185 Ga. 507 | Ga. | 1937
'“Dalton Spread Workers Dnion,” a voluntary labor organization consisting of spread workers including “practically all of the employees of the O’Jay Spread Company,” and four individuals “as members of said organization and for themselves as individuals,” filed a petition against the company, praying a temporary restraining order, injunction, and different amounts of damages to each plaintiff, on account of breaches of a written labor contract of collective bargaining, signed by the company and by one of the indvidual plaintiffs and two others as representatives of the union and its members. It was alleged that the petition was filed as a class bill, not only in behalf of the plaintiffs, but for others similarly situated, who might intervene; and that all have a community of interest under the contract and in its performance. The contract, dated July 1, 1937, recited that it was “to go into effect immediately upon the reopening of the Dalton, Georgia plant” of the company, and was to “remain in effect only for a period of three months from this date” (September 30, 1937); that all employees “may return to their respective positions when operations are resumed at said plant, without prejudice or discrimination,” interference, restraint, or coercion “because of union activities or membership therein;” that “during the life of this agreement” the wage scale in the amounts specified to each of the named employees “shall be in effect;” that there “shall be no strike or lockout;” that any difference would be settled by arbitrators in the manner stated; that “this is not to be construed as a contract of continuous employment for the persons herein named or any other persons; and the . . company does not obligate itself to furnish employment to any of its employees for any period of time, definite or indefinite;” that the company “shall have the right to
The defendant filed general and special demurrers to the petition as amended, upon the grounds that the petition showed no cause of action or matter for equitable relief; that under the contract and the averments of the petition, the plaintiffs had a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law; that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and of causes of action, and the petition was multifarious, in that there was no common right in the plaintiffs; that the petition sought to enforce separate and distinct causes of action, to which separate defenses could be asserted; that the Dalton Spread Workers Union is not a legal entity capable under the law of maintaining the suit; that it was not shown whether or when the plant had begun operation, or was in operation, before or during the periods in which the individual plaintiffs claimed loss of wages; that the item of expenses sought to be recovered by the union was not authorized by the contract, the persons to whom the amounts were paid not being shown to have been employees of the company or members of the union; and that the averments with reference to the change of the defendant’s entity and secretion of assets were a mere conclusion without issuable facts.
On August 25, 1937, the petition was filed, requiring the defendant to appear on the fourth Monday in October, and a temporary restraining order was granted against a violation of the contract and any change in the status of the business covered by the contract, or the assets, which might render the defendant not answerable to the judgment of the court. On September 24, 1937, the court entered orders, overruling the demurrers to the amended petition, and continuing the restraining order “to October 18, 1937, expiration date of the contract.” The contract, dated July 1, 1937, provided that it “shall remain in effect only for a period of three months.” The only exception was to the overruling of the demurrers; and neither side excepted to the continuance of the restraining order to the date stated, now expired.
Except as provided by statute in cases of injunction and damages for counterfeiting labels or trade-marks of unincorporated associations or unions of working men (Code, §§ 106-101 to 106-104, inclusive), it is the rule in this State that a suit can not be brought in the name or in behalf of an unincorporated association, but a suit to enforce or protect a right inuring by virtue of membership in such an association must be brought in the name or in behalf of all the members. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Inman Park Presbyterian Church, 111 Ga. 677 (36 S. E. 880); Thurmond v. Cedar Spring Baptist Church, 110 Ga. 816 (36 S. E. 321); Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Dalton Marble Works, 122 Ga. 774 (50 S. E. 978); Barbour v. Albany Lodge, 73 Ga. 474; Faisan v. Adair, 144 Ga. 797, 798 (87 S. E. 1080, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 243); Jones v. Watson, 63 Ga. 679; 25 R. C. L. 72-74, §§ 28-31; 63 C. J. 659, § 7, 703, § 86; 5 C. J. 1365, § 102; 7 C. J. S. 30, § 1(b), 82, § 35. The petition was thus subject to special demurrer, on the additional ground that the plaintiff union, as a voluntary association, was not a legal entity capable under the law of maintaining the suit. The fact that the “national labor relations act” of July 5, 1935 (49 St. 449, 450) and other prior Federal labor acts (title 29, IT. S. Code Ann., 1936 Supp., pp. 14-35) recognize the existence and rights as entities of unincorporated associations and labor organizations in dealings with employers and in specific relief through Federal agencies as provided by such acts, would not operate to change the rule just stated, in a suit such as this, involving merely an application of general legal and equitable principles and relief to a contract of collective bargaining, without relief under any Federal act.
The amended petition was subject also to grounds of special demurrer, in failing to state when the defendant’s plant reopened, after a closing on account of labor disturbances referred to in the alleged contract and petition. The contract, dated July 1, 1937, in terms providing that it was to “go into effect immediately upon the reopening” of the defendant’s plant, and the individual plaintiffs claiming subsequent loss of earnings on account of a breach of this contract, but only in indirect terms alleging that the plant had
Only upon the grounds and for the reasons stated, it was error to overrule the general and special demurrers to the petition.
Judgment reversed.