Case Information
*0 FILED IN 14th COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 5/28/2015 3:54:37 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk *1 ACCEPTED 14-14-00158-CV FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS R. R USSELL H OLLENBECK 5/28/2015 3:54:37 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE hollenbeck@wrightclose.com CLERK Board Certified Civil Appellate Law Texas Board of Legal Specialization May 28, 2015
Hon. Christopher A. Prine, Clerk Via Electronic Submission
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
301 Fannin, Suite 245
Houston, Texas 77002
Re: Cause No. 14-14-00158-CV
Oiltanking Houston, L.P., et al. v. Alberto Delgado, et al.
Dear Mr. Prine:
The undersigned is counsel for the Appellants, Oiltanking Houston, L.P., Oiltanking Holding Americas, Inc., Oiltanking Partners, L.P., and Oiltanking
North America, L.L.C. (collectively, “Oiltanking”), in this proceeding. Oiltanking
respectfully requests that you forward this letter brief to Justices Boyce, McCally,
and Donovan. A copy of this letter is being served on counsel for the Appellees
contemporaneously with its filing with the Court.
Oiltanking submits this post-submission letter to draw the Court’s attention to a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court that impacts the consideration of
the issues raised at the parties’ recent oral argument.
I. Chapter 95 applies to all negligence claims, including negligent activity
and negligent undertaking claims, when its prerequisites are satisfied. At the parties’ oral argument, the members of the panel asked counsel for both sides, “What about Elmgren ?” (paraphrasing). The panel seemed particularly
concerned about the holdings of that case concerning the scope of Chapter 95’s
application to claims sounding in negligence. See Elmgren v. Ineos USA, LLC , 431
S.W.3d 657, 671 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed).
W RIGHT & C LOSE , LLP O NE R IVERWAY , S UITE 2200, H OUSTON , T EXAS 77056 T EL : 713.572.4321 F AX : 713.572.4320 *2 Fourteenth Court of Appeals
May 28, 2015
Page 2 of 5
In Elmgren , this Court held, in part, as follows: “[W]e conclude that Chapter 95 defeats a premises-liability claim if the statutory requisites are satisfied
but does not as a matter of law reach distinct claims for negligent activity and
negligent undertaking.” Id .
The Texas Supreme Court’s very recent decision in Abutahoun v. Dow Chemical Company , __ S.W.3d __, 2015 WL 2147979 (Tex. May 8, 2015),
answers the panel’s question by effectively overruling Elmgren in this regard. ( See
attached.) In Abutahoun , the Court held as follows:
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Chapter 95 applies to an independent contractor’s negligence claims against a property owner when the claims are based on injuries arising out of the property owner’s negligent activities and not the independent contractor’s own work. . . . Applying the plain language of the statute, we hold that Chapter 95 applies to all independent contractor claims for damages caused by a property owner’s negligence when the requirements of section 95.002(2) are satisfied .
* * * As we have explained, “negligent activity encompasses a malfeasance theory based on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by the owner that caused the injury, while premises liability encompasses a nonfeasance theory based on the owner’s failure to take measures to make the property safe.” Despite their differences, both claims are a species of negligence. While it is true that “[w]e have rejected attempts to blur the distinction between these two claims, it is nonetheless an accurate statement that both types of claims fall within the common meaning of the term “negligence” that appears, undefined in section 95.001(1).
Id . at *1, *7 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
As a result, the Court held that “[w]e can only conclude that the Legislature intended for Chapter 95 to apply to all negligence claims that arise from either a
premises defect or the negligent activity of a property owner or its employees
. . . .” Id . at *6 (emphasis added).
2
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
May 28, 2015
Page 3 of 5
At oral argument, counsel for Appellees all but conceded the absence of any evidence supporting a negligent activity theory of liability. Given this recent
decision from the Texas Supreme Court, as well as the fact that Appellees’ claims
indisputably arise from a condition of the improvement on which they were
working at the time of this accident, it is clear that whether this Court concludes
Appellees’ theories of liability arise from negligent activity, negligent undertaking,
or a condition of the premises, Appellees were required to satisfy the elements of
Chapter 95 to recover.
II. There was no evidence of control or actual knowledge.
Chapter 95 requires proof that (i) the property owner exercised or retained some control over the manner in which the independent contractor performed its
work, and (ii) the property owner had actual knowledge of the danger or condition
of the premises that resulted in the independent contractor’s injuries or death and
failed to adequately warn the contractor. See T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C ODE §
95.003. Appellees failed to satisfy the elements of the statute.
This Court has previously held that proving a property owner exercised control over the means, methods, or details of an independent contractor’s work
requires more than showing a right to order work to start or stop or to inspect
progress and receive reports. See Johnston v. Oiltanking Houston, L.P. , 367
S.W.3d 412, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Nor is it
enough to show the defendant controlled one aspect of an independent contractor’s
activities if the accident arose from another. Id . Finally, the right to schedule the
timing of work, coordinate the activities of contractors, and prescribe alterations or
deviations in the work is also not sufficient to impose liability on a premises
owner. Id . at 419 (“Oiltanking must have some latitude to tell its independent
contractors what to do, in general terms, and may do so without becoming subject
to liability.”). As shown in Oiltanking’s briefing, the evidence at trial did not rise
to the level of control required to establish liability under Chapter 95.
