271 F. 939 | 3rd Cir. | 1921
This writ brings here for review a judgment of nonsuit entered in an action for personal injuries.
On the night of the accident, the plaintiff was a passenger upon a vestibuled train of the defendant, moving on the south-bound track toward Birdsboro, his destination. When about a mile or a mile and a half away, a trainman passed from car to car announcing the station. The station at Birdsboro was on the west, or right hand, side of the train with reference to the direction in which it was moving. There was no platform on the east, or left hand side, beyond the other track. On hearing his station called, the plaintiff arose from his seat and followed the trainman to inquire of him the place at which he should get off, as the station platform was short. The plaintiff passed from the car into an unlighted vestibule and was thrown through an open door, sustaining injuries of which he complains in this action.
At the trial, the plaintiff charged negligence to the defendant upon two grounds; one, in opening the vestibule door before making the stop at the station; the other, in opening the door prematurely, seeking to invoke the law of negligence applicable to leaving open a vestibule door between stations. 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. (6th Ed.) § 524; 4 Elliott on Railroads (2d Ed.) § 1589a; Bronson v. Oakes, 76 Fed. 734, 22 C. C. A. 520.
The learned trial judge disposed of the case on the theory that the announcement of the station, which was the passenger’s destination, was an invitation to him to get ready to alight", and was also notice to him that everything was in readiness for him to alight, including an open vestibule door on the side of the train from which it was intended he should descend. As the evidence was not sufficient to prove a premature opening of the door and as there was no evidence that the door had been carelessly left open during the run between stations, the learned trial judge (charging the plaintiff with notice of the danger of a door opened for his exit, given him by the call of his station) entered judgment of nonsuit on a finding of no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.
The mistake of fact into which we think the trial court fell, and into which this court at the first argument certainly fell, was due to confusion arising from the expression “right’hand side,” used by the
“I went to look for the conductor, so as to ask Mm what sido I should get oil, as the platforms at Birdsboro are short.”
“I came to find the conductor, because I did not know the place I had to get off there. You see you have got a very short platform there, and sometimes you get off in the middle of the track and a train is coming on the other side. One night I was right in the middle of the track and a freight was coming on the other side and it pretty nearly hit me.”
Obscure and ambiguous as these statements are, they are susceptible of still another interpretation, namely: That, because of the reference in each to the short platform on what we may call the right hand side of the train, the plaintiff was seeking the conductor to inquire the place he should get off on that side with reference to the platform. Therefore, we think, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, the case is left with enough evidence to charge the defendant with negligence in having open a vestibule door on what appears to have been the wrong side of the train, and that, in consequence, error in this regard was committed in entering nonsuit.
The judgment below is reversed and a new trial awarded.