21 N.Y. 150 | NY | 1860
Lead Opinion
The Revised Statutes require (2 R.S., 368, § 36) that the time and place of holding any sale of real estate pursuant to any execution, shall be publicly advertised previously for six weeks successively, as follows: 1. A written or printed notice thereof shall be fastened up in three public places in the town where such real estate shall be sold. 2. A copy of such notice shall be printed once in each week, in a newspaper *152 of such county if there be one. It is conceded that the formalities required by the first subdivision of this section have been complied with, and that the time and place of the sale, so far as prescribed by it, had been advertised for six weeks successively, previous to the day of sale. The notice was fastened up on Tuesday, the 26th of March, and continued so fastened up until the day of sale, Wednesday May 8th. It was therefore, so far as the notice fastened up was concerned, publicly advertised for six weeks successively previous to the sale.
The second subdivision, it will be observed, requires a publication in the newspaper, of a copy of the notice posted up; clearly therefore implying that the posting or fastening up is to precede the publication. It is a copy of the notice fastened up, which is to be printed once in each week in a newspaper of the county for six weeks previous to the sale. There is no doubt that all the formalities of the first subdivision were strictly complied with, and the notice thus posted up was the original notice of sale. It is thus expressly declared by statute. It was put up at the right time, and continued up for the right time. No law required it to be put up sooner. A copy of the notice thus fastened up is to be printed in a newspaper for six weeks, once in each week. Can it with truth be said, that the statute requires the copy to be printed, before the original is in existence? It is a perversion of terms to say so. The original is first to be fastened up, and to be put up for the time prior to the sale required by statute, then the copy is to be printed in the newspaper. It is not correct to say that the copy of a notice, the original of which had no existence, until Tuesday, March 26th, should have been published in the newspaper of Saturday, March 23d. The copy could not be prepared for publication until the original had existence, and then it was printed in the first publication thereafter, and printed once in each week for the six weeks successively intervening between the fastening up of the original notice and the day of sale. It seems to me that this is not only a strict compliance with the spirit of the provisions of the statute, but with its letter also.
The defendant relies on the authority of an anonymous case *153
(1 Wend., 90). This seems to have been submitted to the judges of the Supreme Court by a commissioner for their advice, and decided without argument. The provision of the Revised Laws, to which the case referred, was that an insolvent seeking a discharge should cause an advertisement to be published for six weeks successively, specifying the time and place for his creditors to show cause why an assignment should not be made by the insolvent, and he be discharged. It was stated to the judges of the Supreme Court in that case that it did not appear that full six weeks' notice to the creditors had been given. The affidavit of publication set forth that the advertisement or notice had been regularly published in the newspaper directed once in each week, for six weeks successively, commencing on a certain day. WOODWORTH, J., said the proof of publication was undoubtedly defective. The affidavit might literally be true and yet only thirty days' notice be given. The statute requires the advertisement or notice to the creditors to show cause to be published for six weeks successively; that is, during forty-two days. The authority of this case has been greatly impaired by the decision of the Supreme Court of the seventh district inSheldon v. Wright (7 Barb., 39). In that case the provision of the statute under consideration, was that authorizing a surrogate to make an order, directing all persons interested in the estate of a deceased person to show cause, on a day to be named in such order, why so much of the real estate whereof such testator or intestate died seised, should not be sold as would be sufficient to pay his debts, and the statute further provided, that such order should immediately thereafter be published for four weeks successively, in two or more public newspapers printed in this State. (1 Rev. Laws, 450, § 23.) The order in that case was made on the 6th of September, 1826, requiring the cause to be shown before the surrogate on the 19th of October following. The order was published in the "Free Press," a newspaper printed in Auburn, Cayuga county, once in each week for four weeks successively, commencing on the 20th day of September, 1826, and in the "Cayuga Patriot," printed in the same place, once in *154
each week for the same number of weeks, commencing on the 27th of September, 1826. WELLES, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "I have no doubt whatever, that it is essential, in order to give the surrogate jurisdiction of the persons of the heirs, that this provision of the statute should be strictly complied with. It is the only process to bring them into court, and without it they are without their day in court. And I think that notice for the full time required by the statute is equally indispensable; that short notice would be as no notice. * * * * It is claimed that the notice so far as one of the papers was concerned (the Cayuga Patriot), was not published four weeks. That the first publication, which was on the 27th day of September, was less than four weeks before the 19th day of October, when the parties were required to show cause, c. This, as a matter of fact, will be seen upon a computation of time, to be true. But I do not understand the act to require the first of the four successive publications to be four weeks before the day of showing cause. The requirement is satisfied by four successive weekly publications before the day." And such the learned justice says has been the practical construction of the provision of the insolvent laws, requiring notice to creditors to be published in one class of cases six weeks, and in another, ten weeks. The case was brought up on an appeal to this court, and the judgment below affirmed. (1 Seld., 497.) FOOT, J., in delivering the opinion of this court, which was concurred in by five other judges, says that he has no doubt that the decision of the surrogate was correct, in respect to the time and manner of publishing the order to show cause. It was in accordance with the language of the statute, and there does not appear to be any reason for a different construction. And he refers to the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Bachelor v.Bachelor (
I do not think the statute is to be construed in a manner to lead to such results, but that its plain and literal import is to be followed. The notice is to be fastened up for six successive weeks previous to the sale, as was done in this case. A copy of the notice thus put up was to be published once a week for six successive weeks, after such notice by posting had been given. This has also been done. It follows that the judgment of the general term should be reversed, and that of the special term be affirmed.