How this accident occurred was also a matter of dispute at trial. But there was no evidence that anyone at Oiltanking possessed actual knowledge that
3
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
May 28, 2015
Page 4 of 5
hazardous fumes or vapors were leaking around the plumber’s plug into the work
area (if, in fact, they were) before this accident occurred. And as this Court has
previously explained, mere constructive knowledge is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Chapter 95. See, e.g., Elmgren , 431 S.W.3d at 666 (holding
defendant not liable under Chapter 95 where no evidence showed actual
knowledge that valve at issue was leaking); Bishop v. Nabisco, Inc. , 2004 WL
832916 at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Actual
knowledge that the cover was dangerous is different than knowing that the cover
was potentially dangerous.”). There was no evidence at trial that Oiltanking
possessed the actual knowledge necessary to establish liability under Chapter 95.
For these and the others reasons raised in its briefing, Oiltanking respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ R. Russell Hollenbeck W RIGHT & C LOSE , LLP State Bar No. 00790901 4
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
May 28, 2015
Page 5 of 5
RRH:jcr
cc: Peter M. Kelly Via Electronic Service
K ELLY , D URHAM & P ITTARD , LLP
1005 Heights Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77008
Robert S. Kwok Via Electronic Service K WOK D ANIEL L TD ., L.L.P.
6588 Corporate Drive, Suite 300
Houston, Texas 77036
Attorneys for Appellees
5
Safe Workplace Laws Independent contractor's employee was not 2015 WL 2147979 injured by an improvement separate from Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. improvement that was object of his work in
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN removing asbestos insulation and installing new
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE insulation on property owner's pipe system,
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, and thus, statute precluding liability of property
IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. owners for injuries suffered by contractors or their employees from owner's failure to provide Supreme Court of Texas. a safe workplace applied to negligence claim asserted by employee's estate, which in turn Magdalena Adrienna Abutahoun, Individually and meant that estate was required to carry two- as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate pronged evidentiary burden, under the statute, of Robert Wayne Henderson, Deceased, and Tanya to prove that owner exercised or retained some Elaine Henderson, Individually in Her Own Right control over the manner in which the work was and as Next Friend of Z.Z.H., a Minor, Petitioners, performed and that owner had actual knowledge
v. of the danger or condition resulting in worker's The Dow Chemical Company, Respondent death and failed to adequately warn. V.T.C.A.,
Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 95.001 et seq.
NO. 13–0175 | Argued January 14, Cases that cite this headnote
2015 | OPINION DELIVERED: May 8, 2015
Synopsis theories of premises liability, negligence, gross negligence, Worker's estate sued property owner under Background: [2] Statutes Language When construing a statute, courts begin with its
and conspiracy, alleging owner failed to keep its premises language.
in reasonably safe condition while worker was performing
work for independent contractor, and failed to warn worker Cases that cite this headnote of “dangerous ongoing activities, namely the use, application,
and clean-up and removal of asbestos-containing products.”
The 160th Judicial District Court, Jim Jordan, J., entered [3] Appeal and Error
judgment, on jury verdict, for estate. The Court of Appeals Cases Triable in Appellate Court
reversed, 395 S.W.3d 335. Estate's petition for review was Appellate court reviews statutory construction de granted. novo.
Cases that cite this headnote [Holding:] The Supreme Court, Green, J., held that statute
precluding liability of property owners for injuries suffered [4] Statutes
by contractors' employees from an owner's failure to provide Plain Language; Plain, Ordinary, or
safe workplace applied to estate's claims. Common Meaning
Courts look to the plain meaning of the words in a statute as an expression of legislative intent. Affirmed.
Cases that cite this headnote West Headnotes (10) [5] Statutes
Plain language; plain, ordinary, common, or [1] Negligence literal meaning
Statutes Cases that cite this headnote Extrinsic Aids to Construction
If the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts
must read the language according to its common [9] Statutes Plain, literal, or clear meaning of statute;
meaning without resort to rules of construction ambiguity
or extrinsic aids. Because abrogation is disfavored, courts
Cases that cite this headnote examine the statute's plain language for the
Legislature's clear intention to replace a common [6] Statutes law remedy with a statutory remedy, and the
Plain Language; Plain, Ordinary, or court declines to construe statutes to deprive Common Meaning citizens of common-law rights unless the Legislature clearly expressed that intent.
