48 Wash. 657 | Wash. | 1908
This action was brought by respondent, Mable Olmstead, in her own behalf and as guardian of her two minor children, to recover damages on account of the death of her husband, H. M. Olmstead, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the appellant. The defense was a denial of negligence, an allegation of assumption of risk, contributory negligence of the deceased, and settlement between appellant and respondent. On these issues the cause was tried to the court and a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the respondent in the sum of $10,000. The defendant appeals and assigns numerous errors, one of which is that the trial court, upon the undisputed facts, should-have directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The facts, so far as they relate to the injury and the negligence of the appellant, are substantially these: For twelve days prior to the 19th day of February, 1903, the deceased, H. M. Olmstead, had been employed as a sawyer in the shingle mill of appellant at Wahl Station in Whatcom county. For about one year previous to that time the deceased had been employed about the mill in different capacities, part of the time as engineer and fireman, part of the time as packer, and filing and hammering saws, and part of the time as extra man at the saws. He had been employed for one hundred and fifty-six days out of nearly a year, prior to the accident hereinafter mentioned. During the twelve days he was employed as regular sawyer at one of the shingle machines as above stated,
As stated, the deceased had operated this machine regularly for twelve days on a night shift. It was his duty to keep, the machine in order by oiling it often, and to change one of the saws about every two hours and the other about every four hours. On the night of February 19, 1903, he went on duty about seven o’clock p. m. He was killed at 1:30 o’clock that night by the jointer saw, about thirty minutes after he had gone to work after his midnight meal. No one saw the accident or how deceased happened to come in contact with the saw. The last seen of him alive was when he was standing in front of the jointer saw smoking his pipe. About a minute or two afterwards a noise was heard by the engineer and other employees, a cloud of dust arose around the machine, and the engineer, thinking something was wrong, ran to his engine and
The respondent contends, that the clamp, with its projections from the arbor of the shingle saw in close proximity to the shingle chute where deceased was required to work and where he was frequently required to remove accumulations, rendered the place unsafe; that appellant knew of the dangerous character of the place and was therefore guilty of negligence in maintaining the said clamp with such projection. The theory of respondent as to how the accident happened is, that a pile of the shingles had accumulated in the cull chute; that deceased undertook with a shingle to remove the same, and while so doing the sleeves of his shirt and jumper were caught by the projection on the arbor and threw the deceased into the saw. The appellant, on the other hand, contends that the place was reasonably safe; that the deceased had full knowledge of the dangers, which were open and apparent, and therefore assumed the risk; that if the appellant were negligent in maintaining the clamp as stated, the evidence fails to show that such negligence was the cause of the injury; that there is no evidence that the deceased was caught either by the revolving arbor or the projecting clamp, and thereby drawn onto the saw.
It is argued that, because no shingles were found in the chute immediately after the accident, this shows that the deceased had cleared the chute immediately prior thereto. This does not follow as of course, because these accumulations of
Before it can be assumed that the clothing of the deceased came in contact with the clamp prior to his death, some fact must be made to appear which shows a duty to get near the clamp. The only reason offered is that there was a swamp of shingles in the chute at the time. This reason fails in this case because it is not shown that there was any such swamp, or any circumstance indicating a swamp at that time. The cause of death, therefore, is not shown to be the result of negligence on the part of the appellant, even though the appellant were held to be negligent in maintaining the clamp on the arbor of the shingle saw. There is no statutory liability in this case because the accident happened prior to the passage of the factory act of 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 40). The liability, if any, is a common law liability. The accident in this case might have happened in a number of ways for which the defendant was not responsible. For example, the deceased might have fallen on the saw by his own carelessness; he may have been stricken by dizziness; he may have cut his finger off and then fallen on the saw by reason thereof. A number of such theories are advanced. Any of these may be true. The theory advanced by the respondent may be true, but before that theory can be submitted to the jury the evidence must show a satisfactory foundation therefor, and not leave it to the jury to guess between causes for which the defendant would and would not be liable. Peterson v. Union Iron Works, ante p. 505, 93 Pac. 1077, and cases there cited.
Hadley, C. J., Crow, Root, and Rudkin, JJ., concur.