153 F.2d 704 | 3rd Cir. | 1946
This case raises the question whether the claimant, Denis J. O’Leary, is a “fully insured individual” so that he is entitled to primary insurance benefits under the Social Security Act.
Our conclusion upon the merits is that the Board was right and the District Court was wrong. That being so, we may reserve for future occasion the question how far a court is bound to accept both the finding of evidential facts by the Social Security Board and the conclusions and inferences drawn from the facts. The Tax Court’s conclusions, we have been taught, are to be accepted unless its rule of law is wrong. Dobson v. Commissioner, 1943, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248; Commissioner v. Scottish American Inv. Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 119, 65 S.Ct. 169. Whether determinations by the Social Security Board are to be given equal effect we are not now deciding one way or the other.
We turn then to the question upon which the District Judge substituted his oiyn conclusions for that of the Board. This cemetery association was organized, as stated in § 1 of Article 2 of its Constitution and By-Laws, for the “forming and maintaining of a public cemetery for the burial of deceased Roman Catholics who may be entitled to burial according to the law, rules and regulations of the Roman Catholic Church.” The question we have before us, therefore, is whether an organization formed and maintained for this purpose is
We think the question concerning the claimant’s employment is to be settled in accordance with what the Roman Catholic Church, itself, declares through its ecclesiastical law, through its authorized spokesmen and through the rules it establishes for the guidance of its members. These rules and precepts of the Church do not become the law of the land. But they do show the position of the Church with regard to the matter in question and the rights and duties of communicants of the Church with respect thereto. If the Church regards the burial of its deceased communicants and the maintenance of the burying place as part of its religious observances we think that fact makes the operation of the described burying ground a religious function.
Some of the requirements of the Catholic Church on this subject are matters of common knowledge. Perhaps it is not equally well known how clear are the statements of position on the matter. Of this we may take judicial notice and we do. The following statements, we think, clearly demonstrate the complete correctness of the Board in its decision in this case.
In a chapter delineating the rights of the Catholic Church it is said, “Nevertheless sepulture is a religious act and the cemetery is deputed a religious place.”
The particular corporation involved here was organized under the Pennsylvania law of 1874. That statute recognizes the difference between a corporation to maintain and operate a cemetery and a corporation formed for religious purposes. Each purpose was authorized as a form of non-profit corporation. The two evidently could not be combined. This was, however, changed by the Act of 1933, 15 P.S. Ch. 49A, § 2851 — 315, § 2851 — 214(3).
This excerpt from the history of corporation law in Pennsylvania had some significance in the District Court’s mind and was urged upon us in argument here. We think that it has little or no significance. If it had any, the Act of 1933, we think, removed it. But further than that, it is to be borne in mind that this is a nation-wide statute conferring benefits upon employees on a nation-wide scale. We think its sweep is not to be interrupted by the variations and idiosyncracics in local law whether that local law be master and servant or part of a corporation code. See Matcovich v. Anglim, 9 Cir., 1943, 134 F.2d 834, 836; American Oil Co. v. Fly, 5 Cir., 1943, 135 F.2d 491, 493.
We are sure we are right when we agree with the Board that this cemetery was maintained for a religious purpose. We regret that the result of that conclusion is to deprive these claimants of benefits under the Social Security Act. The wisdom of omitting from the coverage of that Act those people who are employed by religious corporations is a matter for the Congress and not for us. We have no doubt that the subject of the appropriate coverage will continue to receive careful attention by the legislative body.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed.
Social Security Act, Title II, § 202(a) [and § 202(b) for wife] as amended, 42 U. S.O.A. § 402(a) [42 U.S.C.A. § 402(b) for wife].
42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) states in part: “The findings of the Board as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall bo conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Board or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) hereof which is adverso to an individual who was a party to the hearing before the Board, because of failure of the claimant or such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) hereof, the court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations.”
People v. Trustees, 21 Hun, N.Y., 184, at pages 193, 194 quoted in Brnilovich v. St. George I. S. Orth. Church, 1937, 326 Pa. 218, 191 A. 655, 110 A.L.R. 384.
O’Reilly, Ecclesiastical Sepulture in the New Code of Canon Law, 9, Chapter I. Rights of the Church.
Id. p. 8, citing Wernz, Jus Decretalium, Tom. III No. 469; Cavagnis, Institationes Juris Publici Ecclesiastic!, Vol. III Lib. IV, No. 278; and Laurentius, Institutiones Juris Canonici, No. 933.
Id. p. 14, citing Can. 1205 ; Wernz, supra, No. 760; Noldin, De Saeramentis, No. 52; and Coronata, De Locis Sacris, No. 4.
Id. p. 35.
Id. p. 44.
Id. p. 9.
Id. p. 32.
Id. p. 40, citing Can. 1212.