Statutes Defined terms; definitional provisions Cases that cite this headnote
Statutes Context [10] Negligence
Statutes Safe Workplace Laws Relation to plain, literal, or clear meaning; When a claim does not arise from a condition ambiguity or use of an improvement to real property A court initially limits its statutory review to the where the contractor or subcontractor modifies plain meaning of the text as the sole expression the improvement, the statute precluding liability of legislative intent, unless the Legislature has of property owners for injuries suffered by supplied a different meaning by definition, a contractors or their employees from owner's different meaning is apparent from the context, failure to provide a safe workplace does not or applying the plain meaning would lead to apply and an independent contractor can recover absurd results. for common law negligence. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 95.002(2). Cases that cite this headnote Cases that cite this headnote
[7] Statutes Titles, headings, and captions
When the plain meaning of a statute controls, the
title of the section carries no weight, as a heading ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF
does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute. APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Cases that cite this headnote Attorneys and Law Firms
[8] Statutes Clear or Unambiguous Statute or Language Absence of Ambiguity; Application of LLP, Houston, Justin Joseph Presnal, Fisher, Boyd, Johnson Erin Marie Wiegand, Fisher, Boyd, Johnson & Huguenard, & Huguenard, LLP, Houston, Michael E. Shelton, The Shelton Law Firm, Houston, for Amicus Curiae Dallas
Statutes Building Trades Council.
Extrinsic Aids to Construction William V. Dorsaneo III, SMU School of Law, Dallas, for
When a statute's language is clear and Amicus Curiae William V. Dorsaneo III. unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to rules
of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the Christine Tamer, Denyse Ronan Clancy, John Lacoste language. Langdoc, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, for Petitioner
Magdalena Adrienna Abutahoun.
nearby. He was also allegedly exposed to asbestos dust Amy Pharr Hefley, Macey Reasoner Stoke, Matthew Eagan, as a result of his own direct contact with the insulation Stephen G. Tipps, Baker Botts LLP, Houston, David P. products. At trial, a Dow employee who worked on the Herrick, Herrick & Associates PC, Dallas, for Respondent same asbestos-insulated pipeline system as Robert Henderson The Dow Chemical Company. testified, “[y]ou name it, we sawed it,” and also testified that individuals within twenty yards of him were “in the
Opinion [asbestos] dust area.” In a pre-trial deposition, Robert Henderson testified that he was doing the same kind of
JUSTICE GREEN delivered the opinion of the Court.
work as Dow employees on the asbestos-insulated pipeline *1 In this case of first impression, we must interpret Chapter system, and he testified about the frequency, regularity, and
95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which proximity of the exposure he received as a bystander to Dow
relates to limitations on a property owner's liability for injury, employees performing similar insulation work nearby. Robert
death, or property damage to an independent contractor. See Henderson testified that, while at Dow's Freeport facility, he
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE ch. 95. The underlying worked on the pipeline system two to three days per week
legal dispute began when a pipeline insulation worker for four to five hours per day, usually working within five to
contracted mesothelioma and sued a chemical company ten feet of Dow employees who were working with asbestos-
alleging that he was exposed to asbestos-containing products based insulation.
while working as an independent contractor at the chemical
company's facility. The sole issue in this appeal is whether *2 Eventually, Robert Henderson was diagnosed with
Chapter 95 applies to an independent contractor's negligence mesothelioma, and he and his wife, Tanya, sued Dow
claims against a property owner when the claims are based and over a dozen other defendants, alleging under various
on injuries arising out of the property owner's negligent negligence and product liability theories that the defendants
activities and not the independent contractor's own work. The were responsible for Robert Henderson's injuries due to
court of appeals held that “[t]he plain meaning of the text asbestos exposure. Upon Robert Henderson's death, the
of Chapter 95 does not preclude its applicability where a petition was amended to allow his adult daughter, Magdalena
claim is based upon negligent actions of the premises owner.” Adrienna Abutahoun, and his minor daughter, through Tanya
395 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2013). Applying the Henderson as next friend, to join the lawsuit as wrongful
plain meaning of the statute, we hold that Chapter 95 applies death heirs (collectively, the Hendersons). The lawsuit
to all independent contractor claims for damages caused was originally filed in the 160th District Court in Dallas
by a property owner's negligence when the requirements of County but was transferred to the asbestos multi-district
section 95.002(2) are satisfied. We affirm the court of appeals' litigation (MDL) pretrial court in Harris County for pretrial
judgment. proceedings. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.162.
Dow moved for summary judgment in the MDL pretrial court, arguing that Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice I. Factual and Procedural Background and Remedies Code applied to the Hendersons' negligence claims against Dow and precluded any recovery. The MDL
The Dow Chemical Company contracted with Win–Way pretrial court granted Dow summary judgment in part and
Industries to install insulation on a system of pipelines at dismissed “all claims against [Dow] in which Plaintiffs allege
Dow's facility in Freeport, Texas. Robert Henderson was that Decedent Robert Wayne Henderson ... was injured by
a Win–Way employee, and he assisted with the insulation exposure to respirable asbestos as the result of the activities
work at Dow's Freeport facility from 1967 to 1968. Dow's of Decedent and/or the activities of other employees of
Freeport facility contained thousands of pipes in a pipeline Decedent's employer on any premises of [Dow].” The MDL
system that ran throughout the facility. The pipes, which pretrial court denied Dow's motion for summary judgment
Robert Henderson helped insulate with a material containing “as to all of Plaintiffs' other claims against [Dow], including
asbestos, transported steam and various types of acid. While Plaintiffs' claims that Decedent was injured by virtue of the
working for Win–Way on the asbestos-insulated pipeline activities of Dow Employees.” Accordingly, although Robert
system at Dow's Freeport facility, Robert Henderson was Henderson was allegedly exposed to asbestos both directly
allegedly exposed to asbestos dust by Dow employees who from his own insulation work and as a bystander to the
were installing, sawing, and removing asbestos insulation
insulation work of Dow employees, only the Hendersons' improvement. See id. at 348. Thus, Chapter 95 applied to
claims predicated on the negligence of Dow's employees were the Hendersons' claims against Dow, and the Hendersons had
allowed to proceed before the jury. to establish Dow's liability under the standards set forth in
Chapter 95, which they failed to do. Id. The Hendersons filed
The MDL pretrial court remanded the case to the original trial a petition for review in this Court, which we initially denied.
