OLD PLANTATION CORP.
v.
MAULE INDUSTRIES, Inc.
Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
*181 Carl A. Hiaasen and McCune, Hiaasen & Kelley, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston, Robert H. Anderson and D.P.S. Paul, Miami, for appellee.
DREW, Justice.
The principal question presented for our determination on this appeal is posed by appellant as follows:
"Does the two-year statute оf limitation, relating to libel and slander (Section 95.11 (6), F.S.A.) govern an action which seeks to recover damages directly caused by the wrongful, intentional and malicious disparagement and impairment of the vendibility of the title to real property, or is the statute of limitation governing the same Section 95.11(4), F.S.A., which provides:
"`Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follоws:
* * * * * *
"`(4) Within four years. Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter.'" (Emphasis ours.)
The lower court held that the two-year statute was applicable and dismissed the complaint.
It will be noticed from the question presented that the words "an action which seeks to recover damages directly caused by the wrongful, intentional and malicious disparagement and impairment of the vendibility of the title to real property" are used to designate the type of action rather than the more commonly used expression "an action for slander of title." At the bar of this Court counsel for appellant ably argued that the term used in his posed question and quoted above was a more apt and proper designation of the type of action than the ancient "slander of title" designation. While we may agree that this argument is sound, the text-writers and the courts have used the expression interchangeably. For example, 33 Ameriсan Jurisprudence, in Section 347 of the title "Libel and Slander," uses the phrase "For Slander or Disparagement of Title." The definition of "Slander of Title" in 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 269, page 391, is as follows:
"`Slander of title' may be defined as a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, or of some right of his, causing him special damage."
In the case of Woodard v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co.,
"Plaintiff contends that this is not an action for slander of title, but is an action on the case to recover damages for wrongful injury to his property. All actions for libel or slаnder are actions on the case, but not all actions on the case are for libel or slander. Regardless of what may be the proper name for this kind of action, we think it clear that it is based on false аnd malicious statements made concerning plaintiff's property.
"* * * An action for slander of title is based upon the false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, resulting in special damages. Cawrse v. Signal Oil Co., [
"In Potosi Zinc Co. v. Mahoney,
We conclude, therefore, that the question presentеd must be disposed of on the basis that the action in the lower court is an action for slander of title and must be governed by the provisions of law applicable to such actions.
While there is authority to the contrary (and we shall refer to this later), we conclude that the great weight of authority in this Country is that the Statute of Limitations applicable to libel and slander is equally applicable to actions for slander of titlе. The nearest we have approached deciding this question is in the case of Lehman v. Goldin,
"The view adopted in a majority of the several American jurisdictions where the question has arisen is that in the absence of a statute expressly referring to actions for slander of title, a statute of limitations relative to actions for libel and slander is equally applicable to actions for slander of title? Thus, the time within which an action for slander of title must be instituted has been held to be governed by a statutory provision relative to actions for slander (or for libel and slander), rathеr than by a statutory provision relative to actions for trespass upon real property, for injury to property, for injuries to personal property, or for any injury to the person or `rights of another, not аrising on contract,' and not `especially enumerated' in any other section of the statute of limitations."
53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 278 (c), page 398, in discussing the applicability of a statute of limitation on libel and slander to аn action for slander of title, said the following:
"The right of action for slander of title or property accrues from the time of publication. The time within which such actions must be commenced usually is regulated by statute. Although there is also authority to the contrary, such actions have been held to be governed by statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions for libel and slander."
A case squarely in point is Woodard v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., supra. In that casе the court concluded by saying:
"We can see no substantial reason why the Legislature would make any distinction between an action involving defamation of title to property and one based upon defamation of the person. A study of the historical development of the statutes of limitation in this state confirms us in the view that the limitation as to the commencement of actions for libel and slander is the same whether the slаnder involves property or the person."
Also see Bush v. McMann,
Appellant makes a most plausible argument that the wording of our statute plainly limits the two-year statute to actions for libel and slander and that actions for slander of title are governed by the general provisions of the four-year statute, principally because the latter action is one not specifically provided for in *183 Chapter 95, F.S. 1951. If it were not for the fact that the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that the same statute governs both actions, and that such had been the law of the land for so long, we might be persuaded to that view. Respect for the rule of stare decisis impels us to fоllow the precedents we find to have governed this question for so long. This is especially true where the argument to change is persuasive but not overwhelming. We think the greatest good will be achieved and the greatest stability in the law maintained by adhering to the weight of authority instead of plowing new ground, especially when the only result would be to enlarge the time within which an action for slander of title could be commenced.
This question, it is true, has not been decided by this Court, but the rule of stare decisis is not limited to previous decisions of the court where the rule is invoked. It has a much broader application. The rule and the reason for it are set forth in Broom's Legal Maxims, 7th Ed., page 118, as follows:
"It is, then, an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis, where the same points come again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being solemnly declared, what before was uncertain and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is nоt in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment (m), but according to the known laws of the land not delegated to prоnounce a new law, but to maintain the old (n) jus dicere et non jus dare (o)."
We alluded to the fact earlier in this opinion that there was some authority contrary to the conclusions we have reached. In the quotation from 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 278(с), page 398, it is said: "although there is also authority to the contrary" the only decision cited in support of that statement is Reliable Mfg. Co. v. Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co.,
"The only case in this country which we have found to the contrary after diligent research is Reliable Mfg. Co. v. Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co.,
There is another proposition presented by appellant which arises out of the principal question. It relates to the date of the accrual of the cause of action. Appellant contends it is a continuing action which continues from day to day until the defendant's claim to the property is dissolved. We find no merit in this cоntention. The cause of action accrued when the wrongful acts alleged in the complaint were committed. The wrongful and malicious filing of the notice of lien by the appellees (as so alleged in the complaint) was the tort which gave rise to the action and the date the tort was committed marked the point the statute began to run. Appellee could have instituted suit on any day thereafter. Walley v. Hunt,
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
TERRELL, SEBRING, HOBSON and MATHEWS, JJ., and HOLT, Associate Justice, concur.
THOMAS, Acting Chief Justice, dissents.