WRIGHT, J., also delivered an opinion for affirmance, and SELDEN, CLERKE and WELLES, Js., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
It is a condition precedent of the sheriff's power to sell lands on execution, that the sale *156 "shall be publicly advertised previously for six weeks successively." This is the language of the statute (2 R.S., 378, 379, § 34), and its plain meaning is, that six whole weeks must elapse between the commencement of the advertisement and the time of sale. There is no more reason for saying that five and a half weeks than for saying that one or two weeks will answer the purpose. If we abridge the time for a single day, we may do it for as many days as we please, and the statute becomes a dead letter.
This public advertisement must be made by posting the notice of sale in the manner specified in the statute, and by causing a copy to be printed "once in each week," in a newspaper of the county in which the lands are situated. Two things, therefore, are required to make the advertisement complete, one the posting of the notice, the other, its insertion in the newspaper; and the publication in both its branches must be for six weeks previous to the sale. The "public advertisement" consists of both these things, and as that must be for six full weeks, so a shorter time will not answer for either one of these performances. There is no publication at all unless the notice is both posted and printed in a newspaper; and if we say that the time either of posting or printing may be shortened, we hold in substance that an advertisement for less than six weeks is good. This we cannot do without abrogating the statute.
It is urged, that according to this construction seven newspaper insertions will always be required before the sale. If that consequence were to follow, the opposite construction would by no means be justified. The number of insertions is not specified in the statute. The advertisement must be for six previous weeks in both the modes prescribed, and it must be in the newspaper "once in each" of those weeks. If the full period of six weeks, which must elapse between the first insertion and the sale, requires the notice to appear seven times in the paper in order to have one publication in each of the six weeks, then it must be inserted so many times. The fundamental requisition is, that the sale must be advertised for a full period of six weeks. But I think the consequence mentioned does not follow. *157 If an advertisement is commenced on the 1st of April by posting, and inserting in a newspaper on that day, the sale can take place on the 13th of May, the intervening period being six weeks or forty-two days. Now the six weekly publications in the paper will be the 1st, 8th, 15th, 22d and 29th days of April, and the 6th of May. As the sale will take place on the 13th of May, the last publication will therefore be at the commencement of the week which immediately precedes it. This will be an undoubted compliance with the law. Another insertion on the very day of the sale cannot be necessary. The sale may lawfully take place in the morning while the newspaper may be issued in the evening. It follows that in all cases six or more insertions will be required according as the sale shall or shall not be appointed to take place precisely at the close of six weeks from the first publication.
The construction which I have indicated is the one given to similar statutes by the former and the existing Supreme Courts of this State. (1 Wend., 90; 16 Barb., 347.) We are referred, however, to the case of Sheldon v. Wright, in this court (1 Selden, 497), as a controlling authority the other way. But an examination of that case will show that no such point was decided. The general question involved was, whether the order of a surrogate directing the sale of an intestate's real estate was valid. One of the objections to be overcome, was the alleged insufficiency of the publication of an order to show cause against the sale. But the surrogate had expressly adjudged that the publication was sufficient, and this court simply held, so far as we can judge from the opinion given, that this decision could not be inquired into collaterally. The observations of Judge FOOT, favorable to such a construction of the statute now in question as the plaintiff contends for, were followed by a disclaimer of any such ground of decision.
On the ground, therefore, that the notice of the sheriff's sale under which the plaintiff claims title, was not advertised for six weeks as the statute requires, I am of opinion that the order of the Supreme Court granting a new trial must be affirmed, and that the defendant must have final judgment *158 according to the stipulation entered into on bringing the present appeal.
DENIO and BACON, Js., also dissented.
Judgment reversed and judgment for the plaintiff.
