Oliva v. Hawaii County Department of Parks and Recreation, et al.

Sep 1, 2026
25-2571

MEMORANDUM*

Karsten Oliva appeals pro se from the district court‘s summary judgment in his employment action alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII“), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA“), and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Oliva‘s national origin and age discrimination claims based on his 2023 job application because Oliva failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to hire him was pretextual. See id. at 721-24, 728-29 (setting forth burden-shifting framework for Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims and explaining that mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a triable dispute regarding an employer‘s motive).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Oliva‘s claims alleging retaliation under Title VII and the ADEA and discrimination claims based on events prior to June 2023 because Oliva failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to those claims. See Forester v. Chertoff, 500 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that ADEA claims against private or state employers must be exhausted); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep‘t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Title VII plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a timely EEOC or state agency charge, and allegations not included in an EEOC charge “may not be considered by a federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Fort Bend County, Tex. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Oliva‘s state law claims for failure to supervise and defamation because Oliva failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he complied with state and county notice requirements. See Oakley v. State, 505 P.2d 1182, 1184-86 (Haw. 1973) (explaining that the Hawaii Revised Statutes and the Hawaii County Charter require written notice be provided to the county before an individual may recover for personal injuries).

We reject as meritless Oliva‘s contention that the district court‘s failure to hold a hearing on the motion for summary judgment violated his due process rights. See Toquero v. INS, 956 F.2d 193, 196 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that “it is well settled that oral argument is not necessary to satisfy due process“).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

The motion (Docket Entry No. 5) to transmit physical exhibits is denied.

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Oliva‘s request for a hearing, set forth in the reply brief, is denied.