court, and the Hendersons' remaining claims based on Dow's After considering the Hendersons' motion for rehearing,
employees' contemporaneously negligent activities were tried which cited several recent courts of appeals' decisions that
to a jury. The Hendersons' claims against all other defendants conflicted with the court of appeals' decision in this case, we
were resolved before the case was submitted to the jury. At granted the Hendersons' petition. See 58 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 85
the conclusion of trial, a general negligence question was (Nov. 24, 2014).
submitted that instructed the jury to consider, with respect
to Dow, “only the activities of [Dow] employees at Dow ...
facilities.” 1 The jury returned a verdict in which it found that II. Discussion
Dow's negligence proximately caused Robert Henderson's
injuries, and that Dow was 30% responsible for causing [1] [2] As always, “[w]hen construing a statute, we begin
Robert Henderson's injuries. Based on the jury verdict and with its language.” State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex.2006). Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and
several adjustments, the trial court rendered judgment against Remedies Code is titled “Property Owner's Liability for Acts
Dow for $2.64 million plus interest and court costs.
of Independent Contractors and Amount of Recovery.” TEX.
Dow appealed the verdict and argued that Chapter 95 does not CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE ch. 95. The heart of the chapter, sections 95.002 and .003, establishes Chapter 95's
distinguish between a property owner's liability for exposure applicability and limitations on a property owner's liability
caused by the activities of contractors and their employees for personal injury, death, or property damage to independent
and exposure that the property owner's own employees'
activities caused. 395 S.W.3d at 338–39. Further, Dow contractors, respectively. 2 Id. §§ 95.002–.003. Regarding
argued that Chapter 95 applied to bar all of the Hendersons' applicability, section 95.002 states that Chapter 95 “applies
negligence claims because the Hendersons did not establish only to a claim.” Id. § 95.002. A “claim” is specifically
that Dow had both control over Robert Henderson's work defined as “a claim for damages caused by negligence.” Id.
and actual knowledge of the dangers of asbestos exposure § 95.001(1). Section 95.002 then explains that Chapter 95
as Chapter 95 requires. See id. at 339; see also TEX. CIV. applies only to a claim for damages caused by negligence:
PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.003. The Hendersons argued (1) against a property owner, contractor, or subcontractor
that Dow could not “avail itself of the heightened protections for personal injury, death, or property damage to an owner,
afforded by Chapter 95” because their claims against Dow a contractor, or a subcontractor or an employee of a
were “based solely upon the negligent activities of Dow contractor or subcontractor; and
employees, and not from injury arising from the condition
or use of an improvement of real property by [Robert] (2) that arises from the condition or use of an Henderson.” 395 S.W.3d at 342. improvement to real property where the contractor or subcontractor constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies *3 The court of appeals agreed with Dow's interpretation the improvement.
of the statute. See id. at 347. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered a take- Id. § 95.002. Section 95.003 establishes the limitations on a nothing judgment in favor of Dow, holding that Chapter property owner's liability for a claim to which Chapter 95 95 applied to the Hendersons' claims against Dow because applies: “[t]he plain meaning of the text of [section 95.002(2) ] does
not preclude [Chapter 95's] applicability where a claim is A property owner is not liable for personal injury, death,
based upon the negligent actions of the premises owner.” or property damage to a contractor, subcontractor, or an
Id. The court of appeals reasoned that the claim arose employee of a contractor or subcontractor who constructs,
from the condition or use of an improvement (the asbestos- repairs, renovates, or modifies an improvement to real
insulated pipeline system) where Robert Henderson, as a property, including personal injury, death, or property
contractor, constructed, repaired, renovated, or modified the
damage arising from the failure to provide a safe workplace Dow argues that the court of appeals correctly held that
unless: “[t]he plain meaning of the text of [section 95.002(2) ] does not preclude [Chapter 95's] applicability where a
(1) the property owner exercises or retains some control claim is based upon the negligent actions of the premises over the manner in which the work is performed, other owner.” 3 395 S.W.3d at 347. Under Dow's interpretation than the right to order the work to start or stop or to of the statute, Chapter 95 “applies ... to a claim ... against inspect progress or receive reports; and a property owner ... for damages caused by negligence ... that arises from the condition or use of an improvement
(2) the property owner had actual knowledge of the to real property.” According to Dow, the only condition
danger or condition resulting in the personal injury, on Chapter 95's applicability—that the claim arise from the
death, or property damage and failed to adequately warn.
