hln 2012, appellant Kelly Lamont. Oliver entered a negotiated plea of guilty to attempted first-degree murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 780 months’ imprisonment. On May 19, 2015, Oliver filed in the trial court a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petition was denied. Oliver brings this appeal ■' ■
The standard of review of an order entered by the trial court on a petition for writ of error coram nobis is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying the writ. Newman v. State,
[2A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State v. Larimore,
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to address errors of the most fundamental • nature. Id, A writ of error coram nobis is available for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Howard v. State,
In his petition, Oliver first stated that he had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he entered his plea, and that the claim would be “reiterated herein.” The ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegations raised in the coram-nobis petition, however, did not establish a ground for the ■writ. This court has repeatedly held that ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claims are not cognizable in error-coram-nobis proceedings and that such proceedings are not a substitute for raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under our postcon-viction rule, l.qArkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. White v. State,
Oliver also argued in his petition that his guilty plea was coerced, which is one of the grounds on which the writ may issue. Oliver did not allege that the plea was the result of fear, duress, or threats of mob violence as previously recognized by this court as grounds for a finding of coercion. See Weekly v. State,
Oliver signed a “Plea and Waiver” document at the time he entered his plea, attesting that he had never been declared mentally incompetent for any reason, that he was not under the influence of alcohol or another drug, and that he did not require psychiatric treatment. Oliver conceded in his coram-nobis petition that the trial court spoke to him and recalled that he had originally maintained his innocence by reason of mental disease or defect and informed him that he was not required to enter a plea of guilty and could proceed to trial on the next day. By entering a plea, Oliver opted to abandon the competency issue, and he waived any claim that he was not guilty of the charges. See Beverage v. State,
| sAs Oliver did not make a showing that there was any fact extrinsic to the record that was not known, or could not have been known, at the time of trial, he did not state a ground for the writ, and the trial court did not err in- denying the relief sought. His allegations' were, at least in part, cognizable in a timely petition under Arkansas’s postconviction rule, Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. Again, we have held that error-coram-nobis proceedings are not a substitute for proceeding under the Rule to challenge the validity of a guilty plea; the two proceedings are not interchangeable. Nelson,
Affirmed.
