173 N.W. 844 | S.D. | 1919
Lead Opinion
The only question presented for determination on this appeal is the constitutionality of chapter 150, Laws of 1911.
Section 4 of article 21 of the Constitution reads as follows:
“4. Exemptions. — The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws exempting from forced sale a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law, to all heads of families, and a reasonable amount of personal property, the kind and value of which shall be fixed by general laws.”
Pursuant to the mandate contained in this section, the first Legislature that convened after the adoption of the Constitution enacted chapter 86, Laws of iSqo, which has become known as the general exemption law.
■'Section 18, art. 6, of the Constitution, provides that — -
“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens or coi'poration, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations.”
Chapter 150, Laws of 1911 (section 2668, Rev. Code 1919), reads as follows:
“Nothing in this chapter shall be so construed as to exempt any personal property from mesne or final process for laborers’ or mechanics’ wages or physicians’ bills, or for the necessaries of life, including only food, clothing and fuel, provided for the debtor or his family, except property absolutely exempt: * * * Provided, that in case -of physicians’ bills or for 'necessaries of life, there shall also 'be exempt household and kitchen furniture, including stoves, of the debtor, to an amount in value not exceeding four hundred dollars, and also two cows; provided, however, that the collection of physicians’ bills shall not be enforced by legal process in less than six months from the accruing thereof except when the debtor is about to remove from the state.”
It is the contention of appellant that this law divides creditors into several classes, giving certain of these classes advantages and preferences over other classes in the matter' of the collection' of their debts; that in giving or attempting to give such preference the Legislature violated the above constitutional provisions ; and that said law is unconstitutional and void.
“This provision of the Constitution imposes upon the Legislature the duty of exempting from seizure or sale, for the payment of any debt or liability, a reasonable amount of property, and of determining such amount by law. ■ In the discharge of this duty, and the exercise of its undoubted power, its judgment and discretion as to the amount of the exemption, and its reasonableness, are final and conclusive, and it may increase or diminish such amount from time to time, according to its own views of an enlightened public policy. Beyond this, however, it cannot constitutionally go. ' -Discrimination, in its exemption law-s, between different classes of creditors and kinds of debts or liabilities, is a species of class legislation which is absolutely prohibited. This must be regarded as the settled doctrine in this state.”
The same rule was followed in Bofferding v. Mengelkoch, 129 Minn. 184, 152 N. W. 135, and in Burrows v. Brooks, 113 Mich. 307, 71 N. W. 460. If the 'Legislature could except a debt due for “necessaries” from the benefit of the exemption law, it could except any or all other debts, and, in that way, deprive a debtor of all benefit of the Constitution on this subject. Donaldson v. Voltz, 19 W. Va. 156; Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465 (Gil. 374) 82 Am. Dec. 108.
Careful consideration has been given to the very exhaustive argument presented by respondent’s counsel, but, as there is nothing doubtful or -difficult of construction in the constitutional provisions involved, a review of such argument would serve no useful purpose. We are satisfied that, in enacting chapter 150-, Laws of 1911, the Legislature exceeded its constitutional power, and that said law is void.
The order appealed from is reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). The Constitution says, in language too plain to need interpretaton, that a reasonable amount
“The exemption is granted to all alike. All debtors can claim the privilege of the exemption law as to such debts.”
But—
“any person furnishing food, fuel, or clothing, any properly licensed physical!, and any workman for wages can claim, the benefit of the exception to the exemption' law.”
Granting an exemption to a debtor, with a provision under which it may be immediately seized and sold for a debt or class of debts, is equivalent to denying any exemption to such person. The statute is a classification of debts and not of debtors. It is, in reality, a classification of creditors with special privileges, and one of the favored class is now claming the privilege of depriving the debtor of his exemption.
But the Constitution says that—
“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges * * * which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
I am unable to see. how it can be claimed that a statute allowing the debts of certain classes of creditors to constitute an exception to the general exemption law falls short of granting a privilege which does not belong equally to all citizens (creditors). The Constitution expressly forbids the granting of special privileges to any class of citizens. Special privileges., to be constitutional, must be granted to all citizens equally.' To hold that, because distinctions may exist which justify a classificaton of creditors, debtors are to- be denied exemptions in every case where
The considerable number of legislative enactments which in effect deprive citizens of the amount of personal property exemptions which the Legislature itself has declared to be “reasonable,” in the general exemption law, but emphasizes the propriety and duty of enforcing the constitutional provision.
A discussion of exemption laws in existence prior to the adoption of the Constitution is not convincing, when it is remembered that the Constitution itself repealed all laws in conflict with its provisions, and contained a direct mandate to the Legislature to enact laws which should enforce — •
“the right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life' * * * by wholesome laws exempting from forced sale * * * a reasonable amount of personal property, the "kind and value of which to be fixed by general laws”
—and not by exceptions to the general exemption law in favor of favored classes of creditors.