condition or use of an improvement to real property that Id. § 95.003. the contractor “constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies”—
was satisfied because Robert Henderson's asbestos exposure [3] [4] [5] [6] “We review statutory construction de resulted from Dow's employees doing the same work he did
novo.” Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 on the same asbestos-insulated pipe system. Dow contends
S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex.2014) (citing City of Rockwall v. that Chapter 95 applies when a negligence claim arises from
Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.2008)). We look to the the “condition or use” of the improvement on which an
plain meaning of the words in a statute as an expression of independent contractor is working, and the claim need not be
legislative intent. Id. “If the statute is clear and unambiguous, predicated on a contractor's negligence.
we must read the language according to its common meaning
‘without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.’ ” [7] [8] Neither party seriously contends that Chapter 95
Id. (quoting Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 284). Thus, we initially is ambiguous, although the Hendersons argue that the Court
limit our statutory review to the plain meaning of the text as should employ several statutory construction aids that are
the sole expression of legislative intent, see State ex rel. State typically reserved for interpreting ambiguous statutes. 4 We
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d read Chapter 95 to be unambiguous, and therefore we apply 322, 327 (Tex.2002), unless the Legislature has supplied its plain meaning as the statute is written. See City of Hous. v. a different meaning by definition, a different meaning is Jackson, 192 S.W.3d 764, 770 (Tex.2006). apparent from the context, or applying the plain meaning
would lead to absurd results, see Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First *5 The core of Chapter 95's applicability is that it “applies State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex.2010). only to a claim,” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.002, and the Legislature specifically defined a “claim” *4 The Hendersons argue that the court of appeals erred to mean “a claim for damages caused by negligence,” id.
by holding that Chapter 95 applies to a claim predicated on § 95.001(1). Section 95.002(1) identifies whom a claim a property owner's “contemporaneous negligent acts” and for damages caused by negligence subject to Chapter 95 not, according to section 95.002(2), only to a claim that may be brought against: “a property owner, contractor, or arises when an independent contractor constructs, repairs, subcontractor.” Id. § 95.002(1). Despite identifying three renovates, or modifies an improvement to real property. In potential defendants in the applicability provision of section other words, according to the Hendersons, any claim that 95.002, the Legislature limited only a property owner's falls within the scope of section 95.002 must arise out of the liability in section 95.003. See id. § 95.003. Furthermore, independent contractor's work. They argue that the omission although the statute lists whom a claim governed by Chapter of a “property owner” from section 95.002(2), especially 95 can be asserted against, section 95.002 says nothing when it is included in section 95.002(1)'s list of possible about the actor who causes the negligence claim to arise and defendants against whom a claim falling within Chapter 95 makes no distinction between harm caused by a contractor's might be asserted, establishes that Chapter 95 applies only to actions and harm caused by another's actions. See id. § claims against property owners arising “out of the contractor's 95.002. Section 95.002(1) simply provides that a claim for work, and does not apply to a contractor who is a passive damages caused by negligence may be brought for “personal victim of the contemporaneous negligent activities of the injury, death, or property damage.” Id. § 95.002(1). That premises owner.” section also identifies the persons who may be damaged as
“an owner, a contractor, or a subcontractor or an employee
of a contractor or a subcontractor.” 5 Id. Reading these Texas Tort Claims Act to no avail); Tex. State Technical Coll. v. Beavers , 218 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Tex.App.–Texarkana
provisions together, Chapter 95 applies to a claim against 2007, no pet.) (“The courts of Texas have struggled to define a property owner for an independent contractor's personal the limits of ‘use’ and ‘condition’ ... under the Texas Tort injury, death, or property damage caused by negligence. The Claims Act.”). But despite numerous intermediate appellate
Legislature did not distinguish between negligence claims court decisions interpreting the phrase “condition or use”
based on contemporaneous activity or otherwise, and neither every way imaginable, we have never held that the phrase shall we. Cf. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 287 (“Because it is rendered the Texas Tort Claims Act ambiguous or inoperable. not defined otherwise, we conclude that the Legislature must This Court has agreed, for purposes of the Texas Tort
have intended for gross negligence to have its commonly- Claims Act, that the “condition or use” provision is “difficult
accepted legal meaning.”). to understand and difficult to apply,” but we have never used that characterization “as an excuse to shirk our duty
The second part of the applicability provision, section to interpret and apply the statute.” Robinson v. Cent. Tex.
95.002(2), includes several undefined statutory words MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex.1989). Accordingly,
and phrases that have amassed commonly-accepted legal although we review the “condition or use” language in meanings in this Court's jurisprudence interpreting other Chapter 95 as a matter of first impression, we draw upon tort-related statutes. Section 95.002(2), the most disputed this Court's interpretation of the similar phrase in the Texas
provision in this case, limits Chapter 95's applicability Tort Claims Act for guidance. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §
“only to a claim ... that arises from the condition or use 311.023(4). of an improvement to real property where the contractor
or subcontractor constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies *6 This Court has defined a “condition” as “either an
the improvement.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE intentional or an inadvertent state of being.” Sparkman v.
