128 Pa. 470 | Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Fayette County | 1889
There is some evidence that the lands in dispute are embraced within the corrected boundaries of the John Lynch warrant, dated September 30, and surveyed December 2, 1815. The testimony as to the actual location of this survey is meagre, but there was perhaps sufficient to justify a submission to the jury, and the verdict is therefore conclusive upon that question. Besides, in the argument of counsel the fact appears to be conceded, and, as no question is made as to the sufficiency of the proof, we must assume that fact. The interference with the Joseph Gratz, an older warrant, surveyed September 9, 1794, was thrown out of the Lynch when the latter was surveyed for patenting in 1830; and the Lynch, properly located, without any interference with other original surveys, must, according to the verdict of the jury, be taken to embrace the premises in dispute.
The plaintiffs, having shown the warrant and survey to the John Lynch, gave in evidence a deed from sheriff Craft to John Huston, dated June 7, 1824, by the recitals of which it appeared to have been sold upon execution process as the property of Joseph Huston, and purchased by John Huston, who afterwards made a deed to Andrew Stewart, dated December 1, 1832; both of which deeds were duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded. These deeds purported to convey the land covered by the John Lynch warrant, but there were no intermediate conveyances connecting Joseph Huston with the Lynch title. The deeds were therefore only admissible to exhibit col- or of title and claim in Andrew Stewart, to whom a patent issued from the commonwealth April 3,1833. The patent was followed by proof of settlement and actual occupancy of the Lynch by Andrew Stewart from the year 1822. In that yeai he erected a stone house, which has since been occupied as a tavern stand on the National turnpike. He also cleared and cultivated a portion of the tract, and it is shown that he has been in the continuous occupancy of the Lynch tract since that time.
The defendants claim title under Jonathan Downer, who, at an early day, settled upon the Joseph Gratz survey. About the year 1820 he built the Downer tavern stand, also on the National road, but further up the mountain, and remained in the occupancy and cultivation of the Gratz until the time of his
The patent to Andrew Stewart was prima facie evidence of title: Lessee of James v. Betz, 2 Binn. 12; Bixler v. Baker, 4 Binn. 213. The patentee is regarded as a trustee for the right owner: Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. 444; but the patent conveys the full legal title of the state, and is evidence of title, especially against one who relies on possession alone, who shows no title, and whose rights, if any, accrued after the date of the patent: Downing v. Gallagher, 2 S. & R. 455; Whitmire v. Napier, 4 S. & R. 290; Diggs v. Downing, 4 S. & R. 348; Gingrich v. Foltz, 19 Pa. 38; Balliot v. Bauman, 5 W. & S. 150; Hull v. Campbell, 56 Pa. 154; Smith v. Vasbinder, 77 Pa. 127; Broad Top Coal Co, v. Coal Co., 65 Pa. 442, and cases there cited.
The patent for the Lynch issued in 1833 to Stewart, who by his tenants was then, and is now, in the possession of the tract, by actual residence, cultivation, and improvement. Neither the warrantee, nor any one claiming under him, comes forward to impeach his title ; nor is any adverse right or title shown to have existed at the time the patent issued. Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to stand upon the patent, and it devolved upon the defendants, under their claim of adverse possession, to exhibit all the acknowledged requisites of a possession efficient to bar the entry of the legal owner or the holder of the title: Sheaffer v. Eakman, 56 Pa. 144. Stewart, it is true, was not in actual possession, by residence or cultivation, of that portion of the Lynch tract now in dis
Jonathan Downer, about the year 1820, settled on the Joseph Gratz. There is no evidence whatever that his claim ex
The burden of proof was upon the defendants to establish all the elements of a title by the statute, and, in the absence of proof to sustain any one of the requisites of such a title, it must be presumed not to exist. Samuel Shipley, in 1860, sold Chalk Hill to Millford Shipley, who entered into possession in 1861, and occupied the tract for eight years. He says he cut timber above the Cool Spring, both above and below the road, but his testimony is vague and uncertain as to the locality. The charge of the learned judge of the court below was much more favorable to their pretensions than the defendants deserved. Whilst we would be unwilling, perhaps, to adopt the reasoning of the charge as a correct exposition of the law of this case, the defendants certainly cannot complain of it.
The judgment is affirmed.