The judgment should 'be reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). Our colleagues are of the opinion that section 2668 of our Code is unconstitutional — 'that it violates section 18, art. 6, in that such statute “divides creditors into several classes, giving certain of these classes advantages and preferences over other classes”; or, as one of our colleagues puts it: “The statute is a classification of debts and not of debtors. It is', in reality, a classification of creditors with special privileges.” We are of the opinion that our colleagues have failed to- give any proper effect to the words “upon the same terms,” which are found in the above section of the Constitution. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the Legislature has plenary power to declare what to it seems “a reasonable amount of personal property” (section 4, art. 21, Const.) to be allowed as exempt upon certain “terms” — that is, under any certain named conditions, state, or circumstances — just so long as it applies to all persons alike when the conditions, state, or circumstances are the same. .Webster defines “terms” as “condi
There has never -been a time in the history of this state or the former territory of Dakota when the Legislature did not assume the right to classify exemptions, basing such classification on those differences in conditions, state, or circumstances which it believed sufficient to limit or control its action. A statute similar to the one now before us was section 9, c. 37, Laws 1862, and this section was amended by chapter 8, Laws 1865-66, section 332, C. C. P. 1877, and chapter 34, Laws 1881. In territorial days we find, as early as 1877, the Code sections 333, 334, Code 1877, declaring, as do sections 2670-2672 of our present Code, that certain persons should not be entitled to any exemptions, and that the so-called “additional” and “specific alternative” exemptions could not be claimed, or else claimed in a limited amount only, as against judgments for certain kinds of debts. As early as 1883 we find section 1, c. 50, Laws 1883, providing, as does section 2669 of our present Code, that no property should be exempt as against a judgment for the purchase price thereof. It is interesting, and we believe entitled to great weight in construing our Constitution, to note the legislation of the first state Legislature, composed, in large part, of men who had been members of the constitutional conventions. 'Such Legislature amended sections 323-325, Code 1877, being the sections from which we 'have derived our present sections 2658-2660. The sections then enacted, just as our present -sections, gave to the head of the family “additional” exemptions to the amount of $750, to a single person “additional” exemptions to an amount of $300 only; gave to a debtor with a family “specific alternative” exemptions of household goods to the value of $200, while all' other debtors could make no claim of household goods as “specific alternative” exemptions; gave to a farmer, if the head of a tamily, “specific alternative” exemptions that might amount to over $2,000 in value — much in excess of what he could 'claim as “additional” exemptions — while another debtor, such as a merchant who might not chance to have the right kind of property to be claimed as “specific alternative” exemptions, was restricted to a claim of “additional” exemptions; and gave to a mechanic as “specific alternative” exemptions tools to the value of $200, to a lawyer or
Under the rule announced by our colleagues, every exemption law passed by such Legislature, as well as every law which it left unamended was, and ever since — together with all subsequent amendments thereof — has been, unconstitutional, and' we have not now, and never have had since statehood, any exemption statute that conformed to section 18, art. 6, of the Constitution, unless it be subdivisions 1-6 of section 2658, and the corresponding parts of previous statutes. The only thing that could consistently be urged by our colleagues as saving our homestead exemption is that section 4, art. 21, specifically limits such homesteads to “heads of families.” If it were not for such provision, our homestead law would, under the view of our colleagues, be unconstitutional, because the Legislature would have no right to discriminate and classify exemption according to the existing “terms,” to wit, as between heads of families and'those not heads of families. But it may well be as'ked, how could our colleagues uphold our homestead law, providing, as it does, not a homestead which shall be alike to all persons, but two homesteads, one for the farmer, another for the resident of a city, homesteads alike only in that there is the same limit as to value, but differing as to size. If the Legislature cannot differentiate exemptions because of a difference in the nature of the debts, it cannot differentiate because of a debtor’s occupation, nor because one debtor may be the head of a family and another not. No one would contend that the territorial Legislature was so restricted in its powers. What, then, is there, in any section of our Constitution, that in any way takes from the state Legislature the power which it concededly would have had were it not for such section? All we can find is a mandate directing that there should be. exemption laws that will insure the rights of debtors to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life. There is not one word that directs or requires such laws to apply the same to all kinds of persons regardless of personal status or occupation, or to all kinds of debts regardless of the origin. A Legislature might well con-
Appellants cites decisions of the Minnesota and Michigan courts in support of his position. The decisions of these courts seem to rest upon the term “any debt,” as used in those sections of their Constitutions corresponding to our section 4, art. 21. The courts of those states hold that their Constitutions give to the Legislature only the power to specify the property or limit the amount in value that shall be exempt; they hold that then the property so specified or property to the amount named is exempt from “any debt,” thus holding that their Constitutions take from the -Legislatures the power to differentiate between “debts.” We are not impressed -with the soundness of the reasoning back of these decisions, especially when considered in the light of the fundamental proposition that a state Legislature has all power not conferred upon the federal government or taken from it by state Constitution.
Section 18, art. 6, Const., does forbid class legislation where there is no sufficient warrant for the attempted classification; but it is uniformly held that such a constitutional provision, forbidding only a classification between persons or things which are “upon the same terms,” does not forbid Legislatures from making classifications based upon difference in the terms — the conditions, state, or circumstances surrounding the persons or things classified — all that such section requires is that a law shall have substantially the same application as to all persons or things under substantially the same conditions, state, or circumstances. Bon Homme County v. Berndt, 13 S. D. 309, 83 N. W. 333, 50 L. R. A. 351; In re Watson, 17 6. D. 486, 97 N. W. 463, 2 Ann. Cas. 321; State v. Doran, 28 S. D. 486, 134 N. W. 53; Schaaf v. Rural Credits Board, 39 S. D. 377, 164 N. W. 964; C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Westby, 178 Red. 619, 102 C. C. A. 65, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97. Absolutely the only restrictions placed upon the Legislature by section 4, art. 21, are that the right of every
If in doubt as to the correctness of our conclusions, we should resolve such doubt in favor'of the constitutionality of the statute — not only because of that rule, so often announced by this court, that no statute should be held unconstitutional unless the fact of its unconstitutionality is beyond reasonable doubt, but because of almost 30 years of universal acceptance of and acquiescence in the validity of our exemption laws by the people, the legislators, and even the courts. 6 R. C. L. 75-101; 12 C. J. 714, 715.
The order appealed from should be affirmed.