§ 95.002(2). This Court has analyzed tort-related statutes Maxwell, 519 S.W.2d 852, 858 (Tex.1975). We have defined that include the undefined phrase “arises from” consistently “use” as meaning “to put or bring into action or service; to as being intended, at minimum, to capture causation. See, employ for or apply to a given purpose.” Miller, 51 S.W.3d at
e.g., Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cnty., 453 588. We have broadly defined an “improvement” to include
S.W.3d 922, 928–29 (Tex.2015) (per curiam) (construing “all additions to the freehold except for trade fixtures [that] how “arising from” was used in another tort-related statute, can be removed without injury to the property.” Sonnier discussing prior cases that explained the phrase, and v. Chisholm–Ryder Co., 909 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tex.1995)
concluding that “a plaintiff can satisfy the ‘arising from’ (examining the statute of repose in section 16.009 of the
standard by demonstrating proximate cause”); see also TEX. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which contains the GOV'T CODE § 311.023(4) (permitting courts to consider identical phrase “improvement to real property”). laws on similar subjects when construing statutes). Thus,
section 95.002(2) provides that Chapter 95 applies to a Given these definitions, a condition of an improvement to
negligence claim that “arises from,” or is caused by, “the real property represents a different concept than a use of condition or use of an improvement to real property where the an improvement to real property. Indeed, we have treated contractor or subcontractor ... modifies the improvement.” 6 a condition or a use as comprising separate prongs of TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.002(2). the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Dall. Metrocare Servs. v. Juarez, 420 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Tex.2013) (per curiam). This
We next consider the meaning of the undefined phrase distinction between these two concepts is supported “by use “condition or use of an improvement to real property.” See of the disjunctive conjunction ‘or’ between the two [words], id. For four decades, Texas jurists have repeatedly expressed which signifies a separation between two distinct ideas.” concerns about the difficulty of discerning the Legislature's Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 581 intended meaning behind the words “condition or use” as (Tex.2000). The Legislature's enunciation of the two concepts they appear in the Texas Tort Claims Act, another tort-related of “condition or use” is consistent with this Court's common statute. 7 See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Miller, law jurisprudence, also reflected in Chapter 95, surrounding 51 S.W.3d 583, 590 (Tex.2001) (Hecht, J., concurring) a controlling contractor or property owner's liability for (detailing multiple instances when members of this Court injuries to independent contractors. 8 In the seminal case “have repeatedly beseeched the Legislature for guidance” of Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.1985), on how to interpret the “use-of-property standard” in the
the Court explained that a property owner's “duty to keep Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Tex.2010) (citations
the premises in a safe condition may subject the [property omitted). Despite their differences, both claims are a species
owner] to direct liability for negligence in two situations: of negligence. See, e.g., W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d
(1) those arising from a premises defect, (2) those arising 547, 550 (Tex.2005) (recognizing that “[p]remises liability
from an activity or instrumentality.” 9 Id. at 417; see also is a special form of negligence” and that “[n]egligence and premises liability ... involve closely related but distinct duty
Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992) analyses”). While it is true that “[w]e have rejected attempts (citing Redinger, 689 S.W.2d 415) (“Recovery on a negligent to blur the distinction between these two claims,” Shumake, activity theory requires that the person have been injured by 199 S.W.3d at 284, it is nonetheless an accurate statement
or as a contemporaneous result of the activity itself rather than that both types of claims fall within the common meaning
by a condition created by the activity.”). of the term “negligence” that appears, undefined, in section 95.001(1), see Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550.
These two categories of negligence existed in this Court's
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of Chapter 95, and “we Next, we address the Hendersons' contention that the court
presume the Legislature enacts a statute with knowledge of of appeals' opinion “obviates more than a century of existing law.” Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825, 835 Texas common law that holds that a property owner is (Tex.2013). More specifically, in a Texas Tort Claims Act liable in negligence for its own contemporaneous negligent
case we decided the year before the Legislature enacted activity.” According to the Hendersons, Chapter 95 did not
Chapter 95, we interpreted the identical phrase “condition or abrogate common law negligence claims against property use” to “encompass[ ] disparate bases for liability, one of owners for their contemporaneous negligent activities. More which is not dependant upon the actions of any employee.” specifically, the Hendersons argue that “there is no ‘clear
DeWitt v. Harris Cnty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1995). repugnance’ between (i) Chapter 95 claims ‘where the
We explained that the “use” language “encompasses ... contractor or subcontractor constructs, repairs, renovates, liability based on respondeat superior.” Id. We added that the or modifies the improvement’ ... versus (ii) common law inclusion of “liability for a condition of real property” existed claims based on the contemporaneous negligent acts of
“in addition to liability based on principles of respondeat property owners.” Dow cites several cases recognizing that,
superior,” and therefore liability for a condition imposed because of Chapter 95, an independent contractor no longer liability for premises defects. Id. (emphasis omitted). Quite has a common law negligence claim against a property plainly, in DeWitt we held that the inclusion of the “use” owner. See, e.g., Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.,
language was meant to impose liability for the negligent 130 S.W.3d 76, 88 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
actions of an employee based on principles of respondeat no pet.) (“We agree ... that chapter 95 controls this case, superior. Id. One year after we attached this particular is [the independent contractor]'s exclusive remedy against meaning to the phrase “condition or use,” the Legislature [the property owner], and precludes common-law negligence
included the same undefined phrase in Chapter 95. We can liability in [the property owner].”).
