OKER, APPELLANT, v. AMERITECH CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 99-270
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided June 28, 2000.
89 Ohio St.3d 223 | 2000-Ohio-139
Submitted February 9, 2000. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72556.
The statute of limitations period applicable to age-discrimination claims brought under
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael R. Oker (“Oker”), appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, affirming the grant of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of appellees, the Ameritech Corporation and Ameritech Ohio (“Ameritech”).
{¶ 2} Oker was employed as an attorney for Ohio Bell Telephone Company and later Ameritech Ohio, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ameritech Corporation, for nearly seventeen years. In 1994, Oker was serving in the litigation subsection of the legal department of Ameritech Ohio. In the fall of that year, Ameritech announced that it was reorganizing its legal department by disbanding the legal departments of its subsidiaries.
{¶ 3} When Ameritech announced the reorganization of the company, it invited attorneys employed by Ameritech Ohio, who were interested in joining the Ameritech Law Department, to submit their resumes for consideration. Pursuant to this process, Oker submitted his resume to Susan R. Lichtenstein, Assistant General Counsel-Litigation for Ameritech Corporation.
{¶ 5} Although Oker was employed only as an attorney through January 7, 1995, he remained with the company through approximately April 15, 1995. During this time, Oker served in a non-managerial capacity as a customer service representative. At this same time, Oker searched for another job as an attorney.
{¶ 6} On April 10, 1995, Ameritech hired Cynthia C. Schafer, an attorney younger in age than Oker, to specialize in litigation.
{¶ 7} On June 29, 1995, Oker filed an action against Ameritech, claiming age discrimination pursuant to
Gold & Schwartz Co., L.P.A., Orville E. Stiffel II and Niki Z. Schwartz, for appellant.
Duvin, Cahn & Hutton, Robert M. Wolff, Martin S. List and Janette M. Louard, for appellees.
MOYER, C.J.
{¶ 8} In Bellian v. Bicron Corp. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 517, 634 N.E.2d 608, we held that an age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to
{¶ 9} For the reasons that follow, we hold that the statute of limitations period applicable to age-discrimination claims brought under
{¶ 10} In State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union 377 v. Youngstown (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 200, 4 O.O.3d 387, 364 N.E.2d 18, this court addressed the issue of when the statute of limitations period for a specific cause of action commences. We held that “[n]ormally, a cause of action does not accrue until such time as the infringement of a right arises. It is at this point that the time within which a cause of action is to be commenced begins to run.” Id. at 203-204, 4 O.O.3d at 389, 364 N.E.2d at 20. Hence, we must determine the point in time at which the actions of Ameritech became a possible infringement of the rights afforded Oker under
{¶ 11} Ameritech contends that any possible infringement of Oker’s right occurred on November 9, 1994, when he was informed that he would not be offered a position in the reorganized Ameritech Law Department.
{¶ 12} In support of its position, Ameritech cites the United States Supreme Court opinion in Delaware State College v. Ricks (1980), 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431. In Ricks, the court decided the Title VII claim of a non-tenured professor, finding that the plaintiff did not file his claim within the applicable federal statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held that the timeliness of such a complaint should be measured from the date the tenure decision was made and communicated to the employee, despite the fact that the eventual loss of the
{¶ 13} Ameritech contends that this case is indistinguishable from Ricks, and that the principles established in that case should govern our interpretation of the statute of limitations provided for in former
{¶ 14} First, the plaintiff in Ricks initiated his suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although Title VII and
{¶ 15} In Lordstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 252, 20 O.O.3d 240, 421 N.E.2d 511, this court considered the statute of limitations applicable to a suit charging sexual discrimination pursuant to
{¶ 16} The school district argued that the complaints were not timely filed because the statute of limitations period had begun to run at the time the teachers were informed that their contracts would not be renewed. However, in holding that the claims were timely filed, we determined that the statute of limitations period began to run, not when the teachers were served notice of the non-renewal, but on the date the teachers’ contracts expired.
{¶ 17} Our decision in Lordstown explained the difference between the facts of that case and those in Ricks. In Ricks, the professor was denied tenure. The
{¶ 18} Like the teachers in Lordstown, Oker was terminated from his position with the company. Ameritech would have us look at its decision not as a termination of Oker but as a failure to hire him, thus assimilating the facts with those in Ricks. We do not accept this interpretation. Instead, we concur that the decision made by Ameritech was a termination of Oker’s employment. Therefore, following the principles established in Lordstown, we hold that the statute of limitations period began to run on the date of Oker’s termination from Ameritech, January 7, 1995.
{¶ 19} The plain language of
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
CHRISTLEY and COOK, JJ., dissent.
JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J.
OKER, APPELLANT, v. AMERITECH CORPORATION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 99-270
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided June 28, 2000.
{¶ 21} I respectfully dissent. The majority analyzes the statute of limitations issue as if this case were based on an allegation of discriminatory discharge. I agree, instead, with the court of appeals’ conclusion that this case involves, not an allegedly discriminatory discharge, but an allegedly discriminatory failure to hire:
“In this case, appellant was informed in the fall of 1994, that all the positions in Ameritech Ohio’s legal department were being eliminated and that the attorneys would have to apply for positions with Ameritech. Accordingly, if Ameritech illegally discriminated against appellant based upon his age, the discriminatory act suffered by appellant would not be the termination from employment as an attorney, but rather would be the failure of Ameritech to hire him based upon his age.”
{¶ 22} According to his deposition, Oker believed that he had been rejected for a position with the Ameritech centralized law department on November 9, 1994 on the basis of his age, having observed since 1990 a phenomenon he described as “the complete purge of all older officers in [the company].” He also conceded during his deposition that Ameritech’s reorganization was “absolutely * * * a real reorganization,” and “not a sham reorganization.” The appellate court opinion notes that Oker’s allegation was that Ameritech discriminated against him when it failed to hire him to work in its centralized law department—not that the Ameritech reorganization was based on age discrimination. Thus the date on which his original position was eliminated as a result of that reorganization is not the date to which a court should look for the commencement of the limitations period.
{¶ 23} Here the alleged discriminatory act—the decision not to hire—occurred on November 9, 1994. It follows that Oker had one hundred eighty days
{¶ 24} I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
CHRISTLEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.