OLIVER ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CLEVELAND INDIANS BASEBALL COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL.; CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT.
No. 2008-1463
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted June 16, 2009—Decided October 1, 2009
123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030
{¶ 34} Furthermore, the majority opinion states that the county‘s valuation is presumptively valid. I would not go that far. In many instances, including here, the county auditor does nothing more than make a percentage adjustment to the property record card. In many instances, including here, that property record card has a valuation that was not the result of an appraisal by a qualified appraiser. When the county auditor has not conducted a reasonable appraisal, its valuation should not be entitled to deference.
{¶ 35} Because the BTA properly applied the relevant case law, including Colonial Village I, it did not commit error in independently valuing the properties, and I would affirm the decisions of the BTA in all four cases before us.
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Karen H. Bauernschmidt Co., L.P.A., and Karen H. Bauernschmidt, for appellants and cross-appellees.
James R. Gorry, for appellees and cross-appellants.
OLIVER ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CLEVELAND INDIANS BASEBALL COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL.; CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT.
[Cite as Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030.]
I
{¶ 1} This case began with the detonation of an explosive device during a Cleveland Indians baseball game; the explosion injured four persons. Appellees Donald Krieger and Clifton Oliver were arrested at the stadium and were taken into police custody, along with a third person with whom they had attended the game, on suspicion of their involvement in the explosion.1 While in custody, appellees suffered from poor conditions in the jail and harsh treatment by the jailers.
{¶ 2} Although a grand jury indicted appellees on several counts of aggravated arson and felonious assault, these charges were later dismissed by the Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney. Appellees’ arrests and detention adversely impacted their jobs and mental and physical health.
{¶ 3} Appellees successfully sued the city of Cleveland, appellant, for malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded each plaintiff $400,000 in compensatory damages and $600,000 in punitive damages. The trial court vacated the punitive-damages award as impermissible against the city. The trial court overruled the city‘s motion, which cited the damage caps in
II
{¶ 4}
{¶ 5} The court of appeals did not consider the opinion of this court in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420. In Arbino, we reviewed a statute similar to
A. Right to trial by jury
{¶ 7} In Arbino, we considered the effect of the damage caps on the right to a jury trial. We founded our analysis on the principle that the fact-finding of a jury is inviolate for those causes for which the right is preserved. Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 35. The right ensures that a jury‘s fact-finding function is not invaded, ignored, or replaced. Id. at ¶ 37. But we noted that “the right to a trial by jury does not extend to the determination of questions of law.” Id. Therefore, we reasoned that while a jury determines the amount of damages as a matter of fact, the actual award may be reduced by the application of a statute as a matter of law, akin to altering awards through remittiturs or statutory treble damages. Id. at ¶ 38-40. Thus, in Arbino, we held that the statutory limit on noneconomic damages in
{¶ 8} Accordingly, Arbino stands for the proposition that a court does not usurp the role of the jury in contravention of
B. Equal protection
{¶ 9} The Ohio and federal equal protection analysis applied in Arbino is applicable in this case as well. As in Arbino, there is no fundamental right or protected class at issue here, and
{¶ 10} We have upheld a different subsection of
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, appellees argue that
{¶ 12} As a preliminary matter, we note that appellees are making a facial challenge to
{¶ 13} In order for a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications. Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 26, citing Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37, and United States v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697. In Arbino, the statute capped noneconomic damages for those persons who were injured but whose injuries were not so serious as to
{¶ 14} Moreover, we would not hold the statute unconstitutional if appellees had presented an as-applied challenge for arbitrariness. The cases relied upon by appellees—Morris, Sheward, and Arbino—are distinguishable from this case. While those cases suggest that it is arbitrary or unreasonable to impose an across-the-board limitation on noneconomic damages, those cases dealt only with lawsuits between private litigants.
{¶ 15}
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we hold that
III
{¶ 17} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. The limit on noneconomic compensatory damages in
{¶ 18} We are unable to apply the limit in
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
O‘DONNELL, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 19} In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, which also addressed whether a cap on compensatory damages violates the right to a jury trial, I dissented and wrote, ” ‘So long as the trial by jury is a part of our system of jurisprudence, its constitutional integrity and importance should be jealously safeguarded. The right of trial by jury should be as inviolate in the working of our courts as it is in the wording of our Constitutions.’ Gibbs v. Girard (1913), 88 Ohio St. 34, 47, 102 N.E. 299. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion in this case eviscerates it by holding constitutional a statute that enables courts to ‘enter judgments in disregard of the jury‘s verdict.’ Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 422, 633 N.E.2d 504. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion [concludes] that juries can meaningfully determine only facts that do not conflict with predetermined assessments of the General Assembly. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion ‘cleans the scalpel for the legislature to cut away unrestrainedly at the whole field of tort redress.’ Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 21, 52, 776 P.2d 488 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).” Arbino at ¶ 163. Today the majority opinion allows the cutting to continue.
{¶ 20} Once again, a majority of this court concludes that a statute may amend an inviolate constitutional right, even though we have previously stated that “[t]he right of trial by jury, being guaranteed to all our citizens by the Constitution of the state, cannot be invaded or violated by either legislative act or judicial order or decree.” Gibbs, 88 Ohio St. 34, 102 N.E. 299, at paragraph two of the syllabus. See
{¶ 21} And once again, I state that “a statute that authorizes a judge to ignore or change factual findings deprives litigants ‘of the benefits of Trial by Jury’ and must be declared unconstitutional.” Id. at ¶ 169.
Equal Protection
{¶ 22} The majority opinion states that “[t]he Ohio and federal equal protection analysis applied in Arbino is applicable in this case as well.” This conclusion ignores one basic fact: in the Arbino case, the majority opinion was working with findings of fact supplied by the General Assembly, whereas in this case, the General Assembly did not issue findings of facts. Instead, the majority opinion supplied its own single finding of fact and did so without commenting on the lack of legislative findings of fact or the creation of its own judicial finding of fact. Applying the equal protection analysis in the Arbino case to this case is unreasonable given the lack of legislative findings of fact in this case.
{¶ 23} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because the caps imposed by
James Burke Jr., John J. Chambers, and Sean P. Allan, for appellee Clifton Oliver.
John J. Spellacy and Sean P. Allan, for appellee Donald Krieger.
Robert J. Triozzi, Director of Law, Joseph F. Scott, Chief Assistant Director of Law, and Jerome A. Payne Jr., Assistant Director of Law, for appellant.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, and David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio.
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Justice.
Notes
{¶ b} “[T]he amount of compensatory damages that represents damages for noneconomic loss that is recoverable in a tort action under this section to recover damages for injury or loss to person or property shall not exceed the greater of two hundred fifty thousand dollars or an amount that is equal to three times the economic loss, as determined by the trier of fact, of the plaintiff in that tort action to a maximum of three hundred fifty thousand dollars for each plaintiff in that tort action or a maximum of five hundred thousand dollars for each occurrence that is the basis of that tort action.”
{¶ c}
{¶ d} “There shall not be any limitation on compensatory damages that represent the actual loss of the person who is awarded the damages. However * * * damages that arise from the same cause of action, transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and that do not represent the actual loss of the person who is awarded the damages shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars in favor of any one person.”