only conclude that the Legislature intended for Chapter 95 to
apply to all negligence claims that arise from either a premises defect or the negligent activity of a property owner or its [9] We have explained that statutes can modify or abrogate common law rules, but only when that was what the
employees by virtue of the “condition or use” language in Legislature clearly intended. Energy Serv. Co. of Bowie
section 95.002(2). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE v. Superior Snubbing Servs., Inc., 236 S.W.3d 190, 194 § 95.002(2); Dugger, 408 S.W.3d at 835. (Tex.2007). Because abrogation is disfavored, we examine the statute's plain language for the Legislature's clear
*7 For the sake of thoroughness, we note that section intention to replace a common law remedy with a statutory
95.002(2)'s inclusion of “condition or use” preserves the remedy, and we “decline[ ] to construe statutes to deprive notion that claims based on a premises defect are distinct from citizens of common-law rights unless the Legislature clearly claims based on negligent activities. As we have explained, expressed that intent.” Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d
“negligent activity encompasses a malfeasance theory based 456, 459 (Tex.1969); see also Cash Am. Int'l Inc. v. Bennett,
on affirmative, contemporaneous conduct by the owner that 35 S.W.3d 12, 16 (Tex.2000). The Hendersons are correct caused the injury, while premises liability encompasses a that a clear repugnance between the common law and a nonfeasance theory based on the owner's failure to take statutory cause of action is required for courts to find that the
measures to make the property safe.” Del Lago Partners,
Legislature abrogated a common law right. See Cash Am. Int'l theories). Similarly, when a claim is brought against a
Inc., 35 S.W.3d at 16. contractor or a subcontractor, section 95.003's limitation on
liability does not apply and an independent contractor can Here, we do not find the sort of “clear repugnance” that would recover for common law negligence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
justify a conclusion that the Legislature intended to abrogate & REM. CODEE § 95.003 (limiting only a property owner's
an independent contractor's common law right to recover liability). We conclude that Chapter 95 did not abrogate an
damages based upon the negligence of property owners. But independent contractor's right to recover for common law
see, e.g., Waffle House, Inc., 313 S.W.3d at 807 (finding negligence in all instances. If anything, Chapter 95 is in
abrogation of common law negligence causes of action where derogation of the common law, and Texas courts do not
a statutory scheme involved a unique set of standards and strictly construe such statutes. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §
procedures and the plaintiff sought to use the common law 312.006(b).
to circumvent the “panoply of special rules” in the statute).
Chapter 95 does not deprive an independent contractor of the Having concluded that Chapter 95 applies to an
right to recover damages from a negligent property owner. independent contractor's claims for damages caused by the
In fact, section 95.003 allows for such a recovery as long as contemporaneous negligent acts of a property owner, Dow
the evidentiary burdens of the statute are satisfied. See TEX. could be subject to liability only if the Hendersons satisfied
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.003 (“A property owner the evidentiary burdens in both prongs of section 95.003.
is not liable for personal injury, death, or property damage to See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.003. At
a contractor ... unless....”). To be sure, when section 95.002 trial and at the court of appeals, the Hendersons sought to
makes Chapter 95 applicable to an independent contractor's establish that negligence claims based on a property owner's
negligence claim against a property owner that arises from or its employees' contemporaneous negligent activities did
the condition or use of an improvement to real property, not fall within Chapter 95, but the Hendersons never sought
the independent contractor's sole means of recovery is by to establish Dow's liability in the event that Chapter 95 did,
satisfying section 95.003. This is consistent with the court in fact, apply to their claims. See 395 S.W.3d at 348. In
of appeals' holding that when Chapter 95 applies to an this appeal, the Hendersons do not challenge the court of
independent contractor's claims, the independent contractor appeals' conclusion that “[o]n this record, ... Chapter 95 is
has “the burden to show that both conditions of section 95.003 applicable to all of [the Hendersons'] claims against Dow.”
[have] been met before liability could be imposed upon” the See id. In fact, the Hendersons urge us not to address Chapter
property owner. 395 S.W.3d at 348. 95's applicability to their specific claims in this case: “But
this debate—is the improvement the entire pipe system at *8 [10] Moreover, by its own terms, Chapter 95's limitation Dow or the specific pipes [Robert] Henderson was working
on liability does not apply to all negligence claims an on–need not be reached in this case....” Most importantly,
injured independent contractor may assert. See TEX. CIV. the Hendersons have not challenged the court of appeals'
PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.002(2). When a claim does conclusion that “the record does not support a finding of
not “arise from a condition or use of an improvement liability as to Dow pursuant to the requirements of Chapter
to real property where the contractor or subcontractor ... 95.” Id. Issues not raised on appeal to this Court are waived.
modifies the improvement,” Chapter 95 does not apply and Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth Cnty. Underground
an independent contractor can recover for common law Water Conservation Dist. No. 1., 263 S.W.3d 910, 918
negligence. See Felton v. Lovett, 388 S.W.3d 656, 660 & (Tex.2008) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(f)); see also Del
n.10 (Tex.2012) (declining to recognize abrogation of the Lago Partners, Inc., 307 S.W.3d at 776 (“[W]e should not
common law because the statute did “not purport to affect the stretch for a reason to reverse that was not raised.”).
common law in cases other than those the statute covers”).
