permanent in as to termed the com- be jury heard jury, omitted] [citation mon at vernacular.” 225 N.W. testimony and saw him on ... [the] Kluver, Similarly, in The trial court reviewed Nichols v. 61 witness stand. and, 42, carefully the ad- (1931), recog- 237 with N.W. 640 Court the evidence vantage having seen heard nized:

825 witnesses, concluded that was suf- there Because the par- circumstances of both may ties often be jury’s ficient evidence to sustain relevant to issues of exemplary damages against defendant, а compensatory damages. I award would hold trial court has broad say that cannot the trial court abused its discretion to admit such pursuant evidence in concluding discretion the ... 103, 401, 403, N.D.R.Ev., to Rules 402 and compensatory award was not commit did not reversible error ad- excessive.” mitting such evidence here. injuries There evidence of actual Normally, jury a will cognizant of a plaintiffs, only personal inju these for plaintiff’s circumstances anyway. Any damage ries but to their mobile jury going recognize is the difference Therefore, home. even if the verdict for janitоr between a and a General Motors compensatory is set and re aside seeking punitive damages, just as trial, manded for a new there is reason knew the difference between the farm la- punitive damages. to vacate award for Landis, borer farmer in and the Dahlen v. statute, 32-03-07, Our does not § supra. Direct subject evidence on the require actual damages to from the flow speculative should be better inferenc- punitive damages tort can before be as es jurors which make appear- from Lipinski sessed. See v. Title Insurance ancеs alone. 1, 970, Company, 202 Mont. 655 P.2d 977 But, importantly, more me seems to And, (1982). punitive damages an award of parties the circumstances of both plaintiff should stand where a entitled to awarding exemplary damages relevant to if, compensatory damages even some “for example by way the sake of reason, no compensatory actual award of punishing the defendant.” 32- N.D.C.C. § damages is made. James v. Public Fi “oppression” 03-07. How can be measured Corporation, Cal.App.3d nance 47 considering without all of the circumstanc- (1975); Cal.Rptr. 121 Fauver Wil “opрressed”? es of the one The wanton- koske, 123 Mont. 211 P.2d ness of a defendant’s misconduct cannot be (1949). also, Annot., See 17 A.L.R.2d considering impact measured without its predicate Actual as a injured party, impact and that necessar- (1951), punitive exemplary damages ily injured consideration includes of the particularly at 539. party’s person A circumstances. of modest plaintiffs’ pecuniary Whether circum means, pay- paycheck who lives from should stances be considered greater check suffers distress eco- a impression difficult of first nomic than one who can comforta- Although North Dakota. cited in the cases bly unexpected cover bills. A should opinion support Justice VandeWalle’s do anguish be able to consider the economic conclusion, ability well as the are other decisions economic assessing dam- suggest plain exemplary defendant which evidence of ages. financial tiffs’ circumstances is relevant to punitive damages: issue Grable v. brings This us back to another rationale (3 Scam.) 4 Ill.

Margrave, He court, of the trial Justice Vande- Smith, 349, Am.Rep. neky v. Or. opinion implicitly recognizеs: a Walle’s (1882); Utlaut v. Flick Real Com Estate plaintiff’s financial circumstances are often Inc., pany, 246 S.W.2d scope relevant to the (1965) Damages Am.Jur.2d. states Thus, compensatory damages. evidence general rule, “[a]s plaintiffs’ frequently circumstances is plaintiff’s pecuniary is ad circumstances reason, admissible for another so the where missible the case is as will anyway will consider circumstances justify exemplary award of exemplary damages. setting damages, although authority there is some court noted this additional reason in contrary.” opinion denying memorandum defendant’s trial, when it a new observed motion be- court allowed “the anguish” mental element of cause bearing ‍​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‍dam- addition ruling the trial court’s ages. I believe that upheld for this reason as well.

should dependent young upon a people,

Few paycheck to meet their bills and

regular

living expenses, lay can afford in bed I be- nurse their bruises and hurts. plaintiffs promptly fact that these

lieve the work, while bruises returned inflicted

defendant, demonstrates suggesting any

malingerers, rather than “Working injuries. nature

minimal among people who is more common

hurt” professional is in “playing hurt” work penalize neither sports. We should plaintiffs, nor reward stoic efforts these defendant, by substi-

the misconduct of this the seriousness of

tuting our own view of conclusions judge. and the trial ASSOCIATION

PRODUCTION CREDIT MINOT, Dakota, Plaintiff North OF Appellee,

Erling and Judith E. O. SCHLAK Schlak, wife, husband Appellants.

Defendants and

PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION Dakota, MINOT, Plaintiff OF North Appellee, R. and Corrine R.

Karl SCHLAK wife, Schlak, husband Appellants.

Defendants and 11090, 11091.

Civ. Nos.

Supreme Court of North Dakota. 19, 1986.

March Olson, Olson, & P.

Richard Sturdevant P.C., Minot, appel- ‍​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‍Burns, for plaintiff and lee.

Case Details

Case Name: Olmstead v. Miller

Court Name: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date Published: Mar 19, 1986

Citation: 383 N.W.2d 817

Docket Number: Civ. 11006

Court Abbreviation: N.D.