OPINION
Rоslyn Henry Oldham, appellant, appeals her conviction for the offense of forgery. See Tex. Penal Code ANN. § 32.21 (Vernon 1989). The jury rejected her not guilty plea and the cоurt assessed punishment at three (3) years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
On January 13, 1992, a jury found appellant guilty of a forgery which occurred on January 9, 1989. She was sentenced the same day. Appellant filed notices of indigen-сy and of appeal, pro se, on February 10, 1992. Appellate counsel was appointed on March 16, Í992, sixty-two days after sentence was imposed and thirty-three dаys after the deadline for filing a motion for new trial had passed.
On March 16, 1992, appellant’s counsel filed a motion to abate the appeal on the grounds that appellant had been denied counsel during the thirty day period for filing *462 a motion for new trial. On April 9, 1992, appellant’s counsel filed an amended motion for abatement of appeal. On April 16, 1992, this Court overruled appellant’s motion for abatement of the appeal.
Appellant raises fifteen points of error. However, since points of error twelve through fifteen are dispositive of the case, we decline to discuss points of error one through eleven. In points of error twelve through fifteen, appellant contends that she was denied her constitutional right to counsel during a critical phase of the judicial proceedings. We agree.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(a)(1) requires that if a motion for new trial is to be filed, it must be done within thirty days of sentencing. See Tex.R.App.P. 31(a)(1). However, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(b) allows this Court to extend the thirty day deadline for “good cause” shown. See Tex.R.App.P. 2(b).
Appellant claims that her trial attorney was released on the day of sentencing, and since appellate counsel was not appointed until sixty-two days later, she was therefore without assistance of counsel during the statutory time period for filing a motion for new trial. Appellant contends that this lack of counsel constitutes “good cause” sufficient to allow us to extend the deadline for filing. The state argues, however, that since there is no evidence on the record that her trial attorney was released, appellant was still represented by counsel.
Under the black letter of the law, the state is correct. “Appointed trial counsel remains as the defendant’s counsel
for all purposes
until he is expressly permitted to withdraw, even if the аppointment was for the trial only.”
Ward v. State,
Now that we have decided that appellant was denied the right to counsel, we must determine whether that denial occurred at а critical stage of the judicial process. In
Trevino v. State,
appellant’s counsel was unable to attend the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial.
The Houston, First District, Court of Appeals has come to the same conclusion on almost identical facts.
See Cox v. State,
In
Ortega,
counsel for appeal was not appointed until after the deadline for filing the motion for new trial had passed.
Id.
at 832. Relying on
Callis,
appеllant contended that his right to counsel had been violated.
Id.
The court, however, distinguished
Callis
on the ground that in
Callis,
trial counsel had affirmatively withdrawn, while in the instant case, there was no record that trial counsel had requested or been permitted to withdraw from representation.
Id.
The court then cited
Ward
for the proposition that “appointed trial counsel remains as the defendant’s counsel for all рurposes until he is expressly permitted to withdraw, even if the appointment was for the trial only.”
Id.
(citing
Ward,
Therefore, applying the rules of Ward and Trevino to the facts at hand, it is dear that appellant was denied her right to counsel at a critical stage of the judicial proceedings. We сonclude that good cause has been shown under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(a) to suspend the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(a) that appellant file her motion for new trial within thirty days of sentencing. See Tex.R.App.P. §§ 2(a) & 31(a). Accordingly, appellants twelfth through fifteenth points of error are sustained.
Sincе we have determined that appellant was denied her right to counsel, we must order appellant’s appeal abated to allow appellant time to file a motion for new trial. The Trevino court outlined the proper procedure to follow:
Because ... appellant was denied counsel at a stage of the review process prior to sentence and noticе of appeal, we set aside the sentence and notice of appeal and return the cause for a hearing on the motion for new trial and an orderly course of subsequent events. In the event appellant’s motion for new trial is denied, sentence should then be pronounced and notice of appeal may be given_ Thereafter the provisions of Art. 40.09 [now Tex. R.App.P. 30, et seq.] should be followed. .,.
Trevino,
The type of order required by
Trevino
reinstates jurisdiction in the trial court and returns appellant to the point after judgment аnd assessment of sentence, but before imposition of sentence and filing of notice of appeal. Therefore, since the appeal must be set aside to allow appellant to file her motion for new trial, this case cannot remain in this Court. For this reason, we must issue a mandate disposing of this appeal.
Cox,
If apрellant’s motion for new trial is granted, then her case will be retried. If the motion is denied, the trial court should pronounce sentence and appellant may give notice of appeal within ninety days after sentencing. Id.; See also Tex.R.App.P. § 41(b). After appellant files her timely notice of appeal, the case will be refiled in the appellate court.
Accordingly, the sentence and notice of appeal are set aside and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the motion for new trial and for the orderly conduct of subsequent post-trial proceedings, in accordance with this opinion.