This Court has developed a comprehensive body of law on In sum, the Hendersons failed to challenge the court of
property owner liability for injuries suffered by independent appeals' conclusions that: (1) their specific claims against
contractors that will continue to apply to cases when the Dow, as pleaded and applied, fell within Chapter 95, and
applicability provision of section 95.002 cannot be met. See (2) their claims were barred by Chapter 95 because the
generally Gen. Elec. Co. v. Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 214– Hendersons did not establish Dow's liability under section
15 (Tex.2008) (explaining the duties owed to independent 95.003. Because these conclusions were not challenged, they
contractors under negligent activity and premises defect are not properly before the Court and we do not decide
the condition or use of an improvement to real property where whether the court of appeals correctly applied Chapter 95 the independent contractor constructs, repairs, renovates, or to the facts of this case. See Guitar Holding Co., L.P., 263 modifies the improvement. Chapter 95 limits property owner S.W.3d at 918. Accordingly, because we agree with the court liability on claims for personal injury, death, or property of appeals' construction of Chapter 95, we affirm its judgment damage caused by negligence, including claims concerning reversing the trial court's judgment and rendering a take- a property owner's own contemporaneous negligent activity. nothing judgment in Dow's favor. This obviates the need to The Hendersons have not challenged the court of appeals' address the remaining issues Dow raises in this appeal. conclusion that Chapter 95 applied to their specific claims
as pleaded, nor have they challenged the court of appeals' conclusion that they failed to establish Dow's liability under III. Conclusion section 95.003. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' judgment that reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered The court of appeals correctly held that Chapter 95 applies to a take-nothing judgment in Dow's favor. independent contractors' claims against property owners for
damages caused by negligence when those claims arise from
Footnotes
1 The trial court overruled Dow's objection that Chapter 95 precluded the submission of a general negligence question.
The trial court also denied Dow's requested jury instructions and questions that would have required the Hendersons to
establish Dow's liability based upon Chapter 95's requirements.
2 For ease of reference, this opinion uses the phrase “independent contractor” as a shorthand substitute for the lengthier
statutory phrase of “a contractor, subcontractor, or an employee of a contractor or subcontractor” that appears in Chapter
95. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE E §§ 95.002–.004. Although the phrase “independent contractor” does not
appear in the text of Chapter 95, it appears in Chapter 95's title and section 95.003's heading, “Liability for Acts of
Independent Contractors.” See id. § 95.003.
3 Both parties and the court of appeals used the phrase “premises owner” when referring to Chapter 95 and its contents.
The word “premises” does not appear in Chapter 95. Instead, the chapter uses the phrase “property owner,” which
section 95.001(3) defines to mean “a person or entity that owns real property primarily used for commercial or business
purposes.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODEE § 95.001(3). We use the phrase “property owner” to remain consistent
with the statutory text.
4 For instance, the Hendersons urge the Court to consider several titles in Chapter 95, legislative statements of the bill's
sponsors, and a canon of construction called the doctrine of the last antecedent as indications of legislative intent. When
the plain meaning of a statute controls, however, “the title of the section carries no weight, as a heading ‘does not limit
or expand the meaning of a statute.’ ” Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 809 (Tex.2010) (quotingTEX.
GOV'T CODE § 311.024). Moreover, “[w]hen a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort
to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the language.” City of Rockwall, 246 S.W.3d at 626; see also Tex.
W. Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 185 (Tex.2012) (recognizing that the doctrine of the last antecedent
applies to ambiguous statutes); Stracener v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Tex.1989) (recognizing
that the doctrine of the last antecedent is merely an aid used to determine the meaning and intent of communications,
and it is not applicable in every case).
5 Although section 95.002(1) specifies who may be damaged for purposes of Chapter 95, section 95.001(2) defines a
“claimant” more broadly to mean “a party making a claim subject to this chapter.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE E §
95.001(2). The word “claimant” appears only in the special legislative definitions and nowhere else in Chapter 95. See id.
6 Once again, only for ease of reference–and not to indicate a lack of significance for the words omitted—we have
shortened section 95.002(2)'s phrase “constructs, repairs, renovates, or modifies the improvement” simply to “... modifies
the improvement.”
7 The Texas Tort Claims Act uses the phrase “condition or use of tangible personal or real property.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODEE § 101.021. The Texas Tort Claims Act is distinguishable, however, because there is a separate section
that applies specifically to claims for premises or special defects. Id. § 101.022. In contrast, Chapter 95's plain language
does not require courts to classify certain negligence claims for different treatment.
8 Below, we address the Hendersons' contention that Chapter 95 did not abrogate common law negligence claims against
property owners, or that any such finding of abrogation was impermissible. See infra pp. ––––.
9 Thereafter, the Court adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1977) approach for imposing liability
on a property owner or general contractor that controls the work of an independent contractor who is negligently injured.
See Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 418.
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.