OPINION
This is an appeal from the court’s order dismissing Oliphant Financial L.L.C.’s suit to recover on amounts due for failure to pay on a rеvolving credit account for want of prosecution.
BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2007, Appellant (Oli-phant) filed its suit against Stephen L. Hill
1
to recover an аmount due for failure to pay on a revolving credit account. Pursuant to Rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s procedures, in a letter dated August 17, 2007, the court set the case for dismissal hearing for November 16, 2007.
2
On November 16, 2007, a second letter notice of a 165a
DISCUSSION
In its sole issue, Oliphant maintains that it is entitled to a default judgment on liquidated damages because its pleadings support the judgment, damages were readily ascertainable, and deemed admissions supported the entry of default judgment. Oliphant maintains it is entitled to a default judgment on liquidated damagеs, and attorney’s fees. Further, it contends that it should not have its case dismissed for want of prosecution because the trial сourt has additional requirements for granting default judgments beyond what is required by law.
Rule 165a allows a trial court to dismiss a case
sua sponte
when a party seeking affirmative relief fails to aрpear for a hearing of which it has notice or when the case is not disposed of within the time standards promulgated by the Supreme Court. Tex.R. Civ. P. 165a(l), (2);
Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip.,
As a general proposition, an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment.
Britton v. Tex. Dept.
In its supplemental brief, Oliphant states that “certain opinions have seemed to indiсate that parties must secure a hearing before they are entitled to challenge the denial of a default judgment оn appeal.” Appellant then argues that a hearing is unnecessary because the trial court does not allow hearings on default judgments unless specified by the court.
Appellant does not address the trial court’s two reasons for dismissal: (1) it failed to take action after notice of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution in accordance with a Rule 165a letter and; (2) for want of prosecution. Even if we liberally construe Oliphant’s statement that the court has additional requirements for grаnting default judgments beyond what is required by law as somehow contesting the court’s two reasons for dismissal, it is (1) unsupported by record refеrences and (2) not supported by an explanation of how legal authorities apply to these facts. As a result, Oliphаnt has waived the issue through inadequate briefing.
See
Tex. R.App. P. 38.1(h)(i);
Town of Flower Mound v. Teague,
CONCLUSION
We affirm the court’s order dismissing the motion for default judgment.
CHEW, Judge, sitting by assignment.
Notes
. Hill did not file a brief.
. Appеllant has attached the court's procedures to its supplemental brief. We have taken judicial notice of the court's procedures set out in the court’s website www.judged. metriabenson.com. The court’s procedures require all newly filed cases be given a dismissal date 120 days after the filing date. Prior to the dismissal hearing date, the responsible party must have moved for and proved up a dеfault judgment. Failure to do so results in a dismissal. This language is also set out in the court’s letter notice.
. The court’s procedures rеquire the responsible party appear at the dismissal hearing if process of service is not complete or if а default judgment has not been granted prior to the dismissal hearing date. A motion to retain with an affidavit of due diligence must be filed аnd set for hearing prior to the dismissal hearing.
. Under the heading "Substantive Issues,” the court indicated that: (1) Petition does not give fair notiсe of claim against Defendant; (2) Judgment relied on causes of action that are not adequately pleaded; (3) Damages cannot be accurately calculated, no written instrument attached to petition; (4) No evidence of salе and delivery of merchandise or performance of services; (5) No evidence that the amount of the account or price charged is in accordance with an express contract or is usual, customary and reasonable; (6) No evidence of a systematic record kept and supported by an affidavit; (7) Other: RFA's (Request for Admissions) defective.
